Free Will for the Determinist

[Marvin_Edwards]

Let’s begin by assuming a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Every event is causally necessitated by prior events. Each of those prior events was in turn reliably caused by earlier events, forming a chain or network of prior causes. This applies to all events, from the motion of the planets to the thoughts and feelings we’re having right now.

Included among the events in the causal chains are the following:

1. Each of us will inevitably encounter problems or issues that require us to make a decision. There will be two or more options and we cannot proceed until we choose what we will do. For example, “What will I have for breakfast this morning, pancakes or eggs?”.

2. We will inevitably consider how choosing each option will likely turn out. For example, “Fixing pancakes will require more work, but I had eggs for breakfast yesterday and the day before, so I’m likely to enjoy the pancakes more than the eggs this morning”.

3. We will inevitably choose the option that seems best to us at that time. For example, “I will fix pancakes this morning”.

4. Finally, our inevitably chosen intent (“I will fix pancakes”) motivates and directs our subsequent actions (actually fixing and eating the pancakes).

Each step in this operation was causally inevitable from any prior point in eternity.

Oh, and we happen to call such events instances of “free will“.

We call it “free will” because it was an autonomous choice, made by us, to suit our own purpose (to have breakfast) and our own reasons (Eggs again? No, pancakes today!).

The term “will” refers to our specific intent for the future. It may be the immediate future as in “I will have pancakes this morning” or a more distant future as in “my last will and testament”.

The term “free” refers to the fact that it was chosen freely by us. No one was holding a gun to our head, forcing us to do his will rather than our own. No one hypnotized us. No one having authority over us had commanded us to eat something other than what we wanted to eat. No brain tumor or mental illness was altering our normal thinking process.

It was us. We did it. We decided the question of “what will I do?” for ourselves. The decision-making equipment was located in our own brain, not in any past object or event.

The Big Bang, although definitely a link in the causal chain, had no interest in our choice. The Big Bang had no brain with which to decide anything. The decision could not be made until the equipment to make decisions arrived.

Nor did causal necessity make the decision for us. Quite the opposite. It was inevitable, from any prior point in eternity, that it would be us that encountered the issue, considered our options, and made the choice for ourselves.

Was our choice deterministic? Of course it was. Every event that ever happens is reliably caused by prior events. But not all prior causes are equally meaningful and relevant to our understanding of what “caused” a current event.

Understanding the Big Bang, or even the concept of causal necessity, is not going to enlighten me about why I chose to fix pancakes instead of eggs this morning. The most meaningful and relevant cause of any deliberate act is the act of deliberation that precedes it. And that is something that I did.

[Syamsu]

Actually what you are doing can best be explained psychologically, rather than as an attempt to formulate a logically coherent conceptual scheme. There is commonly a feeling of certainty associated to statements of facts, and the way you define things is to accommodate these feelings of certitude, logic be damned. Your conceptual scheme just delivers many shiny happy feelings of certainty to you.

Your proposal as it seems to me:
- Redefine choosing in terms of calculating a course of action, in a forced way, as like a chesscomputer calculating a move.
- Redefine subjectivity as a subcategory of objectivity, namely facts about brainprocesses. So that to say a painting is beautiful, becomes to be a statement of fact of a love for the way the painting looks, existing in the brain.

Then also you need to emphasize the complexity of the brain, in order to simulate the variation in opinion that anticipative freedom produces. Where anticipative freedom explains variation in opinion by the many possible futures in a choice, you need a lot of chaos in factors that determine an opinion, in order to explain variety of opinion.

It doesn't really work logically, but you get your feelings of certainty. Also it makes you more clever about programming. And it makes you pay more attention to factors that predetermin behaviour, like environment someone grew up in.

And the correct logic about choosing, not your logic, is inherent in common discourse anyway, so in practise you will have the benefits of that too.

[Terrapin Station]

For example, “What will I have for breakfast this morning, pancakes or eggs?” . . . We will inevitably consider how choosing each option will likely turn out. For example, “Fixing pancakes will require more work, but I had eggs for breakfast yesterday and the day before, so I’m likely to enjoy the pancakes more than the eggs this morning”.

It's difficult for me to imagine anyone actually living like that all the time, and not making a lot of phenomenally arbitrary/random choices instead.

[LuckyR]

For example, “What will I have for breakfast this morning, pancakes or eggs?” . . . We will inevitably consider how choosing each option will likely turn out. For example, “Fixing pancakes will require more work, but I had eggs for breakfast yesterday and the day before, so I’m likely to enjoy the pancakes more than the eggs this morning”.

It's difficult for me to imagine anyone actually living like that all the time, and not making a lot of phenomenally arbitrary/random choices instead.

A great way of describing the subconscious mind's decision making below the level of our conscious "selection" between choices.

[Marvin_Edwards]

For example, “What will I have for breakfast this morning, pancakes or eggs?” . . . We will inevitably consider how choosing each option will likely turn out. For example, “Fixing pancakes will require more work, but I had eggs for breakfast yesterday and the day before, so I’m likely to enjoy the pancakes more than the eggs this morning”.

It's difficult for me to imagine anyone actually living like that all the time, and not making a lot of phenomenally arbitrary/random choices instead.

The key insight I'm trying to share is that our experience, our actions, our choices all remains the same within a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. The notion that determinism somehow changes things is an illusion. Basically, what you will inevitably do is what you would have done anyway, including flipping a coin to get that "random" decision that you prefer.

[Terrapin Station]

It's difficult for me to imagine anyone actually living like that all the time, and not making a lot of phenomenally arbitrary/random choices instead.

The key insight I'm trying to share is that our experience, our actions, our choices all remains the same within a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. The notion that determinism somehow changes things is an illusion. Basically, what you will inevitably do is what you would have done anyway, including flipping a coin to get that "random" decision that you prefer.

I can't imagine people not making a lot of decisions that are unpredictable, though. If they make decisions that are akin to coin-flipping, then you're not going to be able to predict the decision very effectively.

[Terrapin Station]

It's difficult for me to imagine anyone actually living like that all the time, and not making a lot of phenomenally arbitrary/random choices instead.

A great way of describing the subconscious mind's decision making below the level of our conscious "selection" between choices.

I don't buy that there is "subconscious" or unconscious mental phenomena . . . as I've been discussing with others in a few different threads now.

[Marvin_Edwards]

The key insight I'm trying to share is that our experience, our actions, our choices all remains the same within a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. The notion that determinism somehow changes things is an illusion. Basically, what you will inevitably do is what you would have done anyway, including flipping a coin to get that "random" decision that you prefer.

I can't imagine people not making a lot of decisions that are unpredictable, though. If they make decisions that are akin to coin-flipping, then you're not going to be able to predict the decision very effectively.

Right. In practice, predicting what someone is going to choose is nearly impossible. But the practical problem doesn't mean that the causes are unreliable. It just means that prediction is hard. I believe it is possible to build a coin-flipping machine that will always result in heads. But who would bother, since the goal of using the toss is to produce random results. However, in theory, the result is always reliably caused by the physical influences of the flip, the air resistance, the bounce, etc.

[Terrapin Station]

I can't imagine people not making a lot of decisions that are unpredictable, though. If they make decisions that are akin to coin-flipping, then you're not going to be able to predict the decision very effectively.

Right. In practice, predicting what someone is going to choose is nearly impossible. But the practical problem doesn't mean that the causes are unreliable. It just means that prediction is hard. I believe it is possible to build a coin-flipping machine that will always result in heads. But who would bother, since the goal of using the toss is to produce random results. However, in theory, the result is always reliably caused by the physical influences of the flip, the air resistance, the bounce, etc.

Aka "Faith in determinism," almost like it's a religion.

[Marvin_Edwards]

Right. In practice, predicting what someone is going to choose is nearly impossible. But the practical problem doesn't mean that the causes are unreliable. It just means that prediction is hard. I believe it is possible to build a coin-flipping machine that will always result in heads. But who would bother, since the goal of using the toss is to produce random results. However, in theory, the result is always reliably caused by the physical influences of the flip, the air resistance, the bounce, etc.

Aka "Faith in determinism," almost like it's a religion.

Faith in reliable cause and effect is universal. It is so ubiquitous that we all take it for granted. We all walk down the street believing that we will not fly off the planet into space because gravity is reliable.

[Syamsu]

Aka "Faith in determinism," almost like it's a religion.

Faith in reliable cause and effect is universal. It is so ubiquitous that we all take it for granted. We all walk down the street believing that we will not fly off the planet into space because gravity is reliable.

Obviously you can also simply accept the fact that some things are free other things are forced.

That you assert that choice has the logic of cause and effect, means you pretend to know as fact what is good and beautiful. You make agency of choice a factual issue.

[Terrapin Station]

Faith in reliable cause and effect is universal.

False. Haven't you been reading my posts?

We all walk down the street believing that we will not fly off the planet into space because gravity is reliable.

In other words, despite me explicitly telling you this, you still don't know that determinism amounts to thinking that all phenomena are deterministic while the the view on the ontological freedom side amounts to thinking that at least some phenomena are not deterministic.

What I was referring with the "faith in determinism" comment was that your belief that all phenomena are deterministic is a faith belief. Not everyone believes that all phenomena are deterministic.

[Marvin_Edwards]

Faith in reliable cause and effect is universal. It is so ubiquitous that we all take it for granted. We all walk down the street believing that we will not fly off the planet into space because gravity is reliable.

Obviously you can also simply accept the fact that some things are free other things are forced.

That you assert that choice has the logic of cause and effect, means you pretend to know as fact what is good and beautiful. You make agency of choice a factual issue.

The words "free" and "freedom" refer to the absence of a meaningful and relevant constraint. The constraint can be implied or explicit. For example:
1. "I set the bird free (from its cage)"
2. "The constitution guarantees us freedom of speech (free from political censorship)."
3. "The Emancipation Proclamation freed all slaves (from their masters)."
4. "The bank is offering a free toaster (free of charge) to anyone who opens an account."
5. "I participated in the Libet experiment of my own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)."

Causal necessity is neither a meaningful nor a relevant constraint. It is not a meaningful constraint because what will will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us and doing what we do. It is not a relevant constraint because it is always present in every event and there's nothing that we can (or need to) do about it.

[Terrapin Station]

Obviously you can also simply accept the fact that some things are free other things are forced.

That you assert that choice has the logic of cause and effect, means you pretend to know as fact what is good and beautiful. You make agency of choice a factual issue.

The words "free" and "freedom" refer to the absence of a meaningful and relevant constraint. The constraint can be implied or explicit. For example:
1. "I set the bird free (from its cage)"
2. "The constitution guarantees us freedom of speech (free from political censorship)."
3. "The Emancipation Proclamation freed all slaves (from their masters)."
4. "The bank is offering a free toaster (free of charge) to anyone who opens an account."
5. "I participated in the Libet experiment of my own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)."

Causal necessity is neither a meaningful nor a relevant constraint. It is not a meaningful constraint because what will will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us and doing what we do. It is not a relevant constraint because it is always present in every event and there's nothing that we can (or need to) do about it.

"Meaningful" and "relevant" are horrible terms to try to appeal to here, because of the subjectivity of both.

[Marvin_Edwards]

The words "free" and "freedom" refer to the absence of a meaningful and relevant constraint. The constraint can be implied or explicit. For example:
1. "I set the bird free (from its cage)"
2. "The constitution guarantees us freedom of speech (free from political censorship)."
3. "The Emancipation Proclamation freed all slaves (from their masters)."
4. "The bank is offering a free toaster (free of charge) to anyone who opens an account."
5. "I participated in the Libet experiment of my own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)."

Causal necessity is neither a meaningful nor a relevant constraint. It is not a meaningful constraint because what will will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us and doing what we do. It is not a relevant constraint because it is always present in every event and there's nothing that we can (or need to) do about it.

"Meaningful" and "relevant" are horrible terms to try to appeal to here, because of the subjectivity of both.

A cause is meaningful if it efficiently explains why an event occurs. A cause is pragmatically relevant if it can be either present or absent. Causal necessity is neither a meaningful nor a relevant cause of anything. It makes no meaningful distinctions between any events. It provides no useful information.

There are no decisions where the notion of causal necessity is helpful, because all it can tell us is that "whatever you decide will have been inevitable". Useless.