On being and attributes
- servyya
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On being and attributes
Hello everyone, I am new to this forum so excuse me if I violate any norm of the forum, I also have to say that my mother tongue is Spanish, but because I did not find any philosophy forum as active as this one, I had to search forums in others languages, so please also excuse me if my english is not very good.
Discussion:
The problem I have is that I was trying to inquire about concepts such as space, time and being, and I came up with many conflicting ideas about these concepts, and I would like to know what you think about these concepts. For example, one of the ideas that could be reached when trying to know what being is, is that if something exists we assign attributes, that is, characteristics that we believe it possesses. But here a problem arises because attributes exist only in things that exist (although they do not belong exclusively to an existing thing), and in things that exist, we could not proclaim their existence if it were not through attributes, so do attributes define something existing or is it the existing things that define the attributes? What ideas do you have about this? I also wanted to ask you if you know authors authors who deal with these topics or books related to these topics as well. thanks for reading me.
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Re: On being and attributes
Hello servyya and welcome.
Don’t worry, your English is a whole lot better than my Spanish.
Is this a question about the veil of perception?
If so then philosophers like Locke, Berkeley and Kant seem pertinent among many others
For myself, I have lately been favouring indirect theories of perception. My view is that we know objects through the qualities we perceive them to have (their attributes) but perception is a complex process and so the (noumenal) object remains unknown and unknowable since it requires perception with no taint of processing. I also believe that there is an external world existing independently of my internal and necessarily limited representation of it. In other words, knowledge is constructed, and this construction results from an interaction between the perceiver and the perceived.
There are debates about the nature of that interaction. Others on this board favour direct theories of perception and there are some who favour one form of idealism or another. You will find long debates on these issues if you wish to look.
For example, the following contains a recent high level debate between Hereandnow and Count Lucanor which stretched me past breaking at times but was fascinating nonetheless:
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=16663
As a bit of self-promotion here is a somewhat lesser quality debate in which I was involved concerning direct and indirect perception.
viewtopic.php?f=2&t=16641
Oh, and this is fun (I have only recently discovered it):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4QcyW-qTUg
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Re: On being and attributes
Welcomeservyya wrote: ↑July 13th, 2020, 2:49 pm Presentation:
Hello everyone, I am new to this forum so excuse me if I violate any norm of the forum, I also have to say that my mother tongue is Spanish, but because I did not find any philosophy forum as active as this one, I had to search forums in others languages, so please also excuse me if my english is not very good.
Discussion:
The problem I have is that I was trying to inquire about concepts such as space, time and being, and I came up with many conflicting ideas about these concepts, and I would like to know what you think about these concepts. For example, one of the ideas that could be reached when trying to know what being is, is that if something exists we assign attributes, that is, characteristics that we believe it possesses. But here a problem arises because attributes exist only in things that exist (although they do not belong exclusively to an existing thing), and in things that exist, we could not proclaim their existence if it were not through attributes, so do attributes define something existing or is it the existing things that define the attributes? What ideas do you have about this? I also wanted to ask you if you know authors authors who deal with these topics or books related to these topics as well. thanks for reading me.
Doesn't your question boil down to whether we're talking about an ontological framing, or an epistemological one?
Something has attributes because it exists, we know it exists because we perceive/experience its attributes.
Of course what we can know is not necessarily correct and complete, all that is known for certain are the conscious experiential states themselves.
- Pattern-chaser
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Re: On being and attributes
Hi, servyya, and welcome to our dance!servyya wrote: ↑July 13th, 2020, 2:49 pm The problem I have is that I was trying to inquire about concepts such as space, time and being, and I came up with many conflicting ideas about these concepts, and I would like to know what you think about these concepts. For example, one of the ideas that could be reached when trying to know what being is, is that if something exists we assign attributes, that is, characteristics that we believe it possesses. But here a problem arises because attributes exist only in things that exist (although they do not belong exclusively to an existing thing), and in things that exist, we could not proclaim their existence if it were not through attributes, so do attributes define something existing or is it the existing things that define the attributes? What ideas do you have about this?
I rather think it's a mistake to separate a thing from its attributes. It seems to be leading to confusion. Most humans have arms. Arms could be said therefore to be an attribute of a human. As soon as we even think of separating arms from humans, albeit it in a mental/imaginative way, we get into trouble. Humans have arms. Arms don't define humans, any more than humans define arms. If I change your text a bit, I think it makes my point easier to see:
For example, one of the ideas that could be reached when trying to know what being is, is that if a whole exists we divide it into parts, that is, parts that we believe it possesses. But here a problem arises because parts exist only in wholes that exist (although they do not belong exclusively to an existing whole), and in whole things that exist, we could not proclaim their existence if it were not through parts, so do parts define some existing whole or is it the wholes that define their parts?
You're asking if the parts define the whole, or the whole defines its parts. Neither and both, I think. And I think the vagueness of my answer is a consequence of asking the wrong question. After all, there is no good reason why one would divide a whole into parts, is there? The only reason we divide things is that they're too big and complicated for human minds to consider as a whole. We split them up for reductionist purposes, to make these things easier for our minds to grasp. I.e. this division is done for no good reason other than human convenience. Even the wholes ("things") you refer to are parts of something bigger, divided out for our convenience....
"Who cares, wins"
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Re: On being and attributes
Things necessarily "have" or rather amount to properties (or attributes/characteristics), and you can't have properties without also having things. We can conceptualize things to have at least some different properties than they do, and in creating "type" abstractions we siphon off many specific properties that individual things happen to have--that's the whole gist of creating a "type" abstraction in the first place, but there's no way to even conceptually completely separate properties from things.
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Re: On being and attributes
For example one may say "This animal is equine, bay, stallion, sixteen hands". Each attribute predicated of the concept 'horse' either exists in reality, or it doesn't exist, apart from the concept to which it is attached. Each attribute from my example may be attached to some other concept although some predicates would be unconventional.
I personally do not believe in the existence of universals because propositions are not all equally true, some propositions are fantastical due to maladaptive predicates. For example the proposition ' Angels live above the blue sky' is fantastical/ false including on the symbolic level.
Regarding linguistic relativity the Spanish distinction between ser and estar might allow native Spanish speakers a special interest in the matter of being.
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Re: On being and attributes
Is this a "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" type of question? Ask yourself: What method would I use to answer such a question? Is it a question about the way in which some terminology is defined? Is it an empirical question which can be answered by looking at something in the world?servyya wrote:do attributes define something existing or is it the existing things that define the attributes?
To find out whether the questions actually means anything at all, I think it would be good to start by considering the method, if any, that you might be able to use to answer it.
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Re: On being and attributes
It seems weird to me to parse this as being about concepts and how we use language.Belindi wrote: ↑July 14th, 2020, 11:06 am Attributes, i.e. what we predicate of some concept , are universals , and it's debated whether or not universals exist.
For example one may say "This animal is equine, bay, stallion, sixteen hands". Each attribute predicated of the concept 'horse' either exists in reality, or it doesn't exist, apart from the concept to which it is attached. Each attribute from my example may be attached to some other concept although some predicates would be unconventional.
I personally do not believe in the existence of universals because propositions are not all equally true, some propositions are fantastical due to maladaptive predicates. For example the proposition ' Angels live above the blue sky' is fantastical/ false including on the symbolic level.
Regarding linguistic relativity the Spanish distinction between ser and estar might allow native Spanish speakers a special interest in the matter of being.
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Re: On being and attributes
"Unclarity develops easily here for want of the distinction between concept and object. If one says: "A square is a rectangle in which adjacent sides are equal", then one defines the concept square by stating what properties something must have in order to fall under it. I call these properties characteristic marks of the concept. Yet note that these characteristic marks of the concept are not its properties. The concept square is not a rectangle, it is only the objects that fall under this concept that are rectangles, just as the concept black cloth is neither black nor a cloth. Whether there are such objects is not immediately known on the basis of the definition. One wants to define the number Zero, for example, by saying: it is something which when added to One, results in One. Thus a concept is defined by stating what property an object must have in order to fall under it. This property, however, is not a property of the defined concept. Yet, as it seems, it is often imagined that something which added to One results in One is created by definition. What a great illusion! The defined concept does not possess this property, nor does the definition guarantee that the concept is instantiated. This first requires an investigation. Only when one has shown that there is one and only one object with the requisite property is one in a position to give this object the proper name "Zero". To create Zero is hence impossible. I have repeatedly spelt these things out but, seemingly, without success."
(Frege, Gottlob. Basic Laws of Arithmetics, Vol. 1. 1893. In Basic Laws of Arithmetics, Vols. 1&2, translated and edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rosenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. xiv)
<QUOTE
Frege's German term "Merkmal" is translated here as "characteristic mark"; but, put more precisely, a Fregean Merkmal of a concept is a semantic feature (or marker or component) of it. For example, <young> and <male> are semantic features of the concept <boy>.
Frege's important point is that there is a difference between (semantic) features (Merkmale) of a concept, (ontic) properties (Eigenschaften) of a concept, and (ontic) properties of the objects (or other sorts of entities) "falling under" a concept. The features of a concept aren't properties of it but representations of properties of the objects falling under it. For example, its features <young> and <male> aren't properties of the concept <boy>, since it isn't itself young and male. Being young and male are properties of the things falling under the concept <boy>, i.e. of boys. So the features of a concept aren't predicated of it but of the objects falling under it. To say that <male> is a (semantic) feature of the concept <boy> is not to say that the concept <boy> is male.
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Re: On being and attributes
But I would have thought the only possible objects which are not reducible to mental objects i.e. concepts, are mathematical objects or objects that are arbitrarily and pro tem given a definitive attribute or attributes.Consul wrote: ↑July 15th, 2020, 1:31 am QUOTE>
"Unclarity develops easily here for want of the distinction between concept and object. If one says: "A square is a rectangle in which adjacent sides are equal", then one defines the concept square by stating what properties something must have in order to fall under it. I call these properties characteristic marks of the concept. Yet note that these characteristic marks of the concept are not its properties. The concept square is not a rectangle, it is only the objects that fall under this concept that are rectangles, just as the concept black cloth is neither black nor a cloth. Whether there are such objects is not immediately known on the basis of the definition. One wants to define the number Zero, for example, by saying: it is something which when added to One, results in One. Thus a concept is defined by stating what property an object must have in order to fall under it. This property, however, is not a property of the defined concept. Yet, as it seems, it is often imagined that something which added to One results in One is created by definition. What a great illusion! The defined concept does not possess this property, nor does the definition guarantee that the concept is instantiated. This first requires an investigation. Only when one has shown that there is one and only one object with the requisite property is one in a position to give this object the proper name "Zero". To create Zero is hence impossible. I have repeatedly spelt these things out but, seemingly, without success."
(Frege, Gottlob. Basic Laws of Arithmetics, Vol. 1. 1893. In Basic Laws of Arithmetics, Vols. 1&2, translated and edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rosenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. xiv)
<QUOTE
Frege's German term "Merkmal" is translated here as "characteristic mark"; but, put more precisely, a Fregean Merkmal of a concept is a semantic feature (or marker or component) of it. For example, <young> and <male> are semantic features of the concept <boy>.
Frege's important point is that there is a difference between (semantic) features (Merkmale) of a concept, (ontic) properties (Eigenschaften) of a concept, and (ontic) properties of the objects (or other sorts of entities) "falling under" a concept. The features of a concept aren't properties of it but representations of properties of the objects falling under it. For example, its features <young> and <male> aren't properties of the concept <boy>, since it isn't itself young and male. Being young and male are properties of the things falling under the concept <boy>, i.e. of boys. So the features of a concept aren't predicated of it but of the objects falling under it. To say that <male> is a (semantic) feature of the concept <boy> is not to say that the concept <boy> is male.
The future is unknown, and attempts to secure it with definitions of the indefinable are always politically motivated.
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Re: On being and attributes
I don't think this is clear at all, and from what follows the quoted sentence above, I think it's rather clear that he wants to talk about space, time, being, etc. as space, time and being. Not as concepts. "Concepts" in that sentence seems to be a casual way of saying something along the lines of "things such as"--"I was trying to inquire about things such as space, time and being." Of course "things such as" is just as awkward if it's taken literally. Then you get people saying "Being isn't a thing!!" and so on.
If one wants to talk about space, time, being and other >>whatevers<< in that vein, it's not easy to come up with a term to denote those >>whatevers<< without suggesting something misleading to anyone reading comment overly literally . . . and that's especially not easy if one isn't a native English speaker.
But who knows, maybe servyya did want to talk about concepts as concepts for some reason.
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Re: On being and attributes
I do not think your distinction is valid. Since we are all using language we cannot "conceive" these things without the "concept" of them. If we cannot conceive them, we cannot talk about them. That where of we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. Sorry to start of a bit Wittgensteinian, but seriously how do you propose to do one without the other?Terrapin Station wrote: ↑July 15th, 2020, 9:07 am Ah--I just realized that people are apparently taking "concepts" literally with respect to the initial post saying, "The problem I have is that I was trying to inquire about concepts such as space, time and being." People are apparently thinking that servyya wants to talk about concepts as concepts.
I don't think this is clear at all, and from what follows the quoted sentence above, I think it's rather clear that he wants to talk about space, time, being, etc. as space, time and being. Not as concepts. "Concepts" in that sentence seems to be a casual way of saying something along the lines of "things such as"--"I was trying to inquire about things such as space, time and being." Of course "things such as" is just as awkward if it's taken literally. Then you get people saying "Being isn't a thing!!" and so on.
If one wants to talk about space, time, being and other >>whatevers<< in that vein, it's not easy to come up with a term to denote those >>whatevers<< without suggesting something misleading to anyone reading comment overly literally . . . and that's especially not easy if one isn't a native English speaker.
But who knows, maybe servyya did want to talk about concepts as concepts for some reason.
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Re: On being and attributes
Are you using "conceive" in a sense of "having a concept about"? If so, then yeah, that would be tautologous. But "conceive" isn't always used so literally.Sculptor1 wrote: ↑July 15th, 2020, 9:14 amI do not think your distinction is valid. Since we are all using language we cannot "conceive" these things without the "concept" of them. If we cannot conceive them, we cannot talk about them. That where of we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. Sorry to start of a bit Wittgensteinian, but seriously how do you propose to do one without the other?Terrapin Station wrote: ↑July 15th, 2020, 9:07 am Ah--I just realized that people are apparently taking "concepts" literally with respect to the initial post saying, "The problem I have is that I was trying to inquire about concepts such as space, time and being." People are apparently thinking that servyya wants to talk about concepts as concepts.
I don't think this is clear at all, and from what follows the quoted sentence above, I think it's rather clear that he wants to talk about space, time, being, etc. as space, time and being. Not as concepts. "Concepts" in that sentence seems to be a casual way of saying something along the lines of "things such as"--"I was trying to inquire about things such as space, time and being." Of course "things such as" is just as awkward if it's taken literally. Then you get people saying "Being isn't a thing!!" and so on.
If one wants to talk about space, time, being and other >>whatevers<< in that vein, it's not easy to come up with a term to denote those >>whatevers<< without suggesting something misleading to anyone reading comment overly literally . . . and that's especially not easy if one isn't a native English speaker.
But who knows, maybe servyya did want to talk about concepts as concepts for some reason.
Aside from that, you'd seem to be saying that we can't know anything, even in the acquaintance sense, other than concepts. Is that really something you'd claim?
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Re: On being and attributes
I'd claim for sure that you cannot talk about anything except with concepts of them. In talking about all things, you have to imagine what sort of things they are; i.e. conceptualise them.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑July 15th, 2020, 9:25 amAre you using "conceive" in a sense of "having a concept about"? If so, then yeah, that would be tautologous. But "conceive" isn't always used so literally.Sculptor1 wrote: ↑July 15th, 2020, 9:14 am
I do not think your distinction is valid. Since we are all using language we cannot "conceive" these things without the "concept" of them. If we cannot conceive them, we cannot talk about them. That where of we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. Sorry to start of a bit Wittgensteinian, but seriously how do you propose to do one without the other?
Aside from that, you'd seem to be saying that we can't know anything, even in the acquaintance sense, other than concepts. Is that really something you'd claim?
And it would be a brave man to assert that times and space exist in a simply way that they are accessible regardless of our conception of them.
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Re: On being and attributes
I'd agree with that, but what we're talking about isn't simply talking about things or concepts we have.
It's like we can't point without pointing (obviously) but what we're pointing at isn't our pointing (at least most people aren't confused into thinking that we can only point at our pointing). Thinking that we can only talk about concepts qua concepts is the same as thinking that we can only "point at pointing."
Often you can just observe things without having to imagine. If we're both in a room together and we're talking about a particular coffee cup, for example, we can just look at it. We don't have to imagine it. Nevertheless, all of our talking is going to involve concept usage. That's how talking works, after all, on a "mechanical" level, at least insofar as meaning is involved for us. It just doesn't mean that all of our talking is about concepts qua concepts. The particular coffee cup we'd be talking about isn't a concept.In talking about all things, you have to imagine what sort of things they are; i.e. conceptualise them.
It seems absolutely ridiculous to me that I'd have to explain this, by the way.
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