On being and attributes

Discuss any topics related to metaphysics (the philosophical study of the principles of reality) or epistemology (the philosophical study of knowledge) in this forum.
User avatar
servyya
New Trial Member
Posts: 1
Joined: July 13th, 2020, 2:12 pm

On being and attributes

Post by servyya »

Presentation:
Hello everyone, I am new to this forum so excuse me if I violate any norm of the forum, I also have to say that my mother tongue is Spanish, but because I did not find any philosophy forum as active as this one, I had to search forums in others languages, so please also excuse me if my english is not very good.

Discussion:
The problem I have is that I was trying to inquire about concepts such as space, time and being, and I came up with many conflicting ideas about these concepts, and I would like to know what you think about these concepts. For example, one of the ideas that could be reached when trying to know what being is, is that if something exists we assign attributes, that is, characteristics that we believe it possesses. But here a problem arises because attributes exist only in things that exist (although they do not belong exclusively to an existing thing), and in things that exist, we could not proclaim their existence if it were not through attributes, so do attributes define something existing or is it the existing things that define the attributes? What ideas do you have about this? I also wanted to ask you if you know authors authors who deal with these topics or books related to these topics as well. thanks for reading me.
Wossname
Posts: 429
Joined: January 31st, 2020, 10:41 am

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Wossname »

servyya wrote: July 13th, 2020, 2:49 pm servyya » Yesterday, 7:49 pm

Hello servyya and welcome.
Don’t worry, your English is a whole lot better than my Spanish.

Is this a question about the veil of perception?

If so then philosophers like Locke, Berkeley and Kant seem pertinent among many others

For myself, I have lately been favouring indirect theories of perception. My view is that we know objects through the qualities we perceive them to have (their attributes) but perception is a complex process and so the (noumenal) object remains unknown and unknowable since it requires perception with no taint of processing. I also believe that there is an external world existing independently of my internal and necessarily limited representation of it. In other words, knowledge is constructed, and this construction results from an interaction between the perceiver and the perceived.

There are debates about the nature of that interaction. Others on this board favour direct theories of perception and there are some who favour one form of idealism or another. You will find long debates on these issues if you wish to look.

For example, the following contains a recent high level debate between Hereandnow and Count Lucanor which stretched me past breaking at times but was fascinating nonetheless:
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=16663

As a bit of self-promotion here is a somewhat lesser quality debate in which I was involved concerning direct and indirect perception.
viewtopic.php?f=2&t=16641


Oh, and this is fun (I have only recently discovered it):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4QcyW-qTUg
Gertie
Posts: 2181
Joined: January 7th, 2015, 7:09 am

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Gertie »

servyya wrote: July 13th, 2020, 2:49 pm Presentation:
Hello everyone, I am new to this forum so excuse me if I violate any norm of the forum, I also have to say that my mother tongue is Spanish, but because I did not find any philosophy forum as active as this one, I had to search forums in others languages, so please also excuse me if my english is not very good.

Discussion:
The problem I have is that I was trying to inquire about concepts such as space, time and being, and I came up with many conflicting ideas about these concepts, and I would like to know what you think about these concepts. For example, one of the ideas that could be reached when trying to know what being is, is that if something exists we assign attributes, that is, characteristics that we believe it possesses. But here a problem arises because attributes exist only in things that exist (although they do not belong exclusively to an existing thing), and in things that exist, we could not proclaim their existence if it were not through attributes, so do attributes define something existing or is it the existing things that define the attributes? What ideas do you have about this? I also wanted to ask you if you know authors authors who deal with these topics or books related to these topics as well. thanks for reading me.
Welcome :)

Doesn't your question boil down to whether we're talking about an ontological framing, or an epistemological one?

Something has attributes because it exists, we know it exists because we perceive/experience its attributes.

Of course what we can know is not necessarily correct and complete, all that is known for certain are the conscious experiential states themselves.
User avatar
Pattern-chaser
Premium Member
Posts: 8265
Joined: September 22nd, 2019, 5:17 am
Favorite Philosopher: Cratylus
Location: England

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Pattern-chaser »

servyya wrote: July 13th, 2020, 2:49 pm The problem I have is that I was trying to inquire about concepts such as space, time and being, and I came up with many conflicting ideas about these concepts, and I would like to know what you think about these concepts. For example, one of the ideas that could be reached when trying to know what being is, is that if something exists we assign attributes, that is, characteristics that we believe it possesses. But here a problem arises because attributes exist only in things that exist (although they do not belong exclusively to an existing thing), and in things that exist, we could not proclaim their existence if it were not through attributes, so do attributes define something existing or is it the existing things that define the attributes? What ideas do you have about this?
Hi, servyya, and welcome to our dance!

I rather think it's a mistake to separate a thing from its attributes. It seems to be leading to confusion. Most humans have arms. Arms could be said therefore to be an attribute of a human. As soon as we even think of separating arms from humans, albeit it in a mental/imaginative way, we get into trouble. Humans have arms. Arms don't define humans, any more than humans define arms. If I change your text a bit, I think it makes my point easier to see:

For example, one of the ideas that could be reached when trying to know what being is, is that if a whole exists we divide it into parts, that is, parts that we believe it possesses. But here a problem arises because parts exist only in wholes that exist (although they do not belong exclusively to an existing whole), and in whole things that exist, we could not proclaim their existence if it were not through parts, so do parts define some existing whole or is it the wholes that define their parts?

You're asking if the parts define the whole, or the whole defines its parts. Neither and both, I think. And I think the vagueness of my answer is a consequence of asking the wrong question. After all, there is no good reason why one would divide a whole into parts, is there? The only reason we divide things is that they're too big and complicated for human minds to consider as a whole. We split them up for reductionist purposes, to make these things easier for our minds to grasp. I.e. this division is done for no good reason other than human convenience. Even the wholes ("things") you refer to are parts of something bigger, divided out for our convenience....
Pattern-chaser

"Who cares, wins"
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 6227
Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
Location: NYC Man

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Terrapin Station »

Despite my years of studying philosophy both formally and informally, and even more ironically despite the fact that one of my areas of concentration was ontology, I've never been able to grasp what the issue was supposed to be with "knowing what being is." I've never been able to figure out what anyone takes to be murky or in need of explanation there . . . which by the way is one of many, many problems I had with trying to figure out what the heck Heidegger was ever on about.

Things necessarily "have" or rather amount to properties (or attributes/characteristics), and you can't have properties without also having things. We can conceptualize things to have at least some different properties than they do, and in creating "type" abstractions we siphon off many specific properties that individual things happen to have--that's the whole gist of creating a "type" abstraction in the first place, but there's no way to even conceptually completely separate properties from things.
Belindi
Moderator
Posts: 6105
Joined: September 11th, 2016, 2:11 pm

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Belindi »

Attributes, i.e. what we predicate of some concept , are universals , and it's debated whether or not universals exist.

For example one may say "This animal is equine, bay, stallion, sixteen hands". Each attribute predicated of the concept 'horse' either exists in reality, or it doesn't exist, apart from the concept to which it is attached. Each attribute from my example may be attached to some other concept although some predicates would be unconventional.

I personally do not believe in the existence of universals because propositions are not all equally true, some propositions are fantastical due to maladaptive predicates. For example the proposition ' Angels live above the blue sky' is fantastical/ false including on the symbolic level.

Regarding linguistic relativity the Spanish distinction between ser and estar might allow native Spanish speakers a special interest in the matter of being.
Steve3007
Posts: 10339
Joined: June 15th, 2011, 5:53 pm

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Steve3007 »

servyya wrote:do attributes define something existing or is it the existing things that define the attributes?
Is this a "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" type of question? Ask yourself: What method would I use to answer such a question? Is it a question about the way in which some terminology is defined? Is it an empirical question which can be answered by looking at something in the world?

To find out whether the questions actually means anything at all, I think it would be good to start by considering the method, if any, that you might be able to use to answer it.
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 6227
Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
Location: NYC Man

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Terrapin Station »

Belindi wrote: July 14th, 2020, 11:06 am Attributes, i.e. what we predicate of some concept , are universals , and it's debated whether or not universals exist.

For example one may say "This animal is equine, bay, stallion, sixteen hands". Each attribute predicated of the concept 'horse' either exists in reality, or it doesn't exist, apart from the concept to which it is attached. Each attribute from my example may be attached to some other concept although some predicates would be unconventional.

I personally do not believe in the existence of universals because propositions are not all equally true, some propositions are fantastical due to maladaptive predicates. For example the proposition ' Angels live above the blue sky' is fantastical/ false including on the symbolic level.

Regarding linguistic relativity the Spanish distinction between ser and estar might allow native Spanish speakers a special interest in the matter of being.
It seems weird to me to parse this as being about concepts and how we use language.
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Consul »

QUOTE>
"Unclarity develops easily here for want of the distinction between concept and object. If one says: "A square is a rectangle in which adjacent sides are equal", then one defines the concept square by stating what properties something must have in order to fall under it. I call these properties characteristic marks of the concept. Yet note that these characteristic marks of the concept are not its properties. The concept square is not a rectangle, it is only the objects that fall under this concept that are rectangles, just as the concept black cloth is neither black nor a cloth. Whether there are such objects is not immediately known on the basis of the definition. One wants to define the number Zero, for example, by saying: it is something which when added to One, results in One. Thus a concept is defined by stating what property an object must have in order to fall under it. This property, however, is not a property of the defined concept. Yet, as it seems, it is often imagined that something which added to One results in One is created by definition. What a great illusion! The defined concept does not possess this property, nor does the definition guarantee that the concept is instantiated. This first requires an investigation. Only when one has shown that there is one and only one object with the requisite property is one in a position to give this object the proper name "Zero". To create Zero is hence impossible. I have repeatedly spelt these things out but, seemingly, without success."

(Frege, Gottlob. Basic Laws of Arithmetics, Vol. 1. 1893. In Basic Laws of Arithmetics, Vols. 1&2, translated and edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rosenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. xiv)
<QUOTE

Frege's German term "Merkmal" is translated here as "characteristic mark"; but, put more precisely, a Fregean Merkmal of a concept is a semantic feature (or marker or component) of it. For example, <young> and <male> are semantic features of the concept <boy>.

Frege's important point is that there is a difference between (semantic) features (Merkmale) of a concept, (ontic) properties (Eigenschaften) of a concept, and (ontic) properties of the objects (or other sorts of entities) "falling under" a concept. The features of a concept aren't properties of it but representations of properties of the objects falling under it. For example, its features <young> and <male> aren't properties of the concept <boy>, since it isn't itself young and male. Being young and male are properties of the things falling under the concept <boy>, i.e. of boys. So the features of a concept aren't predicated of it but of the objects falling under it. To say that <male> is a (semantic) feature of the concept <boy> is not to say that the concept <boy> is male.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Belindi
Moderator
Posts: 6105
Joined: September 11th, 2016, 2:11 pm

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Belindi »

Consul wrote: July 15th, 2020, 1:31 am QUOTE>
"Unclarity develops easily here for want of the distinction between concept and object. If one says: "A square is a rectangle in which adjacent sides are equal", then one defines the concept square by stating what properties something must have in order to fall under it. I call these properties characteristic marks of the concept. Yet note that these characteristic marks of the concept are not its properties. The concept square is not a rectangle, it is only the objects that fall under this concept that are rectangles, just as the concept black cloth is neither black nor a cloth. Whether there are such objects is not immediately known on the basis of the definition. One wants to define the number Zero, for example, by saying: it is something which when added to One, results in One. Thus a concept is defined by stating what property an object must have in order to fall under it. This property, however, is not a property of the defined concept. Yet, as it seems, it is often imagined that something which added to One results in One is created by definition. What a great illusion! The defined concept does not possess this property, nor does the definition guarantee that the concept is instantiated. This first requires an investigation. Only when one has shown that there is one and only one object with the requisite property is one in a position to give this object the proper name "Zero". To create Zero is hence impossible. I have repeatedly spelt these things out but, seemingly, without success."

(Frege, Gottlob. Basic Laws of Arithmetics, Vol. 1. 1893. In Basic Laws of Arithmetics, Vols. 1&2, translated and edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rosenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. xiv)
<QUOTE

Frege's German term "Merkmal" is translated here as "characteristic mark"; but, put more precisely, a Fregean Merkmal of a concept is a semantic feature (or marker or component) of it. For example, <young> and <male> are semantic features of the concept <boy>.

Frege's important point is that there is a difference between (semantic) features (Merkmale) of a concept, (ontic) properties (Eigenschaften) of a concept, and (ontic) properties of the objects (or other sorts of entities) "falling under" a concept. The features of a concept aren't properties of it but representations of properties of the objects falling under it. For example, its features <young> and <male> aren't properties of the concept <boy>, since it isn't itself young and male. Being young and male are properties of the things falling under the concept <boy>, i.e. of boys. So the features of a concept aren't predicated of it but of the objects falling under it. To say that <male> is a (semantic) feature of the concept <boy> is not to say that the concept <boy> is male.
But I would have thought the only possible objects which are not reducible to mental objects i.e. concepts, are mathematical objects or objects that are arbitrarily and pro tem given a definitive attribute or attributes.

The future is unknown, and attempts to secure it with definitions of the indefinable are always politically motivated.
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 6227
Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
Location: NYC Man

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Terrapin Station »

Ah--I just realized that people are apparently taking "concepts" literally with respect to the initial post saying, "The problem I have is that I was trying to inquire about concepts such as space, time and being." People are apparently thinking that servyya wants to talk about concepts as concepts.

I don't think this is clear at all, and from what follows the quoted sentence above, I think it's rather clear that he wants to talk about space, time, being, etc. as space, time and being. Not as concepts. "Concepts" in that sentence seems to be a casual way of saying something along the lines of "things such as"--"I was trying to inquire about things such as space, time and being." Of course "things such as" is just as awkward if it's taken literally. Then you get people saying "Being isn't a thing!!" and so on.

If one wants to talk about space, time, being and other >>whatevers<< in that vein, it's not easy to come up with a term to denote those >>whatevers<< without suggesting something misleading to anyone reading comment overly literally . . . and that's especially not easy if one isn't a native English speaker.

But who knows, maybe servyya did want to talk about concepts as concepts for some reason.
User avatar
Sculptor1
Posts: 7091
Joined: May 16th, 2019, 5:35 am

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Sculptor1 »

Terrapin Station wrote: July 15th, 2020, 9:07 am Ah--I just realized that people are apparently taking "concepts" literally with respect to the initial post saying, "The problem I have is that I was trying to inquire about concepts such as space, time and being." People are apparently thinking that servyya wants to talk about concepts as concepts.

I don't think this is clear at all, and from what follows the quoted sentence above, I think it's rather clear that he wants to talk about space, time, being, etc. as space, time and being. Not as concepts. "Concepts" in that sentence seems to be a casual way of saying something along the lines of "things such as"--"I was trying to inquire about things such as space, time and being." Of course "things such as" is just as awkward if it's taken literally. Then you get people saying "Being isn't a thing!!" and so on.

If one wants to talk about space, time, being and other >>whatevers<< in that vein, it's not easy to come up with a term to denote those >>whatevers<< without suggesting something misleading to anyone reading comment overly literally . . . and that's especially not easy if one isn't a native English speaker.

But who knows, maybe servyya did want to talk about concepts as concepts for some reason.
I do not think your distinction is valid. Since we are all using language we cannot "conceive" these things without the "concept" of them. If we cannot conceive them, we cannot talk about them. That where of we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. Sorry to start of a bit Wittgensteinian, but seriously how do you propose to do one without the other?
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 6227
Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
Location: NYC Man

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Terrapin Station »

Sculptor1 wrote: July 15th, 2020, 9:14 am
Terrapin Station wrote: July 15th, 2020, 9:07 am Ah--I just realized that people are apparently taking "concepts" literally with respect to the initial post saying, "The problem I have is that I was trying to inquire about concepts such as space, time and being." People are apparently thinking that servyya wants to talk about concepts as concepts.

I don't think this is clear at all, and from what follows the quoted sentence above, I think it's rather clear that he wants to talk about space, time, being, etc. as space, time and being. Not as concepts. "Concepts" in that sentence seems to be a casual way of saying something along the lines of "things such as"--"I was trying to inquire about things such as space, time and being." Of course "things such as" is just as awkward if it's taken literally. Then you get people saying "Being isn't a thing!!" and so on.

If one wants to talk about space, time, being and other >>whatevers<< in that vein, it's not easy to come up with a term to denote those >>whatevers<< without suggesting something misleading to anyone reading comment overly literally . . . and that's especially not easy if one isn't a native English speaker.

But who knows, maybe servyya did want to talk about concepts as concepts for some reason.
I do not think your distinction is valid. Since we are all using language we cannot "conceive" these things without the "concept" of them. If we cannot conceive them, we cannot talk about them. That where of we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. Sorry to start of a bit Wittgensteinian, but seriously how do you propose to do one without the other?
Are you using "conceive" in a sense of "having a concept about"? If so, then yeah, that would be tautologous. But "conceive" isn't always used so literally.

Aside from that, you'd seem to be saying that we can't know anything, even in the acquaintance sense, other than concepts. Is that really something you'd claim?
User avatar
Sculptor1
Posts: 7091
Joined: May 16th, 2019, 5:35 am

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Sculptor1 »

Terrapin Station wrote: July 15th, 2020, 9:25 am
Sculptor1 wrote: July 15th, 2020, 9:14 am

I do not think your distinction is valid. Since we are all using language we cannot "conceive" these things without the "concept" of them. If we cannot conceive them, we cannot talk about them. That where of we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. Sorry to start of a bit Wittgensteinian, but seriously how do you propose to do one without the other?
Are you using "conceive" in a sense of "having a concept about"? If so, then yeah, that would be tautologous. But "conceive" isn't always used so literally.

Aside from that, you'd seem to be saying that we can't know anything, even in the acquaintance sense, other than concepts. Is that really something you'd claim?
I'd claim for sure that you cannot talk about anything except with concepts of them. In talking about all things, you have to imagine what sort of things they are; i.e. conceptualise them.
And it would be a brave man to assert that times and space exist in a simply way that they are accessible regardless of our conception of them.
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 6227
Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
Location: NYC Man

Re: On being and attributes

Post by Terrapin Station »

Sculptor1 wrote: July 15th, 2020, 9:31 am I'd claim for sure that you cannot talk about anything except with concepts of them.
I'd agree with that, but what we're talking about isn't simply talking about things or concepts we have.

It's like we can't point without pointing (obviously) but what we're pointing at isn't our pointing (at least most people aren't confused into thinking that we can only point at our pointing). Thinking that we can only talk about concepts qua concepts is the same as thinking that we can only "point at pointing."
In talking about all things, you have to imagine what sort of things they are; i.e. conceptualise them.
Often you can just observe things without having to imagine. If we're both in a room together and we're talking about a particular coffee cup, for example, we can just look at it. We don't have to imagine it. Nevertheless, all of our talking is going to involve concept usage. That's how talking works, after all, on a "mechanical" level, at least insofar as meaning is involved for us. It just doesn't mean that all of our talking is about concepts qua concepts. The particular coffee cup we'd be talking about isn't a concept.

It seems absolutely ridiculous to me that I'd have to explain this, by the way.
Post Reply

Return to “Epistemology and Metaphysics”

2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise
by John K Danenbarger
January 2023

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul
by Mitzi Perdue
February 2023

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023

The Unfakeable Code®

The Unfakeable Code®
by Tony Jeton Selimi
April 2023

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are
by Alan Watts
May 2023

Killing Abel

Killing Abel
by Michael Tieman
June 2023

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead
by E. Alan Fleischauer
July 2023

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough
by Mark Unger
August 2023

Predictably Irrational

Predictably Irrational
by Dan Ariely
September 2023

Artwords

Artwords
by Beatriz M. Robles
November 2023

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope
by Dr. Randy Ross
December 2023

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes
by Ali Master
February 2024

2022 Philosophy Books of the Month

Emotional Intelligence At Work

Emotional Intelligence At Work
by Richard M Contino & Penelope J Holt
January 2022

Free Will, Do You Have It?

Free Will, Do You Have It?
by Albertus Kral
February 2022

My Enemy in Vietnam

My Enemy in Vietnam
by Billy Springer
March 2022

2X2 on the Ark

2X2 on the Ark
by Mary J Giuffra, PhD
April 2022

The Maestro Monologue

The Maestro Monologue
by Rob White
May 2022

What Makes America Great

What Makes America Great
by Bob Dowell
June 2022

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!
by Jerry Durr
July 2022

Living in Color

Living in Color
by Mike Murphy
August 2022 (tentative)

The Not So Great American Novel

The Not So Great American Novel
by James E Doucette
September 2022

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches
by John N. (Jake) Ferris
October 2022

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021