Seth_Gibson wrote: ↑November 13th, 2020, 2:33 am
I would say values are subjective (I don't like your terminology, or you are missing something from what is possible). In order for something to have value, something must value it. That is, a thing (like a person) must care about that thing, have feelings about that thing, or, if you prefer, values that thing.
In the case of morality, I agree with Hume that it is based on feelings of benevolence. I discuss this in this thread:
This gives morality a feeling as if it were more than subjective because it is shared feelings that are relevant. However, it is still just feelings, a subset of the totality of a person's feelings (except, of course, for sociopaths who have no feelings of benevolence).
I just finished reading all those quotes you put in your post and skimmed the replies, so I know where you are coming from when you say this now, whereas before I did not. I do not know if that makes me informed enough to disagree with Hume yet. I only want to verify something you said in the replies. Marvin says the following:
The sentiment in the southern states towards their negroes allowed them to enslave them. The sentiment towards gay men used to be such that it was not surprising to anyone when they were victimized and beaten. The sentiments with which Donald Trump was raised allowed him to spread rumors and lies about his political opponents.
To which you reply with this:
Hume is not saying that everyone's feelings are infallible (and, indeed, he said that not everyone had the appropriate feelings at all, though I suspect he would be unpleasantly surprised at modern research into how many people lack empathy). If one believes ridiculous fairy tales, then those fairy tales may influence one's feelings. The source of morality, though, is not those fairy tales.
I assume what you say follows from what Hume says here:
A speculative reasoner concerning triangles or circles considers the several known and given relations of the parts of these figures, and thence infers [290] some unknown relation, which is dependent on the former. But in moral deliberations, we must be acquainted beforehand with all the objects, and all their relations to each other
That is not what I was thinking of.
Hume does not focus on the practical aspects of being ethical; he is focused on what ethics is and what its foundation is, how it works. This makes him very different from some others, like the ancient stoic and Epicurean philosophers, who were more interested in practice than theory.
If we look at the first two specific examples you mention, of the enslavement of black people and the treatment of gays, we can say that the first of those was related to false beliefs about black people, about their abilities and characteristics. Which is what you state in your next sentence:
Seth_Gibson wrote: ↑November 13th, 2020, 2:33 am
In other words, Marvin's example regarding racism did not hold up because southerners did not know that negroes were not inferior.
Regarding the treatment of gay people, that can be directly traced to religion. Since you and I are in America, I will focus on the dominant religion here, though this is not unique to Christianity. The traditional Christian view comes straight from the Bible:
Leviticus 18:
22 Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination.
Leviticus 20:
13 If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them.
There are other verses that have been used by Christians who denounce homosexuality, but Leviticus 20:13 is unambiguous about what should be done with people who engage in homosexual acts. So, if one believes that the Bible is the inerrant word of God, that God is always right, then following the Bible, one would believe that men who engage in homosexual acts should be put to death.
Now, that is not based on one's feelings of humanity or benevolence; it is based on a set of religious beliefs.
Of course, Hume does not discuss the specific issue of homosexuality; he was not interested in giving a practical guide to ethics, but was interested in discussing what ethics is and what its foundation is. He may well have had the common prejudice of his society on that, due to the influence of religion on society, but one does not get that from what Hume says is the foundation of morality. And, indeed, his rejection of the "monkish virtues" is giving a direct example of him saying that one should not be basing one's ethics on false religious beliefs, that it is going against the natural sentiments people have.
It has been common to try to manipulate people to get them to overcome their natural sentiments. For example, during wartime, it is common to demonize the enemy, to portray the enemy as less than human. This is so that the soldiers will be more willing to disregard any natural aversion to killing people. If they are not really fully human, then killing them isn't the same as killing their next-door neighbor.
Seth_Gibson wrote: ↑November 13th, 2020, 2:33 am
Of course, the Monkish virtues come into play, as racism is never good in principle, regardless of whether someone is inferior.
I don't agree with that at all. If it were true that black people were all stupid, and could not be intelligent, then there would be nothing wrong with believing that they were all stupid and could not be intelligent. What makes that wrong is the fact that it is factually wrong. If, for example, it were true of all black people that they were not intelligent enough to be doctors, then there would be nothing wrong with preventing them from becoming doctors. What makes it wrong to prevent black people from becoming doctors is the fact that (among other things) it is false that they are all not intelligent enough to be doctors.
The reason why I give no consideration to how rocks feel is because I have no reason to believe that they feel anything. Change that fact (of having no reason to believe they feel anything) and then the treatment of rocks would become a different matter. (This is because I do not wish to cause unnecessary pain; I have empathy, without which, I would not care about the treatment of others, no matter what I believed about them.)
Seth_Gibson wrote: ↑November 13th, 2020, 2:33 am
I would have to read more into monkish virtues because "fasting, penance, mortification, (and) self-denial" all sound very much like an unegoistic ideal, whereas racism would affirm a southerner's superiority. I would also need a more precise notion of Hume's idea of "common Humanity", or common human sentiments of morality which the individual references to make choices. Perhaps Hume can provide the structure for other philosophers to fill in the gaps in his system, and I wonder whether this has already happened.
I don't think Hume thought it very necessary to tell people what "benevolence" was. I don't think he was using such terms in any unusual way.
Your way of looking at this seems very alien to what Hume was up to. He did not think about this in terms that Nietzsche looked at things.
Seth_Gibson wrote: ↑November 13th, 2020, 2:33 am...
I don't think there are any "self-evident" axioms within philosophy. To my way of thinking, calling something "self-evident" is just begging the question: ..."
It makes sense that you would say that because Hume is an empiricist. There can be no deductive, Platonic, "proofs" within philosophy assuming that Hume is right (At least concerning matters of ethics). That is an attractive prospect, although I can see how you would get tired of rubbish. Too many philosophers start with axioms. I know axiology is one of the four branches of philosophy, or that is what I read.
My attitude on that has nothing to do with an appreciation for empiricism. Tell me, what is the difference between saying something is "self-evident" and begging the question?
Do not confuse this with the axioms in a system like Euclidian geometry. With that, one is dealing with a system, and for that, the axioms are defining the system one is discussing. How or even whether Euclidian geometry might apply to the real world is a separate matter from discussing the system itself.
Regarding axiology, you seem to not understand the meaning of the term:
Oxford wrote:axiology
NOUN
mass noun
1 Philosophy
The study of the nature of value and valuation, and of the kinds of things that are valuable.
Axiology is ethics and aesthetics and anything else (if there is anything else) that pertains to value.
Seth_Gibson wrote: ↑November 13th, 2020, 2:33 am
Yes, okay. I would say that I am unconvinced that it is really a problem. We are too far away from understanding how the brain works to know that we will not figure out consciousness with more research into brains. It is, in my opinion, judging the matter prematurely, before we have enough facts to make a proper judgment.
To give an analogy, primitive people regarded fire as a substance, as a thing. The modern view of what fire is that it is not a substance, but is a process, the rapid oxidation of a material.
The mind, too, seems like a process rather than a substance. It, like fire, is not a static thing.
Yes, and I suppose that combines with what you said about how philosophy should mimic science.
It is good to try to discover truths rather than to just make wild guesses. In that sense, yes, philosophy should mimic science. There are some philosophers who agree with this idea (e.g., Hume), and many who do not.
Seth_Gibson wrote: ↑November 13th, 2020, 2:33 am
I am sure you know better than I do that a large portion of Kant's metaphysics is utterly disproven by modern physics. One would think that geniuses could come up with something better, but I guess we overestimate ourselves as a species.
I am not sure what you have in mind regarding Kant's metaphysics. But, regardless, I do not think his approach to philosophy is right.
As you probably know, at least some of what Kant wrote was a reaction to Hume, of him not liking what Hume said.
Seth_Gibson wrote: ↑November 13th, 2020, 2:33 am
But some things are known. You might want to look at some neurobiology, of studies of people with brain damage and what this means for what they are. For a popular book on this sort of thing, you could look at a book by Oliver Sacks, like The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat. So it very much appears to be the case that consciousness has to do with the processes of the brain, with different parts of the brain having different effects on consciousness.
I loved that book! I read it during my freshman year of high school. Books like that burn into my memory. There are so many things we take for granted like:
proprioception (body balance)
recognizing faces and scenery
remembering things from a few moments ago
The ability to sense one's body (Body disassociation)
forgetting things, unlike Hyperamnesiacs who remember everything
Having an IQ above 75
keeping thoughts to ourselves and controlling behavior (unlike Tourettes)
It makes me wonder how our experience of reality would change if biologists end up discovering designer babies, or the ability to improve the intelligence of current humans. Then we could design hyperempathetic/hyperintelligent superhumans that surpass us in every aspect of existence. I do not know what we would do then. If you had a computer that could let you change anything about yourself and your circumstances, would it be best to "improve" everything? Or is it necessary to strive toward a goal? I find it strange because this situation sounds so dystopian, and yet we strive to control our environment every day.
It is the kind of thing that could be used either for creating a dystopian society or for doing much good. Power can be used for either good or evil or something neutral. But I don't think people will ever be able to just make what they want; there are limits to what a biological thing can be. By that I mean, improving intelligence is likely possible (theoretically at this point), but infinite intelligence is not possible.
Seth_Gibson wrote: ↑November 13th, 2020, 2:33 am...
I could be a cannibal or, if not, I may not value people at all, regarding them as completely worthless, not even worth eating. Frankly, I like my dog a lot more than a significant number of people.
You are basing that on Hume's empathetic argument, right? What one values depends on one's emotion and not logic. Keep in mind that I am restating your conclusions without excepting them because I need to read the book and ruminate.
No. You alternate between asking and writing about me and about Hume. When you ask or write about me, I respond about me, not Hume.
Seth_Gibson wrote: ↑November 13th, 2020, 2:33 am
No. One can distinguish between humans and dogs without having any metaphysical ideas about either. They look quite a bit different.
This is the same as the prior case with empathy. I meant distinguishing between dogs and humans based on ethical reasons. It is okay to own a dog but not a human. Why? Or perhaps such is not categorically true. Maybe owning a dog does go against moral sentiment. Why would it though? Like I said earlier, I need more information on Hume's conception of moral sentiment or I am missing something else.
You are asking a question that involves a complicated answer. However, the answer has nothing to do with metaphysics. That is what I keep saying to you, that you keep refusing to accept.
When we distinguish between people and dogs, we can do that in very straightforward ways, in which we observe different appearances and different kinds of actions. This is all very ordinary, and is not dependent upon metaphysics.
I am not presently interested in arguing for whether it is right or wrong to own dogs, but it is more complicated than it appears at first, as "good" parents seem to treat their children in ways similar to how "good" pet owners treat their pets. In your question about whether it is right to own a human, what, exactly, is meant by that? And how is what is generally regarded as proper parenting different from owning children? One tells them what to do, controls what they eat, tells them when to sleep, etc. (One might, of course, say that children are not people, which one occasionally hears from parents regarding their troublesome offspring.)
Now, bad metaphysics could be improperly applied to such questions, and has been done in the past. For example, Descartes thought that animals were basically just biological machines that could not suffer, and consequently he acted accordingly. See:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cons ... ss-animal/
Hume, as usual, took a more reasonable approach, as one knows about other people feeling pain and so forth in exactly the same way one knows that non-human animals feel pain; you can get a start on that at the link above, too. Hume's approach, though, was not to make any metaphysical claim about animals, but simply noted how we know about these things, about our judgements about other people feeling pain, how we know that about people being in pain are the same things we observe in animals (like dogs, which is an example Hume uses). That is, Hume was concerned with epistemology, not metaphysics in this.
Prejudging the matter with some metaphysical gobbledygook, that is not supported by good reasoning, can lead to all sorts of horrors. One could, as suggested by examples already mentioned, come up with some metaphysical nonsense about black people, women, children, or any other group one wants to exclude from consideration of decent treatment.
Seth_Gibson wrote: ↑November 13th, 2020, 2:33 am
I don't think the teleporter matters for the question. How do you know your mother, right now, has real consciousness and is not just a mindless biological machine? How do you know, of anyone other than yourself, that they are not simply mindless biological machines, that do not have minds at all?
I do not know.
I will refer you back to my original response to this:
Jack D Ripper wrote: ↑November 8th, 2020, 1:15 am...
As for consciousness, what sort of test do you really do to determine if someone is conscious? I will answer for you (though feel free to correct me if I get this wrong): You judge by behavior. You do not directly detect consciousness at all in anyone other than yourself. So whether someone else
really has consciousness or not is irrelevant to how you deal with them.
...
I am confident of this as the right answer because there seems to be no alternative that has any plausibility at all.
Notice in this, my question was one of epistemology, of how you know something, rather than some attempt at doing metaphysical speculation. I think you should focus on epistemology, not metaphysics.
"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence." - David Hume