The mind begs the question

[Pattern-chaser]

If the word we use to describe the thing we want to investigate is so vaguely defined, then either we need a clearer definition, or maybe a new term?

All that is needed is awareness of which parts of "consciousness" as a concept are amenable to and require a scientific explanation and which are neither.

Then please describe this "concept" of consciousness that you refer to. ... That is my point: we have no description or definition that would allow scientific investigation of consciousness to proceed.

If the vagueness ("fuzziness") is essential, aren't you admitting that consciousness itself is fuzzy? I.e. that we don't know clearly what we're discussing?

Nope. I'm saying that some of the various concepts we toss around under the umbrella term "consciousness", such as intentionality, contain elements that are dictated by social norms of meaning where definitions are by their vary nature porous and lack firm boundaries. This isn't a bad thing that needs fixing, it is just the nature of how some of our concepts work.

Yes, of course. But doesn't this mean that such subjects cannot be investiugated by scientific means? The techniques of science don't work on things that aren't adequately (according to the needs of scientific investigation) described or defined.

When elements of interpretation and norms are introduced to a subject, the kinds of science that are appropriate or even needed begin to change.

What kinds of science can deal with subjects where that subject cannot be described? Without a description, the gathering of evidence, for scientific analysis, is problematic, at the least.

Subjective reports cannot meaningfully be "measured", and I don't think they're "precisely definable" either.

Cognitive science has been measuring and defining reports by subjects for literally a hundred years by now.

No, cognitive science has been collecting or receiving them; such reports cannot be "measured", which is my point. As for defining them, what else could we do but define them as ... subjective reports (hearsay)? And how does science proceed, based on hearsay? With difficulty, I suggest.

We've been doing what I described literally for decades via brain scans.

And that's another problem. This topic concerns the mind, while you are considering the brain. I do not suggest that mind and brain are unconnected. But I do suggest that introducing the brain into a proposed investigation of the mind can only muddy things even more, as another level of indirection is added to our cogitations. At the moment, our understanding of how the mind and brain are related (not in general, but in detail) is limited, and full of holes. That has improved over time, and may well improve some more, but at present, our knowledge is insufficient to proceed without a lot more clarification, I think.

[Gertie]

"Conscious awareness of a stimulus" is a much smaller and more detailed thing than "consciousness". I was referring to a description of the latter. Do you have one? I don't (not a 'proper' scientific one, that is). I'm not even sure there is one. Can you enlighten me?

Any difficulty involved comes not from consciousness being a mystical, profoundly ineffable property, but because it is a vague, non-scientific term covering a huge grab-bag of concepts, many of which depend on agreed upon social norms, something you don't find in physics. The concept of what it means for an intentional conscious state to qualify as "belief it is raining outside" has elements of fuzziness to it that are essential. Nothing like this occurs with notions such as what counts as a positive electrical charge.

What a scientific theory of consciousness is going to do is restrict itself to things out of that grab-bag that are precisely definable and measurable, which means concentrating on when subjects can report awareness of something, then finding what the causal pathways inside of them are which lead to such reports.

A scientific theory of consciousness would only restrict itself to that because that's the best science can (currently at least) do - noting correlations between reported experiential states and neural processes.


And that's the best science can do, because 'what it is like' experiential states aren't observable or measurable 'objectively', only via a subject's reports. And also because science can't explain that mind/body correlation in terms of our current scientific model of what the world is made of and the forces which explain the processes involved.

That's why people talk of The Hard Problem of Consciousness. It's not a problem with definitions or vagueness, it's to do with the particular nature of 'what it's like' experience.

[Faustus5]

Then please describe this "concept" of consciousness that you refer to. ... That is my point: we have no description or definition that would allow scientific investigation of consciousness to proceed.

Newsflash: scientific investigations of consciousness have been going on for decades and have made a lot of progress. You just have to be very precise about what aspects of consciousness you are investigating in each experimental setting, and different aspects require different tools.

Yes, of course. But doesn't this mean that such subjects cannot be investiugated by scientific means? The techniques of science don't work on things that aren't adequately (according to the needs of scientific investigation) described or defined.

Take "Mary believes that it is raining outside," a classic intentional state. For Mary to have this belief, she has to have the disposition to certain kinds of behavior in various contexts, all of which will depend on her also having other intentional states in an interconnected web. Having states of these kinds is necessary to satisfy the social norms we have created over what having this belief means.

What is NOT necessary (logically) is us being able to look into her brain and see anything of a specific nature in order to justify attributing any given intentional state to her. It could have turned out that such a belief was instantiated physically by some configuration of her intestines, or as a ghostly dualistic ectoplasm ball hovering over her left shoulder. As it happens, we know that the various intentional states which make up her belief that it is raining outside are physically instantiated in parts of her nervous system, but that knowledge in a certain sense is beside the point. All that really matters is that she behaves in the ways the social norms of having that belief dictate.

When she goes outside, we'd expect her to bring an umbrella or wear rain gear, under the assumption she also possesses the intentional state "doesn't like being rained on". But she needn't have this further intentional state to still justify our attributing the original intentional state to her. However, if she looks outside, says when asked, "No, it isn't raining outside" (though we know it is) and proceeds to go out the door with a fully spread umbrella, what intentional state she "actually" has becomes problematic. We don't really have a word for it.

Science doesn't address these kinds of issues, and can't--that's a job for philosophy of language and meaning. And intentional states are arguably the most important aspects of consciousness.

No, cognitive science has been collecting or receiving them; such reports cannot be "measured", which is my point.

We do it all the time. It is literally the easiest thing cognitive science figured out, early in the last century. Remember, a report is a button press, a blink, a verbal statement, or any other motor action the subject is asked to perform when they detect whatever they are being asked to detect by the experimenter. Very often it is extremely important to record the exact moment such reports are made. And that's really, really easy to do.

To have written the above claim, you must have something entirely different in mind than what I'm talking about.

And that's another problem. This topic concerns the mind, while you are considering the brain. I do not suggest that mind and brain are unconnected. But I do suggest that introducing the brain into a proposed investigation of the mind can only muddy things even more, as another level of indirection is added to our cogitations.

I am proceeding under the long established, utterly mainstream paradigm that the mind is something the brain does. This paradigm has ceased being controversial among cognitive scientists for a very long time. If I am going to entertain any other perspective--like literally, take it seriously for even one second rather than just laughing at it and dismissing it the way I would dismiss creationism--I would need to be given extraordinary evidence showing how this paradigm is misguided and also have a viable scientific alternative spelled out for me.

Won't be holding my breath on either of those ever happening.

At the moment, our understanding of how the mind and brain are related (not in general, but in detail) is limited, and full of holes. That has improved over time, and may well improve some more, but at present, our knowledge is insufficient to proceed without a lot more clarification, I think.

I think we agree that a lot of work is yet to come, I just think the work we need to get done is of a fundamentally different nature than what you're looking for. Then again, I could be completely misinterpreting your objections. It's just that you appear to think the easiest, already achieved and achievable steps are in the future whereas I think they got taken care of a long time ago. That's a sign that I don't quite understand what you're getting at.

[Faustus5]

A scientific theory of consciousness would only restrict itself to that because that's the best science can (currently at least) do - noting correlations between reported experiential states and neural processes.

We've been over this before, so I'll just repeat: and that's all it is reasonable to ask science to do. There's literally nothing else left. You do that, in increasing levels of detail, and you're done. You've explained consciousness. It can't be done any other way, and there's no revolutionary breakthrough waiting in the wings, from science and especially not from philosophy, to get the job done or make further advancements. Nor is any necessary. We've figured out the correct way to proceed, and did so a while a go.

And that's the best science can do, because 'what it is like' experiential states aren't observable or measurable 'objectively', only via a subject's reports.

Why subjects make the reports they do, in terms of the internal causal processes which give rise to them, is all a science of consciousness needs to tell us about.

That's why people talk of The Hard Problem of Consciousness.

SOME people. Remember, there is no agreement that the hard problem even exists or is coherent. It is still being debated and no one side has "won", to the degree any side "wins" in philosophy at all. I'm in the camp that thinks the hard problem is an artifact of really confused philosophy of mind that ought to be rejected.

[Pattern-chaser]

Then please describe this "concept" of consciousness that you refer to. ... That is my point: we have no description or definition that would allow scientific investigation of consciousness to proceed.

Newsflash: scientific investigations of consciousness have been going on for decades and have made a lot of progress. You just have to be very precise about what aspects of consciousness you are investigating...

Aspects of what, though? You have avoided this question three or four times now. If you have to be precise about the aspects of consciousness you are investigating, you need to base that precision on an equally precise description of consciousness, I think.

No, cognitive science has been collecting or receiving them; such reports cannot be "measured", which is my point.

We do it all the time. It is literally the easiest thing cognitive science figured out, early in the last century. Remember, a report is a button press, a blink, a verbal statement, or any other motor action the subject is asked to perform when they detect whatever they are being asked to detect by the experimenter.

Ah! A "report" is an experimental observation, not a ... report. Still, an experimental observation can't be measured either. Observations are made or taken, but not measured, I don't think. How do you measure an observation, which we could also call a "measurement"? Sorry, I find your preferred terminology difficult to understand.

[Gertie]

A scientific theory of consciousness would only restrict itself to that because that's the best science can (currently at least) do - noting correlations between reported experiential states and neural processes.

We've been over this before, so I'll just repeat: and that's all it is reasonable to ask science to do. There's literally nothing else left. You do that, in increasing levels of detail, and you're done. You've explained consciousness. It can't be done any other way, and there's no revolutionary breakthrough waiting in the wings, from science and especially not from philosophy, to get the job done or make further advancements. Nor is any necessary. We've figured out the correct way to proceed, and did so a while a go.

And that's the best science can do, because 'what it is like' experiential states aren't observable or measurable 'objectively', only via a subject's reports.

Why subjects make the reports they do, in terms of the internal causal processes which give rise to them, is all a science of consciousness needs to tell us about.

That's why people talk of The Hard Problem of Consciousness.

SOME people. Remember, there is no agreement that the hard problem even exists or is coherent. It is still being debated and no one side has "won", to the degree any side "wins" in philosophy at all. I'm in the camp that thinks the hard problem is an artifact of really confused philosophy of mind that ought to be rejected.

The problem I see here is that science doesn't simply limit itself to noting correlations. It creates an explanatory model to account for the observations, which can predict future events. Scientists don't agree that noting correlations is all it is reasonable to expect of them, or at least they show a curiosity for explanation which drives our understanding of the world forward, and enables us to use that knowledge to manipulate processes.

For example science doesn't simply note that when heat is applied to water, the water changes from a liquid to a gaseous state. It explains why that happens. As part of the overall physicalist model of what the universe is made of, and the forces which account for the interactions of the parts. So we can understand why the next time we heat water it will evaporate. And when we apply heat to a different liquid, we have a basis for understanding whether that too will evaporate, at what temperature we should predict it to happen, etc. Rooted in a physicalist explanatory model.

So it seems to me you are saying this type of explanatory role isn't scientific, if you say all it is reasonable to expect science to do is make observations of what happens when certain processes occur, or noting correlations.

Is your position that this is in principle the reasonable limit of scientific explanation?

I can see that would be a reason to say no Hard Problem exists. Otherwise just repeating your position that noting a correlation is a scientific explanation for conscious experience looks inconsistent.

Alternatively, my position is that it is the particular nature of conscious experience which makes the usual physicalist type explanation for the correlation a problem. This isn't confused thinking. It's clear and straightforward to me.

[RJG]

Begging the question is arguing in a circle. An example is: why is the Bible true? Because God wrote the Bible. How do you know? Because it says so in the Bible.

Does also using the "mind" to understand the mind beg the question. Anything that the mind comes up with is therefore questionable and cannot, with complete certainty, explain the mind (the very thing in question).

There are many things the mind can know with unquestionable certainty. That which is impossible to deny/doubt is that which is unquestionable, and known with certainty. For example, the mind can know with certainty that experiences exist. For it is impossible to deny/doubt (the existence of experiences) without experiencing the denial/doubt of it, ...which then only confirms its existence.


****************

I'm in the camp that thinks the hard problem [of consciousness] is an artifact of really confused philosophy of mind that ought to be rejected.

Agreed. There is no "hard problem" of consciousness, only lots of confusion. Most everyone seemingly wants to make consciousness into something "mystical", or "magical" or "spiritual". But it is none of these. The real consciousness is logical and boring.

Consciousness is the singular bodily experience of 'recognition', made possible by memory. For it is 'recognition' that converts a non-conscious physical bodily experience (physical bodily reaction) into a 'conscious' experience, that we then call “consciousness”.

When we are conscious, we are only conscious of physical bodily reactions. We are not conscious of the outside world, we are only conscious of our physical bodily reactions to the supposed outside world. We are only conscious of stuff (bodily reactions) that has already happened, and therefore consciousness is not a mystical thing that can "decide" or "do" anything. To put it most simply, consciousness is just the recognition of bodily experiences. And of course, recognition would not be possible without memory. So only those entities that possess memory have the capability of recognition and therefore of consciousness.

[chewybrian]

There are many things the mind can know with unquestionable certainty. That which is impossible to deny/doubt is that which is unquestionable, and known with certainty. For example, the mind can know with certainty that experiences exist. For it is impossible to deny/doubt (the existence of experiences) without experiencing the denial/doubt of it, ...which then only confirms its existence.

This is not an example. Rather, it is the only thing we know with certainty.

[RJG]

There are many things the mind can know with unquestionable certainty. That which is impossible to deny/doubt is that which is unquestionable, and known with certainty. For example, the mind can know with certainty that experiences exist. For it is impossible to deny/doubt (the existence of experiences) without experiencing the denial/doubt of it, ...which then only confirms its existence.

This is not an example. Rather, it is the only thing we know with certainty.

Not so. There are many things (other than "experiencing exists") which can be known with unquestionable certainty (i.e. are impossible to deny/doubt).

Examples include:
"Change" exists
"I" (the experiencer) exist
"Experiences" exists
"Logic" and "math" (a priori) exists
"Consciousness" exists
"Eyes, ears, nose, etc" exist (i.e. all organs involved in experiencing)
etc.

[Steve3007]

"Eyes, ears, nose, etc" exist (i.e. all organs involved in experiencing)

You say I can be certain that I have a nose? It would be self-contradictory to deny it? Surely, according to your Cartesian-like method of doubt, the only organ involved in experiencing which we know with certainty to exist is our mind? We can't know with certainty what, if any, physical equipment is feeding information to that mind. All the other things you mentioned there are thoughts within that mind. So I think chewybrian is right.

Quite a long time ago you declared, in these forums, what you're declaring again here, that what you refer to as "objective" and "true" knowledge can only ever be logically certain knowledge, and that nothing else can be regarded as objective or true. But you never got any further than Descartes did in building an edifice of certain knowledge on your "an experiencer exists..." axiom. If you insist that you trust nothing except what you can know with certainty, then you trust nothing but that. If you insist that nothing that isn't certain is true, then nothing but that is true. As was pointed out back when you first started this line of thought, it's not very useful! For starters, it means that, by your standards, everything you've ever said on any other subject which relies on empirical observation has been a waste of your time. For example, according to you, nothing that either you or I or anyone else has said on the subject of the covid virus is true.

Do you really think that's a useful way to use the word "true"?

[Steve3007]

I've just never really understood what seems to be your longstanding obsession with absolute certainty, and the curious idea that any knowledge which isn't certain is useless, and not worthy of labels like "knowledge" or "true".

From my perspective, it appears to go along with your over-use of the notion that you're using pure logic to make your arguments (including your longstanding habit of throwing in "X < X" or "X = ~X" type expressions everywhere, as if they somehow correspond to the English sentences that precede them). Whenever you make an argument you always seem to claim that your conclusions are certain because (you claim) they're based on pure logic. Clearly this isn't the case. Your arguments on the subject of covid, for example, are obviously based on your interpretation of various bits of empirical observation, as are mine. Using pure logic, we wouldn't even know that such things as viruses exist, let alone what their characteristics are, how they move through air, etc. We wouldn't even know that our noses exist!

[chewybrian]

There are many things the mind can know with unquestionable certainty. That which is impossible to deny/doubt is that which is unquestionable, and known with certainty. For example, the mind can know with certainty that experiences exist. For it is impossible to deny/doubt (the existence of experiences) without experiencing the denial/doubt of it, ...which then only confirms its existence.

This is not an example. Rather, it is the only thing we know with certainty.

Not so. There are many things (other than "experiencing exists") which can be known with unquestionable certainty (i.e. are impossible to deny/doubt).

Examples include:
"Change" exists
"I" (the experiencer) exist
"Experiences" exists
"Logic" and "math" (a priori) exists
"Consciousness" exists
"Eyes, ears, nose, etc" exist (i.e. all organs involved in experiencing)
etc.

Not really. I know that I perceive change. Whether change is happening outside of my perception of it cannot be known with certainty. Does the world change to align with a dream I am having? Eyes and ears might exist, or I might just perceive (inaccurately) that they do, etc. Experience/the experiencer could be seen as one in the same. Anything else might be hallucinated.

[Pattern-chaser]

I've just never really understood what seems to be your longstanding obsession with absolute certainty, and the curious idea that any knowledge which isn't certain is useless, and not worthy of labels like "knowledge" or "true".

I think this is the perspective of the analytic philosopher, the Objectivist and the sciencist. I've never understood it myself, for the same reasons you describe. Even rational science is somewhat gulity of this, rejecting as it does any theory that proves false, no matter if it works most of the time. If it isn't true without limits or boudaries, if there is the smallest, tightest-focussed context in which a theory doesn't work, it is rejected. Although none of us want theories that aren't true, and don't work, isn't a theory that works well, most of the time, worth retaining?

[Steve3007]

I think this is the perspective of the analytic philosopher, the Objectivist and the sciencist...

I don't think it's the perspective of any of those three classes of people. I think if it can be said to to be the perspective of anybody, it's the perspective of the solipsist.

[Pattern-chaser]

I think this is the perspective of the analytic philosopher, the Objectivist and the sciencist...

I don't think it's the perspective of any of those three classes of people. I think if it can be said to to be the perspective of anybody, it's the perspective of the solipsist.

What? You think a devotion to absolute certainty belongs with those who believe that only one's mind is certain to exist, and not the purview of those who pursue certainty in the form of Objectivity, etc? I'm sorry, I'm stunned; I can think of no response to this.