I think that amounts to saying: Mathematics is a good language to use for describing the patterns in our observations.Terrapin Station wrote:Okay, but what works best for what we observe when we're doing science is mathematical constructions.
No it's not. I agree. It's just a recognition of the descriptive power of the language of mathematics.That's not the same thing as having an ontological commitment to mathematical constructions (as something that obtains in the objective world) however.
Yes. If we don't believe that then we're not interested in using the notion of "real existence" as one of the tools for describing the patterns in our observations. Or, to put it another way, we're not interested in constructing an ontology. (Do you agree that those are two ways of saying the same thing?)But a lot of it depends on whether one believes that we can even observe an objective world. Many people do not believe this.
I see why you say that. But I think it is possible to see "ontological commitments" as what has practical utility, if the goal is to decide which choice of real existents would best fit the patterns in our observations.So "ontological commitments" are not the same thing as what works best/what has practical utility (at least not in most views, and an instrumentalist with those views wouldn't really be an instrumentalist, at least not in the traditional sense).