The Self as a Highly Functional Illusion

[Atla]

One thing seems to be indisputable fact, collapsed behaviour seems to be centered on us, hence the measurement problem.

Funny how this "indisputable fact" is impossible to back up with a mainstream, scientific source. It's almost as if you are making things up.

That's what we started with:

for example we take any classic double slit experiment with RNG-controlled detectors, and sometimes we get interference patterns and other times bands as results. But both the interference patterns and bands will always be composed of particles that have positions that are "collapsed".

Do you not understand / do you disagree with that the positions of those particles are "collapsed", to put it as simply as I can, that they show up in one piece at a certain location?

[Steve3007]

I think a lot of that stems from the fact that physicists tend to be focused on "practical" matters--models that work, that produce more or less accurate predictions, etc., and not so concerned with philosophical and ontological matters per se (at least not from anything aside from a functionally instrumentalist stance). So there's a difference if we read entries like that from a practical/instrumentalist angle versus reading them from an angle of making (literal) ontological commitments.

True. But the question would then be: on what basis does anybody make any kind of ontological commitment, if not on the basis of what works?

The differences do not have to be a big issue, but I've run into a number of situations on boards/in chat rooms where there seems to be an inability to see one perspective or the other, which makes communication impossible at times.

I think you'd put at least a couple of our previous conversations about various physics related things in that category!

Atla can't possibly as much of a condescending a-hole when he's interacting with others in person. That's one of the big disadvantages of this format.

Yeah, but Faustus did call Atla "cupcake" at one point. It takes two to tango.

[Steve3007]

My mistake. He's used the soubriquet "cupcake" five times. Maybe it's a language thing.

[Faustus5]

Do you not understand / do you disagree with that the positions of those particles are "collapsed", to put it as simply as I can, that they show up in one piece at a certain location?

Irrelevant. I'm only concerned with you backing up the claim that "collapse is centered on us".

All you need to do is cite a mainstream scientific source which supports this belief. Funny how this task, which should be simple and effortless if your claim is an indisputable fact, is so hard for you. It's almost as if you are making things up.

[Atla]

Do you not understand / do you disagree with that the positions of those particles are "collapsed", to put it as simply as I can, that they show up in one piece at a certain location?

Irrelevant. I'm only concerned with you backing up the claim that "collapse is centered on us".

All you need to do is cite a mainstream scientific source which supports this belief. Funny how this task, which should be simple and effortless if your claim is an indisputable fact, is so hard for you. It's almost as if you are making things up.

Facts aren't irrelevant, even if you don't like them. Show me a double slit experiment where we don't directly observe "collapsed" behaviour.

[Steve3007]

I'm only concerned with you backing up the claim that "collapse is centered on us".

Facts aren't irrelevant, even if you don't like them. Show me a double slit experiment where we don't directly observe "collapsed" behaviour.

As is often the case in my experience when things collapse into a flame war, you two are arguing needlessly about something that you probably don't really disagree about.


Since "wavefunction collapse" is the bit of maths that is used to model the event called "observation" (not to be confused with the everyday usage of that word which implies that human senses are always involved in that event), obviously it would be self-contradictory to say "observation is not of collapsed behaviour". It would be equivalent to saying "observation is not observation".

And if we add the word "we" at the start of that, to make it "we don't directly observe collapsed behaviour", we're then indicating that, in this instance, we are actually talking about the particular case of observation involving human senses. So, in that instance, again, it would be self-contradictory to say that the collapse is not centred on us.

If we stipulate as a premise that we are the one making the observation, and we're using "observation" in the sense in which it's used in QM (the event that is represented/modelled by the bit of mathematics called "wavefunction collapse") then obviously, by definition, the collapse is centred on us.

[Atla]

I'm only concerned with you backing up the claim that "collapse is centered on us".

Facts aren't irrelevant, even if you don't like them. Show me a double slit experiment where we don't directly observe "collapsed" behaviour.

As is often the case in my experience when things collapse into a flame war, you two are arguing needlessly about something that you probably don't really disagree about.


Since "wavefunction collapse" is the bit of maths that is used to model the event called "observation" (not to be confused with the everyday usage of that word which implies that human senses are always involved in that event), obviously it would be self-contradictory to say "observation is not of collapsed behaviour". It would be equivalent to saying "observation is not observation".

And if we add the word "we" at the start of that, to make it "we don't directly observe collapsed behaviour", we're then indicating that, in this instance, we are actually talking about the particular case of observation involving human senses. So, in that instance, again, it would be self-contradictory to say that the collapse is not centred on us.

If we stipulate as a premise that we are the one making the observation, and we're using "observation" in the sense in which it's used in QM (the event that is represented/modelled by the bit of mathematics called "wavefunction collapse") then obviously, by definition, the collapse is centred on us.

That's at best, just a rewording of the measurement problem: what is "quantum observation", and why do we seem to be participating in it? Rewording a problem doesn't solve it.

[Steve3007]

So there's a difference if we read entries like that from a practical/instrumentalist angle versus reading them from an angle of making (literal) ontological commitments.

True. But the question would then be: on what basis does anybody make any kind of ontological commitment, if not on the basis of what works?

I should have known to pay more attention to the use of the word "literal" there, and realized that you're not using the phrase "ontological commitment" with a colloquial meaning of the word "commitment". I should have remembered, after all these years, that I'm on a philosophy discussion website.

In your view, does my question, quoted above, ask anything coherent and substantial if we're using the philosophical definition of an ontological commitment as opposed to the way that "commitment" might be used in everyday speech?

(Since Quine, among others, apparently, had interesting things to say about the philosophical notion of ontological commitments, I guess I'm going to have to do some homework here.)

[Terrapin Station]

So there's a difference if we read entries like that from a practical/instrumentalist angle versus reading them from an angle of making (literal) ontological commitments.

True. But the question would then be: on what basis does anybody make any kind of ontological commitment, if not on the basis of what works?

I should have known to pay more attention to the use of the word "literal" there, and realized that you're not using the phrase "ontological commitment" with a colloquial meaning of the word "commitment". I should have remembered, after all these years, that I'm on a philosophy discussion website.

In your view, does my question, quoted above, ask anything coherent and substantial if we're using the philosophical definition of an ontological commitment as opposed to the way that "commitment" might be used in everyday speech?

(Since Quine, among others, apparently, had interesting things to say about the philosophical notion of ontological commitments, I guess I'm going to have to do some homework here.)

To make ontological commitments in the sense I'm referring to, one has to believe that one can access or somehow know "what's really the case."

So, for example, current mathematical models might work very well for dealing with quantum phenomena so far, and those models might suggest things like superpositions (avoiding whether we have to interpret them in particular non-necessary ways to get to the idea of a superposition--just imagine that we do not), but that doesn't imply an ontological commitment that what's really going on, literally, is some objective (extramental) expression of the mathematical model in question, with literal superpositions taking place, and so on. But this requires that one can know what's really going on (and what's not really going on--perhaps such as knowing that there are no objective mathematical objects/functions).

Lately, at least on boards like this, there seems to be an increase in the number of idealists/representationalists/instrumentalists-on-epistemology (maybe because there are so many engineering, computer science, etc. types on boards like this, and maybe those views are trendy in those fields at the moment), so they're not going to agree that we can know what's really the case in the world contra what works instrumentally.

[Steve3007]

To make ontological commitments in the sense I'm referring to, one has to believe that one can access or somehow know "what's really the case."

Yes, since ontology is about what is the case, clearly that's true. My question was: Given that we do believe it's possible to access "what's really the case", on what basis does anybody make any kind of ontological commitment, if not on the basis of what works? It seems to me that "what works" (by which I mean what coherently and parsimoniously fits what is observed) is the only way.

So, for example, current mathematical models might work very well for dealing with quantum phenomena so far, and those models might suggest things like superpositions (avoiding whether we have to interpret them in particular non-necessary ways to get to the idea of a superposition--just imagine that we do not), but that doesn't imply an ontological commitment that what's really going on, literally, is some objective (extramental) expression of the mathematical model in question, with literal superpositions taking place, and so on.

It doesn't necessitate it. But it's perfectly possible to believe that one can access "what's really the case" and to be using those mathematical models of those quantum phenomena as attempts to do so. Just because we're doing QM, that doesn't mean we have to be taking an entirely instrumentalist approach, making no attempt at figuring out what ontological position we're going to take. We might simply have discovered, from experience, that deciding what we think is really going on such that it fits what we observe is difficult.

But this requires that one can know what's really going on (and what's not really going on--perhaps such as knowing that there are no objective mathematical objects/functions).

Yes. It does. I agree, of course.

Lately, at least on boards like this, there seems to be an increase in the number of idealists/representationalists/instrumentalists-on-epistemology (maybe because there are so many engineering, computer science, etc. types on boards like this, and maybe those views are trendy in those fields at the moment), so they're not going to agree that we can know what's really the case in the world contra what works instrumentally.

You've said this a lot. Maybe it's true. But I'm reasonably sure from past conversations with you that you, at least sometimes, see this when it isn't there, along with seeing people reifying abstract concepts (mathematics in particular) when they're not. That, at least, is my anecdotal experience in some past conversations. If I extrapolated from that anecdotal experience I'd conclude that the phenomenon is not as widespread as you think it is and that there are some false positives.

[Terrapin Station]

To make ontological commitments in the sense I'm referring to, one has to believe that one can access or somehow know "what's really the case."

Yes, since ontology is about what is the case, clearly that's true. My question was: Given that we do believe it's possible to access "what's really the case", on what basis does anybody make any kind of ontological commitment, if not on the basis of what works? It seems to me that "what works" (by which I mean what coherently and parsimoniously fits what is observed) is the only way.

A couple examples:

Mathematics works well for scientific purposes. If you don't buy that there are objective mathematical objects, then what you're asserting is the case ontologically, with respect to objective phenomena, is something different than what has a lot of instrumental utility. There's currently no alternative way to deal with natural phenomena in a scientific, predictive, etc. way (especially not that works near as well as mathematics.)

Types/universals work very well conceptually and are pretty necessary for thinking about anything. If you don't buy that there are real types or universals, then what you're asserting is the case ontologically is something that doesn't work nearly as well for navigating and thinking about the world.

What we go by, if we think we can know what's really the case, are observations, how things seem to be, what there's evidence for, etc.

[Steve3007]

What we go by, if we think we can know what's really the case, are observations, how things seem to be, what there's evidence for, etc.

Exactly. Observations.

As I said, it seems to me that "what works" (by which I mean what coherently and parsimoniously fits what is observed) is the only way.

We'd have to be coherent in the sense that our propositions as to what exists are logically consistent. e.g. if we were to define energy as just movement of matter then we wouldn't propose energy to exist sans matter (and if we didn't define it just as that then that wouldn't be a problem.) And we'd probably want to be parsimonious in the sense of not proposing an ontology full of real existents that have no role as explanations of what is observed.

[Faustus5]

Facts aren't irrelevant, even if you don't like them. Show me a double slit experiment where we don't directly observe "collapsed" behaviour.

Show me a scientific citation from a respected, mainstream source in which your claim that collapse is "centered on us" is supported.

We both know you'll never be able to do it.

[Atla]

Facts aren't irrelevant, even if you don't like them. Show me a double slit experiment where we don't directly observe "collapsed" behaviour.

Show me a scientific citation from a respected, mainstream source in which your claim that collapse is "centered on us" is supported.

We both know you'll never be able to do it.

I have. You disagree that we only seem to be able to observe "collapsed" behavior, so you disagree with every known QM experiment. In other words you are anti-science.

[Terrapin Station]

As I said, it seems to me that "what works" (by which I mean what coherently and parsimoniously fits what is observed) is the only way.

Okay, but what works best for what we observe when we're doing science is mathematical constructions. That's not the same thing as having an ontological commitment to mathematical constructions (as something that obtains in the objective world) however. But a lot of it depends on whether one believes that we can even observe an objective world. Many people do not believe this.

So "ontological commitments" are not the same thing as what works best/what has practical utility (at least not in most views, and an instrumentalist with those views wouldn't really be an instrumentalist, at least not in the traditional sense).