There is a relevant distinction between concepts (ideas) or predicates and attributes or properties. The former have semantic properties (meaning, reference), while the latter lack such properties. (That's why Husserl distinguishes between "categories of meaning" and "categories of objects" in his ontology.) For example, it makes sense to ask "What's the meaning of the concept <mass>?", but it makes no sense to ask "What's the meaning of a particle's mass?"Belindi wrote: ↑May 30th, 2021, 6:41 am Dracula, men, and wolves are all concepts. Every and each concept is a collection of attributes.
Attributes are concepts too.
It so happens that men, and wolves , possess fixed attributes of time and space whereas Dracula is attributable not to concepts of fixed time and space but to other concepts such as [drinks blood] and [teeth] which is shared with men and wolves.
Naturally we dispute the significance to our prosperity of concepts that don't include concepts of time and space. However it is prudent for men to consider the importance of concepts that are not spatio-temporal, because the latter are leading causes of human behaviours. Obviously Dracula and vampires are trivial, whereas Buddhism and capitalism are important.
It is not the case that "Dracula, men, and wolves are all concepts," because what are concepts are the concept of Dracula, the concept of a man, and the concept of a wolf, none of which is Dracula, a man, or a wolf. Nor is it the case that "[e]very and each concept is a collection of attributes," because concepts can only be composed of other concepts.
Of course, concepts have properties; but this is not to say that they are properties.
We do have concepts of non-spatiotemporal things too such as abstract mathematical objects and concepts qua (platonistically) abstract predicate-meanings (and constituents of equally abstract propositions).
As for the ontology of concepts, see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/