Steve3007 wrote:Of course, some people would strongly object to the notion that quantum probabilities, for example, are real. They would see that as a prime example of the reification of mathematics that (they would say) physicists in particular are often particularly prone to do.
This is one reason I always tend to fall back on the principle of utility. i.e. my underlying criteria for deciding what I believe to be real are that it's (a) coherent and (b) useful to believe them to be real. Being incoherent would usually mean being self-contradictory. So, for example, if energy were defined only in terms of the relative motion of matter then the idea of energy existing in the absence of matter would be incoherent. But it isn't, so it isn't. If quantum probability were defined as a mathematical model then it would be incoherent to see it as a real existent. I'll leave that one there for now.
So, in the spirit of utility and coherence, I think it's both useful and non-self-contradictory to regard potentials as real existents so long as the term "potential" is not being used to refer only to a belief/preference/thought in a person's mind.
Sy Borg wrote:I am not sure what kind of beliefs or preferences stem from seeing potentials as real. Do you mean theism?
I'm not certain which part of my post you're replying to here. But anyway, I'm not thinking about theism in any of my remarks.
As mentioned, I think *everything* is real, and the idea that some things that we speak about are not part of reality to be technically incoherent, in that we are in what appears to be a closed system of the universe so all of these thoughts and ideas exist within it - as thoughts and ideas.
Yes, as I said earlier, the map is made from real paper. My thoughts exist in a real brain. Information exists in a real medium. A movie exists on a real DVD. And so on. The issue with the reification of abstractions (confusing the map with the territory), when it happens, isn't anything to do with those facts. It's more of a category error. As I said, it's about conflating references with referents (the things to which the references refer). So, in the example of the reification of mathematics in the subject of physics, the fallacy would consist of constructing a mathematical model in order to describe/reference/model an aspect of the real world, as it is observed, and treating that model as if it
is the thing to which it refers.
As I said, I don't think this fallacy occurs in physics as much as some (notably Terrapin Station) claim that it does. But to the extent that it does happen, if it does, I agree with TS that it is a fallacy.
If everything is real, then we have the usual 3D entities and we have 2D representations and thoughts that relate, at least to some extent, to that 3D reality, eg. anthropomorphic deities, vampires.
If you wanted to propose that everything, including for example vampires or Santa Claus or unicorns or whatever, is real, I'd have no problem with that, so long as it's clear how the word "real" is being used. But as I've said in this topic and elsewhere, in contexts like this topic I use the word "real" to refer to things that we propose to exist extra-mentally; outside of our thoughts. In that usage, I propose that vampires are not real. That's not the same as saying that they and other similar things are something separate from the physical world. Our thoughts are part of the physical world.
However, life is not lived technically, so claiming that parts of reality such as vampires or homophobic deities are not part of reality is functionally coherent, even if these things do indeed exist as mental phenomena within our biosphere.
Precisely. We believe them to exist as mental phenomena. That's how I'm using the word "abstract" as the antonym of "real". As I've said, if you use the word "real" in a different way - one in which everything is real - that's fine. I think different word usages between different people and/or in different contexts are fine so long as we're clear about them and don't fall into fallacies of ambiguity or equivocation.