Question for non-zombies: If you went to sleep as me in my bed with my memories...

[AverageBozo]

To readers who are philosophical zombies, please do not attempt to answer the below question, and please do not post in or participate in this thread. In other words, if you are not or do not have a spirit (a.k.a. consciousness), please do not answer the question or participate in this topic.

This question is only for truly conscious people. In other words, this question is only for non-zombies. This is because philosophical zombies will not understand what is meant by the words you, me, and I in the question.

In the sense that the words are used in this topic, if I said the word "you" to a philosophical zombie, I would be referring to something that doesn't actually exist, since the word 'you' in the sense used in this topic refers to something that the zombie lacks by definition.

With those important clarifications in mind, if you are a not a philosophical zombie, please do let me know your answer to the following question:

If you went to sleep in my body in my bed with my memories, and awoke in your body in your bed with your memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

I think the answer has to be 'yes'. If, on the other hand, the question were reworded as "If you went to sleep in my body with ONLY my memories, and awoke in your body with ONLY your memories..." the answer would be 'no'.

Just curious. How would you be aware of a difference (in Scott’s version)?

[tsihcrana]

Because Scott states 'YOU went to sleep in my body with my memories...' The words imply that I am 'me' just with additional memories and inside Scott's body, in which case I would be aware of each of those facts from the perspective of being myself having those experiences. So I am myself and aware of what is going on while in Scott's body, and as such am accumulating memories in that state. When I return to my body I have access to those memories because they're 'mine'.

[AverageBozo]

Yes, additional memories. Good points.

But wouldn’t those memories simply seem to be part of the overall pool of memories? Awareness of memories that weren’t present previously is not the same as being aware that these memories are new.

Your thoughts?

[tsihcrana]

That's a good question: if memories were suddenly planted in my mind would I realize it? Or would they just be available for recollection? The latter seems more likely. However, interesting though the question is, I don't think it radically alters the scenario in question.

The question states I am me going to bed in Scott's body in his bed and with (I'm going to call it 'the addition of') his memories. Regardless of the ability to experientially apprehend alterations in one's memory, there would still arise new memories of being in Scott's body and going to sleep in his bed, which would still persist upon waking in your own bed.

[AverageBozo]

Agree.

We probably should have interpreted the original question to mean that we went to sleep with Scott’s memories but were unaware of them because of being asleep.

Of course, it really wouldn’t matter if we did that, because there would be a twilight time between awake and asleep.

[MAYA EL]

To readers who are philosophical zombies, please do not attempt to answer the below question, and please do not post in or participate in this thread. In other words, if you are not or do not have a spirit (a.k.a. consciousness), please do not answer the question or participate in this topic.

This question is only for truly conscious people. In other words, this question is only for non-zombies. This is because philosophical zombies will not understand what is meant by the words you, me, and I in the question.

In the sense that the words are used in this topic, if I said the word "you" to a philosophical zombie, I would be referring to something that doesn't actually exist, since the word 'you' in the sense used in this topic refers to something that the zombie lacks by definition.

With those important clarifications in mind, if you are a not a philosophical zombie, please do let me know your answer to the following question:

If you went to sleep in my body in my bed with my memories, and awoke in your body in your bed with your memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

Of course I would what kind of a question is that?

[AverageBozo]

To readers who are philosophical zombies, please do not attempt to answer the below question, and please do not post in or participate in this thread. In other words, if you are not or do not have a spirit (a.k.a. consciousness), please do not answer the question or participate in this topic.

This question is only for truly conscious people. In other words, this question is only for non-zombies. This is because philosophical zombies will not understand what is meant by the words you, me, and I in the question.

In the sense that the words are used in this topic, if I said the word "you" to a philosophical zombie, I would be referring to something that doesn't actually exist, since the word 'you' in the sense used in this topic refers to something that the zombie lacks by definition.

With those important clarifications in mind, if you are a not a philosophical zombie, please do let me know your answer to the following question:

If you went to sleep in my body in my bed with my memories, and awoke in your body in your bed with your memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

Of course I would what kind of a question is that?

Circle back through the thread, Maya. That’ll give you your answer.

[MAYA EL]

To readers who are philosophical zombies, please do not attempt to answer the below question, and please do not post in or participate in this thread. In other words, if you are not or do not have a spirit (a.k.a. consciousness), please do not answer the question or participate in this topic.

This question is only for truly conscious people. In other words, this question is only for non-zombies. This is because philosophical zombies will not understand what is meant by the words you, me, and I in the question.

In the sense that the words are used in this topic, if I said the word "you" to a philosophical zombie, I would be referring to something that doesn't actually exist, since the word 'you' in the sense used in this topic refers to something that the zombie lacks by definition.

With those important clarifications in mind, if you are a not a philosophical zombie, please do let me know your answer to the following question:

If you went to sleep in my body in my bed with my memories, and awoke in your body in your bed with your memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

Of course I would what kind of a question is that?

Circle back through the thread, Maya. That’ll give you your answer.

Care to throw me a hint or two so I don't spend all day long searching?

[AverageBozo]

Awesome. Fascinating.

There are an I-that-is-you in this question, the one who goes to sleep, as well as an I-that-is-me, the one who wakes up—2 different selfs but only one consciousness. Actually, there are 2 partial consciences, the one that gets into bed and the one that gets up. They exist consecutively, not concurrently. In a sense, the 2 partials add up to 1 whole (excluding the sleep time from this equation). Make no mistake: the I in your body is you and the I in mine is me.

Because only one consciousness is operative at any given time, each consciousness would be unaware of the other’s memories and experiences. The I-that-is-you goes to bed each night without being aware of anything out of the ordinary. Likewise the I-that-is-me awakens every day with a reality consistent with the previous morning’s reality.

The reality that the I that is you knows is different than the one that the I that is me knows, but with only one awareness (a partial one at that) operational at a time there would be no way to notice that reality had changed from one to the other.

Not possible. To have your body is to be you.

I would like to clarify that a difference exists that could be observed, but neither of the I’s would be aware of that difference nor even be able to be aware of a difference, because they each have only one reality and therefore cannot make a comparison.

We would not notice or be aware of a difference, although a difference would exist. The senses that we have will not provide us the information about the difference. That information would come from a sense that we do not have, of an unknown type.

In the same, we often will have intuition or gut feeling about something, but no measurable facts. This occurs when our senses detect something that does not fit into the acceptable frequency to be measured by us.

Would you notice a difference: I don't know because gut feeling or intuition might catch it.
Would there be a difference to notice: Yes, but do you notice it is the issue.

etc.

[Oliver Krieger]

Scott wrote :

If you went to sleep in my body in my bed with my memories, and awoke in your body in your bed with your memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

If my memories on the following day, would exclude the going to bed with your memories on the day before, then i could not know.
Since what i would have gone to bed with, were your memories, the question implies, that this exclusion is the meaning of the question.
Since nothing within the question seems to imply, that your memories would become mine, or vice versa, there is no logical reason to think that this memory-swapping would have happened.

Answer from a strictly logical perspective: No, i wouldn't notice a difference, my memories would maybe have a blind spot lacking the memory of what happened on the day before, but contain no trace of your memories.

Answer from a realistic perspective: Since we know each other now, or could have had contact, like this one before, or even more intimate, the logical answer could be criticized.

There appears to be no true paradox within the question.

[The Beast]

Hello.
Scots’s question (which starts his book) is one which exposes the workings of the mind. The swampman by Donald Davidson makes the argument that cognitive thought does (also) arise from causal history and since it is a different body it would be a different identity. The question might be one of what constitutes the identity or what is the unconscious element. In the free sample of his book, Hughes exposes two wrongs and the swampman cognizes (if possible) what the difference is.

[Wahey1985]

Standardly I'd say there's a massive difference to notice in regard to falling asleep with an identity of another in one location and then waking up in your own home as yourself.
There's a difference in surroundings, a difference in physicality, a difference in perception and with us all being unique a difference in belief.
But along the thought process of going to sleep as one person then waking up as another it would depend if your aware of your trueself whilst being the other and then if you can retain the memories of experiencing being the other having woken up as yourself.
Ie. If you are aware of your own trueself whilst as the other you would notice the differences - if allowed to have a memory of the differences of physicality and mental process' of the other once awake in your own body as a result of not being the same.
I think anyway.
If your not aware of yourself in your normal form and your experiencing another you wouldn't, I don't think you could exist in that format as wouldn't you be the other just experiencing the self, surely you would have to be self aware to be aware your experiencing the other.
God knows.
I don't personally want to experience being someone other than myself and I wouldn't want someone else experiencing being me despite how much I watched Quantum Leap - I'm more of a trekky, show me a worm hole and you'll find me just as complexed - i.e. should we? Where the heck are we going to end up, I'm not going first with just a trichorder not on your nelly, I saw what happened to Janeway.
Best wishes.