Question for non-zombies: If you went to sleep as me in my bed with my memories...

[CIN]

CIN

This question is only for truly conscious people. In other words, this question is only for non-zombies. This is because philosophical zombies will not understand what is meant by the words you, me, and I in the question.

Zombies understand these words exactly as functionalists think we all understand them, i.e. if they behave as if they understand them, then in fact they understand them. Whether functionalists are right about this, I have no idea.

Functionalism just dodges the question raised by the notion of philosophical zombies doesn't it? By ignoring the issue of how/why/if phenomenal 'what it is like' conscious experience exists.

I tend to agree with you, but I'm reluctant to rule out any theory of consciousness until we have one that works, which we don't. Even Malebranche's theory of Occasionalism has never been refuted, and it actually solves the problem very neatly.

[Terrapin Station]

CIN

This question is only for truly conscious people. In other words, this question is only for non-zombies. This is because philosophical zombies will not understand what is meant by the words you, me, and I in the question.

Zombies understand these words exactly as functionalists think we all understand them, i.e. if they behave as if they understand them, then in fact they understand them. Whether functionalists are right about this, I have no idea.

Functionalism just dodges the question raised by the notion of philosophical zombies doesn't it? By ignoring the issue of how/why/if phenomenal 'what it is like' conscious experience exists.

I tend to agree with you, but I'm reluctant to rule out any theory of consciousness until we have one that works, which we don't. Even Malebranche's theory of Occasionalism has never been refuted, and it actually solves the problem very neatly.

There's zero evidence for it. A theory that's purely SciFi or fantasy doesn't solve anything if there's zero evidence for the SciFi or fantasy scenario.

[Gertie]

CIN

This question is only for truly conscious people. In other words, this question is only for non-zombies. This is because philosophical zombies will not understand what is meant by the words you, me, and I in the question.

Zombies understand these words exactly as functionalists think we all understand them, i.e. if they behave as if they understand them, then in fact they understand them. Whether functionalists are right about this, I have no idea.

Functionalism just dodges the question raised by the notion of philosophical zombies doesn't it? By ignoring the issue of how/why/if phenomenal 'what it is like' conscious experience exists.

I tend to agree with you, but I'm reluctant to rule out any theory of consciousness until we have one that works, which we don't. Even Malebranche's theory of Occasionalism has never been refuted, and it actually solves the problem very neatly.

A deus ex machina will do that.

I'm open-minded about this too, my problem with Functionalism is it doesn't even seriously try to address the Hard Problem, because it doesn't fit our go-to physicalist toolkit. It's more of a functional description of brain processes. That's fine, and it's fair enough to opine that's the best we can do (for now), but not to claim it is the Theory of Consciousness.

[CIN]

CIN

Zombies understand these words exactly as functionalists think we all understand them, i.e. if they behave as if they understand them, then in fact they understand them. Whether functionalists are right about this, I have no idea.

Functionalism just dodges the question raised by the notion of philosophical zombies doesn't it? By ignoring the issue of how/why/if phenomenal 'what it is like' conscious experience exists.

I tend to agree with you, but I'm reluctant to rule out any theory of consciousness until we have one that works, which we don't. Even Malebranche's theory of Occasionalism has never been refuted, and it actually solves the problem very neatly.

There's zero evidence for it. A theory that's purely SciFi or fantasy doesn't solve anything if there's zero evidence for the SciFi or fantasy scenario.

Theories of consciousness fall into two classes: those which appear to require some feature of reality for which we have no evidence in order to solve the problem (dualism, idealism), and those which don't require such a feature, but don't appear to solve the problem (functionalism, eliminativism).

Apparently, then, any theory that solves the problem must have some feature for which we have no evidence. Since we don't know what that feature is, it could, for all we know, be God, as postulated by Malebranche and Berkeley, and also by my one-time philosophy tutor, the late John Foster.

[Terrapin Station]

CIN



Functionalism just dodges the question raised by the notion of philosophical zombies doesn't it? By ignoring the issue of how/why/if phenomenal 'what it is like' conscious experience exists.

I tend to agree with you, but I'm reluctant to rule out any theory of consciousness until we have one that works, which we don't. Even Malebranche's theory of Occasionalism has never been refuted, and it actually solves the problem very neatly.

There's zero evidence for it. A theory that's purely SciFi or fantasy doesn't solve anything if there's zero evidence for the SciFi or fantasy scenario.

Theories of consciousness fall into two classes: those which appear to require some feature of reality for which we have no evidence in order to solve the problem (dualism, idealism), and those which don't require such a feature, but don't appear to solve the problem (functionalism, eliminativism).

Apparently, then, any theory that solves the problem must have some feature for which we have no evidence. Since we don't know what that feature is, it could, for all we know, be God, as postulated by Malebranche and Berkeley, and also by my one-time philosophy tutor, the late John Foster.

LOL at the notion of gods solving any problem. You may as well just say that Harry Potter waves a magic wand and says "Scrimbooblio!" and that "solves" any problem.

[CIN]

my problem with Functionalism is it doesn't even seriously try to address the Hard Problem, because it doesn't fit our go-to physicalist toolkit. It's more of a functional description of brain processes. That's fine, and it's fair enough to opine that's the best we can do (for now), but not to claim it is the Theory of Consciousness.

I think any theory which claims that our everyday ideas about consciousness are mistaken counts as a theory of consciousness: so functionalism and eliminativism both count. They are, if you like, meta-theories of consciousness, in that they make claims about our everyday notions of consciousness, rather than taking for granted that when we talk about consciousness we know what we're talking about.

I am inclined to think that both functionalism and eliminativism are wrong. But I also recognise that when I say that, I am talking only about my own beliefs, and not about consciousness.

[CIN]

I tend to agree with you, but I'm reluctant to rule out any theory of consciousness until we have one that works, which we don't. Even Malebranche's theory of Occasionalism has never been refuted, and it actually solves the problem very neatly.

There's zero evidence for it. A theory that's purely SciFi or fantasy doesn't solve anything if there's zero evidence for the SciFi or fantasy scenario.

Theories of consciousness fall into two classes: those which appear to require some feature of reality for which we have no evidence in order to solve the problem (dualism, idealism), and those which don't require such a feature, but don't appear to solve the problem (functionalism, eliminativism).

Apparently, then, any theory that solves the problem must have some feature for which we have no evidence. Since we don't know what that feature is, it could, for all we know, be God, as postulated by Malebranche and Berkeley, and also by my one-time philosophy tutor, the late John Foster.

LOL at the notion of gods solving any problem. You may as well just say that Harry Potter waves a magic wand and says "Scrimbooblio!" and that "solves" any problem.

That reaction would be fine if we had the faintest inkling of what the real explanation of consciousness looks like, but we don't. All you're doing is holding up a card saying "I'm an atheist." That's about you, not about the problem.

[Terrapin Station]

There's zero evidence for it. A theory that's purely SciFi or fantasy doesn't solve anything if there's zero evidence for the SciFi or fantasy scenario.

Theories of consciousness fall into two classes: those which appear to require some feature of reality for which we have no evidence in order to solve the problem (dualism, idealism), and those which don't require such a feature, but don't appear to solve the problem (functionalism, eliminativism).

Apparently, then, any theory that solves the problem must have some feature for which we have no evidence. Since we don't know what that feature is, it could, for all we know, be God, as postulated by Malebranche and Berkeley, and also by my one-time philosophy tutor, the late John Foster.

LOL at the notion of gods solving any problem. You may as well just say that Harry Potter waves a magic wand and says "Scrimbooblio!" and that "solves" any problem.

That reaction would be fine if we had the faintest inkling of what the real explanation of consciousness looks like, but we don't. All you're doing is holding up a card saying "I'm an atheist." That's about you, not about the problem.

If we're going to critique things in terms of explanations and whether there is one, we need to examine the notion of explanations. Are you prepared to do that?

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

If you went to sleep in my body in my bed with my memories,

Not possible. To have your body is to be you.

I didn't ask if it is possible, nor did I assert that you wouldn't be me (also).

Assuming the human posting as Terrapin Station is not a philosophical zombie, this is the hypothetical question I asked:

If you went to sleep in my body in my bed with my memories, and awoke in your body in your bed with your memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

You're not getting it. ___I___ couldn't go to sleep "in your body" with your memories. Your body (naturally with your memories) would BE you. It can't be "me as you." That's incoherent.

I could be misunderstanding what you are trying to say, but it seems to me like you may be committing the false dichotomy fallacy.

I never asserted that you wouldn't be me also, or that as me you wouldn't be you also.

However, to make things clearer, let me rephrase:

If you went to sleep in Scott's body in Scott's bed with Scott's memories, and awoke in Terrapin Station's body in Terrapin Station's bed with Terrapin Station's memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

To readers who are philosophical zombies, please do not attempt to answer the below question, and please do not post in or participate in this thread. In other words, if you are not or do not have a spirit (a.k.a. consciousness), please do not answer the question or participate in this topic.

This question is only for truly conscious people. In other words, this question is only for non-zombies. This is because philosophical zombies will not understand what is meant by the words you, me, and I in the question.

In the sense that the words are used in this topic, if I said the word "you" to a philosophical zombie, I would be referring to something that doesn't actually exist, since the word 'you' in the sense used in this topic refers to something that the zombie lacks by definition.

With those important clarifications in mind, if you are a not a philosophical zombie, please do let me know your answer to the following question:

If you went to sleep in my body in my bed with my memories, and awoke in your body in your bed with your memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

No there would be no difference. Why? Because for you to notice the difference would require a memory of the episode, yet you stipulated there would only be routine memory.

I agree with your reasoning. But wouldn't that also therefore mean that (1) you being Scott and me being LuckyR is identical to (2) me being Scott and you being LuckyR?

In other words, doesn't your agreeable conclusion also mean that (1) and (2) are the same thing?

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

If you went to sleep in my body in my bed with my memories, and awoke in your body in your bed with your memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

The reality that the I that is you knows is different than the one that the I that is me knows, but with only one awareness (a partial one at that) operational at a time there would be no way to notice that reality had changed from one to the other.

If I am understanding correctly, you are saying that you believe that there would be a difference but it would be imperceptible, meaning something would have actually changed but it would impossible to be noticed or observed; is that correct?

Yes, that is exactly what I meant.

However I would like to clarify that a difference exists that could be observed, but neither of the I’s would be aware of that difference nor even be able to be aware of a difference, because they each have only one reality and therefore cannot make a comparison.

Are you saying a third-party observer could notice the difference? Are you saying some kind of physical material difference would exist that could be noticed by observing the atoms and molecules in the two bodies?

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

We would not notice or be aware of a difference, although a difference would exist. The senses that we have will not provide us the information about the difference.

Would there necessarily be a material physical difference that could in theory be observed by a third-party observer?

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

If you went to sleep in my body in my bed with my memories, and awoke in your body in your bed with your memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

There will be no difference in your spirit/atma/conciousness. There is only one consciousness, but bodies and minds carry memories. Those belong to your body not your spirit.

I agree.

Does that therefore mean that #1 and #2 below are identical, meaning they are the same thing:

(1) You being in Scott's body and me being in AmericanKestrel's body.

(2) You being in AmericanKestrel body and me being in Scott's body.

?

[Terrapin Station]

Not possible. To have your body is to be you.

I didn't ask if it is possible, nor did I assert that you wouldn't be me (also).

Assuming the human posting as Terrapin Station is not a philosophical zombie, this is the hypothetical question I asked:

If you went to sleep in my body in my bed with my memories, and awoke in your body in your bed with your memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

You're not getting it. ___I___ couldn't go to sleep "in your body" with your memories. Your body (naturally with your memories) would BE you. It can't be "me as you." That's incoherent.

I could be misunderstanding what you are trying to say, but it seems to me like you may be committing the false dichotomy fallacy.

I never asserted that you wouldn't be me also, or that as me you wouldn't be you also.

However, to make things clearer, let me rephrase:

If you went to sleep in Scott's body in Scott's bed with Scott's memories, and awoke in Terrapin Station's body in Terrapin Station's bed with Terrapin Station's memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

In other words, your memories ARE a part of your body--namely, a subset of your brain structure/function. Someone else can't be "in your body with your memories" because someone else is their own brain, which is different than yours. It's just like someone else's finger couldn't be "in your finger"--if it's their finger, it's not your finger, and vice versa, and a hybrid wouldn't be either your finger or theirs, it would be something different.

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

If you went to sleep in my body in my bed with my memories, and awoke in your body in your bed with your memories, would you notice a difference? Would there be a difference to notice?

It depends on two things: whether consciousness is a Cartesian substance (this is an unpopular idea these days, because it's hard to see how it could work; but as far as I know it has never actually been refuted), and if so, whether it's the kind of thing that can store memories. If the answer to the first is 'yes', there would be a difference to notice, but whether I would notice it depends on whether I could retain any memories from my old body in my consciousness.

If I am understanding correctly, you are saying that for there to be a difference some kind of mystical dualism must be true; otherwise, there would be no difference. If so, I agree with that.