Can consciousness exist without any brain at all?

[psyreporter]

Arjand, I think similarly, that being alive may mean experiencing consciousness at least some of the time.

There's a caveat, though. I think that the consciousness of brainless organisms would be exponentially less than brained ones. That is, it appears to me that the extreme interactivity within brains exponentially increases the scope and detail of perception and the range of possible responses.

An aspect to consider is that from a genetic and physiological perspective, the brain neurons of mice and whales are almost identical to that in a human and wales have a 3x larger brain than humans. Recently it was discovered that wales also posses a part of the brain that was thought to be unique to humans, which means that the brain of a whale is almost similar from a genetic and physiological perspective to that of a human, but 3x as large.

Even flies have similar brain 'technology' and neurons.

Humans and flies employ very similar mechanisms for brain development and function
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2 ... 085903.htm

Why is it possible that a human with merely 5-10% brain tissue manages to live a normal and healthy life with a wife, children and a job, or to have a high IQ and complete an academic degree?

Consciousness without a brain?
"Any theory of consciousness has to be able to explain why a person like that, who's missing 90 percent of his neurons, still exhibits normal behaviour," Axel Cleeremans, a professor philosophy of cognitive science from the Université Libre de Bruxelles in Belgium"
viewtopic.php?f=12&t=16742

Similarly, considering that the brain neurons in whales and humans are almost the same (both physical and genetic) why are whales not 3x as smart as humans?

As it appears, the brain is merely an instrument and what it is that makes use of the potential provided by the brain, is something else. In humans with merely 5% brain tissue, that 'human origin' manages to keep up and perform quite well, while in whales, 3x as much brain neurons is used for 'being whale'.

[Consul]

Some philosophers view consciousness as a 'function' of life. From that perspective, any life form is to be considered conscious within a gradation of serving that functionality.

Is a bacteria truly conscious or can it be said that it is an automata, a deterministic chemical process without meaning?

Recent studies indicate that bacteria are far more intelligent than was previously assumed.
…

If intelligence requires nothing more than adaptive competence (the capacity to solve biological problems such as survival, nourishment, and reproduction through adaptive plasticity), then bacteria may be said to be intelligent; but their intelligence has nothing to do with (subjective) sentience.

[psyreporter]

If intelligence requires nothing more than adaptive competence (the capacity to solve biological problems such as survival, nourishment, and reproduction through adaptive plasticity), then bacteria may be said to be intelligent; but their intelligence has nothing to do with (subjective) sentience.

That statement would only be possible by neglecting the 'why' question of the mentioned adaptive competence/plasticity or 'capacity to solve biological problems'. When the question why would be addressed, even a bacteria would nessesarily be attributed (a level of) subjective sentience.

As can be seen in the topic "Plant sentience" and veganism, meaning is the key to determine whether a life form is to be considered sentient.

Plants are as sentient as rocks. It's important to understand the difference between reactions and sentience.

You mentioned the following with regard plant sentience:

It is highly doubtful that the information in question here is semantic information rather than mere signal-information. A genuine language essentially has a semantic dimension (meaning & reference).

My reply:

From your reference:

σ is an instance of information, understood as semantic content, if and only if:

• (GDI.1) σ consists of one or more data;
• (GDI.2) the data in σ are well-formed;
• (GDI.3) the well-formed data in σ are meaningful.

As can be seen in the reference from Stanford, semantic information derives its quality from 'meaningfulness'.

When it can be established that the addressing of the question 'why' is applicable when it concerns the 'capacity to solve biological problems' in life forms such as bacteria and plants, then it can be said that 'meaning' is necessarily applicable by which it follows that bacteria and plants are to be considered sentient.

[psyreporter]

When it concerns the question: what makes a whale brain different from that of a human? (why is a human more intelligent), the answer of science has been "cortical neurons".

More specifically, higher intelligence has been associated with larger cortical grey matter in the prefrontal and posterior temporal cortex in adults (cortical neurons).

In the following example of an article from 2016, the conclusion is that a human brain is more intelligent because of cortical neurons, of which then is assumed that humans uniquely have a specific type of cortical neurons.

The Paradox of the Elephant Brain
So what do we have that no other animal has? A remarkable number of neurons in the cerebral cortex (cortical neurons), the largest around, attainable by no other species, I say.
https://nautil.us/issue/35/boundaries/t ... hant-brain

A study in 2019 showed that killer whales have more of those cortical neurons than humans. This was only discovered recently. Before a few years ago, it was not known that whales also have those neurons.

The killer whale has more gray matter and more cortical neurons than any mammal, including humans.

Humpbacks have humanlike brain cells (spindle cortical neurons)
Humpback whales and killer whales have a type of brain cell seen only in humans, researchers reported on Monday.
https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna15920224

Whales boast the brain cells that 'make us human'
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn ... -us-human/

Are whales deep thinkers?

Whale and dolphin brains contain specialized brain cells called spindle neurons. These are associated with advanced abilities such as recognising, remembering, reasoning, communicating, perceiving, adapting to change, problem-solving and understanding. So it seems they are deep thinkers! Not only that, but the part of their brain which processes emotions (limbic system) appears to be more complex than our own.

From a neurobiology perspective, the brain of some whales and dolphins is 'more advanced' and 'better equipped' for the task of which science believes that it is the origin of human emotions and intelligence (conscious experience).

[Consul]

If intelligence requires nothing more than adaptive competence (the capacity to solve biological problems such as survival, nourishment, and reproduction through adaptive plasticity), then bacteria may be said to be intelligent; but their intelligence has nothing to do with (subjective) sentience.

That statement would only be possible by neglecting the 'why' question of the mentioned adaptive competence/plasticity or 'capacity to solve biological problems'. When the question why would be addressed, even a bacteria would nessesarily be attributed (a level of) subjective sentience.

Is your why-question the etiological question of an efficient cause or the teleological question of a final cause (purpose)?
Anyway, intelligent behavior, including teleonomic behavior, doesn't entail or require subjective sentience.

As for the concept of teleonomy, see the Mayr quote in this previous post of mine: viewtopic.php?p=391949#p391949

As can be seen in the topic "Plant sentience" and veganism, meaning is the key to determine whether a life form is to be considered sentient.

Plants are as sentient as rocks. It's important to understand the difference between reactions and sentience.

You mentioned the following with regard plant sentience:

It is highly doubtful that the information in question here is semantic information rather than mere signal-information. A genuine language essentially has a semantic dimension (meaning & reference).

My reply:

From your reference:

σ is an instance of information, understood as semantic content, if and only if:

• (GDI.1) σ consists of one or more data;
• (GDI.2) the data in σ are well-formed;
• (GDI.3) the well-formed data in σ are meaningful.

As can be seen in the reference from Stanford, semantic information derives its quality from 'meaningfulness'.

When it can be established that the addressing of the question 'why' is applicable when it concerns the 'capacity to solve biological problems' in life forms such as bacteria and plants, then it can be said that 'meaning' is necessarily applicable by which it follows that bacteria and plants are to be considered sentient.

No, that's an invalid inference! You're presupposing that the processing of semantic information cannot take place nonconsciously, but it seems that brains are very well capable of doing that. There are nonconscious neural representations.

[psyreporter]

That statement would only be possible by neglecting the 'why' question of the mentioned adaptive competence/plasticity or 'capacity to solve biological problems'. When the question why would be addressed, even a bacteria would nessesarily be attributed (a level of) subjective sentience.

Is your why-question the etiological question of an efficient cause or the teleological question of a final cause (purpose)?

None of them. The 'why' question concerns the reason why a life form is intelligent in the first place, without a cause or endpoint being known beforehand (without the assumption of determinism).

Anyway, intelligent behavior, including teleonomic behavior, doesn't entail or require subjective sentience.

As for the concept of teleonomy, see the Mayr quote in this previous post of mine:

The concept teleonomic behavior or teleonomy requires determinism to be true and when it is to be considered true for a part of life, it necessarily also needs to hold true for any other part of life, including human life.

Consciousness is merely a manifestation of the 'origin of life'. There is no indication that animals or humans have a special substance that differentiates their 'consciousness' or experience of life from other life. From that perspective, any life is to be considered to posses of a gradation of subjective conscious experience.

At question to settle the debate:

1) what is the origin of life?
2) is consciousness to be considered a mere manifestation of the origin of life?
3) If no at 2), then: what is the argumentative foundation for the idea that consciousness in certain life forms (e.g. animals) has a different origin than life?

From your post in the topic about Panpsychism:

All teleonomic behavior is characterized by two components. It is guided by a 'program', and it depends on the existence of some endpoint, goal, or terminus which is foreseen in the program that regulates the behavior. This endpoint might be a structure, a physiological function, the attainment of a new geographical position, or a 'consummatory' (Craig 1918) act in behavior. Each particular program is the result of natural selection, constantly adjusted by the selective value of the achieved endpoint."

viewtopic.php?p=391949#p391949

It is illogical to consider that lower life forms are bound by determinism and are 'programs' that perform a function that can be described empirically.

In a sense, the problem indicated by the philosophical zombie theory, by which it is indicated that it isn't even possible to know whether other humans are conscious, is abused in the concept teleonomy by completely ignoring that problem (the inability to know whether anything is conscious).

By the simple nature of lower life forms, it is attempted to pose that their simple behavior is 'caused' by a mere program, of which nobody can argue that that isn't the case, as shown by the philosophical zombie theory, but which is also not just when that problem is ignored as part of the concept.

In short: when teleonomy is a valid theory for explaining intelligent behavior in lower life forms, determinism would necessarily also apply to human life.

No, that's an invalid inference! You're presupposing that the processing of semantic information cannot take place nonconsciously, but it seems that brains are very well capable of doing that. There are nonconscious neural representations.

It is illogical and absurd to consider that a brain would exist before the senses, and before something that necessarily preceded the senses to provide the required qualitative distinction-ability (valuing). Therefor, the origin of life and of intelligence must lay outside the scope of the individual.

When it concerns apparent automated processes, which could include all tools made by humans, it should be seen as a mere extension of the origin of life, and in the case of humans, it's manifested consciousness. Thus for example a phone, is indicative of conscious experience of the human. It performs simple function but the origin of that function is an exponent of human life, which remains unknown until today.

In short: simple automated functions that serve life forms cannot arise out of nothing. They originate from life by which one remains obligated to explain the origin of life when one intends to consider their existence meaningless.

[Sy Borg]

From your reference:

σ is an instance of information, understood as semantic content, if and only if:

• (GDI.1) σ consists of one or more data;
• (GDI.2) the data in σ are well-formed;
• (GDI.3) the well-formed data in σ are meaningful.

As can be seen in the reference from Stanford, semantic information derives its quality from 'meaningfulness'.

When it can be established that the addressing of the question 'why' is applicable when it concerns the 'capacity to solve biological problems' in life forms such as bacteria and plants, then it can be said that 'meaning' is necessarily applicable by which it follows that bacteria and plants are to be considered sentient.

No, that's an invalid inference! You're presupposing that the processing of semantic information cannot take place nonconsciously, but it seems that brains are very well capable of doing that. There are nonconscious neural representations.

However, as discussed many times, you are talking about what seems not to be "conscious" to humans. If these simpler responses are all you have - sans the extreme subjective "loudness" of human mentality - then maybe such states are noticeable, if that's all the responses available? As per my usual analogy, a pin still makes a sound when dropped next to the hammering of a pneumatic drill, but it seems like nothing.

[Consul]

No, that's an invalid inference! You're presupposing that the processing of semantic information cannot take place nonconsciously, but it seems that brains are very well capable of doing that. There are nonconscious neural representations.

However, as discussed many times, you are talking about what seems not to be "conscious" to humans. If these simpler responses are all you have - sans the extreme subjective "loudness" of human mentality - then maybe such states are noticeable, if that's all the responses available? As per my usual analogy, a pin still makes a sound when dropped next to the hammering of a pneumatic drill, but it seems like nothing.

Three different neurobiological levels of information-processing:

1. the nonconscious level of precognitive processing of mere signals (nonrepresentational "instructions") or asemantic information
2. the nonconscious level of cognitive processing of genuine signs (representations) or semantic information
3. the conscious level of cognitive processing of genuine signs (representations) or semantic information (in the form of subjective experience or appearance)

Level 3 depends on levels 2+1, and level 2 depends on level 1—so there is a downward entailment; but there is no upward entailment, because level 1 is independent of levels 2 and 3, and level 2 is independent of level 3.

[Consul]

Three different neurobiological levels of information-processing:

1. the nonconscious level of precognitive processing of mere signals (nonrepresentational "instructions") or asemantic information
…

We find level 1 realized in organisms lacking a nervous system, in which case it's not a level of neurobiological but just biological information-processing.

[Sy Borg]

No, that's an invalid inference! You're presupposing that the processing of semantic information cannot take place nonconsciously, but it seems that brains are very well capable of doing that. There are nonconscious neural representations.

However, as discussed many times, you are talking about what seems not to be "conscious" to humans. If these simpler responses are all you have - sans the extreme subjective "loudness" of human mentality - then maybe such states are noticeable, if that's all the responses available? As per my usual analogy, a pin still makes a sound when dropped next to the hammering of a pneumatic drill, but it seems like nothing.

Three different neurobiological levels of information-processing:

1. the nonconscious level of precognitive processing of mere signals (nonrepresentational "instructions") or asemantic information
2. the nonconscious level of cognitive processing of genuine signs (representations) or semantic information
3. the conscious level of cognitive processing of genuine signs (representations) or semantic information (in the form of subjective experience or appearance)

Level 3 depends on levels 2+1, and level 2 depends on level 1—so there is a downward entailment; but there is no upward entailment, because level 1 is independent of levels 2 and 3, and level 2 is independent of level 3.

I would like to consider "mere signals" in more detail.

Certainly they are "mere signals" to humans and their brained peers. It would not make sense for a large, complex mammal like a human to notice all of its background processing. Rather, our brains shape a global impression (albeit, more fragmented that is agreed by orthodoxy), and that is what we call "consciousness", as opposed to its constituents.

Flowering plants also have global impressions via action potentials instead of nerves, and the central processing is done in the root ball. Meanwhile, microbes are small, so most events are inherently global to them. What I am talking about is orders of magnitude less profound than mammalian consciousness. I posit that the emergence of consciousness was less likely an "infinite jump" from complete non-consciousness to complete consciousness than but an exponential jump from reflexiveness to mentality.

[Sam26]

Sometimes there will be news headlines about someone living with "no brain" but actually the person has 10% of a brain left or such, so in those cases the news headline is using hyperbole, if not being outright dishonest. This topic is not for discussing whether someone can be conscious with a very small and/or severely damaged brain. Rather, this topic is for discussing whether a person/creature can be conscious without any brain at all.

Please do not answer with a simple yes or no, but instead make sure to provide evidence and argument to backup your answer.

There is a huge amount of data supporting the proposition that brains are not necessary for consciousness. I give my inductive argument in the following thread: viewtopic.php?t=15925

[Consul]

There is a huge amount of data supporting the proposition that brains are not necessary for consciousness. I give my inductive argument in the following thread: viewtopic.php?t=15925

The supernaturalistic, substance-dualistic interpretation of near-death experiences (NDEs) and out-of-body experiences (OBEs) is unconvincing.

QUOTE>
"An alternative, naturalistic approach to understanding NDEs depends on the findings that all the components of the classical NDE can be caused by cortical disinhibition and excessive uncontrolled brain activity. This can occur in conditions of severe stress, extreme fear, and cerebral anoxia, as well as with certain drugs, and we already have most of the ideas needed to understand why this should cause NDEs. Tunnels and lights are caused by disinhibition in visual cortex, and strange noises by disinhibition in auditory cortex. OBEs and life reviews can be induced by heightened temporal lobe activity, and the positive emotions and lack of pain have been attributed to the action of endorphins and encephalins, endogenous opiates which are widely distributed in the limbic system and released under stress. The visions of other worlds and spiritual beings might be real glimpses into another world, but against that hypothesis is that the worlds described tend to fit people’s cultural upbringing and religious beliefs. In the popular genre of ‘Heaven tourism’, Christians report seeing Jesus, angels, and a door or gate into heaven. Yet Hindus are more likely to meet the king of the dead and his messengers, the Yamdoots.

All these apparently strange experiences – sleep paralysis, lucid dreams, OBEs, and NDEs – once seemed inexplicable. But now that we are beginning to understand them, they seem not to provide evidence for other worlds or consciousness beyond the brain but, like dreaming or psychedelic states, to offer important test cases for intuitions about the relations between conscious and unconscious, between real and unreal, between self and body, and between retrospective verbal report and ‘experience itself’. Not least, these times when sensory input and bodily interaction with the world are reduced and experience seems more self-generated encourage us to reflect on who or what is doing the generating – that is, on the nature of our selves."

(Blackmore, Susan, and Emily T. Troscianko. Consciousness: An Introduction. 3rd ed. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018. p. 430)
<QUOTE

[Sam26]

There is a huge amount of data supporting the proposition that brains are not necessary for consciousness. I give my inductive argument in the following thread: viewtopic.php?t=15925

The supernaturalistic, substance-dualistic interpretation of near-death experiences (NDEs) and out-of-body experiences (OBEs) is unconvincing.

QUOTE>
"An alternative, naturalistic approach to understanding NDEs depends on the findings that all the components of the classical NDE can be caused by cortical disinhibition and excessive uncontrolled brain activity. This can occur in conditions of severe stress, extreme fear, and cerebral anoxia, as well as with certain drugs, and we already have most of the ideas needed to understand why this should cause NDEs. Tunnels and lights are caused by disinhibition in visual cortex, and strange noises by disinhibition in auditory cortex. OBEs and life reviews can be induced by heightened temporal lobe activity, and the positive emotions and lack of pain have been attributed to the action of endorphins and encephalins, endogenous opiates which are widely distributed in the limbic system and released under stress. The visions of other worlds and spiritual beings might be real glimpses into another world, but against that hypothesis is that the worlds described tend to fit people’s cultural upbringing and religious beliefs. In the popular genre of ‘Heaven tourism’, Christians report seeing Jesus, angels, and a door or gate into heaven. Yet Hindus are more likely to meet the king of the dead and his messengers, the Yamdoots.

All these apparently strange experiences – sleep paralysis, lucid dreams, OBEs, and NDEs – once seemed inexplicable. But now that we are beginning to understand them, they seem not to provide evidence for other worlds or consciousness beyond the brain but, like dreaming or psychedelic states, to offer important test cases for intuitions about the relations between conscious and unconscious, between real and unreal, between self and body, and between retrospective verbal report and ‘experience itself’. Not least, these times when sensory input and bodily interaction with the world are reduced and experience seems more self-generated encourage us to reflect on who or what is doing the generating – that is, on the nature of our selves."

(Blackmore, Susan, and Emily T. Troscianko. Consciousness: An Introduction. 3rd ed. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018. p. 430)
<QUOTE

Sorry, but this quote doesn't even begin to address what's happening in NDEs. It's a typical response, so that's understandable, but it also shows that she hasn't studied NDEs in depth. There are plenty of corroborated NDEs that have happened when there is no measurable brain activity, so this idea that it's uncontrolled brain activity is a myth. There is plenty of research that demonstrates that cerebral anoxia, drugs, and the other examples given are not even close to what's experienced in an NDE. People in an NDE claim to be more lucid in their experience, not less lucid, which would be the case in each of these examples given by Troscianko.

There have been many cases where what the person described, as they claimed to be separate from their bodies, is corroborated by doctors, nurses, friends and family. This is objective corroboration, not hearsay, anecdotal stories, hallucinations, the brain shutting down, drugs or any of the other explanation of the sort. There are just too many consistent stories here to dismiss, unless you're wedded to a particular worldview, which many people are.

Finally, it's true that people from different cultures describe beings they see in terms of their cultural views. However, this shouldn't be surprising, this is done in our everyday lives too. We often interpret our experiences in terms of our cultural views. The more important thing is how consistent are the NDEs, are they overall more consistent than not; and there's plenty of data that shows they are more consistent than not. Most testimonial evidence has a certain amount of inconsistency. If you take the testimonial evidence of 20 people at an accident site you'll find a certain amount of inconsistency, but this doesn't negate the consistent reports, unless the consistency is too high.

[Faustus5]

There are plenty of corroborated NDEs that have happened when there is no measurable brain activity, so this idea that it's uncontrolled brain activity is a myth.

You don't know "when" the experiences were actually happening. Reports from subjects merely tell us when they think they were having the experiences, which is not reliable particularly when you are talking about trauma. Memory is a tricky thing.

This is objective corroboration. . .anecdotal stories. . .

Unless you can point to a setting where a patient was intentionally brought into a near death state with everyone in the room taking objective notes and measurements in real time for the express purpose of carefully studying a NDE, you literally have nothing BUT an anecdotal story and not real science deserving of the name.

[Consul]

The supernaturalistic, substance-dualistic interpretation of near-death experiences (NDEs) and out-of-body experiences (OBEs) is unconvincing.

QUOTE>
"An alternative, naturalistic approach to understanding NDEs depends on the findings that all the components of the classical NDE can be caused by cortical disinhibition and excessive uncontrolled brain activity. This can occur in conditions of severe stress, extreme fear, and cerebral anoxia, as well as with certain drugs, and we already have most of the ideas needed to understand why this should cause NDEs. Tunnels and lights are caused by disinhibition in visual cortex, and strange noises by disinhibition in auditory cortex. OBEs and life reviews can be induced by heightened temporal lobe activity, and the positive emotions and lack of pain have been attributed to the action of endorphins and encephalins, endogenous opiates which are widely distributed in the limbic system and released under stress. The visions of other worlds and spiritual beings might be real glimpses into another world, but against that hypothesis is that the worlds described tend to fit people’s cultural upbringing and religious beliefs. In the popular genre of ‘Heaven tourism’, Christians report seeing Jesus, angels, and a door or gate into heaven. Yet Hindus are more likely to meet the king of the dead and his messengers, the Yamdoots.

All these apparently strange experiences – sleep paralysis, lucid dreams, OBEs, and NDEs – once seemed inexplicable. But now that we are beginning to understand them, they seem not to provide evidence for other worlds or consciousness beyond the brain but, like dreaming or psychedelic states, to offer important test cases for intuitions about the relations between conscious and unconscious, between real and unreal, between self and body, and between retrospective verbal report and ‘experience itself’. Not least, these times when sensory input and bodily interaction with the world are reduced and experience seems more self-generated encourage us to reflect on who or what is doing the generating – that is, on the nature of our selves."

(Blackmore, Susan, and Emily T. Troscianko. Consciousness: An Introduction. 3rd ed. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018. p. 430)
<QUOTE

Sorry, but this quote doesn't even begin to address what's happening in NDEs. It's a typical response, so that's understandable, but it also shows that she hasn't studied NDEs in depth.

Yes, she (Blackmore at least) has! See e.g. her book Seeing Myself: What Out-of-body Experiences Tell Us About Life, Death and the Mind (2020)!
Also:
https://www.susanblackmore.uk/near-death-experiences/
https://www.susanblackmore.uk/out-of-body-experiences/

There are plenty of corroborated NDEs that have happened when there is no measurable brain activity, so this idea that it's uncontrolled brain activity is a myth.

The crucial timing problem concerning the question when exactly NDEs happen hasn't really been solved, and the imperfect measurement instruments used such as EEG cannot rule out the possibility that there is still electrical activity somewhere in the brain that remains undetected by them; so a flat (isoelectric) EEG doesn't necessarily mean that there is no neural activity left.

Anyway, the assertion that there can be conscious states during a temporary brain death is self-undermining, because if the brain of someone undergoing an NDE were completely "dead", i.e. 100% neurally inactive, then no NDE memories could be formed and stored, since memory traces require neural processes. Therefore, nobody having undergone an NDE during a temporary brain death could possibly recall it. But those claiming to have undergone an NDE allegedly do recall it, so they cannot be right if their NDEs took place when their brains were dead. For if there occurred NDEs during a temporary brain death, nobody could possibly have any recollective memories of them, since the forming and storing of memories require an electrochemically active, functioning brain. Veridical NDE memories (which aren't posterior confabulations) cannot have been formed when there was no neural activity in their brains. It follows that if there really occurred conscious states during a temporary brain death, they would be unrecallable and thus unknowable in principle!