Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
- Sam26
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Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
On Certainty is a response to Moore's papers, Proof of an External World and A Defense of Common Sense in which Moore proposes a number of propositions that he claims to know with certainty. Propositions such as the following: "Here is one hand" and "There exists at present a living human body, which is my body (G.E. Moore, Philosophical Papers (1959), p. 1)." Moore continues to enumerate other propositions that he claims to know, with certainty, to be true. These propositions provide for Moore a proof of the external world, and as such, they supposedly form a buttress against the skeptic.
So, it is not only Moore's claim to knowledge that Wittgenstein criticizes, but he also critiques the skeptic, and specifically their use of the word doubt. Wittgenstein's response to Moore's propositions is not entirely unsympathetic, although he argues that Moore's propositions do not accomplish what Moore thinks they do, namely, to provide a proof of the external world. Moore's proof is supposed to undermine the doubts of the skeptic. It is also supposed to demonstrate that the conclusion follows necessarily, and if it does, then the skeptic's doubts are supposed to vanish - at least in theory. The proof would look something like the following:
1) Moore has knowledge that he has two hands.
2) Moore infers from the fact that he has two hands, to the conclusion that
there exists an external world.
3) Hence, Moore knows that an external world exists.
Wittgenstein is challenging the first premise in the above argument; more specifically, he is challenging Moore's claim that he has knowledge of his hands. Having knowledge of something presupposes that there are good reasons (at least in most cases) to believe it, but exactly what is it that Moore has knowledge of? He claims to have knowledge of the existence of his hands, but what would count as evidence for such a claim? Do I know that I have hands because I check to see if they are there every morning? Do I make a study of my hands, and thereby conclude that I do indeed have hands? I have knowledge of chemistry, physics, history, epistemology, and other subjects, and there are ways to confirm my knowledge. However, in our everyday lives do we need to confirm that we have hands? And do we normally doubt such things?
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
- Sam26
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
"If you do know that here is one hand [G.E. Moore, Proof of an External World], we'll grant you all the rest. When one says that such and such a proposition can't be proved, of course that does not mean that it can't be derived from other propositions; any proposition can be derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself (OC, 1)."
So, Wittgenstein grants that if Moore does indeed know that he has a hand, then Moore's conclusion follows (see previous post). The skeptic says that such a proposition can't be proved. This doesn't mean, according to Wittgenstein, that we can't derive them based on other propositions. However, the derivation may not be any stronger than the proposition we started with. My interpretation is that there is something foundational (not the traditional view of foundationalism) here, viz., that some propositions are foundational to our claims of knowledge or our claims of doubt. When you reach bedrock no part of the foundational structure is stronger.
"From it seeming to me--or to everyone--to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so. What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it (OC, 2)."
The skeptic may have a point (although it may not be the point he/she is trying to make), that just because people (or Moore) say something is so, it doesn't follow that it is. However, Wittgenstein points out that what we need to ask, is whether the doubt makes sense. Doubting occurs in a language-game, and language-games have rules - later Wittgenstein will point out that a doubt that doubts everything is not a doubt. Some kinds of doubting make no sense, i.e., if you start out doubting everything, then doubting loses all sense.
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
- Sam26
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
"If for e.g. someone says 'I don't know if there's a hand here' he might be told 'Look closer'.--This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features (OC, 3)."
The language-game of doubt, and what it means in a particular context to overcome the doubt.
"'I know that I am a human being.' In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean 'I know I have the organs of a human'. (E.g. a brain which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as 'I know I have a brain'? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on (OC, 4)."
Here we begin to see the connection between the use of the word know, and the use of the word doubt. The negation of the proposition "I know that I am a human being" illustrates this. Wittgenstein points out what it might mean, but we get a sense of how unclear the former proposition is by its negation. The negation being "I don't know that I am a human being."
What are the grounds for doubt? What are the grounds for knowing? Maybe part of the confusion lies in the fact that we can imagine situations were we can doubt such propositions. However, can we doubt the propositions Moore is using, and can we doubt them in Moore's contexts?
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
"Whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends on what I make count as determinants for that proposition (OC, 5)."
This is an interesting point, many of our beliefs are indeed determined by what we make count as evidence. In fact, most arguments are over this very thing. For instance, some religious people believe there is evidence for the existence of God, but others do not believe there is evidence, or at least good evidence. I am not saying there is or there isn't evidence for the existence of God, only that a proposition is true or false for me or you based on what we allow to count as evidence. In fact, language-games can arise to support any system of belief. However, it's not the language-game itself that decides whether we have knowledge of X or Y, otherwise we could create language-games to support any belief.
Language-games can give support for the correct use of certain words; and in the case of On Certainty, we are looking at how we use the word know. So, not all language-games are created equal. We need to look at the original use, and how a word has developed over the years, i.e., the language-game and grammar that surrounded the word's birth and growth.
"Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.--For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed (OC, 6)."
This is where Wittgenstein begins to show that Moore's use of the word know is contrary to the word's original home, i.e., contrary to how the word is normally used. There is a kind of logic of use involved in Wittgenstein's method throughout On Certainty.
For the longest time I didn't know exactly what Wittgenstein was referring too, when he made the following statement about Moore's proposition: "...a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed."
However, in a later passage he seems to clarify what he has in mind. In OC 42 Wittgenstein speaks of the "mental state of conviction," and that this state of conviction is something that occurs regardless of whether a proposition is true or false. Wittgenstein seems to refer to it as a subjective state of certainty, and we observe this in the way people speak or gesticulate. The way we gesticulate will often show our convictions. Moore's claim to knowledge seems to be more in line with this subjective state of certainty, than with real knowledge claims. This will be developed more as we look at these passages.
Finally, if some of you want to learn how Wittgenstein examines words using the methods in the Philosophical Investigations - I believe On Certainty puts Wittgenstein's methods (the methods of the PI) to use, i.e., we can learn how to apply his methods by a close examination of OC.
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
But my position is that all that can be known with certainty is the content of your own conscious experience.
From there on, it's inference built upon inference.
So I know the phenomenal experience of having a hand exists, because the nature of experience is direct access (knowledge) to its content.
Does that mean my hand or brain actually exist independantly of my experience - I can't think of a way of establishing that with certainty. And the same goes for your hands, and trees and the laws of physics and everything else which is known to me in the form of the content of my experience.
When we talk about ''objective knowledge'' we generally mean we've compared notes on the content of our experience, and they reliably tally. I can point to a tree and ask a hundred people if they see the tree, and they'll reliably agree. So objective knowledge has to be of physically observable stuff, or the conceptualised extrapolations we makes from observing measurements and patterns (eg physical causality, the law of gravity). And we end up with the physicaist model of what the world is made of and how it works, based on the scientific method of observation and measurement, and falsifiability by comparing notes on those observations and measurements. What we're actually comparing is the content of our experience inter-subjectively - you see the tree too.
Now it's such observations of the way the world works which I think give rise to notions of reason and logic. We observe two physical things can't be in the same place for example. A tree can't simultaneously not be a tree. If A happens, causality or observed patterns we call physical laws mean B will follow.
So to get to a place where logic kicks in, we've already made the inference that a real world exists independantly of my conscious experience, made the further inference that if I compare notes with other experiencing subjects who share that world with me we can ''objectively'' know (physical) facts about it, and the further inference that (physical) facts about the way our (physical) world works are so reliable we can treat them as (physical) laws which have a logic to them which will always hold.
Then QM comes along and says think again! At the fundamental level causality is probabilististic, a physical object has no location until an observation is made and the field collapses, there is action at a distance.
So to say my hand exists (and what that actually means) requires inference built upon inference, guided by a logic which isn't as reliable as we thought, and is itself inferred.
The counter to all that is - it works. If I don't believe my physical hand and walls exist in reality, I find out punching a wall feels bloody real. So it may as well be.
- Sam26
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
Your view has its adherents, so you're not alone. For me, and I believe Wittgenstein and others, epistemology is a linguistic expression, i.e., we learn to use concepts in social environments, and this is where meaning takes place. For example, when we observe how children learn to use words we can see that this happens socially. In other words, we observe how they use words in particular contexts, which society deems to be correct or incorrect. Wittgenstein demonstrates this very early on in the Philosophical Investigations. His example is very primitive but it highlights an important aspect of linguistic training. The example he uses is one that takes place between a builder and his assistant. This example, is also an instance of what Wittgenstein refers to as a language-game. In this language-game the builder calls out to the assistant for a block, pillar, slab, or beam (PI 2), and the assistant, who is the student in this case, either responds correctly or not, depending on whether he/she brings the correct object. One of the key points is how we learn concepts in social settings, i.e., we learn to use words this way. There are logical rules implicit in this primitive game; and the rules of any language-game, including the language-game of epistemology, develop in this way. So, meaning happens separate from you. What's happening inward is not relevant to what it means, for example, to know. This isn't to deny that consciousness plays a part in this societal game, but only to say that meaning is something that happens between people, an agreement of sorts. There is an important connection here (one that's very problematic) between what I'm saying, and what Wittgenstein points out later in the PI about having a private language, and the rules associated with a private language. The so-called private language argument further illustrates the point that meaning is derived socially and not inwardly.
You wrote more, but for now I'm only going to respond this part to stay on topic. The first part of what you said is something that is important to this discussion.
Thanks,
Sam
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
"My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on.--I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc, etc. (OC, 7)"
Our lives show that we have certain beliefs, and many of these beliefs are shown by our actions. The very act of sitting at a computer and typing shows my belief that there is a keyboard; that I have hands; that I am controlling my fingers; that what I type is saved to a hard drive, etc, etc. I don't even think about it, i.e., I don't think to myself and say, "Is this really a keyboard?" After all there is no reason to doubt it, and even if I did doubt it, would that doubt really amount to anything? That I am certain of these beliefs is reflected in what I do. We all act in ways that show our certainty of the world around us. Occasionally things do cause us to doubt our surroundings, but usually these things are out of the ordinary. I am referring to our sensory experiences, i.e., generally we can trust our senses even if occasionally we draw the wrong conclusion based on what we see, hear, smell, etc.
The backdrop of reality grounds us, if this wasn't the case, then the skeptic would have an argument. However, the skeptic tends to doubt things that shouldn't be doubted. They doubt that which is outside the language-game of doubting; and they violate the rules of doubting within the language-game of doubting. Similarly, Moore is extending the use of the word know beyond its normal use, beyond the grammar associated with the word.
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
Anyway here's my response to your reply to me. Happy to leave it for now if you want to finish your outline.
Maybe I'm still not getting it, but I don't agree that knowing requires linguistic expression to exist, it strikes me that's putting the cart before the horse. I can know I have a pain in my toe, without having learned words for pain and toe. In fact we created words for pain and toe, because we know the experience of pain in toes. Or I might have a pain in my oesophagus, before I even learn there's such a thing called an oesophagus (I still couldn't point to it).
So I don't think that having a word for my hand, with particular associated learned connotations, is the basis for believing something called ''my hand'' exists. It's the mental experience of the seeing, feeling, moving of my hand which makes me inclined to believe it exists.
Of course symbols like language aren't identical with what they symbolise, and there are rules about how we teach language which influence how we think about the things words symbolise, I think that becomes something of a back and forth process, especially as we 'think' in words. And when we communicate with language, my associations with a word or concept won't be identical to yours.
As regards meaning, again I believe meaning is rooted in conscious experience, not language. If I have a pain in my toe that is meaningful, because I'm experiencing it. Now if I want to tell you about it, we need a shared way of communicating in order to compare notes about our private conscious experience, because you can't see my toe pain. You can see a tree if I point to it because it's physical and 'out there', and we can agree to call it ''a tree'', along with other tree-like stuff we come across. It's an observable/measurable physical feature of our shared world model. Inter-subjective, third person falsifiable knowledge. But we can't know exactly what the other is experiencing when looking at the tree, or exactly what that term means to each of us, its connotations, associations, what memories it evokes, etc - what it fully means to each of us. The nitty gritty of that will be correlated in our own unique neural interactions, shaped by past experience.
So I reckon me and W are in opposite corners on this. It's probably safe to assume he's given it more thought than me tho, so am I missing something?
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
- Sam26
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
No problem, my thoughts will go on for quite some time.
The one thing that's difficult to do is separate language from our inner experiences. So, if we do separate language from our inner life, then we just have the inner experiences, and the corresponding primitive belief (brain) states. And, as you pointed out there is no concept that's associated with these inner experiences, because there is no language in our example. No one, including Wittgenstein, is denying that we have these primitive belief states (at least as I interpret W.). Our tendency is to think that primitive belief states, which by the way are prior to linguistic beliefs (as expressed either verbally or as statements/propositions), have linguistic content. They do have content in the world, but that content is expressed in our actions. In fact, we see this in our everyday lives. For instance, the act of opening a door shows our belief that there is a door there, the act is a non-linguistic belief. The process of knowing (justifying our beliefs) is strictly a linguistic endeavor, it comes later in our belief system, as beliefs expressed in statements/propositions. A baby prior to learning language expresses these primitive belief states in their actions (reaching for something, touching their toes, tasting something, etc).Gertie wrote: ↑September 11th, 2021, 11:53 am Maybe I'm still not getting it, but I don't agree that knowing requires linguistic expression to exist, it strikes me that's putting the cart before the horse. I can know I have a pain in my toe, without having learned words for pain and toe. In fact we created words for pain and toe, because we know the experience of pain in toes. Or I might have a pain in my oesophagus, before I even learn there's such a thing called an oesophagus (I still couldn't point to it).
So I don't think that having a word for my hand, with particular associated learned connotations, is the basis for believing something called ''my hand'' exists. It's the mental experience of the seeing, feeling, moving of my hand which makes me inclined to believe it exists.
I do want to point out that there is a kind of inner certainty that's being expressed in primitive man, and even in our modern everyday lives, but this feeling is not a linguistic phenomenon or event. This inner certainty is expressed in our actions, not linguistically. Obviously if you have a language, then you can express your inner certainty. However, when you do, it enters the realm of the language-game, and it subject to all the associated rules of linguistics. Knowing is something that happens necessarily in language, it's not a private happening, i.e., what it means to know, and all the associated beliefs are linguistic. It's something that happens between people as verbal or written statements. You don't justify to yourself that you have a hand, you simply have it, and your actions show that you believe that you have it.
I'm not saying that there isn't inner knowledge being acquired, but that knowledge is expressed as language. It's not some private thing we acquire apart from language. I think many people confuse the inner certainty we feel, as knowledge, but that is quite different.
Having a hand is part of base reality, it's bedrock, it's what gives life to all that follows, including language. I'll explain this as I go along.
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
"The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at all except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong. In a law-court, for example, "I am certain" could replace "I know" in every piece of testimony. We might even imagine its being forbidden to say "I know" there. [A passage in Wilhelm Meister, where "You know" or "You knew" is used in the sense "You were certain", the fact being different from what he knew.] (OC, ."
This passage seems to be straight forward, i.e., in many instances we can use the two words know and certain interchangeably; and this is probably where some confusion occurs. Except, as Wittgenstein says where it's "...meant to mean: I can't be wrong." - this seems to be a reference to Moore's propositions. Moore seems to be saying that here is a hand, and I can't be wrong about this, or many of the other propositions Moore uses. There seems to be something special about Moore's propositions, and Wittgenstein picks up on this. It's probably why Wittgenstein has some sympathy for Moore's argument.
It seems to be the case that Wittgenstein uses the word certain in both the subjective and the objective sense. The latter is akin to knowing, the former is reflective of my inner state of subjectivity.
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
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Re: Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"
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