Some thoughts on Wittgenstein's final notes called "On Certainty"

[Sam26]

Geez, this site has some weird quirks. I spent a lot of time writing a response and lost it all because it logged me out without me knowing. Ya, I should have saved what I wrote as I went along, obviously. I'm use to other forums where this doesn't happen, and I'm use to being able to edit things even after they've been posted. Oh well, just one of those things.

[Gertie]

It's so frustrating when that happens! Don't know about you but I find it hard to get my mojo back to start again.

It might help if I say I accept the gist of this description of W's notion of language games, which basically strikes me as saying context affects meaning in language, I've no major prob with this much -

Wittgenstein develops this discussion of games into the key notion of a language-game. Wittgenstein introduces the term using simple examples, but intends it to be used for the many ways in which we use language. The central component of language games is that they are uses of language, and language is used in multifarious ways. For example, in one language-game, a word might be used to stand for (or refer to) an object, but in another the same word might be used for giving orders, or for asking questions, and so on. The famous example is the meaning of the word "game". We speak of various kinds of games: board games, betting games, sports, "war games". These are all different uses of the word "games". Wittgenstein also gives the example of "Water!", which can be used as an exclamation, an order, a request, or an answer to a question. The meaning of the word depends on the language-game within which it is being used. Another way Wittgenstein puts the point is that the word "water" has no meaning apart from its use within a language-game. One might use the word as an order to have someone else bring you a glass of water. But it can also be used to warn someone that the water has been poisoned. One might even use the word as code by members of a secret society.

Wittgenstein does not limit the application of his concept of language games to word-meaning. He also applies it to sentence-meaning. For example, the sentence "Moses did not exist" (§79) can mean various things. Wittgenstein argues that independently of use the sentence does not yet 'say' anything. It is 'meaningless' in the sense of not being significant for a particular purpose. It only acquires significance if we fix it within some context of use. Thus, it fails to say anything because the sentence as such does not yet determine some particular use. The sentence is only meaningful when it is used to say something. For instance, it can be used so as to say that no person or historical figure fits the set of descriptions attributed to the person that goes by the name of "Moses". But it can also mean that the leader of the Israelites was not called Moses. Or that there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses, etc. What the sentence means thus depends on its context of use.

These meanings are not separated from each other by sharp boundaries, but blend into one another (as suggested by the idea of family resemblance). The concept is based on the following analogy: The rules of language are analogous to the rules of games; thus saying something in a language is analogous to making a move in a game. The analogy between a language and a game demonstrates that words have meaning depending on the uses made of them in the various and multiform activities of human life. (The concept is not meant to suggest that there is anything trivial about language, or that language is "just a game".)

[Sam26]

It's so frustrating when that happens! Don't know about you but I find it hard to get my mojo back to start again.

Yes, I spent a couple of hours writing some things on the private language argument, which relates to what we're talking about, but I lost it all. And, I have lost my mojo, so it will be a while before I redo it. One of the things I like about the other philosophy site I belong to, is that when you do pre-post writing it doesn't disappear, it's there whether you logout or not. You can login weeks later and it's still there. You can also edit your own posts whenever you want.

Anyway, I'll get back to this soon, I hope.

[Sam26]

Gertie says, "Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject.

I want to specifically respond to statements like this, which is important to what Wittgenstein is saying in OC, and it directly relates to the PLA in the PI.

Private Language Argument (PI 243-315)

In the Philosophical Investigations (PI 243) Wittgenstein starts by asking an important question. “But could we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?” But don’t we often write down our feeling and moods, etc., in private? Wittgenstein replies, “This isn’t what I mean,” i.e., the words in this example are not something others understand. It’s a private language, i.e., it’s only known to him or her.

Wittgenstein also asks, “How do words refer to sensations?—There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about sensations every day and give them names?” However, the real question is how is the relationship between the name and its referent set up? How is it, Wittgenstein continues (I’m quoting and paraphrasing PI 244), that a human being learns the meaning of the names of their sensations? A child learns to connect their natural expression of pain with words, and later sentences. As the child learns how to associate language with their pain, the child is taught new pain-behavior. This, Wittgenstein points out, doesn’t mean that the word pain really means crying, the word pain replaces crying. It doesn’t describe it.

In PI 246 Wittgenstein asks, “In what sense are my sensations private?”—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “to know” as it is normally used (and how else are to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.—Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself!—It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain? What is it supposed to mean[my emphasis]—except perhaps that I am in pain?”

Others know when you are in pain (unless you’re purposely hiding your pain), i.e., they’re justified in believing you’re in pain because of what you tell them, or because of your pain behavior (screams, cries, wincing, etc.). So, others are justified in their knowledge of your pain, but you’re not. You don’t justify to yourself that you’re in pain. This is senseless.

So, you say to someone, “I am in pain,” they respond, “Are you sure, maybe you’re mistaken.” You see how silly it sounds. Making a claim to knowledge carries with it the idea that you’re justified in your belief, which is something that’s verified. Sometimes it turns out that my justification is unfounded. Hence, this is why Wittgenstein points out in OC 12 that knowing “…seems [note the word seems] to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression ‘I thought I knew.’” It often turns out that we are wrong in our claims to know, but how would that work with having a pain, or any sensation we're having?

I will continue the analysis of the PLA.

[Gertie]

Gertie says, "Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject.

I want to specifically respond to statements like this, which is important to what Wittgenstein is saying in OC, and it directly relates to the PLA in the PI.

Private Language Argument (PI 243-315)

In the Philosophical Investigations (PI 243) Wittgenstein starts by asking an important question. “But could we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?” But don’t we often write down our feeling and moods, etc., in private? Wittgenstein replies, “This isn’t what I mean,” i.e., the words in this example are not something others understand. It’s a private language, i.e., it’s only known to him or her.

Wittgenstein also asks, “How do words refer to sensations?—There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about sensations every day and give them names?” However, the real question is how is the relationship between the name and its referent set up? How is it, Wittgenstein continues (I’m quoting and paraphrasing PI 244), that a human being learns the meaning of the names of their sensations? A child learns to connect their natural expression of pain with words, and later sentences. As the child learns how to associate language with their pain, the child is taught new pain-behavior. This, Wittgenstein points out, doesn’t mean that the word pain really means crying, the word pain replaces crying. It doesn’t describe it.

In PI 246 Wittgenstein asks, “In what sense are my sensations private?”—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “to know” as it is normally used (and how else are to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.—Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself!—It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain? What is it supposed to mean[my emphasis]—except perhaps that I am in pain?”

Others know when you are in pain (unless you’re purposely hiding your pain), i.e., they’re justified in believing you’re in pain because of what you tell them, or because of your pain behavior (screams, cries, wincing, etc.). So, others are justified in their knowledge of your pain, but you’re not. You don’t justify to yourself that you’re in pain. This is senseless.

So, you say to someone, “I am in pain,” they respond, “Are you sure, maybe you’re mistaken.” You see how silly it sounds. Making a claim to knowledge carries with it the idea that you’re justified in your belief, which is something that’s verified. Sometimes it turns out that my justification is unfounded. Hence, this is why Wittgenstein points out in OC 12 that knowing “…seems [note the word seems] to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression ‘I thought I knew.’” It often turns out that we are wrong in our claims to know, but how would that work with having a pain, or any sensation we're having?

To know something is experiential. Knowing is an aspect of experiencing.

I don't think this is controversial, but if you disagree with that, why?

Further, the knowing of the experience itself cannot be mistaken because of the direct, first person nature of experiencing - if you disagree with that, why?

Nothing else but the experience itself can be known in this direct, first person way, so only my experience is certain. All other knowing is inferred from the content of the experience, including the existence of a world independant of experience - if you disagree with that, why?


If you agree so far, we should also agree the following -

If we want to check our experience is an accurate representaion of the real world, we have to do that inter-subjectively, comparing notes with other people's private, first person experience. This is where language comes in, as a symbolic expression of private experience. Or we can infer it from observing how others act.


So if I want to test my first person experience ''I have a hand'' I can use language to ask others if they experience seeing it too. Or I can punch them with it to see if they react. In other words, I'm checking if they are experiencing the physical/observable /public aspects of my hand. Which is the experiential third person way of knowing if my hand exists available to them.


The counter to this is -


Others know when you are in pain (unless you’re purposely hiding your pain), i.e., they’re justified in believing you’re in pain because of what you tell them, or because of your pain behavior (screams, cries, wincing, etc.). So, others are justified in their knowledge of your pain, but you’re not. You don’t justify to yourself that you’re in pain. This is senseless.


This assumes I have to justify to myself that I am in pain in order to have ''knowledge'' that I am in pain, in some way other than the directly known experiencing of being in pain.

But I'm claiming all knowing is experiential, as outlined above. So you need to address that.

[Gertie]

Now pain.

The difference between knowledge of the existence of my hand and knowledge of the existence of a pain in my hand, is that physical aspects if hands are observable (experienciable) to third person experiencing subjects. Where-as the pain I feel in my hand isn't physically manifested in a way which is third person observable. It is only experienced privately, first person, by me.

Third person falsifiability is, as I said, the best we can do to ascertain True knowledge about physical/observable stuff. We can test these experiences inter-subjectively, and discover error. So I might be wrong it is raining, that might be a false belief, if everyone else who looks observes (experiences seeing) it is raining.

That test isn't available to an experience like pain. It can't be observed by third persons, so we have to rely on what experiencing person says, or observing their behaviour.

But to conclude from that I can't know my hand is painful, because you can't experience my pain, doesn't work, if all knowing is experiential. It's saying only third person accessible stuff is knowable.

You can define knowledge that way by fiat, but Im saying that if knowing is experiential, which it just is, what you're doing is excluding private first person experience which isn't inter-subjectively verifiable by other people's private first person experience!