Ok, how about this angle. Think of consciousness on a scale from 0 for rocks to 100 for mammals. If an organism scores 0.0001, I agree that that is technically infinitely larger than zero, an emergence. However, it is also much closer to zero than 100.Consul wrote: ↑October 6th, 2021, 4:38 pmEven that "smallest level of phenomenal consciousness" is either there or not there! It cannot be half-present and half-absent.Sy Borg wrote: ↑October 6th, 2021, 3:38 pmThe smallest level of phenomenal consciousness would be so feeble and inconsistent, and very likely intermittent, that the difference between those extremely weak perceptions and none at all is moot when compared with human consciousness. It's akin to us talking about how many atoms are needed before humans can see them.
Epistemic indeterminacy or uncertainty about the absence or presence of P-consciousness from the perspective of external observers is one thing, and ontic indeterminacy about its absence or presence is another thing. The former is certainly possible, but the latter is not.
Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
Huh? "A because A"?
"What we can observe cannot matter"? Really? If by "we" he means "humans with normal observational faculties suitably situated" (as would normally be meant in such a context), then what other observers does he have in mind? And if the activities in question were "so small, or perhaps so big, that they would be unobservable by us whatever extensions of our senses we were able to achieve by artificial means," then we would be perfectly entitled to impute consciousness to rocks. Or any other pseudo-property we impute to things based on their behavior --- including "purposive beings" and "rational agent." The warrant for applying those, too, is behavioral --- on behavior observable by us.There may be rational beings whose highly effi cient activities we could discern only under a high-powered microscope. It would not be plausible to say that their activities cannot be counted as behavior, because they are not ordinarily observable by us. Nor can we rule out the possibility that there are purposive beings, and indeed rational agents, whose physical activities are so small, or perhaps so big, that they would be unobservable by us whatever extensions of our senses we were able to achieve by artificial means. What we can observe cannot matter."[/i]
That argument amounts to a rejection of empiricism, and thus the entire scientific enterprise. It is a reductio ad absurdum.
Whatever mysterious property Strawson imagines his hypothetical creatures might have, if it does not manifest in behaviors of a certain kind, observable by us, then it does not warrant the term "consciousness," and so denoting it is gratuitous.
That is a somewhat metaphorical use of "behavior," and while acceptable as such, "mental actions" are NOT the sorts of actions which warrant attribution of consciousness, e.g., that we would examine when trying to decide whether cats or tadpoles are conscious.He also argues plausibly that thinking and imagining are or can be mental actions, and that mental actions are forms of behavior—inner behavior.
Good point.You're right, because if behavior is what organisms do, then a natural evolution of conscious organisms doing nothing (apart from watching and thinking perhaps) is more than unlikely. Moreover, some forms of behavior do seem to require consciousness. For instance, how could Beethoven have composed his symphonies without experiencing any sounds or mental images of sounds (musical imagination)?
Yes, the specification of the relevant sorts of behavior will be more elaborate than mere corporeal motion.By the way, the very concept of (outer) behavior is pretty hard to define. For instance, it's inadequate to say that behavior is corporeal motion, because when animals are playing dead, this is a form of behavior characterized by the absence of corporeal motion: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apparent_death
More later on the McGinn material.
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
Why disagree? Because in many cases behaviour does not give "an excellent indication of what goes on inside", that's why. To an extent, you are attempting 'mind-reading', which is what I am disagreeing with. It's not your use of guesswork, which we all use for much of the time, having no alternative. I disagree with characterising guesswork as something more authoritative, e.g. describing guesswork as offering an "excellent indication" of what is guessed-at.Sy Borg wrote: ↑October 6th, 2021, 3:35 pmWhy disagree? Autistic people indeed give the impression of being conscious beings (when they are awake haha), so that supports my point.
I'm not talking about mind reading but using behavioural cues to determine whether an organism is conscious or not.
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
Yes, but there is still a binary distinction between C = 0 and C > 0.Sy Borg wrote: ↑October 6th, 2021, 4:47 pmOk, how about this angle. Think of consciousness on a scale from 0 for rocks to 100 for mammals. If an organism scores 0.0001, I agree that that is technically infinitely larger than zero, an emergence. However, it is also much closer to zero than 100.Consul wrote: ↑October 6th, 2021, 4:38 pmEpistemic indeterminacy or uncertainty about the absence or presence of P-consciousness from the perspective of external observers is one thing, and ontic indeterminacy about its absence or presence is another thing. The former is certainly possible, but the latter is not.
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
Sorry, I inadvertently quoted the same because-sentence twice.
Of course, observability is a necessary condition for a science of behavior; but Strawson's point is that it's not a necessary condition for behavior. It's not part of the definition of behavior.GE Morton wrote: ↑October 6th, 2021, 8:07 pm"What we can observe cannot matter"? Really? If by "we" he means "humans with normal observational faculties suitably situated" (as would normally be meant in such a context), then what other observers does he have in mind? And if the activities in question were "so small, or perhaps so big, that they would be unobservable by us whatever extensions of our senses we were able to achieve by artificial means," then we would be perfectly entitled to impute consciousness to rocks. Or any other pseudo-property we impute to things based on their behavior --- including "purposive beings" and "rational agent." The warrant for applying those, too, is behavioral --- on behavior observable by us.Consul wrote: ↑October 6th, 2021, 2:13 pmStrawson: "There may be rational beings whose highly efficient activities we could discern only under a high-powered microscope. It would not be plausible to say that their activities cannot be counted as behavior, because they are not ordinarily observable by us. Nor can we rule out the possibility that there are purposive beings, and indeed rational agents, whose physical activities are so small, or perhaps so big, that they would be unobservable by us whatever extensions of our senses we were able to achieve by artificial means. What we can observe cannot matter."
That argument amounts to a rejection of empiricism, and thus the entire scientific enterprise. It is a reductio ad absurdum.
Whatever mysterious property Strawson imagines his hypothetical creatures might have, if it does not manifest in behaviors of a certain kind, observable by us, then it does not warrant the term "consciousness," and so denoting it is gratuitous.
Thinking and imagining are conscious actions or passions, so thinking or imagining beings are conscious beings. This is not to say that all experiencing beings are thinking or imagining beings.GE Morton wrote: ↑October 6th, 2021, 8:07 pmThat is a somewhat metaphorical use of "behavior," and while acceptable as such, "mental actions" are NOT the sorts of actions which warrant attribution of consciousness, e.g., that we would examine when trying to decide whether cats or tadpoles are conscious.
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
Yes, but an organism with C=0.0001 will rely so much on automatic reflexes that the difference between them and complex echinoderms and cnidarians would be moot. One might say a flatworm is more like a jellyfish than it is like us, despite being brained organisms.Consul wrote: ↑October 7th, 2021, 10:20 amYes, but there is still a binary distinction between C = 0 and C > 0.Sy Borg wrote: ↑October 6th, 2021, 4:47 pmOk, how about this angle. Think of consciousness on a scale from 0 for rocks to 100 for mammals. If an organism scores 0.0001, I agree that that is technically infinitely larger than zero, an emergence. However, it is also much closer to zero than 100.Consul wrote: ↑October 6th, 2021, 4:38 pmEpistemic indeterminacy or uncertainty about the absence or presence of P-consciousness from the perspective of external observers is one thing, and ontic indeterminacy about its absence or presence is another thing. The former is certainly possible, but the latter is not.
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
There is still a real difference between nonsentience and minimal sentience, even if there is little or no behavioral difference between the first sentient species and its immediate nonsentient ancestor species.Sy Borg wrote: ↑October 7th, 2021, 7:03 pmYes, but an organism with C=0.0001 will rely so much on automatic reflexes that the difference between them and complex echinoderms and cnidarians would be moot. One might say a flatworm is more like a jellyfish than it is like us, despite being brained organisms.
Anyway, what is your consciousness scale supposed to measure?
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
I'm not referring to the superficial level of detail pertaining toGE Morton wrote: ↑October 5th, 2021, 11:32 pmYes, it does. But so does every other true declarative sentence.John_Jacquard wrote: ↑October 5th, 2021, 10:58 pm
Any explanation involves the use of symbols to represent a pattern of information.
True. It doesn't need one; the relationships between words and things are arbitrary, established by conventions in a given speech community.But a symbol has no literal connection to the pattern of information it represents .
What are you claiming that explanation is an attribute of?The attribute of explanation being possible in reality.
"Reality" is not "able to be explained." There is no ability of "reality" involved. WE are able to explain things. You're using the passive voice to attribute an ability to "reality" that belongs to us.( why should reality be able to be explained? )
Symbols representing information.
For instance physical matter is a symbol that represents information.
All aspects of reality itself involve symbols that represent a pattern of information .
I'm not looking at a subjective superficial instance.
( for example a specific individual using language within their narrow subjective experience)
I'm referring to reality itself .
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
How significant do you hold the development if a particular individual's centralized nervous system ?Sy Borg wrote: ↑October 7th, 2021, 7:03 pmYes, but an organism with C=0.0001 will rely so much on automatic reflexes that the difference between them and complex echinoderms and cnidarians would be moot. One might say a flatworm is more like a jellyfish than it is like us, despite being brained organisms.Consul wrote: ↑October 7th, 2021, 10:20 amYes, but there is still a binary distinction between C = 0 and C > 0.Sy Borg wrote: ↑October 6th, 2021, 4:47 pmOk, how about this angle. Think of consciousness on a scale from 0 for rocks to 100 for mammals. If an organism scores 0.0001, I agree that that is technically infinitely larger than zero, an emergence. However, it is also much closer to zero than 100.Consul wrote: ↑October 6th, 2021, 4:38 pmEpistemic indeterminacy or uncertainty about the absence or presence of P-consciousness from the perspective of external observers is one thing, and ontic indeterminacy about its absence or presence is another thing. The former is certainly possible, but the latter is not.
( regarding your consciousness scale ?)
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
Not sure what you are asking. Whether I think the evolution of the CNS makes a difference? It depends on the CNS, be it a simple nerve cord of a flatworm or a mammal's large and complex system.John_Jacquard wrote: ↑October 8th, 2021, 2:32 pmHow significant do you hold the development if a particular individual's centralized nervous system ?Sy Borg wrote: ↑October 7th, 2021, 7:03 pmYes, but an organism with C=0.0001 will rely so much on automatic reflexes that the difference between them and complex echinoderms and cnidarians would be moot. One might say a flatworm is more like a jellyfish than it is like us, despite being brained organisms.
( regarding your consciousness scale ?)
How much does a rudimentary brain offer that a relatively sophisticated nerve ring does not? Hard to know.
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
It refers to phenomenal consciousness. That is what we're talking about, yes?Consul wrote: ↑October 8th, 2021, 1:04 pmThere is still a real difference between nonsentience and minimal sentience, even if there is little or no behavioral difference between the first sentient species and its immediate nonsentient ancestor species.Sy Borg wrote: ↑October 7th, 2021, 7:03 pmYes, but an organism with C=0.0001 will rely so much on automatic reflexes that the difference between them and complex echinoderms and cnidarians would be moot. One might say a flatworm is more like a jellyfish than it is like us, despite being brained organisms.
Anyway, what is your consciousness scale supposed to measure?
If we say an organism, such as an ameoeba, has no P-consciousness (a common, but huge, assumption based on indirect evidence) and we say humans and other intelligent mammals are at 100, then other organisms will fairly naturally fall into the scale. Yes, this is based on the same huge assumptions that see most humans denying that most life forms experience anything of their lives whatsoever.
There might be a real difference between a flatworm and a jellyfish, but I reckon the difference between a flatworm and a chimp is far, far greater.
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
Well, that is startling reversal of roles. You've apparently adopted novel understandings of what is a "symbol" and what is a "pattern of information." Physical objects ("aspects of reality") are not "symbols" of anything. A symbol is a token, invented or chosen by us, to represent some "aspect of reality." Information is knowledge gained by us concerning some "aspect of reality," often communicated via symbols.John_Jacquard wrote: ↑October 8th, 2021, 2:27 pm
For instance physical matter is a symbol that represents information.
All aspects of reality itself involve symbols that represent a pattern of information.
You have the cart pulling the horse there.
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
You are describing a symbol and pattern of information related to a tiny scale of detail related to reality.GE Morton wrote: ↑October 8th, 2021, 7:05 pmWell, that is startling reversal of roles. You've apparently adopted novel understandings of what is a "symbol" and what is a "pattern of information." Physical objects ("aspects of reality") are not "symbols" of anything. A symbol is a token, invented or chosen by us, to represent some "aspect of reality." Information is knowledge gained by us concerning some "aspect of reality," often communicated via symbols.John_Jacquard wrote: ↑October 8th, 2021, 2:27 pm
For instance physical matter is a symbol that represents information.
All aspects of reality itself involve symbols that represent a pattern of information.
You have the cart pulling the horse there.
[ zoomed into the level of detail of a particular individual's experience]
But I'm not taking about symbol representing a pattern of information , just from that tiny scale of detail .
I am referring to all scales of detail of reality .
( the totality of all scales of detail )
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Re: Is consciousness really the mystery it seems?
The interview I just mentioned (on Thanatos TV EN):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g2aWjH7iNg8
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