Can we agree as to what metaphysics is?

[Pattern-chaser]

If you want to know what the difference between metaphysics and science is, you need to compare them directly. Of course, "each of them is what it is," but what is each of them? Arguably, there is a continuum between theoretical science and theoretical philosophy (metaphysics); but it's not the case that there are no distinctions at all, that doing science is generally the same as doing philosophy (metaphysics).

Submarines and stair-lifts are both forms of transport, they have that in common. But what purpose would we have in comparing them? Of course, there are distinctions between science and metaphysics, but so what? Doesn't this simply reflect the different uses to which they are put, and for which each was 'designed'?

"Metaphysics is the conjectural end of science. Its ontological claims must be tested by general scientific plausibility. Plausibility is largely a matter of maximal coherence of our beliefs in the light of often recalcitrant experience: in other words not only must theoretical beliefs cohere with one another but they must cohere with beliefs derived from observation and experiment."

(Smart, J. J. C. "Methodology and Ontology." In Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change, edited by Kostas Gavroglu, Yorgos Goudaroulis, and Pantelis Nicolacopoulos, 47-57. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1989. p. 51)

"I regard metaphysics as continuous with science. Science gets metaphysical when it gets very general and controversial and relates itself also to humanistic and other non-typically scientific concerns. A criterion for metaphysical truth is plausibility in the light of total science."

(Smart, J. J. C. "Physicalism and Emergence." 1982. In Essays Metaphysical and Moral: Selected Philosophical Papers, 246-255. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987. p. 248)

These quotes would seem to come from those who consider science to be the one-and-only investigative tool. Instead of acknowledging that science and metaphysics are very different disciplines, they seem to want to show how metaphysics is just a part, a backwater, of science. IMO, this is misleading.

[Steve3007]

I like Victoria Coren a lot. But I already stopped watching "Only Connect" - it's too fiendishly difficult for me. Only the "Round Britain Quiz" on Radio 4 - is it still being made? - is comparable. I just sit there, baffled and amazed. And don't get me started on Daphne Fowler, the smartest human being I've ever encountered.

Yes, "Round Britain Quiz" is still on radio 4. Late evenings. I can't remember which ones. I just learnt the other day that the title "Only Connect" is a reference to Howard's End by E M Forster. (The wife told me). I never knew that.

[Consul]

Submarines and stair-lifts are both forms of transport, they have that in common. But what purpose would we have in comparing them? Of course, there are distinctions between science and metaphysics, but so what? Doesn't this simply reflect the different uses to which they are put, and for which each was 'designed'?

So what do you think makes the difference between metaphysics and science?

"Metaphysics is the conjectural end of science. Its ontological claims must be tested by general scientific plausibility. Plausibility is largely a matter of maximal coherence of our beliefs in the light of often recalcitrant experience: in other words not only must theoretical beliefs cohere with one another but they must cohere with beliefs derived from observation and experiment."

(Smart, J. J. C. "Methodology and Ontology." In Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change, edited by Kostas Gavroglu, Yorgos Goudaroulis, and Pantelis Nicolacopoulos, 47-57. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1989. p. 51)

"I regard metaphysics as continuous with science. Science gets metaphysical when it gets very general and controversial and relates itself also to humanistic and other non-typically scientific concerns. A criterion for metaphysical truth is plausibility in the light of total science."

(Smart, J. J. C. "Physicalism and Emergence." 1982. In Essays Metaphysical and Moral: Selected Philosophical Papers, 246-255. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987. p. 248)

These quotes would seem to come from those who consider science to be the one-and-only investigative tool. Instead of acknowledging that science and metaphysics are very different disciplines, they seem to want to show how metaphysics is just a part, a backwater, of science. IMO, this is misleading.

Smart was a science-oriented naturalistic philosopher. He defined "metaphysics" as "the philosophical study of the universe and our place in it", thinking that the philosophical study of the universe and the scientific study of it go hand in hand. He would have subscribed to the following statement:

"Metaphysics is the most general department of a common enquiry into both the particularities and the generalities of existence, which is a seamless web from the particular claims of natural history onwards through ever-increasingly general theses in the theoretical and mathematical sciences."

(Campbell, Keith. Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. p. 2)

[Pattern-chaser]

Submarines and stair-lifts are both forms of transport, they have that in common. But what purpose would we have in comparing them? Of course, there are distinctions between science and metaphysics, but so what? Doesn't this simply reflect the different uses to which they are put, and for which each was 'designed'?

So what do you think makes the difference between metaphysics and science?

I offered my opinion some posts ago:

"Metaphysics" describes those questions, theories and enquiries that science cannot address, but philosophy can.

[Consul]

So what do you think makes the difference between metaphysics and science?

If "science" means "empirical science", then it's clear that metaphysics is not itself an empirical discipline, but a theoretical one. In 1737 Pierre Bayle defined it as "scientia speculativa entis" ("speculative science of being"); and in his time the speculative sciences were the theoretical sciences, with "speculatio" being the Latin translation of the Greek "theoria". There was a time when speculation (aka contemplation or intuition, or "intellectual vision") was held in high esteem as a non-empirical, non-sensual source of knowledge, especially theistic or mystical knowledge. But with the rise of experimental philosophy or empirical science, many began to doubt or deny the epistemic value of speculation, thinking that we cannot acquire knowledge of or gain insight into reality (especially a supernatural or divine reality) through purely a priori theorizing. The empiricists degraded speculation from its high estate to mere conjecture or surmise, and regarded purely a priori theorizing as resulting in nothing more than hypotheses waiting for empirical verification or falsification.

However, the perennial debate between empiricists and rationalists hasn't ended yet. Some still think metaphysics can be "a speculative science of pure reason" (Kant).

[Consul]

I offered my opinion some posts ago:

"Metaphysics" describes those questions, theories and enquiries that science cannot address, but philosophy can.

What is that which "science cannot address"?

"to address" = "to think about and begin to deal with (an issue or problem)" (Oxford Dict.)

[Belindi]

I offered my opinion some posts ago:

"Metaphysics" describes those questions, theories and enquiries that science cannot address, but philosophy can.

What is that which "science cannot address"?

"to address" = "to think about and begin to deal with (an issue or problem)" (Oxford Dict.)

Absolutes. Qualia. Mind dependence/independence.How we can know anything.

[Consul]

What is that which "science cannot address"?

"to address" = "to think about and begin to deal with (an issue or problem)" (Oxford Dict.)

Absolutes. Qualia. Mind dependence/independence.How we can know anything.

What do you mean by "absolutes"?
Anyway, I don't think qualia are scientifically unaddressable. In fact, psychology and neurophysiology do address them.

There are metascientific questions in the philosophy of science concerning the epistemological and methodological foundations of science, but we want to know what the general difference between science and metaphysics (ontology) is.

[Consul]

…but we want to know what the general difference between science and metaphysics (ontology) is.

Is the difference that metaphysics "soars beyond the bounds of experience" and science doesn't? Well, the science of mathematics does so too; but like metaphysics it's not an empirical science. Physics is an empirical science, but physicists are theorists too, who sometimes venture beyond the bounds of experience (e.g. string theory, multiverse theory. pre-big-bang models).

[Steve3007]

the science of mathematics does so too

Mathematics is not a science. Degrees in mathematics are traditionally given as BA's not as BSc's. Mathematics is a tool used by various sciences. In my view, to call it a science is akin to mistaking a hammer for a thing that is built using that hammer or mistaking the English language for a novel written using that language.

[Belindi]

What is that which "science cannot address"?

"to address" = "to think about and begin to deal with (an issue or problem)" (Oxford Dict.)

Absolutes. Qualia. Mind dependence/independence.How we can know anything.

What do you mean by "absolutes"?
Anyway, I don't think qualia are scientifically unaddressable. In fact, psychology and neurophysiology do address them.

There are metascientific questions in the philosophy of science concerning the epistemological and methodological foundations of science, but we want to know what the general difference between science and metaphysics (ontology) is.

Absolute means all relationships are not separated by time, place, or force.The Absolute is the state of not depending on any particular relationship such as time, place, or force.

Qualia are essentially subjective and no empirical description can capture a quale.

The general difference between science and metaphysical ontology is best understood via scepticism regarding how we can know anything. The scientist approaches what he can know by observations and experiments on material he selects. The philosopher asks if the material selected by the scientist is itself an invention of his and other scientists' minds: is what the scientist aims for an invention or a discovery?

The scientist presumes nature is orderly and it's theoretically finally possible to know everything there is to know. The philosopher asks if this is true, or if creation is maybe chaotic,or perhaps not finite at all.

[Pattern-chaser]

I offered my opinion some posts ago:

"Metaphysics" describes those questions, theories and enquiries that science cannot address, but philosophy can.

What is that which "science cannot address"?

Many things. One example is whether we are brains-in-vats. There is no evidence associated with this idea, for or against. And that, in itself, is a conclusive reason why science cannot deal with it. No evidence = no analysis = no conclusion. No formal and precise scientific consideration of this issue is possible. We must use the tool kit of 'serious thought' to address this issue, and others like it, and that is what metaphysics does. It handles those issues for which science is unsuited.

[3017Metaphysician]

You still haven't reconciled how physicalism/metal events explains metaphysically conscious phenomena, did you?. Has consciousness been objectively explained? Did Dennet explain it? Where's Dennet when you need him!!!

I'll do an "It's not explained" discussion on these grounds:
(1) You give detailed criteria you're using for counting as an explanation in general,
(2) You also tell us why your criteria from (1) are going to be the demarcation criteria for explanations, and
(3) We examine whether the criteria given in (1) actually are your demarcation criteria by testing them with a number of mundane things (so, not consciousness) that you believe are explained versus not explained, and we make sure that you can present explanations for what you consider explained that meet your criteria, and we see whether some of the mundane stuff that you don't consider explained can't be explained per your criteria.

If we don't do the above three points systematically, I'll not entertain "it's not explained" discussions. Unfortunately, since I can't get you to even respond to the simplest of questions or requests, there's no way in hell that you'll be doing any of (1), (2) or (3) above.

Okay, let's see, if mathematics stumps you (which obviously it has, since it's clearly metaphysical), how about music?

Before I answer any more questions, is there any possibility that you'll answer even a single question I asked you above? If you won't, why should I answer any question you're asking? Don't conversations require both people answering questions?

Do you want me to start doing this:

2nd request:
"we'd have to clarify what that's supposed to be saying that's different than merely 'How does physicalism explain abstracts?'"

TS!

Happy Friday! I have an idea, where perhaps we can hit the re-set button (if you will accept the challenge). Obviously the discussion is not producing any kind of' 'universal truth', as it were. And so, how about we ferret-out your Physicalism? Let's have fun and try to deconstruct yours and my arguments (I'll start with parsing some concepts including words you used that I think are metaphysical, and put them in a basic syllogism which may or may not be sound). Then, we can see whether the conclusion follows. I'll offer a few fig-leaf examples. And, I'll keep your definition on the subject line so we don't get distracted (I'll change it if you are not comfortable with the definition) thus:

RE: In philosophy, physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical,[1] or that everything supervenes on the physical.[2] Physicalism is a form of ontological monism—a "one substance" view of the nature of reality as opposed to a "two-substance" (dualism) or "many-substance" (pluralism) view. Both the definition of "physical" and the meaning of physicalism have been debated.


A few examples of a logical syllogism to parse:

Terrapin Station used the concept of "individuals" in his premises to argue for how all humans perceive things-in-themselves vis a vis physicalism:

"Individuals" relate to human being
Consciousness relates to "individuals"
Therefore, consciousness relates to human being

And so:

Human beings listen to music
TS is a human being
Therefore, TS has listened to music
Music is perceived metaphysically
Humans perceive music
Therefore, humans perceive the metaphysical
All mathematics is perceived metaphysically
Humans perceive mathematics
Therefore, humans perceive the metaphysical

Similarly:

All humans have a Will
TS is a human
Therefore, TS has a Will
The Will is metaphysical
Sentience is the Will
Therefore, sentience is metaphysical


This one I need your help with:

TS has the capacity to perceive emotions
Physicalism does not explain how TS perceives things
Therefore, Physicalism is not perceived as emotions


TS, which one's are false? If false, please rearrange the syllogisms to make 'the premise' sound so that the conclusion can follow properly.
If you get stumped, (which I'm hoping you won't) no worries, we can just post the definitions of each concept first (Metaphysics in this case is the first principles of Being/ontology) then rearrange accordingly.

If you want to start over, okay, but you need to start over with something shorter, because the above is a complete mess. There are numerous issues with every sentence. For example, at the start, from where are you getting that I'm forwarding some sort of argument about how people perceive anything? And then you're using the "things-in-themselves" term, which is a mess that you won't address, and on and on and on.

You need to start with something simpler, and you need to actually respond to comments made and questions asked, especially when I ask for a clarification.

By the way, the manner in which you're using "metaphysical" as an adjective is just nonsensical.

Also, re "physicalism does not explain," again, I WILL NOT DO a "this is explained/this is not explained" discussion if you don't address the requirements I gave above for a discussion about that. If we start over or not, you're going to need to meet those requirements if you want to introduce a "this is not explained" argument.

So pick something very simple, just an idea or two, just a sentence or two that you want to start with, and then you're going to need to actually respond to comments and answer questions. What simple thing would you like to start with?

TS!

I'm not sure I'm following that. Are you saying logic (deduction) is complicated?

[Consul]

the science of mathematics does so too

Mathematics is not a science. Degrees in mathematics are traditionally given as BA's not as BSc's. Mathematics is a tool used by various sciences. In my view, to call it a science is akin to mistaking a hammer for a thing that is built using that hammer or mistaking the English language for a novel written using that language.

There's a difference between pure mathematics and applied mathematics. In empirical science and technology mathematics is used as a tool, but mathematics itself is a science too, a rational, formal science. Arguing that there is no mathematical knowledge is a hopeless uphill battle.

I just checked the universities in Germany: The academic degrees in math are "Bachelor of Science" and "Master of Science".

[Consul]

Absolute means all relationships are not separated by time, place, or force.The Absolute is the state of not depending on any particular relationship such as time, place, or force.

"the absolute = 1. something that exists without being dependent on anything else. 2.Ultimate reality; God." (Oxford Dict.)

So nature or the universe can be called "the absolute" as well.

Qualia are essentially subjective and no empirical description can capture a quale.

Introspection is an empirical source of knowledge. There is an introspective psychology. There is certainly no introspective neurology; but if neurological reductionism about experiences is true, then they are constituted by extrospectively accessible and observable neural processes.

The general difference between science and metaphysical ontology is best understood via scepticism regarding how we can know anything. The scientist approaches what he can know by observations and experiments on material he selects. The philosopher asks if the material selected by the scientist is itself an invention of his and other scientists' minds: is what the scientist aims for an invention or a discovery?

The scientist presumes nature is orderly and it's theoretically finally possible to know everything there is to know. The philosopher asks if this is true, or if creation is maybe chaotic,or perhaps not finite at all.

So the general epistemological difference between metaphysics and science is that the former consists in transempirical ("experience-transcendent") speculation or theorization, which goes beyond what is empirically known or knowable? Is metaphysics met(a)empirical theoretics or met(a)empirics?