Can we agree as to what metaphysics is?

[Steve3007]

One thing that seems to be true of metaphysics is that since Aristotle, understandings of what exactly it is have changed somewhat.

Perhaps due to that changing understanding over time, metaphysics seems to be one of those areas of philosophy over which people with only a half-remembered partial knowledge of that history (like me) disagree as to what counts as part of it. As I recall, A J Ayer, in "Language, Truth and Logic", decides to dispense with everything that he regards as metaphysics. Some modern understandings of it seem to focus on the etymology of the prefix "meta", and declare that, just as metadata is data about data, metaphysics is one step removed from the physical. So, by that definition, all abstract concepts that we use in our mental models of the way that the physical world behaves are metaphysical. So, depending on how the words are being used, that could include concepts like time, causality and determinism. Maybe it could also be regarded as including things like the laws of physics, as opposed to the physical stuff that those abstract concepts describe?

How do you use that word? Do you use it only in that modern sense? Do you use it in the old Aristotelian sense? Or does it depend on the context? Maybe a bit of both? Maybe you agree with those Logical Positivists that metaphysics can be dispensed with altogether?

[Terrapin Station]

This is copy-pasting part of a recent post of mine explaining metaphysics to 3017Metaphysician (ironically enough):

"Metaphysics, by the way, is traditionally divided up into three areas: (1) 'First principles' (the idea of which is basically things we take to be logically necessary for certain things to obtain, but logic is, like mathematics, an abstracted way of thinking about relations), (2) Philosophy of religion, and (3) Ontology.

"Ontology is the bulk of metaphysics, especially in last 150 years or so. Ontology is 'philosophy of being' or 'philosophy of existence' in the most general sense, and isn't at all incompatible with physicalism. If being/existence is solely physical, then that's what ontology is about (so in other words, that's what the bulk of metaphysics is about in that case--the physical world). 'Metaphysics' doesn't conventionally refer to anything like 'beyond physics' (with a sense of 'transcendent' or anything like that). The word 'metaphysics' stems from an Aristotle anthology from hundreds of years ago. The compiler was putting the book that the compiler named 'Metaphysics' after Aristotle's book entitled 'Physics.' The book that the compiler named 'Metaphysics' had been left untitled by Aristotle. So the compiler gave it a name that amounted to 'The book after the book entitled 'Physics''--hence 'Metaphysics.'"

Adding a bit to this, the traditional content of metaphysics thus became the subject matter of the Aristotle book: basically the idea was "This section (of this Aristotle compendium) is entitled 'Metaphysics,' thus the subject matter of metaphysics is the same as what Aristotle talks about in this book."

The analytic rejection of metaphysics was largely due to a rejection of the idea that one could derive first principles "from an armchair." This rejection was heightened due to both the basic views of the logical positivists and the increasing success and importance of the sciences and its empiricist methodology in the later 19th century (which also spurred on desires to "make philosophy a science.") Philosophy of religion had already been more or less siphoned off from metaphysics prior to that point (so that wasn't a big concern in the analytic rejection), and the analytic rejection of the idea of deriving first principles "from an armchair" is largely what precipitated reformulating metaphysics as primarily being ontology with an understanding that ontology is basically doing the same thing that the sciences are doing, just via philosophical methodology rather than scientific (experimental/empiricist) methodology. And then that opened the door to rescuing the "first principles" part of metaphysics, especially once logical positivism was seen as a big OOPS! because of the way it turned out to be self-refuting.

[Terrapin Station]

Some common questions/topics in metaphysics include things like:

(1) Just what does it refer to to exist? (And is "existence" a predicate (a property that something can have (or fail to have))? Is "subsistence" different than "existence"? And so on.)

(2) Just what is time?

(3) Just what is identity--that is, what makes x "that thing" (or what makes x an F, a particular type of thing), and does identity persist through time?

(4) Are there ontic simples, and is there more than one type? (Basically this is the philosophical equivalent of elementary particles.)

(5) How do part/whole relations work?

(6) What are relations in general? Do relations exist mind-independently?

(7) What are properties in general?

(8) Are there real abstracts/types?

(9) What is the relationship between mind and body?

That's just scratching the surface, but sometimes examples of the sorts of topics covered helps an understanding of what the general (sub)field is.

[3017Metaphysician]

One thing that seems to be true of metaphysics is that since Aristotle, understandings of what exactly it is have changed somewhat.

Perhaps due to that changing understanding over time, metaphysics seems to be one of those areas of philosophy over which people with only a half-remembered partial knowledge of that history (like me) disagree as to what counts as part of it. As I recall, A J Ayer, in "Language, Truth and Logic", decides to dispense with everything that he regards as metaphysics. Some modern understandings of it seem to focus on the etymology of the prefix "meta", and declare that, just as metadata is data about data, metaphysics is one step removed from the physical. So, by that definition, all abstract concepts that we use in our mental models of the way that the physical world behaves are metaphysical. So, depending on how the words are being used, that could include concepts like time, causality and determinism. Maybe it could also be regarded as including things like the laws of physics, as opposed to the physical stuff that those abstract concepts describe?

How do you use that word? Do you use it only in that modern sense? Do you use it in the old Aristotelian sense? Or does it depend on the context? Maybe a bit of both? Maybe you agree with those Logical Positivists that metaphysics can be dispensed with altogether?

Steve!

Nice OP!

A whole lot to focus in on, but for now, I'll contribute briefly my understanding of why LP is dead. Specifically, I would argue that the LP's have rejected Kant's synthetic a priori judgements for some unjustified reason. It's yet another kind of sad irony since the LP's notion of logic pigeon-hole's them into a limited belief system of self-awareness which is not only binary (limited truth values having yes/no answers-formal logic) but paradoxical at their own 'peril'. For instance, the LP believes analytic a priori, and synthetic a posteriori are the only means/method of acquiring knowledge about themselves (and the world). However, the obvious missing piece is the lack of knowledge about themselves (existential finitude) and the nature of their own perception, existence and/or reality. Or said another way, a 'phenomenological' approach is not considered.

As such, the phenomenon of self-awareness is denied. For instance, we know that through the limitations of formal reasoning because of its inherent incompleteness/paradox, the idea or notion of that logic (modal/formal logic) limits their possibilities of acquiring knowledge (which was part of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason). And likewise the limits of synthetic posteriori knowledge confines our understanding to material cause and effect (material observation). Both sciences (cognitive and physical) have taken exception to that limited belief/truth-value system. Why?

Philosophically, in parsing the infamous proposition: 'all events must have a cause', what is the purpose of such a judgement relative to self-aware conscious beings? Is that considered a metaphysical statement? How is such a judgement possible? What causes this sense of awareness? What value do similar propositions have on the species?

Cognitively, most sciences that explore the boundaries of conscious existence (meaning-of-life-questions/the why's of existence) study the natural behavior and the wants and needs (the human condition) that most humans seek to fulfill in society. As we know, things like aspiration, intention, purpose, curiosity, love and wonderment are all vital to quality of life concerns and intrinsic to our species. Those kinds of things that relate to self-awareness speak to one's Will to even have such aspirations (achievement of goals). And without even suggesting additional biological advantages for this same sense of conscious existence and contributing qualities (Qualia), one has to stop and ask what do those things even mean to the Logical Positivist? Is living life both an immaterial and material phenomena?

Things like intentionality, or even the phenomenon of love, creativity, music and revelatory knowledge, what are these things-in-themselves? Are they in-themselves, a meaningless method in seeking or acquiring knowledge and meaning? Is one's intrinsic or innate 'passion' for something (to be) transcend some notions of their (LP's) own sense of logic? Some things we love just are, but we don't care to explore what, where, how or why. Isn't that part of 'I think therefore I am'? What is intuition and what is its purpose? And finally, do any of these features of consciousness have any Darwinian/biological survival advantages when emergent instinct is all that's needed to survive (i.e., why would people choose, through their own Will, to commit suicide, love a house/car because of its color, love material objects, love immaterial things-the mind of another, etc. etc.)?

Then, of course, there are those things that relate to Cosmology like the origin, nature, and purpose of the universe and so on... . We know metaphysical inquiries also provide for other meaningful purposes when we consider the studies of being, identity, change, space and time, causality, necessity and possibility. And all those things take us back to questions about the nature of consciousness and the relationship between mind and matter.

I suppose on the other hand, who cares about metaphysically abstract structures of reality/existence like mathematics, music, time, gravity, the Will... ! Aren't we better off just worrying about basic things like eating, drinking, procreating and maybe sleeping? Nihilism could be a contradiction in terms!


Anyway, enough soapbox...just some initial thoughts and my contribution to your OP. As always please feel free to challenge any and all...

[Terrapin Station]

One thing that seems to be true of metaphysics is that since Aristotle, understandings of what exactly it is have changed somewhat.

Perhaps due to that changing understanding over time, metaphysics seems to be one of those areas of philosophy over which people with only a half-remembered partial knowledge of that history (like me) disagree as to what counts as part of it. As I recall, A J Ayer, in "Language, Truth and Logic", decides to dispense with everything that he regards as metaphysics. Some modern understandings of it seem to focus on the etymology of the prefix "meta", and declare that, just as metadata is data about data, metaphysics is one step removed from the physical. So, by that definition, all abstract concepts that we use in our mental models of the way that the physical world behaves are metaphysical. So, depending on how the words are being used, that could include concepts like time, causality and determinism. Maybe it could also be regarded as including things like the laws of physics, as opposed to the physical stuff that those abstract concepts describe?

How do you use that word? Do you use it only in that modern sense? Do you use it in the old Aristotelian sense? Or does it depend on the context? Maybe a bit of both? Maybe you agree with those Logical Positivists that metaphysics can be dispensed with altogether?

Steve!

Nice OP!

A whole lot to focus in on, but for now, I'll contribute briefly my understanding of why LP is dead. Specifically, I would argue that the LP's have rejected Kant's synthetic a priori judgements for some unjustified reason. It's yet another kind of sad irony since the LP's notion of logic pigeon-hole's them into a limited belief system of self-awareness which is not only binary (limited truth values having yes/no answers-formal logic) but paradoxical at their own 'peril'. For instance, the LP believes analytic a priori, and synthetic a posteriori are the only means/method of acquiring knowledge about themselves (and the world). However, the obvious missing piece is the lack of knowledge about themselves (existential finitude) and the nature of their own perception, existence and/or reality. Or said another way, a 'phenomenological' approach is not considered.

As such, the phenomenon of self-awareness is denied. For instance, we know that through the limitations of formal reasoning because of its inherent incompleteness/paradox, the idea or notion of that logic (modal/formal logic) limits their possibilities of acquiring knowledge (which was part of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason). And likewise the limits of synthetic posteriori knowledge confines our understanding to material cause and effect (material observation). Both sciences (cognitive and physical) have taken exception to that limited belief/truth-value system. Why?

Philosophically, in parsing the infamous proposition: 'all events must have a cause', what is the purpose of such a judgement relative to self-aware conscious beings? Is that considered a metaphysical statement? How is such a judgement possible? What causes this sense of awareness? What value do similar propositions have on the species?

Cognitively, most sciences that explore the boundaries of conscious existence (meaning-of-life-questions/the why's of existence) study the natural behavior and the wants and needs (the human condition) that most humans seek to fulfill in society. As we know, things like aspiration, intention, purpose, curiosity, love and wonderment are all vital to quality of life concerns and intrinsic to our species. Those kinds of things that relate to self-awareness speak to one's Will to even have such aspirations (achievement of goals). And without even suggesting additional biological advantages for this same sense of conscious existence and contributing qualities (Qualia), one has to stop and ask what do those things even mean to the Logical Positivist? Is living life both an immaterial and material phenomena?

Things like intentionality, or even the phenomenon of love, creativity, music and revelatory knowledge, what are these things-in-themselves? Are they in-themselves, a meaningless method in seeking or acquiring knowledge and meaning? Is one's intrinsic or innate 'passion' for something (to be) transcend some notions of their (LP's) own sense of logic? Some things we love just are, but we don't care to explore what, where, how or why. Isn't that part of 'I think therefore I am'? What is intuition and what is its purpose? And finally, do any of these features of consciousness have any Darwinian/biological survival advantages when emergent instinct is all that's needed to survive (i.e., why would people choose, through their own Will, to commit suicide, love a house/car because of its color, love material objects, love immaterial things-the mind of another, etc. etc.)?

Then, of course, there are those things that relate to Cosmology like the origin, nature, and purpose of the universe and so on... . We know metaphysical inquiries also provide for other meaningful purposes when we consider the studies of being, identity, change, space and time, causality, necessity and possibility. And all those things take us back to questions about the nature of consciousness and the relationship between mind and matter.

I suppose on the other hand, who cares about metaphysically abstract structures of reality/existence like mathematics, music, time, gravity, the Will... ! Aren't we better off just worrying about basic things like eating, drinking, procreating and maybe sleeping? Nihilism could be a contradiction in terms!


Anyway, enough soapbox...just some initial thoughts and my contribution to your OP. As always please feel free to challenge any and all...

What in the world is this response supposed to have to do with talking about what metaphysics is?

[Pattern-chaser]

Maybe it could also be regarded as including things like the laws of physics, as opposed to the physical stuff that those abstract concepts describe?

I would guess so.

How do you use that word? Do you use it only in that modern sense? Do you use it in the old Aristotelian sense? Or does it depend on the context? Maybe a bit of both? Maybe you agree with those Logical Positivists that metaphysics can be dispensed with altogether?

I just addressed this in another topic:

Metaphysics is the attempt to answer questions that can only be fully answered by making non-empirical claims about what there is or could be, or about the nature or defining essence of some concrete thing, or about the proper analysis of concepts other than those used specifically for the evaluation of agents and their institutions.

This is Michael Rea's definition, of course, not mine. But it's the best I've found. And I think it's the first part of his sentence that covers most usages of the word "metaphysics", as it applies to philosophy and philosophy forums: "Metaphysics is the attempt to answer questions that can only be fully answered by making non-empirical claims about what there is or could be".

I definitely do not agree with the Logical Positivists. I don't think there is any serious issue or question that philosophy cannot (or should not) address.

[Steve3007]

A whole lot to focus in on, but for now, I'll contribute briefly my understanding of why LP is dead...

Hi again 3017Metaphysician. Thanks for that. As far as I can gather, your post is intended to be specifically about the decline of Logical Positivism.

My understanding as to where Logical Positivism fails is that in rejecting metaphysics it rejects the basis for its own verification principle and rejects the subject that forms the basis of science. I think that might be the same as some parts of what you said, but it's hard to tell.

[Steve3007]

...This is Michael Rea's definition, of course, not mine. But it's the best I've found. And I think it's the first part of his sentence that covers most usages of the word "metaphysics", as it applies to philosophy and philosophy forums: "Metaphysics is the attempt to answer questions that can only be fully answered by making non-empirical claims about what there is or could be".

Yes, I'd certainly agree that metaphysics is not, in itself, about empirical evidence. But part of it, at least, is about the principles and abstractions that underlie subjects which do concern themselves with empirical evidence. I think we agree about that.

[JackDaydream]

@Steve3007

I am not going to try to answer the question of what metaphysics is because I that it would require a book as it's such a vast topic, as it involves life, death and the universe. Of course, people use the term a little differently from one another which can be problematic but that is probably because it is so hard to pin down and define, a bit like the idea of consciousness.

I have read Ayer's writing and find it a useful analysis, but it may be going too far when it leads to the point where philosophers think that metaphysics is not a useful focus at all. Ayer acknowledges that most people do speculate about metaphysical issues.The way which I interpret logical positivism is as a useful thinking point for seeing limitations of possible metaphysical knowledge. But, that doesn't mean that metaphysics should be disregarded and it is at the basis of all models of reality, including the physical sciences. Perhaps, a combined analysis of metaphysical assumptions and reflection on the linguistic aspects of this, but with reference to knowledge gained within the empirical sciences, may give the widest scope for the fullest informed understanding of metaphysics.

[Pattern-chaser]

...This is Michael Rea's definition, of course, not mine. But it's the best I've found. And I think it's the first part of his sentence that covers most usages of the word "metaphysics", as it applies to philosophy and philosophy forums: "Metaphysics is the attempt to answer questions that can only be fully answered by making non-empirical claims about what there is or could be".

Yes, I'd certainly agree that metaphysics is not, in itself, about empirical evidence. But part of it, at least, is about the principles and abstractions that underlie subjects which do concern themselves with empirical evidence. I think we agree about that.

Well, yes. A metaphysical matter that has no connection at all with empirical reality is somewhat pointless. Having said that, such connections can be quite indirect, and sometimes less than obvious. It's only if there are NO connections that the pointlessness emerges.

[3017Metaphysician]

A whole lot to focus in on, but for now, I'll contribute briefly my understanding of why LP is dead...

Hi again 3017Metaphysician. Thanks for that. As far as I can gather, your post is intended to be specifically about the decline of Logical Positivism.

My understanding as to where Logical Positivism fails is that in rejecting metaphysics it rejects the basis for its own verification principle and rejects the subject that forms the basis of science. I think that might be the same as some parts of what you said, but it's hard to tell.

Yes Steve. In other words:

LP failed because it tried to reduce the concept of meaning to the process of verification, and it became increasingly clear that this was an impossible task (as the later Wittgenstein, among other, pointed out quite clearly). Logical Positivists would look at a scientific proposition — such as the laws of gravity — and note that such theories are meaningful precisely because they can be used functionally in ways that verify them. They wanted to extend that kind of apparent rigor to philosophy more broadly put, and at the same time restrict philosophy more broadly put to questions that could respond fruitfully to that kind of verification. But they could never solve what later came to be known as the demarcation problem: how to simultaneously retain those things they thought should be part of philosophy and exclude those things they thought should not be part of philosophy. The result was an assortment of conflicts and paradoxes that fragmented the movement.

The issue with emotions was an outgrowth of this thinking, not the root of it. Subjective experience (including emotions) is in many ways the converse of metaphysical propositions. One cannot verify a feeling about something, and so from the LP perspective feelings are not proper subjects of philosophical analysis.

[3017Metaphysician]

A whole lot to focus in on, but for now, I'll contribute briefly my understanding of why LP is dead...

Hi again 3017Metaphysician. Thanks for that. As far as I can gather, your post is intended to be specifically about the decline of Logical Positivism.

My understanding as to where Logical Positivism fails is that in rejecting metaphysics it rejects the basis for its own verification principle and rejects the subject that forms the basis of science. I think that might be the same as some parts of what you said, but it's hard to tell.

...hence, (and I forgot to add to the last paragraph in my response to you) the proposition 'all events must have a cause' is synthetic a priori because its mostly an innate feeling.

[3017Metaphysician]

A whole lot to focus in on, but for now, I'll contribute briefly my understanding of why LP is dead...

Hi again 3017Metaphysician. Thanks for that. As far as I can gather, your post is intended to be specifically about the decline of Logical Positivism.

My understanding as to where Logical Positivism fails is that in rejecting metaphysics it rejects the basis for its own verification principle and rejects the subject that forms the basis of science. I think that might be the same as some parts of what you said, but it's hard to tell.

At the risk of redundancy, it should read:

LP failed because it tried to reduce the concept of meaning to the process of verification, and it became increasingly clear that this was an impossible task (as the later Wittgenstein, among other, pointed out quite clearly). Logical Positivists would look at a scientific proposition — such as the laws of gravity — and note that such theories are meaningful precisely because they can be used functionally in ways that verify them. They wanted to extend that kind of apparent rigor to philosophy more broadly put, and at the same time restrict philosophy more broadly put to questions that could respond fruitfully to that kind of verification. But they could never solve what later came to be known as the demarcation problem: how to simultaneously retain those things they thought should be part of philosophy and exclude those things they thought should not be part of philosophy. The result was an assortment of conflicts and paradoxes that fragmented the movement.

The issue with emotions was an outgrowth of this thinking, not the root of it. Subjective experience (including emotions) is in many ways the converse of metaphysical propositions. One cannot verify a feeling about something, and so from the LP perspective feelings are not proper subjects of philosophical analysis. Hence, the proposition 'all events must have a cause' is synthetic a priori because its mostly an innate feeling.

[Steve3007]

...Hence, the proposition 'all events must have a cause' is synthetic a priori because its mostly an innate feeling.

I don't see what this has to do with the reasons why Logical Positivism failed (or the wider topic of what metaphysics is). I see "all events must have a cause" as a proposition that derives from inductive reasoning. So, like all propositions that derive from inductive reasoning, it is not certain. I think the only certain things are necessary truths like tautologies (things that it would be self-contradictory to deny). It would not be self-contradictory to propose: "some events don't have causes".

In my view, causality/causation is a generalization that we propose to be universally true by observing particular instances of correlations between events. That's why I say it's created using inductive reasoning. In that sense it's similar to other inductively derived propositions, like the laws of physics.

[Terrapin Station]

...Hence, the proposition 'all events must have a cause' is synthetic a priori because its mostly an innate feeling.

I don't see what this has to do with the reasons why Logical Positivism failed (or the wider topic of what metaphysics is). I see "all events must have a cause" as a proposition that derives from inductive reasoning. So, like all propositions that derive from inductive reasoning, it is not certain. I think the only certain things are necessary truths like tautologies (things that it would be self-contradictory to deny). It would not be self-contradictory to propose: "some events don't have causes".

In my view, causality/causation is a generalization that we propose to be universally true by observing particular instances of correlations between events. That's why I say it's created using inductive reasoning. In that sense it's similar to other inductively derived propositions, like the laws of physics.

Keeping this as short/simple as I can:

Logical positivists believed that there were only two valid means of acquiring knowledge: logical reasoning and empirical verification.

Logical reasoning was thought to only lead to logic and mathematics per se, neither of which is metaphysics/ontology.

Re empirical verification, logical positivists believed that statements were only meaningful if they could be proved true or false (at least in principle) empirically. And then a common logical positivist "mantra" was that "the meaning of a statement is its method of verification." And thus if a statement wasn't verifiable, it was literally meaningless.

Logical positivists saw metaphysical claims as not being verifiable via empirical methods, so they saw metaphysics as literally meaningless. This part is controversial in terms of making sense of why this was the case--that is, why logical positivists saw metaphysical claims this way and didn't see scientific claims the same way, if for no other reason than there can be a lot of overlap between scientific and metaphysical claims. Remember that ontology, the bulk of metaphysics, is simply philosophy of existence or being--or in other words philosophy of "what there is, including the nature of what there is," in the most generalized sense possible/practical (which if nominalism has things right, means that we have to talk a lot about particulars), but that's the same thing as what science is doing--it's studying what there is and its nature and trying to formulate generalizations about it.

At any rate, the big "oops" of logical positivism, which almost seems like a joke, and which is strange for not being realized sooner, is that the whole program of logical positivism fails its own test:

Neither

"There are only two valid means of acquiring knowledge: logical reasoning and empirical verification"

nor

"Statements are only meaningful if they can be proved true or false empirically; otherwise they're literally meaningless"

are logical or capable of empirical verification, so that means that logical positivism itself is literally meaningless and not a valid means of acquiring knowledge per its own critiera.