Is it Metaphysics or Science Fiction...?

[Sculptor1]

Good science Fiction can make better science than some metaphysics.
Arthur C Clarke predicted the artificial satellite which came to pass. He predicted something akin to the Interenet too. His space elevator is mathematically possible, maybe one day practical for smaller planets?
Several other writers have postulated body-tech, automomous drones, which is now emerging.
In fact you can make a great list of tech predicted by sci fi robotics, electric cars, bionic limbs, AI, wireless tech, space exploration including the moon landings.

[stevie]

...
What I am asking in this thread is to what extent science can be seen as a clear foundation for metaphysics? Physics and science seem to be seen as extremely important as many of the 'big' thinkers' ideas, such as Kant and Hegel are seen as open to question. What is the most reliable or useful foundation for metaphysics. In science or any other way of trying to explain and understand the nature of reality how far is worth going in developing "metaphysical fantasies"?

Science is about the evident and metaphysics is about the non-evident which means: science is about the publically observable (via the five senses) and metaphysics is about thought constructions (to avoid the sometimes misunderstood term "fabrications") exclusively. Now of course expressions of metaphysical views are publically observable (via the five senses) since these are sounds uttered or signs written and thus expressed metaphysics as such can become the object of science, e.g. psychology. But the conceptual objects expressed by metaphysics still are mere thought constructions.

So "the most ... useful foundation for metaphysics" is human mentality. But due to its being driven by urges, psychological needs and desires I would not call human mentality "reliable".

If it is not seen as worthwhile, what can be the purpose and subject matter of philosophy?

Philosophy isn't necessarily metaphysics. Philosophy can also be conceptual analysis revealing the groundlessness of metaphysics. But metaphysics can nevertheless be seen as a manifestation of human creativity like writing novels or paintings.

[Consul]

Difference Between Physics and Metaphysics:

• Physics is the study of the observable and is thus restricted to what we have in our universe while metaphysics is a philosophical study of being and knowing.…

We do find unobservable entities such as quarks in the ontologies of physical theories.
However, the concept of observability can be defined narrowly or more broadly. Is the observable restricted to what is sensorily perceptible by us without technological assistance (e.g. microscopes, telescopes)? For example, Anjan Chakravartty writes that…

QUOTE>
"The distinction here between the observable and the unobservable reflects human sensory capabilities: the observable is that which can, under favorable conditions, be perceived using the unaided senses (for example, planets and platypuses); the unobservable is that which cannot be detected this way (for example, proteins and protons). This is to privilege vision merely for terminological convenience, and differs from scientific conceptions of observability, which generally extend to things that are detectable using instruments (Shapere 1982). The distinction itself has been problematized (Maxwell 1962; Churchland 1985; Musgrave 1985; Dicken & Lipton 2006) and defended (Muller 2004, 2005; cf. Turner 2007 regarding the distant past). If it is problematic, this is arguably a concern primarily for certain forms of antirealism, which adopt an epistemically positive attitude only with respect to the observable. It is not ultimately a concern for scientific realism, which does not discriminate epistemically between observables and unobservables per se."

Scientific Realism: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/
<QUOTE

[Consul]

Science is about the evident and metaphysics is about the non-evident which means: science is about the publically observable (via the five senses)

If that is the case, then a science of phenomenal consciousness/subjective experience is impossible in principle.

[Consul]

The more distant or remote from empirical verifiability or falsifiability a hypothesis or theory is, the more "metaempirical" it is; and the more metaempirical it is, the more metaphysical it is. And the more metaphysical it is, the more epistemically risky and uncertain is the belief in its truth. That is, the more metaempirical or metaphysical a hypothesis or theory is, the more speculative or conjectural it is.

(With English not being my mother tongue, I hope these are grammatically correct sentences.)

[Sy Borg]

Consul, your English is vastly better than that of most native speakers. If I don't understand you, it's usually because the ideas were too complex for my tiny Antipodean brain.

In the end, much to the chagrin of some physicists, physics has its limits. As each limit is confronted, experts will have their opinions as to what is most likely going on, but they have to test. Those hypotheses are effectively one step towards metaphysics - unproven models that lie outside of known physics.

In that sense, the multiverse, string theory and QLG and IIT are "metaphysical", but that should not be thought of as denigration, rather it's a description of how science works. A theory will start with an idea that postulates processes outside of current physical knowledge, usually from indication by mathematical models. Math helped humanity discover Neptune, the Higgs boson, black holes, neutrinos and gravitational waves, amongst others.

Interestingly, math has its own kind of metaphysics in pure math. That is, mathematicians can create cohesive models that apparently appear too "beautiful", too cohesive, to not indicate a true aspect of nature. Yet these beautiful models are, in fact, either entirely abstract or they describe dynamics we are yet to understand.

[Consul]

Interestingly, math has its own kind of metaphysics in pure math. That is, mathematicians can create cohesive models that apparently appear too "beautiful", too cohesive, to not indicate a true aspect of nature. Yet these beautiful models are, in fact, either entirely abstract or they describe dynamics we are yet to understand.

Speaking of beauty (as a criterion of theory choice) in science, the physicist Sabine Hossenfelder has written a book titled Lost in Math: How Beauty Leads Physics Astray:

"In this “provocative” book (New York Times), a contrarian physicist argues that her field’s modern obsession with beauty has given us wonderful math but bad science.
Whether pondering black holes or predicting discoveries at CERN, physicists believe the best theories are beautiful, natural, and elegant, and this standard separates popular theories from disposable ones. This is why, Sabine Hossenfelder argues, we have not seen a major breakthrough in the foundations of physics for more than four decades.
The belief in beauty has become so dogmatic that it now conflicts with scientific objectivity: observation has been unable to confirm mindboggling theories, like supersymmetry or grand unification, invented by physicists based on aesthetic criteria. Worse, these “too good to not be true” theories are actually untestable and they have left the field in a cul-de-sac. To escape, physicists must rethink their methods. Only by embracing reality as it is can science discover the truth."

See:

* Beauty Does Not Equal Truth, in Physics or Elsewhere

* How the belief in beauty has triggered a crisis in physics

[Consul]

There are different theoretical virtues that are used as positive criteria for theory choice (both in science and in philosophy), and among them are aesthetic virtues such as beauty, elegance, and simplicity. The big question is whether there is an objective connection between such aesthetic properties of theories and their truth.

QUOTE>
"Theoretical virtues: Properties, such as simplicity, fertility, naturalness, unity, lack of ad hoc features, that characterise a good theory. They are called virtues precisely because a theory that possesses them is considered virtuous. Occasionally, explanatory power is considered an independent theoretical virtue, but some philosophers take it that the explanatory power of a theory is constituted by virtues such as the above. McMullin has drawn a useful distinction between synchronic virtues (such as logical consistency or simplicity) and diachronic virtues (such as fertility and consilience of inductions) that characterise the development (and the potential) of a theory over time. Diachronic virtues are epistemically significant because they relate to how a theory responds to pressure that comes from the evidence, or from other theories. A theory that yields novel predictions, for instance, is more credible than a theory that gets modified in an ad hoc way in order to fit with the data. Other philosophers, however, take all virtues to be pragmatic or aesthetic."

(Psillos, Stathis. Philosophy of Science A–Z. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. p. 243)

"Theoretical virtues are 'good-making' properties of theories, features such that a theory which has them is in some sense thereby better off, perhaps because the fact that a theory has those features gives us some reason to believe that that theory is true. Correspondingly, theoretical vices are 'bad-making' properties of theories, features such that a theory which has them is in some sense worse off, perhaps because the fact that a theory has those features gives us some reason to believe that that theory is false. Much of metaphysics is taken up with trying to assess and balance the theoretical virtues and vices of various theories; this is one of the main ways in which metaphysicians try to work out what theory they ought to believe in (this process is sometimes known as 'cost-benefit analysis'). In this respect, metaphysical enquiry resembles scientific practice, for scientists also take theoretical virtues into consideration when choosing between theories.
Which features of theories count as theoretical virtues, and which theoretical vices, are—like most things in philosophy—highly contentious."

("Theoretical Virtues." In: Helen Beebee, Nikk Effingham and Philip Goff, Metaphysics: The Key Concepts, 248-248. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011.)
<QUOTE

[Sy Borg]

Interestingly, math has its own kind of metaphysics in pure math. That is, mathematicians can create cohesive models that apparently appear too "beautiful", too cohesive, to not indicate a true aspect of nature. Yet these beautiful models are, in fact, either entirely abstract or they describe dynamics we are yet to understand.

Speaking of beauty (as a criterion of theory choice) in science, the physicist Sabine Hossenfelder has written a book titled Lost in Math: How Beauty Leads Physics Astray:

"In this “provocative” book (New York Times), a contrarian physicist argues that her field’s modern obsession with beauty has given us wonderful math but bad science.
Whether pondering black holes or predicting discoveries at CERN, physicists believe the best theories are beautiful, natural, and elegant, and this standard separates popular theories from disposable ones. This is why, Sabine Hossenfelder argues, we have not seen a major breakthrough in the foundations of physics for more than four decades.
The belief in beauty has become so dogmatic that it now conflicts with scientific objectivity: observation has been unable to confirm mindboggling theories, like supersymmetry or grand unification, invented by physicists based on aesthetic criteria. Worse, these “too good to not be true” theories are actually untestable and they have left the field in a cul-de-sac. To escape, physicists must rethink their methods. Only by embracing reality as it is can science discover the truth."

See:

* Beauty Does Not Equal Truth, in Physics or Elsewhere

* How the belief in beauty has triggered a crisis in physics

I am a long-time subscriber to both Robert's and Sabine's YT channels.

I think she is right. Ultimately, our models are maps of physical objects and processes. Yet, if we are to map a coastline, for instance, the simplest and most beautiful models will be the most approximate. Ultimately we can expect the detail to become so complex that only AI will be able to describe it.

[stevie]

Science is about the evident and metaphysics is about the non-evident which means: science is about the publically observable (via the five senses)

If that is the case, then a science of phenomenal consciousness/subjective experience is impossible in principle.

Maybe yes, maybe no. But I've not made a statement with reference to "a science of phenomenal consciousness/subjective experience".

[Terrapin Station]

My point was that the many worlds hypothesis in QM, specifically, is neither of those things. The first (a) is semantic versions of what the mathematics is saying. The second (b) is the reification of mathematics. The example I gave above, of mistakenly thinking that the mathematics is representing some kind of real membrane or fabric ("the fabric of the spacetime continuum") falls into that category. But the many worlds hypothesis doesn't. As I said (as I understand it) the many world hypothesis is not a semantic interpretation of the mathematics which describe/predict what is observed. It's a proposed ontology. It's proposed because the observations and the mathematics which describe/predict them are not deemed to result in a satisfactory ontology (an idea of what's really going in) themselves.

First, as soon as you get to "there is this" (including there are these mathematical statements) or "this is observed," you're in the realm of ontology. Ontology is about what there is (and then of course it usually continues with "how it is.")

In order to understand the mathematics, because of what understanding is in the first place, we have to assign some meaning to it, we have to assign what it represents (even if that's simply "itself"). That's a semantic interpretation (by definition). It's not possible for us to utilize the mathematics without assigning some interpretation to it. That doesn't imply that we have to make an ontological commitment to whatever interpretation we apply (in other words, we can use the mathematics in a strictly instrumental way), but we'd still need to apply some interpretation in order to understand what we're doing.

[Steve3007]

First, as soon as you get to "there is this" (including there are these mathematical statements) or "this is observed," you're in the realm of ontology. Ontology is about what there is (and then of course it usually continues with "how it is.")

OK. So we're in the realm of ontology when considering "there is what?" questions, whether that's about real things, abstract concepts or observations.

Well, as I said, my understanding of the many worlds theory in QM is that it is a proposed answer to the question "what is there?" where that's about real things. As I said, the mathematics of QM describes and predicts observations. It offer nothing in answer to the question "what is there?" if that question is about what real entities exist. It just tells us what observations we're going to make. The many worlds theory (as I said) is not part of that process. It's an attempt to say what is really happening.

In order to understand the mathematics, because of what understanding is in the first place, we have to assign some meaning to it, we have to assign what it represents (even if that's simply "itself"). That's a semantic interpretation (by definition). It's not possible for us to utilize the mathematics without assigning some interpretation to it. That doesn't imply that we have to make an ontological commitment to whatever interpretation we apply (in other words, we can use the mathematics in a strictly instrumental way), but we'd still need to apply some interpretation in order to understand what we're doing.

OK, and as I said the meaning that is applied to the mathematics that is used in QM is all about describing and predicting observations. So it's the "this is observed" aspect of ontology that you mentioned above. It says nothing directly about what might be really happening regardless of what is observed. Hence, some people find it necessary to propose things like the many worlds hypothesis. They're not content to simply "shut up and calculate". They're not content to see the purpose of the laws QM as being to predict the results of QM experiments. They want to have some sense that all of these experiments are telling us something of how the world really is, not just of how future experiments are going to go.

This was the point I was making. I was just saying that, regardless of whether we agree with these many worlds hypothesizers, it's not correct to group that particular hypothesis with those that amount to the reification of mathematics.

[JackDaydream]

@3017Metaphysician
Your point that a case could be made for the view that 'science is only fiction' was the thought which I was having when I started the thread. I am not saying I don't think that science and its findings are not important. I don't come from a science background, having only studied sciences until age 16 because I went off in more of an arts direction. However, I do try to keep read a certain amount of thinking and authors within physics and other aspects of the 'sciences' as part of the pursuit of philosophy. But, sometimes it does seem that ideas like the Big Bang and evolution are seen as being an all encompassing starting point for most other things. These theories and others probably capture a lot of aspects of 'truth' but not everything

Generally, all theories and other worldviews may be seen as representations of ways of explaining but they are only constructions. Most have metaphorical aspects and thay may be as important as logic because the human mind conceives in various forms of understanding and even scientific thinking may be based on images, which may be put into words. But, the understanding captured within science may be based on imagination and, in that way, science and the arts may be linked fundamentally, and even religious thinking may fit somewhere into this because it involves narrative descriptions and ways of trying to explain how 'reality' works.

[Terrapin Station]

First, as soon as you get to "there is this" (including there are these mathematical statements) or "this is observed," you're in the realm of ontology. Ontology is about what there is (and then of course it usually continues with "how it is.")

OK. So we're in the realm of ontology when considering "there is what?" questions, whether that's about real things, abstract concepts or observations.

Well, as I said, my understanding of the many worlds theory in QM is that it is a proposed answer to the question "what is there?" where that's about real things. As I said, the mathematics of QM describes and predicts observations. It offer nothing in answer to the question "what is there?" if that question is about what real entities exist. It just tells us what observations we're going to make. The many worlds theory (as I said) is not part of that process. It's an attempt to say what is really happening.

Basically if we're making an instrumentalist interpretation of the mathematics (and the entire process re doing experiments etc.), we're still making an interpretation.

Also, MWI/multiverses can still be instrumentalist rather than something making an ontological commitment. You can parse that is more of an "as if" visualization tool.

[3017Metaphysician]

Difference Between Physics and Metaphysics:

• Physics is the study of the observable and is thus restricted to what we have in our universe while metaphysics is a philosophical study of being and knowing.…

We do find unobservable entities such as quarks in the ontologies of physical theories.
However, the concept of observability can be defined narrowly or more broadly. Is the observable restricted to what is sensorily perceptible by us without technological assistance (e.g. microscopes, telescopes)? For example, Anjan Chakravartty writes that…

QUOTE>
"The distinction here between the observable and the unobservable reflects human sensory capabilities: the observable is that which can, under favorable conditions, be perceived using the unaided senses (for example, planets and platypuses); the unobservable is that which cannot be detected this way (for example, proteins and protons). This is to privilege vision merely for terminological convenience, and differs from scientific conceptions of observability, which generally extend to things that are detectable using instruments (Shapere 1982). The distinction itself has been problematized (Maxwell 1962; Churchland 1985; Musgrave 1985; Dicken & Lipton 2006) and defended (Muller 2004, 2005; cf. Turner 2007 regarding the distant past). If it is problematic, this is arguably a concern primarily for certain forms of antirealism, which adopt an epistemically positive attitude only with respect to the observable. It is not ultimately a concern for scientific realism, which does not discriminate epistemically between observables and unobservables per se."

Scientific Realism: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/
<QUOTE

Thank you Consul!

Quick question (actually not so 'quick'), how does the Realist view things like; numbers, subconsciousness, sentience, dreams, time, gravity, dark energy, the Will, self-awareness, etc..? Would the Realist consider them as 'real' things-in-themselves? (And if they are considered to be real, to the Realist, what method of understanding would make them especially 'real', I wonder... ?)

Thank you Consul.