Is it Metaphysics or Science Fiction...?

[Pattern-chaser]

Rossen Vassilev Jr. suggested that physics 'has become too metaphysical' in an article, 'Einstein versus Logical Positivism' in, 'Philosophy Now' Ultimate Guides issue 4, 2021.

The full article is available on the interweb, here.

But in spite of all of this, the multiverse hypothesis remains a purely speculative theory in the sense that we cannot check it by direct observation. In fact, it has no concrete empirical evidence to back it up.

Ok, and do you consider this to be a Bad Thing? Still using the multiverse theory as an example, do you believe a theory that cannot be verified or falsified is useless?

What I am asking in this thread is to what extent science can be seen as a clear foundation for metaphysics?

To no extent at all. Science and metaphysics differ in many ways, I suppose, but the one that matters to me here is that they do not cover the same philosophical 'territory'. They don't clash or contradict one another; they accomplish investigation in different environments, and where one is applicable, the other is not.

[Pattern-chaser]

Not necessary to spend sleepless nights wondering how reality works.

Correct. And yet some of us choose to spend our time doing just that. There are some questions that have no answer, or whose answer is inaccessible to us, but answering them is important to us, for some reason. And so we address them anyway, even though no deducible conclusion exists. Answering these questions - or attempting to do so - is commonly called "metaphysics".

[3017Metaphysician]

Rossen Vassilev Jr. suggested that physics 'has become too metaphysical' in an article, 'Einstein versus Logical Positivism' in, 'Philosophy Now' Ultimate Guides issue 4, 2021. This has lead me to wonder if metaphysics has become too based on physics and the sciences. In the article, Vassilev said,
'many of the theories embraced by theoretical physicists today look like what Smolin calls "metaphysical fantasies". One of the most prominent is the idea of multiple universes, also known as the "many worlds hypothesis" or 'muliverse' theory. Different versions of it have been promoted as an answer to puzzles in many branches of physics; it was the subject of an entire issue of "New Scientist" magazine in 2011, and among its many supporters was the late Stephen Hawking, who worked on it in his last published paper. But in spite of all of this, the multiverse hypothesis remains a purely speculative theory in the sense that we cannot check it by direct observation. In fact, it has no concrete empirical evidence to back it up. It cannot be proven using Schlick's principle of verifibiality; nor can it be falsified empirically in the way Karl Popper believed any truly scientific theory should be. As a mere artifact of theoretical speculation and mathematical models, it is more philosophy and metaphysics than testable empirical science. It borders on science fiction.'

At the beginning of the article, the author said how logical positivists challenged metaphysics as being fanciful speculations. However, even Ayer acknowledged that human beings are likely to wonder about the questions about metaphysics. I am not advocating for logical positivism because I don't believe that it goes far enough in looking at issues of metaphysical importance. Of course, metaphysics is a term with ambiguity, as suggested in a recent thread which looked at whether its meaning could be agreed upon. My own basic working definition of its scope is about the attempt to understand the processes underlying life, the universe and reality.

What I am asking in this thread is to what extent science can be seen as a clear foundation for metaphysics? Physics and science seem to be seen as extremely important as many of the 'big' thinkers' ideas, such as Kant and Hegel are seen as open to question. What is the most reliable or useful foundation for metaphysics. In science or any other way of trying to explain and understand the nature of reality how far is worth going in developing "metaphysical fantasies"? If it is not seen as worthwhile, what can be the purpose and subject matter of philosophy?

Jack!

These 'distinctions' may/may not be helpful:



Difference Between Physics and Metaphysics:

• Physics is the study of the observable and is thus restricted to what we have in our universe while metaphysics is a philosophical study of being and knowing.

• Metaphysics begins where physics ends

• Many of metaphysical concepts are today accepted as laws of physics since modern physics is not just Newtonian physics but has advanced to quantum physics.

• Metaphysics is close to spirituality though it is not religion

• Physics explains only what can be explained using our knowledge base while metaphysics goes beyond our present knowledge.



If a big tree falls in a forest and there is a huge sound but no one is there to listen this sound. Is there a sound? We call a physical phenomenon sound only when we are able to hear it. But the phenomenon of sound takes place without we coming to know about its occurrence. This is merely to explain metaphysics simply means physics principles that take place without our knowledge. Physics has its limitations while metaphysics has no limitations. It is only our limited knowledge of the universe through physics that we seem to understand metaphysics which is not possible at the moment. However with advancements in physics and quantum physics coming into existence, many of the unresolved concepts of metaphysics are being explained.

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that studies the first principles of being, identity and change, space and time, causality, necessity and possibility.[1] It includes questions about the nature of consciousness and the relationship between mind and matter. The word "metaphysics" comes from two Greek words that, together, literally mean "after or behind or among [the study of] the natural". It has been suggested that the term might have been coined by a first century CE editor who assembled various small selections of Aristotle’s works into the treatise we now know by the name Metaphysics (μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, meta ta physika, lit. 'after the Physics ', another of Aristotle's works).[2]

Metaphysics studies questions related to what it is for something to exist and what types of existence there are. Metaphysics seeks to answer, in an abstract and fully general manner, the questions:[3]


Philosophical questions: what means and methods are appropriate to understand the nature of what's considered ultimate reality? Does the proposition 'all events must have a cause' a synthetic judgment that is logically necessary to advance a given physical theory? Is that judgement a metaphysical judgment, physical judgement, or both a physical and metaphysical judgement? Do all events have causes? And finally, do all mental causes have affects (Affect Consciousness)?

[Steve3007]

What I am asking in this thread is to what extent science can be seen as a clear foundation for metaphysics?

That is essentially the same as asking to what existent empirical observation in general can be seen as a foundation for metaphysics. And the answer would depend on what aspect of metaphysics you're talking about. If you're talking about ontology then I think the ontological position we decide to take is clearly based on what we observe of the world.

[Tegularius]

Not necessary to spend sleepless nights wondering how reality works.

Correct. And yet some of us choose to spend our time doing just that. There are some questions that have no answer, or whose answer is inaccessible to us, but answering them is important to us, for some reason. And so we address them anyway, even though no deducible conclusion exists. Answering these questions - or attempting to do so - is commonly called "metaphysics".

Agree completely!

[JackDaydream]

@3017Metaphysician
I was reading your post and I think one interesting remark is that 'Metaphysics is close to spirituality though it is not religion'. I think that you mean that it is connected to the search for 'truth'. Certainly, I have thought about metaphysics in that way because it is connected to the big questions about the nature of existence and reality. Someone remarked to me that I approach philosophy like 'religion' and I think that they were implying that I was looking for answers. I do see philosophy and metaphysics as a quest. This can include aspects of science and physics but not just focusing on the scientific aspects. However, reading your entry leads me to wonder whether the reason why metaphysics is less prominent in some philosophy circles is because it touches on aspects behind and beyond science and many do not wish to enter this 'unknown' territory and prefer to stick with 'realism' and established facts. Even some of the physics does touch upon potential mystery and really even though my post does question potential fantasy and science fiction, in some ways it is such exciting exploration. It may be the pursuit of mythos rather than simply logos.

[JackDaydream]

@Steve3007
Metaphysics and ontology is based 'on what we observe in the world', but it is about looking at the bigger picture and patterns. In many ways even when drawing upon physics it does incorporate ways of thinking about the unseen aspects of how the physical world functions even when this is based on observation of the empirical.

[JackDaydream]

@Pattern-chaser
Thank you for uploading the article which I am referring to on the thread since I am not able to do this on my phone. If anyone is interested in reading the full article please see Pattern-chaser's post on this page.

[JackDaydream]

@Terrapin Station
Your viewpoint seems to be fairly similar to the viewpoint of the author of the article and you may wish to read the original article which Pattern-chaser has kindly provided a link too in his post. As I have been thinking while writing on the thread I have become aware that I do not agree with the author and think that such fantasising is worthwhile. Of course, it may be hard to know if it correct but that may be difficult to ascertain with certainty. Perhaps it does not matter that it is not certain, as long as there is some recognition and honesty about it being speculation. So, I am prepared to embrace the science fiction in the physics and metaphysics. I do enjoy the science fiction genre and I am thinking that the reason why is probably because of imaginative thinking about the physical and metaphysical aspects which are explored within the worldviews created

[Terrapin Station]

@Steve3007
Metaphysics and ontology is based 'on what we observe in the world', but it is about looking at the bigger picture and patterns.

Not necessarily, especially if as part of your ontology, you don't believe that there are bigger patterns to look at.

[Terrapin Station]

I do not agree with the author and think that such fantasising is worthwhile.

It's not that I don't think it's worthwhile. I just think that it's important to be frank about and to understand what it is, rather than taking it to imply that, for example, there really is a "multiverse" just because that's an interpretation of the mathematics (of quantum mechanics) that works.

[Steve3007]

It's not that I don't think it's worthwhile. I just think that it's important to be frank about and to understand what it is, rather than taking it to imply that, for example, there really is a "multiverse" just because that's an interpretation of the mathematics (of quantum mechanics) that works.

When the multiverse, or "many worlds hypothesis", is invoked in proposed descriptions of what's going on in quantum mechanics, it's not because that's an interpretation of the mathematics that works. It's kind of the opposite motive to that. The mathematical descriptions/predictions of observations work fine without having to invoke many worlds hypotheses, as long as the physicists don't try to figure out what's really going on regardless of those observations (i.e. as long as they don't try to construct a possible ontology). The many worlds hypothesis is one of the things that's proposed (by some) as a way to "rescue reality"; to have an ontological position; to be able to say more than just what the results of some QM experiments are; to be able to do more than just "shut up and calculate". That's my understanding anyway.

[Terrapin Station]

It's not that I don't think it's worthwhile. I just think that it's important to be frank about and to understand what it is, rather than taking it to imply that, for example, there really is a "multiverse" just because that's an interpretation of the mathematics (of quantum mechanics) that works.

When the multiverse, or "many worlds hypothesis", is invoked in proposed descriptions of what's going on in quantum mechanics, it's not because that's an interpretation of the mathematics that works. It's kind of the opposite motive to that. The mathematical descriptions/predictions of observations work fine without having to invoke many worlds hypotheses, as long as the physicists don't try to figure out what's really going on regardless of those observations (i.e. as long as they don't try to construct a possible ontology). The many worlds hypothesis is one of the things that's proposed (by some) as a way to "rescue reality"; to have an ontological position; to be able to say more than just what the results of some QM experiments are; to be able to do more than just "shut up and calculate". That's my understanding anyway.

Note my comment in my earlier post:

"The SciFi stuff grows out of imaginative interpretations (as opposed, say, to strictly formalist interpretations) of the mathematics that support the most successful predictions of observed phenomena."

So, we have the mathematics, and we'll typically (and more or less necessarily) have something that amounts to a semantic interpretation of the mathematics. That's more or less necessary for one to have an understanding of the mathematics in the first place. As humans, we can't really function merely like a computer would. Humans wind up having some semantic understanding of things like mathematics. We wonder what the significance of it is, we wonder "what the mathematics means," and we can't really avoid that while being able to utilize the mathematics in the first place.

Well, those semantic interpretations can range from (a) strictly formalist interpretations--that is more or less that the mathematics is just the mathematics, that is, just an abstract tool that enables successful predictions, where that doesn't amount to anything more than its "face value," to (b) fantastical stuff like multiverse/many worlds ideas.

So in no manner was I suggesting anything at all along the lines of the more fantastical interpretation being necessary.

We have the mathematical constructions. The mathematical constructions work to make predictions. As humans, we'll also have some semantic interpretation of those mathematical constructions, which can range from strictly formalist interpretations to highly fantastical interpretations to all sorts of things in between those two extremes. The interpretations don't affect the mathematical constructions. They're simply ways of (trying to) understand them, ways of thinking about "what do these mathematical constructions mean'? What do they represent?" and so on.

[Steve3007]

Note my comment in my earlier post:

"The SciFi stuff grows out of imaginative interpretations (as opposed, say, to strictly formalist interpretations) of the mathematics that support the most successful predictions of observed phenomena."

Yes, I saw that...

So, we have the mathematics, and we'll typically (and more or less necessarily) have something that amounts to a semantic interpretation of the mathematics. That's more or less necessary for one to have an understanding of the mathematics in the first place. As humans, we can't really function merely like a computer would. Humans wind up having some semantic understanding of things like mathematics. We wonder what the significance of it is, we wonder "what the mathematics means," and we can't really avoid that while being able to utilize the mathematics in the first place.

Yes, mathematical language is too abstract for most people, so there's usually an attempt to translate it into a human language like English. What that usually seems to do is allow people to create a mental picture of what the mathematics is supposed to represent. People like those mental pictures because they like to believe that the phenomenon being described is something they'd somehow be able to directly observe. And sometimes, of course, particularly in things like popular science TV shows, an actual picture or animation is created (to save people the trouble of creating their own in their heads). So, for example, the mathematics describing the way objects move in the vicinity of black holes is typically represented by pictures/animations of flexible rubber-like membranes, or swirly vortexy things, leaving some people with the impression that the mathematics is describing an actual rubber-like membrane, or similar. This is related to the reification of mathematics that you've often talked about (and talked about again in this topic).

But my point was specifically about the many worlds hypothesis in quantum mechanics...

Well, those semantic interpretations can range from (a) strictly formalist interpretations--that is more or less that the mathematics is just the mathematics, that is, just an abstract tool that enables successful predictions, where that doesn't amount to anything more than its "face value," to (b) fantastical stuff like multiverse/many worlds ideas.

My point was that the many worlds hypothesis in QM, specifically, is neither of those things. The first (a) is semantic versions of what the mathematics is saying. The second (b) is the reification of mathematics. The example I gave above, of mistakenly thinking that the mathematics is representing some kind of real membrane or fabric ("the fabric of the spacetime continuum") falls into that category. But the many worlds hypothesis doesn't. As I said (as I understand it) the many world hypothesis is not a semantic interpretation of the mathematics which describe/predict what is observed. It's a proposed ontology. It's proposed because the observations and the mathematics which describe/predict them are not deemed to result in a satisfactory ontology (an idea of what's really going in) themselves.

So in no manner was I suggesting anything at all along the lines of the more fantastical interpretation being necessary.

Understood. All I was saying was that the people who propose the many worlds hypothesis think it is necessary in order to have an ontological position. It's not necessary (they would say) if we don't care about ontological positions and just want to "shut up and calculate" (i.e. just want to create accurate mathematical descriptions of the results of experiments and forget about what's really happening.)

We have the mathematical constructions. The mathematical constructions work to make predictions. As humans, we'll also have some semantic interpretation of those mathematical constructions, which can range from strictly formalist interpretations to highly fantastical interpretations to all sorts of things in between those two extremes. The interpretations don't affect the mathematical constructions. They're simply ways of (trying to) understand them, ways of thinking about "what do these mathematical constructions mean'? What do they represent?" and so on.

Yes. The semantic interpretations of those mathematical constructions serve that purpose. My understanding of the many worlds hypothesis in quantum mechanics is that it isn't an example of one of those.

[3017Metaphysician]

@3017Metaphysician
I was reading your post and I think one interesting remark is that 'Metaphysics is close to spirituality though it is not religion'. I think that you mean that it is connected to the search for 'truth'. Certainly, I have thought about metaphysics in that way because it is connected to the big questions about the nature of existence and reality. Someone remarked to me that I approach philosophy like 'religion' and I think that they were implying that I was looking for answers. I do see philosophy and metaphysics as a quest. This can include aspects of science and physics but not just focusing on the scientific aspects. However, reading your entry leads me to wonder whether the reason why metaphysics is less prominent in some philosophy circles is because it touches on aspects behind and beyond science and many do not wish to enter this 'unknown' territory and prefer to stick with 'realism' and established facts. Even some of the physics does touch upon potential mystery and really even though my post does question potential fantasy and science fiction, in some ways it is such exciting exploration. It may be the pursuit of mythos rather than simply logos.

Remember that Metaphysics also studies the why's of existence (meaning of conscious existence, time and space, causation, etc.). As such, it can overlap into the concepts or axioms of God/Religious ideology.

As far as 'established facts', you would have to 'deconstruct' that for it to be germane to the argument of irrelevance. Otherwise, we are simply back the standard definitions of Metaphysics:

...first principles of being, identity and change, space and time, causality, necessity and possibility….origin and nature of the universe, how the world of appearances presented to our senses relates to its underlying reality and order, the relationship between mind and matter, and the existence of the Will.

As such, empirical science (physics) alone has not been able to answer many of them particularly concerning the nature of existing things, including the complete understanding of (ultimate) reality (ToE). Even so, the closest we get to understanding 'ultimate reality' are only provided for in like theories in themselves, with no observable data (the BB is just a theory). To that end, viz your OP supposition, could one make a philosophical case for the opposite; science is only 'fiction' ?