How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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Consul
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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GE Morton wrote: January 20th, 2022, 10:05 pm
Consul wrote: January 16th, 2022, 8:39 pm In my view, materialism/physicalism is an all-encompassing worldview that isn't only about concrete reality but about reality simpliciter. So I don't define it as the thesis that everything concretely real is material/physical, but that everything real is material/physical.
Then "concretely real" is not a sub-category of "real," but an entirely disjoint realm (since your latter clause there would seem to include the former)? And you're still left in the awkward position of denying that theories, laws, etc., are "real." That also seems to conflict with what you said above, i.e., "everything real is concrete."

The trouble with denying that they (and laws, theories, et al) are "real" is that such a claim entails that they don't exist, i.e., "unreal"="does not exist," per the common understanding of that term. And, of course, all those things certainly do exist. You're trying to restrict the term "real" to a particular class of existents, which conflicts with its ordinary meaning (and thus renders communication difficult), but adds nothing (that I can see) to our understanding of experience.
I am using "is not real" in the simple sense of "does not exist" rather than in the sense of "does not exist mind-independently". What is concretely real is real and concrete; that is, it exists as a concrete entity.

I don't find concretism—the view that everything real/existent is concrete—"awkward". On the contrary, what I find awkward is the belief in abstract entities, especially in alleged abstract artifacts such as theories. How could any concrete (mental or physical) activity or process in space&time bring something abstract (neither mental nor physical) into existence that doesn't exist anywhere in space&time? Sounds like magic to me! I strongly disagree with your contention that "all those things certainly do exist."
GE Morton wrote: January 20th, 2022, 10:05 pm
Consul wrote: January 16th, 2022, 8:39 pm(By the way, Steven French has written a book titled There Are No Such Things As Theories.)
Heh. A self-refuting claim, like "I don't exist." The latter is belied whenever it is uttered. So are theories which deny the existence of theories. (Though I'm sure French chose that title just because it was catchy).
No, the theory that there are no theories doesn't self-contradictorily presuppose its own existence, because it can be consistently applied to itself: It is itself nonexistent. What does exist are concrete sentences in concrete copies of French's book that describe his theory.
GE Morton wrote: January 20th, 2022, 10:05 pm
Consul wrote: January 16th, 2022, 8:39 pmAgain, if concepts are abstracta, I think there are no such things. Note that concepts qua types of mental representations are abstract items too!
Indeed they are. So, concepts don't exist? Do we need to purge that term from the language?
No, we can happily continue to talk about abstract concept-types (such as the concept <dog>) for the sake of convenience; but from my concretistic perspective we need to be aware that concept-types are fictional objects, and that what really exists instead are concrete tokens of them in people's minds.
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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Consul wrote: January 21st, 2022, 1:01 pmNo, the theory that there are no theories doesn't self-contradictorily presuppose its own existence, because it can be consistently applied to itself: It is itself nonexistent. What does exist are concrete sentences in concrete copies of French's book that describe his theory.
According to the standard abstractist conception of theories, they are sets of logically connected propositions or sentence-types; but <There are no theories> is just one proposition or sentence-type, so I'd prefer to call it a thesis rather than a theory. A one-sentence thesis can be part of a theory, but it alone isn't properly called a theory in philosophico-scientific discourse, is it? In ordinary language "theory" is used more loosely like in "Her method is based on the theory that all children want to learn," where the so-called theory consists of one sentence only (example taken from Merriam-Webster); but strictly speaking, a philosophical or scientific theory is a multi-sentence text.
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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Consul wrote: January 21st, 2022, 1:01 pmNo, we can happily continue to talk about abstract concept-types (such as the concept <dog>) for the sake of convenience; but from my concretistic perspective we need to be aware that concept-types are fictional objects, and that what really exists instead are concrete tokens of them in people's minds.
Saying that two (or more) people have the same concept <x> in their minds is like saying that they wear the same hat, where the sameness isn't numerical identity but qualitative identity in the form of exact similarity. Numerically different concept-tokens in different minds can be exactly similar, in which case we can speak of a corresponding concept-type as an abstractive fiction, so that we don't always have to refer to particular concept-tokens in particular minds when we think or talk about concepts.
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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JackDaydream wrote: I have been reading Daniel Dennett on the concept of qualia. He suggests that philosophers have tied themselves into knots over qualia.
I have no illusions real or imaginary (I trust my qualia to be true) that philosophers often tie themselves in knots, and it's the scientists that untie them to reveal what actually exists in reality.. I do not agree with John Searle, et al. I fully support Daniel Dennett in offering an account of how consciousness arises from the interaction of physical and cognitive processes in the brain, he describes consciousness as an 'account of the various calculations occurring in the brain at close to the same time', and compares consciousness to an academic paper that's being created (and edited) on-the-fly by 'multiple people' as it were (no ghost in the machine, no homunculus inside my skull!) it's his "multiple drafts" theory of consciousness.
JackDaydream wrote: In the past, I had not been particularly impressed by Dennett' s writings, but I had only read articles and not a specific book. I was far more impressed by his book from 1991, 'Consciousness Explained' , than I expected. I just came across the book in a local charity shop, so I However, I am aware of how this was written a long time ago, so may not be a reflection of his current outlook on consciousness.
I first read 'Consciousness Explained' at the age of 29 in 1991 when it was first published, I have to say it was what inspired me to study consciousness extensively at that time. I also read 'The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and The Laws of Physics' by Roger Penrose that had not long been published in 1989. Good times as I recall. I don't believe Daniel Dennett has substantially altered his views/theory since then, but I may be wrong.
Gee wrote: I assure you that I am very biased on the subject of Daniel Dennett. I do not see him as a philosopher, mostly because he does not recognize much truth in his studies of consciousness. He is a "science guy" who plays at being a philosopher. A person can love science and philosophy equally, but like a man who loves two women, he will at some point have to choose which he will make a life with. Dennett chose science as wife and delegated philosophy to mistress -- it is obvious in his work because he trusts science -- and yet, he is employed as a philosopher, not a scientist. This makes him a fraud in my mind.
As with other detractors of Daniel Dennett, do I detect a hint of religiosity creeping in here.. what's all that you say 'two women, a wife, a mistress'. I can't leave that 'philosophical bunkum' without a comment. I'm just getting a gut feeling, and it's not good. Philosophers beware the scientists here are watching you closely! :shock: (I'm being playful in case you take my remarks too seriously ;) )
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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Gee wrote: Thank you for providing this link. I watched the whole thing and find that it is true that Dennett has not changed his mind one whit since writing the book, Consciousness Explained. This video was taped at the end of 2019, he joined the Freedom From Religion Foundation around 2010, and wrote Consciousness Explained before that. He is also regarded as one of The Four Horsemen, not of the apocalypse, but of Atheism. He is a warrior against religion and a great deal of his support is political, not because he has a good theory of consciousness, but because he has a theory that excludes religion. He has spent decades refining his arguments, but in order to exclude any possibility of religious ideas -- spirit -- he had to remove subjective experience -- qualia.
I was right, religion.. God has spoken! :) (sarcasm)
Gee wrote:The fact that he is discussing the nervous system, not consciousness, seems to be missed by many people. For myself I prefer Spinoza's ideas about consciousness.
If I accept a god in any way then I have to say Spinoza's pantheism is worth investigating in-depth, but I will have to add that I'm not familiar with his ideas about consciousness. I will have to 'read up' on that.
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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Consul wrote: January 21st, 2022, 1:01 pm
I am using "is not real" in the simple sense of "does not exist" rather than in the sense of "does not exist mind-independently". What is concretely real is real and concrete; that is, it exists as a concrete entity.

I don't find concretism—the view that everything real/existent is concrete—"awkward". On the contrary, what I find awkward is the belief in abstract entities, especially in alleged abstract artifacts such as theories. How could any concrete (mental or physical) activity or process in space&time bring something abstract (neither mental nor physical) into existence that doesn't exist anywhere in space&time? Sounds like magic to me! I strongly disagree with your contention that "all those things certainly do exist."
You don't think it awkward to declare that laws, theories, etc., don't exist? Are all the world's law schools perpetuating a delusion? All the physics, geology, biology, cosmology texts delivering fantasies?

"Existence" (and "real") has a far broader scope, not only in common usage, but in philosophy and all the sciences, than you are willing to give it. I doubt that many would be interested in such a radical revision of language.
No, the theory that there are no theories doesn't self-contradictorily presuppose its own existence, because it can be consistently applied to itself: It is itself nonexistent. What does exist are concrete sentences in concrete copies of French's book that describe his theory.
Er . . . describe WHAT? You presuppose the existence of theories by that very sentence. BTW, Certain concrete sentences, if expressing certain propositions and structured in a certain way, are theories, by definition. Hence if the sentences exist, so does the theory (we can conjure all kinds of things into existence by definition. My own argument is that EVERYTHING we claim exists, apart from our direct percepts and the inaccessible noumena, comes into existence in just that way).
GE Morton wrote: January 20th, 2022, 10:05 pm
Consul wrote: January 16th, 2022, 8:39 pmAgain, if concepts are abstracta, I think there are no such things. Note that concepts qua types of mental representations are abstract items too!
Indeed they are. So, concepts don't exist? Do we need to purge that term from the language?
No, we can happily continue to talk about abstract concept-types (such as the concept <dog>) for the sake of convenience; but from my concretistic perspective we need to be aware that concept-types are fictional objects, and that what really exists instead are concrete tokens of them in people's minds.
You suppose that we can have a token of something that does not exist? A "token" presupposes something for which it is a token. Saying concepts are "fictional," BTW, lumps them with fairies, unicorns, etc. And "minds" are just as abstract as concepts and theories.
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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Consul wrote: January 21st, 2022, 8:11 pm
According to the standard abstractist conception of theories, they are sets of logically connected propositions or sentence-types; but <There are no theories> is just one proposition or sentence-type, so I'd prefer to call it a thesis rather than a theory
That "thesis," however, does not stand alone. It is merely the conclusion of set of arguments to which French devoted an entire book. Those arguments, with its conclusion, is the theory.
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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The concept of qualia , is an essential part of an ontological way to interpretate reality . Marting Heidegger explained beeing in time , as the ontological beeing-handiness in time, as an essential part of beeing the magic between humans. So without a qualia , the beeing in time is reduced , which has consequences for ontology and with it reduces the real-time character of zen buddhistic philosophy.
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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Consul wrote:
No, we can happily continue to talk about abstract concept-types (such as the concept <dog>) for the sake of convenience; but from my concretistic perspective we need to be aware that concept-types are fictional objects, and that what really exists instead are concrete tokens of them in people's minds.
But a concrete token in a mind is both subjective and dynamic. Thoughts are freely creative. A concrete token in minds, plural, is mediated through and crystallised by language and without language it could not exist.

The concept 'dog' varies from thinker to thinker according to what the thinker's intention is towards a dog. Anthony is a dog groomer and the dog in question usually tries to bite him when he baths it. Bill is a veterinary surgeon and the dog in question has an operable tumour. Gerard is the dog's affectionate owner and he dreads his companion's demise. Manuel is a small boy who knows only one dog, the family's Newfoundland who is large and keeps pulling Manuel out of the water.
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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Belindi wrote: January 22nd, 2022, 7:51 am
Consul wrote:
No, we can happily continue to talk about abstract concept-types (such as the concept <dog>) for the sake of convenience; but from my concretistic perspective we need to be aware that concept-types are fictional objects, and that what really exists instead are concrete tokens of them in people's minds.
But a concrete token in a mind is both subjective and dynamic. Thoughts are freely creative. A concrete token in minds, plural, is mediated through and crystallised by language and without language it could not exist.

The concept 'dog' varies from thinker to thinker according to what the thinker's intention is towards a dog. Anthony is a dog groomer and the dog in question usually tries to bite him when he baths it. Bill is a veterinary surgeon and the dog in question has an operable tumour. Gerard is the dog's affectionate owner and he dreads his companion's demise. Manuel is a small boy who knows only one dog, the family's Newfoundland who is large and keeps pulling Manuel out of the water.
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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GE Morton wrote: January 22nd, 2022, 1:22 amYou don't think it awkward to declare that laws, theories, etc., don't exist? Are all the world's law schools perpetuating a delusion? All the physics, geology, biology, cosmology texts delivering fantasies?

"Existence" (and "real") has a far broader scope, not only in common usage, but in philosophy and all the sciences, than you are willing to give it. I doubt that many would be interested in such a radical revision of language.
I don't think ontological concretism requires "a radical revision of language." For example, I don't object to math teachers telling their students that there are infinitely many natural numbers—despite my conviction that there aren't really any numbers (qua abstract objects) at all.

David Chalmers has introduced a useful distinction between "ordinary and ontological existence assertions," with the former being made "outside the ontology room" and the latter "inside the ontology room":

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=15244&p=300928&hili ... cs#p300928

Doing serious ontology "inside the ontology room" requires taking existence assertions more seriously than "outside the ontology room". Existential and existentially quantified ("There is/are…") statements are found everywhere, in all sorts of academic and non-academic contexts and discourses; but a serious ontologist always needs to ask whether the things said to exist or to be there really exist or are really there. And, speaking as a serious ontologist, I make the negative ontological existence assertion that there aren't (really) any such things as abstract objects.
GE Morton wrote: January 22nd, 2022, 1:22 am
Consul wrote: January 21st, 2022, 1:01 pmNo, the theory that there are no theories doesn't self-contradictorily presuppose its own existence, because it can be consistently applied to itself: It is itself nonexistent. What does exist are concrete sentences in concrete copies of French's book that describe his theory.
Er . . . describe WHAT? You presuppose the existence of theories by that very sentence. BTW, Certain concrete sentences, if expressing certain propositions and structured in a certain way, are theories, by definition. Hence if the sentences exist, so does the theory (we can conjure all kinds of things into existence by definition. My own argument is that EVERYTHING we claim exists, apart from our direct percepts and the inaccessible noumena, comes into existence in just that way).
There's a distinction between a concrete text (complex of sentences) representing an abstract theory and the abstract theory it represents. Note that the truth of "x represents y" doesn't require the coexistence of both x and y, because the existence of theory-representations doesn't entail the existence of theories.
GE Morton wrote: January 22nd, 2022, 1:22 am
Consul wrote: January 21st, 2022, 1:01 pm No, we can happily continue to talk about abstract concept-types (such as the concept <dog>) for the sake of convenience; but from my concretistic perspective we need to be aware that concept-types are fictional objects, and that what really exists instead are concrete tokens of them in people's minds.
You suppose that we can have a token of something that does not exist? A "token" presupposes something for which it is a token. Saying concepts are "fictional," BTW, lumps them with fairies, unicorns, etc. And "minds" are just as abstract as concepts and theories.
A real relation requires the coexistence of its relata, but a purely intentional relation doesn't, because it can be a "unilateral relation" or pseudorelation between something existent and something nonexistent (fictional/imaginary). For example, my thinking about Batman doesn't require the coexistence of me and Batman. I exist, and Batman doesn't; yet I am intentionally related to him by thinking about him. Analogously, if abstract types are fictional items, token-type relations are just intentional pseudorelations between existent tokens and nonexistent types. But it doesn't follow that our token-type talk is thereby rendered meaningless.

By the way, some have suggested that universals be identified with classes/sets of exactly similar property-particulars (so-called tropes or modes). Analogously, types of things such as concept-types could be identified with groups, sums, or collectives of exactly similar tokens such as concept-tokens (where exact similarity means semantic identity).
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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Belindi wrote: January 22nd, 2022, 7:51 am
Consul wrote:No, we can happily continue to talk about abstract concept-types (such as the concept <dog>) for the sake of convenience; but from my concretistic perspective we need to be aware that concept-types are fictional objects, and that what really exists instead are concrete tokens of them in people's minds.
But a concrete token in a mind is both subjective and dynamic. Thoughts are freely creative. A concrete token in minds, plural, is mediated through and crystallised by language and without language it could not exist.

The concept 'dog' varies from thinker to thinker according to what the thinker's intention is towards a dog. Anthony is a dog groomer and the dog in question usually tries to bite him when he baths it. Bill is a veterinary surgeon and the dog in question has an operable tumour. Gerard is the dog's affectionate owner and he dreads his companion's demise. Manuel is a small boy who knows only one dog, the family's Newfoundland who is large and keeps pulling Manuel out of the water.
There being different attitudes toward dogs doesn't mean there being different concepts of a dog. However, Timothy Williamson has drawn a distinction between concepts and conceptions:

QUOTE>
"A distinction is sometimes drawn between concepts and conceptions. A concept is more like a dictionary definition. For example, a dictionary may define the word 'vixen' as 'female fox', so the concept vixen just is the concept female fox (my dictionary also gives another definition for 'vixen', as 'quarrelsome woman', which would be another concept). By contrast, your conception of a vixen includes all the beliefs you would express using that word (in a given sense). Unlike the concept vixen, my conception of a vixen includes my belief that a vixen lives under my garden shed. Dictionaries are for concepts, encyclopaedias for conceptions. If we distinguish concepts from conceptions like this, then conceptual questions are special, because they concern definitions. Clarifying one's concepts is defining one's terms.
One advantage of distinguishing concepts from conceptions is that it explains how knowledge can be communicated from one person to another and preserved over time. Conceptions are personal and fleeting, but definitions can be shared and stable. 'Vixen' has been defined as 'female fox' for many centuries and many millions of speakers of English."

(Williamson, Timothy. Doing Philosophy: From Common Curiosity to Logical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. pp. 45-5)
<QUOTE

Anyway, if concepts are concrete mental representations of things, there is still the question of their relationship with mind and thought. Where there are mental representations, there are representational mental states, which are dispositional states of mind. Following Fodor&Lowe, I'd define a concept (qua mental entity) as the (relatively stable) individual mental ability and tendency to think about X or Xs (as such) in some way.

QUOTE>
"[H]aving concept X is having the ability to think about Xs (or better, that having concept X is being able to think about Xs 'as such')."

(Fodor, Jerry A. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. p. 3)

———

"As for the ontological status of concepts themselves, if they are, as I have been suggesting, ways of thinking of entities, then it would seem that they are mental properties—for properties, quite generally, are appropriately thought of as being ways entities are, whether we are talking of properties as universals or properties as particulars (…). For example, redness is a way objects can be coloured and squareness is a way they can be shaped. A concept, then, is a way someone can be thinking of an entity. Understood as universals, concepts are mental attributes and understood as particulars they are mental modes. The objects that possess them are thinking subjects, that is, persons."

(Lowe, E. J. The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 85)

"But what, quite generally, are concepts supposed to be? Of course, this in itself is a highly contentious question. Here I shall simply state one widely held view of the matter, which is that a concept is a way of thinking of some thing or things (Lowe, 2006, pp. 85–6). Since thought is a mental process, this means, in effect, that concepts are mental properties of a certain kind. For properties or qualities, quite generally, are ways of being – ways things are (…). For example, roundness is a way of being shaped and redness is a way of being colored. By the same token, concepts, being ways of thinking of things, are ways of being and hence properties – and, more specifically, mental properties, since thought is a mental process. So much for the ontology of concepts. But we speak of thinkers grasping or failing to grasp concepts. We may take this simply to be a matter of their being able, or not being able, to think of things in certain ways. Someone who grasps the concept of a cat is able to think of certain things – in this case, certain living organisms – in a certain way. What way is that? Well, of course, such a person is able to think of certain living organisms as being cats. And what does this involve? Well, among other things, it involves being able to think of these organisms as possessing certain characteristic properties, such as furriness and warmbloodedness, and – most importantly for present purposes – as satisfying a certain criterion of identity. We needn’t suppose, however, that a person who grasps the concept of a cat must be able to articulate such a criterion in an explicit form, in line with the general form of a criterion of identity stated earlier. Indeed, it is notoriously difficult – even for philosophers – to formulate clear and uncontroversial criteria of identity for many kinds of things, even when we seem to have a good implicit grasp of such criteria that is manifested in our ability to make confident identity-judgments concerning things of those kinds."

(Lowe, E. J. "Individuation." In A Companion to Metaphysics, 2nd ed., edited by Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz, 28-36. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. p. 28-9)
<QUOTE
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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JackDaydream wrote: December 13th, 2021, 9:17 am I have been reading Daniel Dennett on the concept of qualia. He suggests that 'philosophers have tied themselves into knots over qualia. They started where anyone would start: with the clearest intuitions about their own minds. Those intuitions, alas, form a mutually self-supporting circle of doctrines, imprisoning their imaginations in the Cartesian Theater. Even though philosophers have discovered the paradoxes inherent in this closed circle of ideas_ that is why the literature gets more and more convoluted, instead of convuluting agreement.'


The idea of qualia was first introduced in philosophy by
CI Lewis in 1929. However, it is a complex area, so I raise it for consideration. To what extent is it useful, or does it blur and fuzz over issues to do with perception and what constitutes reality?
The term ''qualia'' can be used in different ways, for example as only sensory experience, or all conscious phenomenal experience, so I don't find it that useful.

I'd rather people either specify they're talking about phenomenal ''what it is like'' experience generally, or specify what type of experience they mean. I tend to think in terms of ''flavours'' of experience, such as seeing, hearing, remembering, feeling sensations like hunger or pain, mood, imagining, thinking with your internal narrator, etc.

I don't see any reason to put sensory experience in one category, and all the other types of experience in another.

And the philosophical issue of the mind-body problem is relevant to all flavours of experience, not just sensory experience.

And the notion of ''a quale'' seems incongruous when we're talking about experiencing, which is more like a process than an accumulation of individual, quantifiable, isolatable 'reds' or 'toe hurts' or 'remembering my last birthday's.

Overall, I don't think it's a term which helps clarify discourse, or is especially helpful in understanding the nature of conscious experience.
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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Consul wrote: January 22nd, 2022, 5:54 pmI don't think ontological concretism requires "a radical revision of language." For example, I don't object to math teachers telling their students that there are infinitely many natural numbers—despite my conviction that there aren't really any numbers (qua abstract objects) at all.

David Chalmers has introduced a useful distinction between "ordinary and ontological existence assertions," with the former being made "outside the ontology room" and the latter "inside the ontology room":

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=15244&p=300928&hili ... cs#p300928
I'm aware that there is a big problem, because (to use my example above) teachers are expected not to teach falsities; and if there are no natural numbers at all, then it is false that there are infinitely many natural numbers. Is it then also morally wrong for teachers to tell their students that there are infinitely many natural numbers?

Well, Chalmers distinguishes between truth and correctness, arguing that an ontologically false ordinary existence assertion can still be correct. But it is not certain that this isn't just a verbal distinction without a real difference. What is certain is that there is a relevant evaluative difference between e.g. the statements "The number of natural numbers isn't finite" and "The number of natural numbers is finite". From the point of view of ontological concretism, both statements are equally false; so what alternative value-predicate can be used to mark the relevant difference between them? Chalmers suggests "correct"/"incorrect", but I'd prefer "valid"/"invalid". Of course, the next problem is how to clearly spell out the distinction between truth and correctness/validity. (This is highly off-topic here!)
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Re: How Useful is the Concept of Qualia?

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Gertie wrote: January 22nd, 2022, 6:37 pm
JackDaydream wrote: December 13th, 2021, 9:17 am I have been reading Daniel Dennett on the concept of qualia. He suggests that 'philosophers have tied themselves into knots over qualia. They started where anyone would start: with the clearest intuitions about their own minds. Those intuitions, alas, form a mutually self-supporting circle of doctrines, imprisoning their imaginations in the Cartesian Theater. Even though philosophers have discovered the paradoxes inherent in this closed circle of ideas_ that is why the literature gets more and more convoluted, instead of convuluting agreement.'


The idea of qualia was first introduced in philosophy by
CI Lewis in 1929. However, it is a complex area, so I raise it for consideration. To what extent is it useful, or does it blur and fuzz over issues to do with perception and what constitutes reality?
The term ''qualia'' can be used in different ways, for example as only sensory experience, or all conscious phenomenal experience, so I don't find it that useful.

I'd rather people either specify they're talking about phenomenal ''what it is like'' experience generally, or specify what type of experience they mean. I tend to think in terms of ''flavours'' of experience, such as seeing, hearing, remembering, feeling sensations like hunger or pain, mood, imagining, thinking with your internal narrator, etc.

I don't see any reason to put sensory experience in one category, and all the other types of experience in another.

And the philosophical issue of the mind-body problem is relevant to all flavours of experience, not just sensory experience.

And the notion of ''a quale'' seems incongruous when we're talking about experiencing, which is more like a process than an accumulation of individual, quantifiable, isolatable 'reds' or 'toe hurts' or 'remembering my last birthday's.

Overall, I don't think it's a term which helps clarify discourse, or is especially helpful in understanding the nature of conscious experience.
I also think Dennett dodges the tough questions which conscious experience raises by obfuscation, trying to ignore anything which isn't a neat fit with his physicalist square hole, or retreating to functionalism for 'explanations'.
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2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise
by John K Danenbarger
January 2023

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul
by Mitzi Perdue
February 2023

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023

The Unfakeable Code®

The Unfakeable Code®
by Tony Jeton Selimi
April 2023

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are
by Alan Watts
May 2023

Killing Abel

Killing Abel
by Michael Tieman
June 2023

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead
by E. Alan Fleischauer
July 2023

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough
by Mark Unger
August 2023

Predictably Irrational

Predictably Irrational
by Dan Ariely
September 2023

Artwords

Artwords
by Beatriz M. Robles
November 2023

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope
by Dr. Randy Ross
December 2023

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes
by Ali Master
February 2024

2022 Philosophy Books of the Month

Emotional Intelligence At Work

Emotional Intelligence At Work
by Richard M Contino & Penelope J Holt
January 2022

Free Will, Do You Have It?

Free Will, Do You Have It?
by Albertus Kral
February 2022

My Enemy in Vietnam

My Enemy in Vietnam
by Billy Springer
March 2022

2X2 on the Ark

2X2 on the Ark
by Mary J Giuffra, PhD
April 2022

The Maestro Monologue

The Maestro Monologue
by Rob White
May 2022

What Makes America Great

What Makes America Great
by Bob Dowell
June 2022

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!
by Jerry Durr
July 2022

Living in Color

Living in Color
by Mike Murphy
August 2022 (tentative)

The Not So Great American Novel

The Not So Great American Novel
by James E Doucette
September 2022

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches
by John N. (Jake) Ferris
October 2022

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021