Idealism(s)

[Consul]

Are there any academically-received philosophers who are eliminative mentalists, or reductive mentalists? These are the attitudes towards idealism that students sometimes have to be disabused of.

According to Charlie Broad (in The Mind and its Place in Nature), the famous idealists (apart from Kant) are all eliminative mentalists ("pure mentalists", as he would call them) rather than reductive mentalists. However, Berkeley at least can be regarded as a reductive mentalist, given that he writes that "collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things." For if physical things are constituted by or composed of mental things, and constitution/composition entails the reductive identifiability of the constituted/composed thing with the constituting/composing things (taken together), then Berkeley is not an eliminativist about the physical.

See: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/#3.1

QUOTE>
"So far as I am aware, Reductive Mentalism has never been held[.]"
(p. 612)

"Reductive Mentalism (2, 112). Reductive mentalism would be the counterpart of Behaviourism. It would consist in holding that the material characteristics of being extended and public, of having position, motion, etc., are reducible to combinations of purely mental characteristics. And there is precisely the same reason to deny this as to deny the opposite doctrine of Reductive Materialism. So far as I know, the present theory has never been held. All mentalists with whose works I am acquainted have held that material characteristics are delusive appearances of certain mental characteristics. This is obvious in the case of Leibniz, Hegel, Ward, Bradley, and M'Taggart. Berkeley's theory, on the face of it, is somewhat different. He holds that sensa really do have some material characteristics. They really are extended, coloured, hot, etc., and they really do move about in sense-fields. But (a) they are also mental events. And (b) they do not have all the characteristics of matter. For they are private, fleeting, and incapable of interacting with each other, (c) The remaining characteristics of matter are ascribed to God's habits of volition by Berkeley. These are permanent, neutral, and capable of causal action. But they are not extended or movable; and they are mental. Thus, in the end, materiality is a delusive characteristic for Berkeley as for other mentalists. There is nothing which has all the characteristics of materiality; though there are some things which have some of these characteristics, and other things which have the rest of them. For Berkeley materiality is a delusive characteristic, in the sense in which the characteristic of being a mermaid is delusive; i.e., it is a compound characteristic which applies as a whole to nothing, though it can be analysed into factors each of which does apply to something. For M'Taggart or Hegel materiality is delusive in a still more radical sense. It is a compound characteristic some of whose factors apply to nothing. E.g., nothing, on their view, is really extended."
(pp. 624-5)

"Of these theories I believe that Pure Mentalism, both in its less radical Berkeleian form and in the more radical form in which it is held by Leibniz, Hegel and M'Taggart, may be rejected. Thetheory has a negative and a positive side. The negative side is that materiality is a delusive characteristic. The positive side is that things which have nothing but mental qualities and relations are misperceived to have material qualities and relations."
(p. 630)

(Broad, C. D. The Mind and its Place in Nature. London: Kegan Paul, 1925.)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

However, from the perspective of ontological idealism in the form of eliminative mentalism, there is no physical nature; and from its perspective in the form of reductive mentalism, there is no irreducibly physical nature, i.e. no physical nature which isn't constituted by mental entities.

* If reductive mentalism is true, then our putative perception of the physical world is an illusion: What appears physical exists, but it is really mental.

* If eliminative mentalism is true, then our putative perception of the physical world is a hallucination: What appears physical doesn't exist at all.

[Belindi]

However, from the perspective of ontological idealism in the form of eliminative mentalism, there is no physical nature; and from its perspective in the form of reductive mentalism, there is no irreducibly physical nature, i.e. no physical nature which isn't constituted by mental entities.

* If reductive mentalism is true, then our putative perception of the physical world is an illusion: What appears physical exists, but it is really mental.

* If eliminative mentalism is true, then our putative perception of the physical world is a hallucination: What appears physical doesn't exist at all.

Pre-established harmony would chime with the Absolute of absolute idealism, if God's volition and time are not part of that equation. Spinoza's God-or-Nature fits with pre-established harmony (minus God's volition and the time element) and also with the Absolute.
One does feel intuitively attached to the principle of order , of pre-established harmony. I understand Islamic belief holds that science glorifies God because science lets us understand the eternal workings of God.

[Consul]

Pre-established harmony would chime with the Absolute of absolute idealism, if God's volition and time are not part of that equation. Spinoza's God-or-Nature fits with pre-established harmony (minus God's volition and the time element) and also with the Absolute.
One does feel intuitively attached to the principle of order , of pre-established harmony. I understand Islamic belief holds that science glorifies God because science lets us understand the eternal workings of God.

Both in Leibniz's world-model and in Berkeley's a nature-transcendent personal god is responsible for "the principle of order" in nature. They are theistic idealists. In Spinoza's pantheistic world-model there is a nature-immanent and impersonal determinism that is free from any teleological factors such as divine intentions or volitions.

"Berkelian idealism. There is nothing to the physical world except our experience and its patterns. This ordering of experience is sustained directly by God."

(Robinson, Howard. Introduction to George Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. p. xvii)

QUOTE>
"There is some debate in the literature as to whether God is also to be identified with Natura naturata. The more likely reading is that God, as Nature, is both Natura naturans and Natura naturata, and that the infinite and finite modes are not just effects of God or Nature’s power but actually inhere in and express that infinite substance. Be that as it may, Spinoza’s fundamental insight in Book One is that Nature is an indivisible, eternal or self-caused, substantial whole—in fact, it is the only substantial whole. Outside of Nature, there is nothing, and everything that exists is a part of Nature and is brought into being by Nature with a deterministic necessity. This unified, unique, productive, necessary being just is what is meant by ‘God’. Because of the necessity inherent in Nature, there is no teleology in the universe. God or Nature does not act for any ends, and things do not exist for any set purposes. There are no “final causes” (to use the common Aristotelian phrase). God does not “do” things for the sake of anything else. The order of things just follows from God’s essences with an inviolable determinism. All talk of God’s purposes, intentions, goals, preferences or aims is just an anthropomorphizing fiction."

Baruch Spinoza: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/
<QUOTE

[snt]

Don't make it too complicated, Actually all kinds of idealism have in common that credibility is imputed (by mind) to the mere fabrications (or "constructions " if you prefer) of itself. Mind imputes credibility to itself independent of external stimuli. The direct opposite of idealism is science because science relies on material evidence exclusively and material evidence necessarily is 'stimulus external to and independent of mind'.

I believe this to be incorrect. Isn't the scientist involved as part of the measurement and is he not a mind? The idea that what science perceives through sense experience is independent of mind does not follow from the concept repeatability.

Science merely functions as a humble observer in a tiny fraction of time (even a few hundred years would be a tiny amount of time to address cosmic matters) and science would equally perform when idealism is true.

With the idea that mind is primary and the fundament of the cosmos, one is to look at the fundamental nature of mind and not a manifested mind such as a human mind.

[Belindi]

Don't make it too complicated, Actually all kinds of idealism have in common that credibility is imputed (by mind) to the mere fabrications (or "constructions " if you prefer) of itself. Mind imputes credibility to itself independent of external stimuli. The direct opposite of idealism is science because science relies on material evidence exclusively and material evidence necessarily is 'stimulus external to and independent of mind'.

I believe this to be incorrect. Isn't the scientist involved as part of the measurement and is he not a mind? The idea that what science perceives through sense experience is independent of mind does not follow from the concept repeatability.

Science merely functions as a humble observer in a tiny fraction of time (even a few hundred years would be a tiny amount of time to address cosmic matters) and science would equally perform when idealism is true.

With the idea that mind is primary and the fundament of the cosmos, one is to look at the fundamental nature of mind and not a manifested mind such as a human mind.

Mind is a reification of experience. Body similarly is reification of experience. Not extended matter, not minds, but experience is what can't be denied.

[snt]

Mind is a reification of experience. Body similarly is reification of experience. Not extended matter, not minds, but experience is what can't be denied.

When it concerns the fundamental nature of experience, i.e. the primary qualities that are required for experience to be possible, would it not concern qualities that can be referenced with the term mind?

The term mind could refer to a human mind (a manifested mind) but since what is indicated with the term isn't empirical in nature, the term would essentially always refer to the primary qualities of what makes a manifested mind possible, despite the complexity in a manifested form.

In my opinion, when it concerns experience, one is referring to a phenomenon that fundamentally requires the primary qualities of mind. While it can be said that only experience can testify (i.e. to be undeniable), that would not imply anything with regard the fundamental nature of reality. From such a perspective, when it is considered that experience cannot be denied, then that might equally apply to mind.

[Belindi]

Mind is a reification of experience. Body similarly is reification of experience. Not extended matter, not minds, but experience is what can't be denied.

When it concerns the fundamental nature of experience, i.e. the primary qualities that are required for experience to be possible, would it not concern qualities that can be referenced with the term mind?

The term mind could refer to a human mind (a manifested mind) but since what is indicated with the term isn't empirical in nature, the term would essentially always refer to the primary qualities of what makes a manifested mind possible, despite the complexity in a manifested form.

In my opinion, when it concerns experience, one is referring to a phenomenon that fundamentally requires the primary qualities of mind. While it can be said that only experience can testify (i.e. to be undeniable), that would not imply anything with regard the fundamental nature of reality. From such a perspective, when it is considered that experience cannot be denied, then that might equally apply to mind.

But mind is experienced empirically in the sense that several people can come to a consensus that they are, or are not, in the presence of mental function.

What makes mental experience possible is physical experience (the body) without which what we experience as nature would not exist.The converse is also true: what makes physical experience (the body)possible is mental experience without which what we experience as nature would not exist.

The fundamental nature of reality is what I call 'nature'. Nature itself exists only when nature is conceived of as an integrated entity. This is a matter of faith; there are faith -based claims that the fundamental nature of reality is chaos. It's possible to experience empirical investigation into 'minds' or 'bodies' only from a perspective of faith that there be integrated order to investigate.

Experience itself and only experience itself is fundamental because it's impossible to experience chaos unless chaos is the experience of loss of integrated order. I have no objection if my argument take a theological path.

The strongest sort of idealism is absolute idealism. The term 'absolute' implies mind is a function of experience and is not self caused . More relative sorts of idealism imply mind is self caused and is not a function of anything else.

[snt]

But mind is experienced empirically in the sense that several people can come to a consensus that they are, or are not, in the presence of mental function.

Empirical experience of mind would merely concern a manifested form of mind. Experience in my opinion would follow the qualitative properties of mind. Experience would be one level up from mind.

What makes mental experience possible is physical experience (the body) without which what we experience as nature would not exist.The converse is also true: what makes physical experience (the body)possible is mental experience without which what we experience as nature would not exist.

While what you say is not technically incorrect, in my opinion it would not address the fundamental possibility of experience, which would be mind.

The fundamental nature of reality is what I call 'nature'. Nature itself exists only when nature is conceived of as an integrated entity.

So it would be the conceiving part that would provide nature with existence? Do you view conceiving equal to experience? If so, would you agree that some could view conceiving to be a descriptive property of 'mind'?

Experience itself and only experience itself is fundamental because it's impossible to experience chaos unless chaos is the experience of loss of integrated order.

But how would you explain the idea of chaos? Wouldn't that idea imply that something more fundamental would need to underlay the possibility of experience?

The strongest sort of idealism is absolute idealism. The term 'absolute' implies mind is a function of experience and is not self caused . More relative sorts of idealism imply mind is self caused and is not a function of anything else.

While absolute idealism seeks a self-caused nature of the (egoistic) Absolute, the concept causality could become obsolete when mind is considered as the foundation of the cosmos. One would need to venture into the sphere of infinity instead of self-causation.

[Belindi]

But mind is experienced empirically in the sense that several people can come to a consensus that they are, or are not, in the presence of mental function.

Empirical experience of mind would merely concern a manifested form of mind. Experience in my opinion would follow the qualitative properties of mind. Experience would be one level up from mind.

What makes mental experience possible is physical experience (the body) without which what we experience as nature would not exist.The converse is also true: what makes physical experience (the body)possible is mental experience without which what we experience as nature would not exist.

While what you say is not technically incorrect, in my opinion it would not address the fundamental possibility of experience, which would be mind.

The fundamental nature of reality is what I call 'nature'. Nature itself exists only when nature is conceived of as an integrated entity.

So it would be the conceiving part that would provide nature with existence? Do you view conceiving equal to experience? If so, would you agree that some could view conceiving to be a descriptive property of 'mind'?

Experience itself and only experience itself is fundamental because it's impossible to experience chaos unless chaos is the experience of loss of integrated order.

But how would you explain the idea of chaos? Wouldn't that idea imply that something more fundamental would need to underlay the possibility of experience?

The strongest sort of idealism is absolute idealism. The term 'absolute' implies mind is a function of experience and is not self caused . More relative sorts of idealism imply mind is self caused and is not a function of anything else.

While absolute idealism seeks a self-caused nature of the (egoistic) Absolute, the concept causality could become obsolete when mind is considered as the foundation of the cosmos. One would need to venture into the sphere of infinity instead of self-causation.

I understand and accept the matter of your first comment.I conflated manifested with empirical whereas "manifested mind" is correct.
"Experience is one level up from mind" I accept. However I am trying to not feel minds are morally superior to bodies and I can't do so unless I also believe experience is one level up from bodies.
The feeling that minds are morally superior to bodies is historical /cultural, mainly Abrahamic if not precisely Christian.

Concepts and reality: I have faith that nature integrated and uncaused is both ontically and conceptually real.

Chaos: In a relative world it's impossible to conceive of an idea without the idea's context of what is not that idea. Therefore we can conceive of chaos by reference to what is not chaos. Ontic chaos can be conceived i.e. visualised only by analogy with relative chaotic experiences either personal or vicarious. In relative terms what is not chaotic is formally systematic.

I agree causality sort of disappears when it becomes absolute. I am impressed by Ted Honderich's analysis:

causal chains, causal circumstances, nomic connections

. The absolute is a grand nomic connection; cause of itself.

When you say "infinity", do you mean causal infinity or a version of spatial infinity? We can't know the whole of nature, all we can know is extended matter and 'mind' and there may be infinitely more aspects of nature than the two we are familiar with.

[snt]

"Experience is one level up from mind" I accept. However I am trying to not feel minds are morally superior to bodies and I can't do so unless I also believe experience is one level up from bodies.

When mind is the origin of the cosmos, (a fundamental form of)experience would be its first effect and experience would therefore also underlay (precede) a human body.

A closer look at the paradox of sensory experience in relation to conscious intentionality is an example that proves that experience precedes a human body.

"Yet Levinas does exploit a difficulty that beset Husserl’s early phenomenology of time-consciousness, one that would argue in favor of Levinas’ 1974 conception of “diachrony”, or the interruption that he equates with transcendence-in-immanence. This was the paradox of sensation in relation to intentionality that Husserl identified in Appendix 12 of his lectures on internal time consciousness (Hua 10: 130–133).[34]

In his 1965 essay, “Intentionality and Sensation” (DEH: 135–150), Levinas focused on the gap (i.e., diachrony) between bodily sensation entering intentionality and sensation as pre-conscious bodily processes. He recalled the paradox that the sensuous origins of intentionality lay outside intentionality’s field or reach, in the body, even as the ongoing alterations of sensation forge our feeling of ongoing temporal progression. To be explicitly experienced, sensation thus had to intentionalize. Yet much of its prior, bodily existence eludes our consciousness.

Levinas compared this dual, conscious-preconscious status of sensibility to his idea of a pre-intentional “receptivity of an ‘other’ penetrating into the ‘same’, [in sum, to our intersubjective] life and not [to] ‘thought’” (DEH: 144). As already broached by Husserl, this sensuous “other” will support Levinas’ 1974 arguments for the affective interruptions of the even flow of time-consciousness, and his claim that intersubjective affects overflow the framework of all representational consciousness."

A phenomenon between intentionality and sensation. Levinas and Husserl
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40883394
https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... nd_Husserl
https://www.scribd.com/doc/224260714/Le ... -Sensation

The paradox of sensory experience in relation to conscious intentionality is actually a quite strange phenomenon. There is something that precedes conscious awareness and thus mental intelligence while in the same time it provides the foundation for intelligence.

When you say "infinity", do you mean causal infinity or a version of spatial infinity? We can't know the whole of nature, all we can know is extended matter and 'mind' and there may be infinitely more aspects of nature than the two we are familiar with.

The concept infinity would need to be considered as beginning-less. It would involve an aspect of a nature that contrasts with the essence of finitude. Infinity cannot stand in relation therefore there can be no causal or spatial infinity. Only from within experience, a relational infinity can be imagined that is merely endless in nature which results in absurdities.

[Belindi]

"Experience is one level up from mind" I accept. However I am trying to not feel minds are morally superior to bodies and I can't do so unless I also believe experience is one level up from bodies.

When mind is the origin of the cosmos, (a fundamental form of)experience would be its first effect and experience would therefore also underlay (precede) a human body.

A closer look at the paradox of sensory experience in relation to conscious intentionality is an example that proves that experience precedes a human body.

"Yet Levinas does exploit a difficulty that beset Husserl’s early phenomenology of time-consciousness, one that would argue in favor of Levinas’ 1974 conception of “diachrony”, or the interruption that he equates with transcendence-in-immanence. This was the paradox of sensation in relation to intentionality that Husserl identified in Appendix 12 of his lectures on internal time consciousness (Hua 10: 130–133).[34]

In his 1965 essay, “Intentionality and Sensation” (DEH: 135–150), Levinas focused on the gap (i.e., diachrony) between bodily sensation entering intentionality and sensation as pre-conscious bodily processes. He recalled the paradox that the sensuous origins of intentionality lay outside intentionality’s field or reach, in the body, even as the ongoing alterations of sensation forge our feeling of ongoing temporal progression. To be explicitly experienced, sensation thus had to intentionalize. Yet much of its prior, bodily existence eludes our consciousness.

Levinas compared this dual, conscious-preconscious status of sensibility to his idea of a pre-intentional “receptivity of an ‘other’ penetrating into the ‘same’, [in sum, to our intersubjective] life and not [to] ‘thought’” (DEH: 144). As already broached by Husserl, this sensuous “other” will support Levinas’ 1974 arguments for the affective interruptions of the even flow of time-consciousness, and his claim that intersubjective affects overflow the framework of all representational consciousness."

A phenomenon between intentionality and sensation. Levinas and Husserl
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40883394
https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... nd_Husserl
https://www.scribd.com/doc/224260714/Le ... -Sensation

The paradox of sensory experience in relation to conscious intentionality is actually a quite strange phenomenon. There is something that precedes conscious awareness and thus mental intelligence while in the same time it provides the foundation for intelligence.

When you say "infinity", do you mean causal infinity or a version of spatial infinity? We can't know the whole of nature, all we can know is extended matter and 'mind' and there may be infinitely more aspects of nature than the two we are familiar with.

The concept infinity would need to be considered as beginning-less. It would involve an aspect of a nature that contrasts with the essence of finitude. Infinity cannot stand in relation therefore there can be no causal or spatial infinity. Only from within experience, a relational infinity can be imagined that is merely endless in nature which results in absurdities.

Intentionality is the state of being which may be described as experience vis a vis the environment of that experience.
Intentionality is a therefore a relationship in a relative world. In an absolute world there is no intentionality because environment and experience are identical.

snt wrote:

A closer look at the paradox of sensory experience in relation to conscious intentionality is an example that proves that experience precedes a human body.

Experience precedes a human body-mind.

Regarding infinity, and how"infinity cannot stand in relation to". If the quotation in inverted commas is the total definition of infinity then a world ' where' environment and experience are identical is an absolute world.

If we think of experience as body-mind experience there is no paradox. I think there is a way to combine dual aspect monism with absolute idealism, but I can't remember what it is.

[snt]

Experience as experience doesn't seem to amount to anything. Experience demands a purpose.

The paradox of sensory experience shows that sensing is primary and that means that the potential for sensing is primary.

As Levinas writes "sensation had to intentionalize to be experienced" and yet, much of its pre-intentional existences eludes consciousness.

Sensation precedes intentionality (conscious attention). The only way that that can be explained when humans are not to be a meaningless puppet in a predetermined simulation, is that sensation involves an a priori value judgement which requires the concept 'good', which would therefore underlay (precede) sensation and experience.

[snt]

Experience precedes a human body-mind.

If we think of experience as body-mind experience there is no paradox. I think there is a way to combine dual aspect monism with absolute idealism, but I can't remember what it is.

I would have to disagree.

Experience is subjective and that subjectivity would demand a fundamental explanation.

When it concerns a body-mind, it is easy to understand that an aspect is required beyond subjectivity and that there is a paradox.

It is very easy to understand: how can you envision yourself (as a subjective experience) in complete nothingness to then explore an outer world? The subjective experience that is required at the root of life wouldn't have any ground to be subjective of.

When it concerns sensing, it concerns an aspect that provides any potential sense-data that can be used to facilitate subjective experience. This is a paradox because sensing requires subjectivity (intentionality and attention).

Do you understand the paradox?

[Belindi]

Experience precedes a human body-mind.

If we think of experience as body-mind experience there is no paradox. I think there is a way to combine dual aspect monism with absolute idealism, but I can't remember what it is.

I would have to disagree.

Experience is subjective and that subjectivity would demand a fundamental explanation.

When it concerns a body-mind, it is easy to understand that an aspect is required beyond subjectivity and that there is a paradox.

It is very easy to understand: how can you envision yourself (as a subjective experience) in complete nothingness to then explore an outer world? The subjective experience that is required at the root of life wouldn't have any ground to be subjective of.

When it concerns sensing, it concerns an aspect that provides any potential sense-data that can be used to facilitate subjective experience. This is a paradox because sensing requires subjectivity (intentionality and attention).

Do you understand the paradox?

I understand how there seems to be a paradox and I try to dispel it.

Intentionality and attention are oriented experience in a temporal world, but are not experience itself. In the absolute sense, experience is all there is, and in the absolute sense, orientation is irrelevant.

In the temporal or relative sense, subjective experience is all there is. However I try to not deceive myself the word 'subjective' determines that there be an actual subject of experience over and above the memories which a fully -functioning body-mind accumulates . Scepticism demands we must query the existence of anything other than experience.

This 'outer world' thing is integral to subjectivity and is bound up with "privileged access" to a bundle of experience. "Privileged access" to the bundle necessitates the apprehension of what is other than the bundle of experience. However, subject-object dualism does not apply to absolute experience.

Many people would reasonably object to any claim there be absolute anything. Experience is the only idea that can be both subjective and absolute with no contradiction or paradox.