Some People Might Not Have Conscious Experiences

[Consul]

Yes, and I think in normal people there is a spectrum of fidelity from very hazy and indistinct to very crisp and clear for Visual Imagination. My Visual Imagination is on the low end of the fidelity spectrum, because my Visual Imaginings are usually pretty hazy and indistinct.

It varies form person to person, but visual imagination is always more or less hazy and sketchy, being unlike the visual perception of complete, defined, and stable physical pictures.

[GE Morton]

I have always assumed that all normally functioning Human Minds would have at least similar kinds of Conscious Experiences. I have thought this for decades. But after many years of discussions about this with people on various Forums, it has finally become clear to me that some people actually must not have Conscious Experiences or Qualia. I limit this observation to things like the Experience of Redness . . . They are not Color blind so they can Detect Red in their Visual Field in some way but it seems to be more at the level of the Neural Activity. They can somehow sense that their Neurons are Firing for Red and indicate that there is Red in their Field of View but there seems to be no Experience of Redness in their Field of View.

Anyone other than ourselves who can "sense that their neurons are firing for red" and "indicate that there is Red in their field of view" IS "having an experience of red," by definition, regardless of denial he may assert. Such facts are the only basis we have for attributing conscious experience to anyone other than ourselves.

[SteveKlinko]

There is (sensory) perception, and there is imagination.

In my understanding, the latter is the mental imitation or simulation of the former. To use Hume's terms, ideas, i.e. mental images, are copies of (sense-)impressions.

There is an interesting pathological phenomenon called aphantasia. This term means "absence/lack of imagination", but it usually refers only to the absence/lack of visual imagination (visualization) rather than to the absence/lack of all kinds of imagination (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, gustatory…).

In my understanding, thought is inner speech; and as such it is itself a kind of imagination: linguistic imagination (= the simulation of outer speech)—which is the visual or auditory imagination of (seeing &) reading or (saying &) hearing words and sentences. (Or if the symbols are Braille letters for the blind, with Braille being a tactile writing&reading system, then linguistic imagination consists in the imagination of feeling Braille letters with one's fingers.)

Total aphantasia would mean the absence of thought, since thought consists in the use of linguistic imagery, which involves the use of visual, auditory, or tactile imagery.

Yes, and I think in normal people there is a spectrum of fidelity from very hazy and indistinct to very crisp and clear for Visual Imagination. My Visual Imagination is on the low end of the fidelity spectrum, because my Visual Imaginings are usually pretty hazy and indistinct.

What I am a little unclear about in your writing is the nature of imagination and the inner world. The nature of sensory experiences is important and points to the impor of the sensory aspects of existence and experience. I am not saying that you, anymore than other people are not tackling this. But, the bridge between material reality and the inner world are important here. I know that you have your own model but it is so hard to span the gap between mind and embodied experience, especially in terms of the sentient life of human beings.

Imagination is Visualization. So it is a Conscious Visual Experience although not pretty hazy for most people, including myself.

[SteveKlinko]

I have always assumed that all normally functioning Human Minds would have at least similar kinds of Conscious Experiences. I have thought this for decades. But after many years of discussions about this with people on various Forums, it has finally become clear to me that some people actually must not have Conscious Experiences or Qualia. I limit this observation to things like the Experience of Redness . . . They are not Color blind so they can Detect Red in their Visual Field in some way but it seems to be more at the level of the Neural Activity. They can somehow sense that their Neurons are Firing for Red and indicate that there is Red in their Field of View but there seems to be no Experience of Redness in their Field of View.

Anyone other than ourselves who can "sense that their neurons are firing for red" and "indicate that there is Red in their field of view" IS "having an experience of red," by definition, regardless of denial he may assert. Such facts are the only basis we have for attributing conscious experience to anyone other than ourselves.

So do you think that when a Computer has the Hex Number 00ff0000 (the usual number for pure Red) in a buffer, that is the same thing as Experiencing Redness?

[JackDaydream]

In my understanding, the latter is the mental imitation or simulation of the former. To use Hume's terms, ideas, i.e. mental images, are copies of (sense-)impressions.



In my understanding, thought is inner speech; and as such it is itself a kind of imagination: linguistic imagination (= the simulation of outer speech)—which is the visual or auditory imagination of (seeing &) reading or (saying &) hearing words and sentences. (Or if the symbols are Braille letters for the blind, with Braille being a tactile writing&reading system, then linguistic imagination consists in the imagination of feeling Braille letters with one's fingers.)

Total aphantasia would mean the absence of thought, since thought consists in the use of linguistic imagery, which involves the use of visual, auditory, or tactile imagery.

Yes, and I think in normal people there is a spectrum of fidelity from very hazy and indistinct to very crisp and clear for Visual Imagination. My Visual Imagination is on the low end of the fidelity spectrum, because my Visual Imaginings are usually pretty hazy and indistinct.

What I am a little unclear about in your writing is the nature of imagination and the inner world. The nature of sensory experiences is important and points to the impor of the sensory aspects of existence and experience. I am not saying that you, anymore than other people are not tackling this. But, the bridge between material reality and the inner world are important here. I know that you have your own model but it is so hard to span the gap between mind and embodied experience, especially in terms of the sentient life of human beings.

Imagination is Visualization. So it is a Conscious Visual Experience although not pretty hazy for most people, including myself.

Imagination involves visualisation as well as stories. There is definite innate visualisation but it is also learned. Another aspect is conscious control because I find that the imagination can be intrusive at times. There is a kind of steering process but to fight against the images which arise in consciousness would be like an attempt at suppression of the imagination in a forced way. It may be more about being able to simply allow images to flow in mindfully.

[Gertie]

Stevek

My Experience of something like Redness has literally no associations with Emotions and Memories, but rather I directly Experience the Quale of Redness as a thing in itself that appears in my Visual Experience. The question is: Why should we expect everybody to have the same Visual Experience that you do or that I do. That might be a big mistake and will only be resolved when Science can measure Conscious Experience directly. Other people's Visual Experience might be totally Alien if it could be measured. But then my Visual Experience would be Alien to them.

If we think about the state of our neural connections every time we experience seeing or imagining a red something, the totality of that experience will be correlated to all the neural activity happening in any specific moment, which is highly complex and effectively unique from person to person (and moment to moment for each person) in its precise details.

So depending on past experiences creating specific neural patterns of connections available to be re-stimulated, seeing a red pillar pillar box might spark a specific set of neural activity in me and a different one in you, as well as the totality of the stimuli I'm having in that moment being different to yours.

I don't think it's possible to ever experience 'redness' in isolation to everything else going on experientially. Brains just don't work that way, but we can still identify categories of types of experience like this or that colour.

And these categories are isolatable enough to both agree we are looking at a bright red pillar box or whatever, and match it to a colour chart ('representing' a particular light wave length hitting human visual system) when we both focus in on identifying the colour.

[Atla]

A tour on a skeptic™ forum can make anyone wonder about the existence of P-zombies.

[SteveKlinko]

Imagination involves visualisation as well as stories. There is definite innate visualisation but it is also learned. Another aspect is conscious control because I find that the imagination can be intrusive at times. There is a kind of steering process but to fight against the images which arise in consciousness would be like an attempt at suppression of the imagination in a forced way. It may be more about being able to simply allow images to flow in mindfully.

I agree.

[SteveKlinko]

Stevek

My Experience of something like Redness has literally no associations with Emotions and Memories, but rather I directly Experience the Quale of Redness as a thing in itself that appears in my Visual Experience. The question is: Why should we expect everybody to have the same Visual Experience that you do or that I do. That might be a big mistake and will only be resolved when Science can measure Conscious Experience directly. Other people's Visual Experience might be totally Alien if it could be measured. But then my Visual Experience would be Alien to them.

If we think about the state of our neural connections every time we experience seeing or imagining a red something, the totality of that experience will be correlated to all the neural activity happening in any specific moment, which is highly complex and effectively unique from person to person (and moment to moment for each person) in its precise details.

So depending on past experiences creating specific neural patterns of connections available to be re-stimulated, seeing a red pillar pillar box might spark a specific set of neural activity in me and a different one in you, as well as the totality of the stimuli I'm having in that moment being different to yours.

I don't think it's possible to ever experience 'redness' in isolation to everything else going on experientially. Brains just don't work that way, but we can still identify categories of types of experience like this or that colour.

And these categories are isolatable enough to both agree we are looking at a bright red pillar box or whatever, and match it to a colour chart ('representing' a particular light wave length hitting human visual system) when we both focus in on identifying the colour.

But I disagree. I can partition out and Experience the Redness of something in my Visual Field of View quite easily. The other parts of the Image in my FOV are Irrelevant to the Experience of the Redness. For that matter I can even Experience Redness purely from my Imagination. I can See the Redness as a thing in itself. It makes no difference what the context is, to See or Experience the Redness.

[SteveKlinko]

A tour on a skeptic™ forum can make anyone wonder about the existence of P-zombies.

Hahhh, you do understand!

[GE Morton]

I have always assumed that all normally functioning Human Minds would have at least similar kinds of Conscious Experiences. I have thought this for decades. But after many years of discussions about this with people on various Forums, it has finally become clear to me that some people actually must not have Conscious Experiences or Qualia. I limit this observation to things like the Experience of Redness . . . They are not Color blind so they can Detect Red in their Visual Field in some way but it seems to be more at the level of the Neural Activity. They can somehow sense that their Neurons are Firing for Red and indicate that there is Red in their Field of View but there seems to be no Experience of Redness in their Field of View.

Anyone other than ourselves who can "sense that their neurons are firing for red" and "indicate that there is Red in their field of view" IS "having an experience of red," by definition, regardless of denial he may assert. Such facts are the only basis we have for attributing conscious experience to anyone other than ourselves.

So do you think that when a Computer has the Hex Number 00ff0000 (the usual number for pure Red) in a buffer, that is the same thing as Experiencing Redness?

Whether it is experiencing "redness" would depend upon its behavior, not upon any values in its memory or registers. Nor would I have any means of determining whether its experience of "redness" was the "same" as my experience of it, any more than I can determine whether my experience of "redness" is the same as yours.

[Atla]

A tour on a skeptic™ forum can make anyone wonder about the existence of P-zombies.

Hahhh, you do understand!

I know, right?

[Gertie]

Stevek

My Experience of something like Redness has literally no associations with Emotions and Memories, but rather I directly Experience the Quale of Redness as a thing in itself that appears in my Visual Experience. The question is: Why should we expect everybody to have the same Visual Experience that you do or that I do. That might be a big mistake and will only be resolved when Science can measure Conscious Experience directly. Other people's Visual Experience might be totally Alien if it could be measured. But then my Visual Experience would be Alien to them.

If we think about the state of our neural connections every time we experience seeing or imagining a red something, the totality of that experience will be correlated to all the neural activity happening in any specific moment, which is highly complex and effectively unique from person to person (and moment to moment for each person) in its precise details.

So depending on past experiences creating specific neural patterns of connections available to be re-stimulated, seeing a red pillar pillar box might spark a specific set of neural activity in me and a different one in you, as well as the totality of the stimuli I'm having in that moment being different to yours.

I don't think it's possible to ever experience 'redness' in isolation to everything else going on experientially. Brains just don't work that way, but we can still identify categories of types of experience like this or that colour.

And these categories are isolatable enough to both agree we are looking at a bright red pillar box or whatever, and match it to a colour chart ('representing' a particular light wave length hitting human visual system) when we both focus in on identifying the colour.

But I disagree. I can partition out and Experience the Redness of something in my Visual Field of View quite easily. The other parts of the Image in my FOV are Irrelevant to the Experience of the Redness. For that matter I can even Experience Redness purely from my Imagination. I can See the Redness as a thing in itself. It makes no difference what the context is, to See or Experience the Redness.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/won ... b2c02a011d

[Consul]

Imagination is Visualization. So it is a Conscious Visual Experience although not pretty hazy for most people, including myself.

Visualization qua visual imagination is only one kind of imagination among others such as auditory imagination; and it had better be called quasi-visual experience, because it is not the same as visual experience by means of one's eyes. ("The mind's eye" is just a metaphor.)

[SteveKlinko]

I have always assumed that all normally functioning Human Minds would have at least similar kinds of Conscious Experiences. I have thought this for decades. But after many years of discussions about this with people on various Forums, it has finally become clear to me that some people actually must not have Conscious Experiences or Qualia. I limit this observation to things like the Experience of Redness . . . They are not Color blind so they can Detect Red in their Visual Field in some way but it seems to be more at the level of the Neural Activity. They can somehow sense that their Neurons are Firing for Red and indicate that there is Red in their Field of View but there seems to be no Experience of Redness in their Field of View.

Anyone other than ourselves who can "sense that their neurons are firing for red" and "indicate that there is Red in their field of view" IS "having an experience of red," by definition, regardless of denial he may assert. Such facts are the only basis we have for attributing conscious experience to anyone other than ourselves.

So do you think that when a Computer has the Hex Number 00ff0000 (the usual number for pure Red) in a buffer, that is the same thing as Experiencing Redness?

Whether it is experiencing "redness" would depend upon its behavior, not upon any values in its memory or registers. Nor would I have any means of determining whether its experience of "redness" was the "same" as my experience of it, any more than I can determine whether my experience of "redness" is the same as yours.

It is astounding that you have trouble discerning the difference between actually Experiencing Redness and the Hex Number.