https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-m30aaI5Yf8
Interesting angle/unangle.
Average Bozo put their finger on the prob I have.
''Consider the following statement in the circumstance of sorting apples on a moving belt:
This apple is red.[10]
Upon observation, the apple is an undetermined color between yellow and red, or it is mottled both colors. Thus the color falls into neither category " red " nor " yellow ", but these are the only categories available to us as we sort the apples. We might say it is "50% red". This could be rephrased: it is 50% true that the apple is red. Therefore, P is 50% true, and 50% false. Now consider:
This apple is red and it is not-red.
In other words, P and not-P. This violates the law of noncontradiction and, by extension, bivalence.''
I don't think this works, because you can just say this apple is mottled, with parts here and there being red. That's not a fundamental prob of logic, just a lack of specificity in a world of stuff made up of parts isn't it?
Logic is itself derived from how we observe the physical world to be (at the level of resolution we experientially model it, so not at the level of QM). So logic deriving from a physicalist model of the world isn't likely to have a fundamental prob with describing the world and how it works at the physicalist level. QM presents probs to that derived conceptualisation of logic and cause and effect, because we don't experientially model the world at the QM level of resolution, we have to discover that QM level of resolution through technological observation and adapt our deductions accordingly).
Well we can look at the correlated physical parts (neural correlation) and see lots of roughly identical neurons, which form patterns of connections creating dedicated subsystems, which are also neurally interacting affecting each other. There will be correlated mechanisms for functions like attention and focus, and somehow bringing everything together as an experiential unified field of consciousness. All of that physical stuff going on in the brain hasn't been identified yet, but probably won't present a fundamental challenge to science or logic, hasn't so far at least.Next, consider things like the phenomenon of Qualia and related sentient experiences (metaphysical phenomena), or otherwise the various qualities of consciousness that are “mottled” together during everyday cognition (feelings/logic and so forth), that also suggests a type of both/and phenomenon instead of an either/or logical approach:
“St. Thomas, the Intellectualist, had argued that the intellect in man is prior to the will because the intellect determines the will, since we can desire only what we know. Scotus, the Voluntarist, replied that the will determines what ideas the intellect turns to, and thus in the end determines what the intellect comes to know.”
How to we reconcile that either/or thinking?
If phenomenal experience is seen as a different type of manifestation of those scientifically understandable physical processes and relationships of parts, we've resolved the mottling issue in principle. The unified field of consciousness is like the mottled apple, and we can theoretically categorise this and that part of seeing, hearing, thinking, desiring,etc, in a similar sort of way we can categorise the correlated physical neural subsystems for seeing, hearing, thinking, desiring, etc. There doesn't seem to be an in principle fundamental challenge to logic there, just another way of recognising the relationship between the parts and the whole.
The beach part was real in the form of phenomenal experience, the car part had a physical reality too.And so returning to the phenomenon of ‘driving and not driving’ how is that possible? Consider an individual driving their car, daydreaming about the beach, running a traffic light then crashing. In a dualist sense if you will, which mind was driving and which mind was on the beach? Suppose I argue I was consciously at the beach watching a cute babe swimming, while running the traffic light and crashing. Was that experience real? Well, yes it was real.
It was real to me at that time in the same sense, manner and respect happening all at the same time. For all I knew, I was on the beach, yet my body was still driving the vehicle. That said, you may wonder which mind was on the beach and which mind was driving? And if I was not physically on the beach, was my thought about the beach, in-itself, metaphysical? In any case, how can one physically be in two places at one time? Again, for all that person knew, they were on the beach and not driving. So, you could say that they were sort-of driving when they crashed. Is that considered a true statement? What does sort-of mean? Would that violate the rules of either/or thinking?
I don't think there are two minds present in that scenario. The largely unconscious parts of your brain were on autopilot while driving because that didn't require much attention or focus, you were doing something automatic and familiar and other parts of your brain's subsystems manifested in the space left, day dreaming about the beach. But focus doesn't obliterate the unified field where you're still more 'vaguely' seeing the road, that's still there. We seem to have brain mechanisms primed for change which can snap attention back to the unexpected which might require a response, but yours let you down there. Functionally speaking there's nothing weird here, it's just that snap back attention mechanism didn't work well enough.
You can imagine your ancestor walking through the savannah thinking about this and that, maybe usefully planning the meal she'll create with the berries she's going to collect... then hearing a rustle in the bush and snapping her attention to that bush fearing a threat, adrenaline spiking, unconscious bodily functions shifting to fight/flight/freeze mode. In evolutionary functional terms it makes sense. Even if it's only a rabbit she can add to the pot, the ability to snap focus on change is obviously useful.
I'd say it raises issues of mind-body monism and dualism. And when you delve into those issues you find that functional explanations will hold, but issues of substance and properties run into fundamental problems and paradoxes. It's at that level we run into into the Hard Problem and where physicalism and its associated science and logic have limitations. What is the fundamental nature of the stuff/processes in the mind-body relationship, and indeed what is the nature of that relationship.In summary, I will argue that our consciousness exists, yet like other naturally occurring phenomena (Time itself, the Will, etc.) or otherwise the nature of one’s conscious existence, it is all considered logically impossible (by definition). Hence, ‘driving and not driving’ is a description of naturally occurring conscious phenomenon which is considered logically impossible, yet still exists.
But in theory substance monism and dualism don't have a fundamental prob I can see with 'mottling', or parts in relation to the whole - except in fundamental terms of substance and properties (as opposed to whole and parts). I think...