Let's talk consciousness.

[GrayArea]

Third argument

Subjective experience cannot have preceded the sense-data and that means that sensing must be primary.

Sensing requires something that cannot originate on a subjective level. The origin of consciousness therefore, cannot be subjective of nature.

I assume that your idea of "sensory" and my idea of "translation" are quite similar by definition. To sense is for an object to become affected and to know what that means to the object, isn't it?

Yes, but what would justify the assumption of sensing potential-in-effect by which the idea of neural activity can be considered a subjective origin of 'awareness itself'?

Do you see that there is a paradox when it concerns the explanation of that sensing potential relative to a life form or organism? The ability to sense an 'outer world' cannot logically have come from within.

Adding on, I suppose that subjectiveness is what decides the objectiveness and vice versa. They are ultimately symbiotic to one another. To explain more, the sheer act of an object translating the outside world into its own terms IS all that makes an object into "an object" within the objective world. Due to how the only reason why the objects' own subjective perspective exist to begin with is because of their own existence, which roots itself on the objective reality. Meaning that both kinds of perspectives are needed for one another—they come in pairs and are causally united/simultaneous, so to speak. Both the subjective and the objective need each other in order to exist as one.

Not to mention that for an object to be affected and to know what that means to itself not only alters the subjective perspective of itself, but its objective self.

I suppose the conclusion is that an object needs both the existence seen from itself(subjective) and seen from outside of itself(objective) in order to exist. If it does not exist to itself ( = no subjective perspective), then "itself" is not there to begin with, and so "it" does not exist to begin with. Same goes with the case where it does not exist to the outer world. ( = no objective perspective)

As per your argument, I believe that the sensory of itself (= subjective experience) can happen at the same time as the sensory of the outer world(translating the objective to the subjective), neither preceding the other. This can be because they are both a part of a single act of sensory(=translation in general) that all object seems to have by nature.

But what about the potential for sensing of which the root of sensory experience in an organism would be 'sensing potential-in-effect'? Can it originate on either a subjective or objective level?

There is a possibility that you may think of it all as a paradox, because where the “sensing” occurs (the sensing of the outer world by an object) is the infinitesimally thin in-between of the outer world and the object. It does seem like you are approaching this from an “either-this-or-that” perspective, that the ability to sense an outer world would have to come either from within or not within. And perhaps because of this, you see the “infinitesimally thin in-between” as something that is neither the outer world or the object. But personally, I see it as something that is both the outer world and the object. With that said, I would say your viewpoint is just as correct as mine, because the in-between can never fully be defined as the outer world OR the object. But we don't necessarily have to call this a paradox. A paradox is when we cannot choose between one point of view or the other. We can simply accept all involved viewpoints in order to fully fledge out the definitions. These viewpoints are but two sides of the same coin, if you will.

So with that said, the ability for an object to “sense” the outer world is essentially the ability to be altered by the outer world, which in this case, comes from both the outer world and the object. The outer world (senses / is altered by) the object as much as the object (senses / is altered by) the outer world.

[CHNOPS2]

It all happens at the same time. Is not that one thing cause other thing to move. Is a whole change. Like a change in a photogram of a movie.

Seeing a cat, that moment, is what happens when you have a particular relation of matter (enviroment + body + brain).

[value]

My apology for the late reply, I have been away from the forum.

The topic and OP are very interesting and seem to be a basis for a valuable discussion on consciousness.

...

What would explain (as fundamental ground) the activity of neurons translating an outer world of qualia if not 'awareness itself'? It would seem nonsensical that such a process can be assumed to be the basis of 'awareness itself'.

The neurons translating their outer world does not hold basis on anything I would say, because it is only driven by an object’s desire to be that object. It doesn’t apply to just the neurons.

So your argument is basically that the same force that holds a vase or a particularly shaped rock togheter is what underlays neurons as 'objects' that are then to 'produce' consciousness on that basis?

Did you consider relevance of an a priori aspect as ground for 'awareness itself'? If not, why would it be logical that 1) neurons have developed and 2) that they perform as they do to 'produce' awareness? (what would be your explanation that neurons exist and perform?)

Also more regarding your last paragraph, neurons were perhaps something that were inevitably bound to be created through sheer probability, since evolution kept itself going for millions of years.

Can you mention a property of the mentioned probability that would provide a reason for neurons to develop when given sufficient time? If not, is your argument based on the Infinite Monkey Theorem (topic)?

Neurons do become aware of the outside environment as just individual neurons, yes. But ONLY after they become aware of themselves. And they cannot become aware of themselves without the help of other neurons.

That is to say, they can only become “aware” of the outside environment once they are “aware” of themselves “translating” the outside environment. Translation itself does not bring awareness. Or else—if they are not aware of themselves—they would simply be “reacting” to the outside environment like any other inanimate objects with only the translating capabilities and not self-awareness.

A neuron can translate other neurons outside of its physical self, simply by interacting with it. But just because it can do that, it does not mean that it is aware of itself. How will it accomplish this? A single neuron cannot accomplish that. Instead, it should actually be the brain that becomes aware of itself.

I’ve always believed that “awareness” is when an object translates ITSELF, not when it translates its outer environment. To translate the outer world is to perceive the outer world. To translate itself is then, therefore, to perceive itself.

Perhaps if all the neurons in a set group of neurons (which we call the brain) become aware of ONE ANOTHER, then that group of neurons could become aware of itself as a single entity, because each and every group of neurons translate each other (Or perhaps, translating what other neighboring neurons translate from itself.), which leads to those “each other” translating the each and every group of neurons, meaning that this “group of neurons” as a single entity has its components translating one another and being translated by one another (Overall like a snake biting its own tail)—therefore translating itself as a whole.

The original neuron #1 translates itself by first making the other neurons translate itself and then begin a cycle of translating that, eventually, leads to a neuron 2 affecting neuron 1 after a lot of translations. Of course, the information from neuron #1 is preserved throughout the translation. This is because when a post-synaptic neuron receives neurotransmitters from the pre-synaptic neuron, and lets out neurotransmitters of its own towards a different neuron(which then causes various results), the translated context of the neurons will still remain intact since the neurons’ translations are merely the “ways” in which they are affected, meaning that the “ways in which they send out information” according to “the ways in which they were affected” is all that matters (as long as the neurotransmitters and things that they cause are all solely caused by the specific “ways in which the neuron was affected” for every different instances of neural translation—which they are—therefore fully conveying the consequences of “in what way the neuron was affected”.), instead of having the same identical neurotransmitter from a single neuron go around every single neuron cell for consciousness to be created.

What evidence is there that neurons operate out of themselves and that the explicit self-awareness that you are seeking to explain originates from the individuality of individual neurons?

[value]

You seem to intend to imply that one can know that reality is real by inferring that one can be certain that one has 'conscious experience', as in René Descartes his assertion 'I think, therefore I am' (cogito, ergo sum). Is that correct?

Not entirely so, I’d say. Because even the process of thinking, or conscious experience, which one such as Descartes could argue proves our existence, has to be “real” to us first in order for it to happen. But one thing is for sure: What us humans—including you and I—perceive as “reality”, does exist, simply because there is a term for it, which is the word “reality”.

No, that is not a sufficient ground to claim that the idea of objective reality as ground for causality is valid because words are mere notions of expressions of experience and what is called experience is at question.

Looking back in the past (history) is no ground for claims about the realness of reality.

Your argument seems to be that the realness of reality is to be inferred from a moral obligation (ought) to 'do ones job' to perceive reality as it is perceived. It would be interesting but what would explain that moral ought?

It’s not much of a moral ought now that I think about it, but more of a description of human life that we have no choice but to inevitably follow, as long as we are living that human life. It is not what we choose—it is simply what we are.

How can you be certain that your argument is valid?

How can this be said when you would consider 2 ('awareness itself') to arise from the translation activity of 'another neuron'?

You’re not entirely wrong—It can perhaps be said that awareness within the brain is both a product and the creator of the translational activity of another neuron, at the same time.

To start off, the brain controls the translational activity of neurons, because the neurons altogether create the brain, and since the reason why the neurons translate one another is because it is affected by another neuron.

So if the brain is the amalgamation of “all the pre-synaptic neurons that each activate another post-synaptic neuron to make them translate the pre-synaptic neurons”, then that makes the brain the creator of the translational activity of another neuron.

But at the same time, the brain is also the amalgamation of “all the post-synaptic neurons that translate all the other pre-synaptic neurons”. So at the same time, it is also the product of the translational activity of other neurons. Think of it as like the two sides of the same coin.

(Not to mention that all the neurons should act as both pre-synaptic neurons and post-synaptic neurons.)

From a third-person perspective, there is no awareness involved. It’s just the brain being able to control (and be the product of) the translational process of its neurons.

How does awareness play a role in all this, you may ask? All this also applies from the perspective of the aware brain itself. Awareness means self control from the perspective of the aware object, because all objects control themselves, and a self-aware object sees itself as an object too. So even from a self-aware / local perspective, the brain DOES control the translational activities of neurons as much as it is its PRODUCT. But the awareness itself technically does not.

So there is an essential symbiotic relationship involved BEFORE conscious awareness can be produced by the neurons and brain? Do you have an explanation how that symbiotic relationship can have formed by two apparent independent parts that arrose by sheer probability and by given millions of years time?

Do you consider the mentioned 'non-mechanistic force' at the basis of 'translation activity of neurons' to be a potential option or a certain option? What would be the ground for either idea? And most importantly, what would be the origin of that non-mechanistic force? Could such a force lay within neurons (i.e. the individual organism)?

The origin of that non-mechanistic force would lie in an object’s ability to be able to choose which information to take in / translate from the outer world (at any time), and choose the way to react to that outer world. That is to say, it originates once more from the fact that an object / individual organism was SPECIFICALLY MADE to be what it is, just because it could be. And if you ask if that object had control over how it was specifically made, I would say it did. An object, during its creation, creates itself as much as its external forces do. That’s why “that specific object” is the one to be created to begin with, out of all other possible objects.

A selective choice within a scope of available information involves a moral reasoning capacity in my opinion. With an AI it is ultimately the creator of the AI that provides that capacity (with AI being at most an extension of the human life form).

Does your theory consider humans to have free will or does it consider human consciousness to be bound by mere probabilistic potential within the scope of its outer 'really real' (true causal) environment?

[value]

Second argument

If physical reality would precede conscious experience causally, how would it be logical that there is an experience at all? If the physical reality to be experienced would be 'known' beforehand there would fundamentally not be anything to experience so it would make no sense for consciousness to have arisen.

It would work if "to know" was equal to "to experience", perhaps? Or if both happened at the same time?

The implication of the idea that 'awareness itself' is produced by neuron activity is that the mentioned 'experience' would causally originate (be produced) by physical reality. In such a case, how can it be said that what is to be experienced cannot have been known beforehand, i.e. is not causally explainable?

If 'awareness itself' is to be produced by physical reality it seems to be impossible to escape causality and thus 'experience' could not potentially achieve a quality that is non-deterministic. Do you disagree?

Neuron activity does causally originate from physical reality—and consciousness causally originates from the neuron activity. The neuron activity is only a half of what consciousness should be.

If I understood your question correctly, while neuron activity IS the physical reality, consciousness is NOT neuron activity.

What is to be experienced within consciousness cannot indeed have been known beforehand (before neural activity), because neurons are an aspect of physical reality that can become aware of itself, unlike all other aspects of physical reality that can translate the external world but not become aware of that translation (by translating itself).

That is not what I intended to denote. One is to explain the 'why' of conscious experience and when the outer world would be causal as you indicate that it would be and when experience is to follow neurons that have come about by causal probability in millions years of time evolution then what would be there to be experienced?

What is already known on a cosmic scale does not need experience since it would make conscious experience meaningless. Do you disagree?

I think the awareness itself had as much part in creating itself, as the physical reality did. Therefore, I do not completely think that our awareness is determined by the external world. Like I said in one of my previous replies in this thread—an object, during its creation, creates itself as much as its external forces do. That’s why “that specific object” is the one to be created to begin with, out of all other possible objects. This also applies to awareness, because when I say object, I just mean “an existing thing”, not purely physical.

Now, does this say that our awareness is governed by deterministic forces or not? I think it’s both at the same time. It has to be. Our awareness must require both its own existence and the external physical world in order to be created “as” its own existence.

How can it be said that conscious experience is an 'as' (or 'is'), i.e. that it exists as a 'created thing'? Is it not merely your experience that could potentially provide ground for the idea? It was said earlier that such an idea is not valid. The realness of reality cannot be proven from within experience.

[value]

So with that said, the ability for an object to “sense” the outer world is essentially the ability to be altered by the outer world, which in this case, comes from both the outer world and the object. The outer world (senses / is altered by) the object as much as the object (senses / is altered by) the outer world.

That would require deterministic causality which has been disproven by many philosophers.

According to many philosophers there is no true 'interaction' between objects. There are forces at play that do not yet have an explanation.

David Hume:

"The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other.

When I see, for instance, a billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from the cause? … All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable."

Immanuel Kant responded to this by arguing:

"The relation between a real ground and its consequent can only be given by experience.

...

It is impossible ever to comprehend through reason how something could be a cause or have a force, rather these relations must be taken solely from experience."

Kant and Hume on Causality
Kant famously attempted to “answer” what he took to be Hume’s skeptical view of causality. ... Because Hume’s discussion of causality and induction is equally central to his philosophy, understanding the relationship between the two philosophers on this issue is crucial for a proper understanding of modern philosophy more generally.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-hume-causality/

In the face of this quote, how would you defend your idea that sensing would causally follow interaction between objects in nature?

--

Some references on unexplained forces in nature:

2 days ago - new research on 'strong force':
The strong force governs how what’s internal to the atom’s nucleus—neutrons, protons, and the quarks and gluons that make them up—bind together. It is the least understood of the four fundamental forces of nature, which include gravity, electromagnetism, and the weak force.
https://www.labmanager.com/news/researc ... erse-29117

3 days ago - new research on 'weak force':
The weak nuclear force is currently not entirely understood, despite being one of the four fundamental forces of nature.
https://www.eurekalert.org/news-releases/969876

[value]

The podcast Partially Examined Mind might be of interest. It provides a series of several podcasts on the subject consciousness that includes guest philosophers who are dedicated to the subject (e.g. philosophy professor Ned Block, author of the bestseller The Nature of Consciousness) and it shows a state of the art perspective on the problems of consciousness.

Ep. 223: Guest Ned Block on Consciousness (Part One)
For the climax and denouement of our summer philosophy of mind series, Ned Block himself comes on to help us fill in the gaps about functionalism and attributing consciousness to machines. We discuss two essays by other authors responding to Ned's work from the collection Blockheads!: Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness (2019), ed. Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar.
https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2019/ ... ned-block/

Ep. 223: Guest Ned Block on Consciousness (Part Two)
We talk with Ned about a second Blockheads (2019) article, Michael Tye's “Homunculi Heads and Silicon Chips: The Importance of History to Phenomenology," which provides a variation off of the David Chalmers fading qualia argument (see our ep. 222), plus Ned's Blockheads response "Fading Qualia: A Response to Michael Tye."
https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2019/ ... ned-block/

Ep. 218: The Hard Problem of Consciousness (Chalmers, et al) (Part One)
On "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature" by David Chalmers (2003), with special guest Gregory Miller from the Panpsycast Philosophy Podcast. Can we explain human experience using the terms of brain physiology?
https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2019/ ... ciousness/

Ep. 219: The Harder Problem of Consciousness (Block & Papineau)
On Ned Block's "The Harder Problem of Consciousness" (2002) and David Papineau's "Could There Be a Science of Consciousness?" (2003). What would give us sufficient reason to believe that a non-human was conscious?
https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2019/ ... -papineau/

Ep. 221: Functionalist Theories of Mind (Putnam, Armstrong) (Part One)
On Hilary Putnam’s "The Nature of Mental States" (1973) and David M. Armstrong’s "The Causal Theory of the Mind" (1981). What is the mind? Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth consider a theory of mind that defines things not by what they're made of, but what they do. What does this mean?
https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2019/ ... sm-putnam/

Ep. 221: Functionalist Theories of Mind (Putnam, Armstrong) (Part Two)
Continuing on functionalism with David M. Armstrong’s "The Causal Theory of the Mind" (1981).
https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2019/ ... armstrong/

Ep. 222: Debating Functionalism (Block, Chalmers) (Part One)
On Ned Block's “Troubles with Functionalism” (1978) and David Chalmers’s “Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia” (1995). If mental states are functional states, there couldn't be zombies, i.e., something functionally equivalent to you but which yet doesn't have qualia (a sense of "what it's like" to be you... an inner life). Yet Block claims that there could be such zombies: for example, a functional duplicate of you whose components are actually all the citizens of China acting according to signals broadcast by satellites according to algorithmic rules.
https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2019/ ... -part-one/

Ep. 222: Debating Functionalism (Block, Chalmers) (Part Two)
Continuing on Ned Block's “Troubles with Functionalism” (1978) and David Chalmers’s “Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia” (1995).
https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2019/ ... -chalmers/

There may be many more! https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/

As it appears to me from the cited podcasts, the questions that are still pending today and that amount to 'the Harder problem of consciousness' could have been asked by a child.

[GrayArea]

So your argument is basically that the same force that holds a vase or a particularly shaped rock togheter is what underlays neurons as 'objects' that are then to 'produce' consciousness on that basis?

Well, almost. What you just described IS one of the things needed, but something else that is needed for an object to be self-aware / conscious, is its ability to translate “itself” as well and not just the external world. An object translates the external world by reacting to it in the object’s native ways, so it just has to do the same towards itself. Individual neurons by themselves cannot achieve that in my opinion, but the brain—an amalgamation of neurons—could. Because all it might take for a group of neurons to be self-aware as a single entity is for its components (neurons) to just “translate” one another. If all the neurons translate one another, then it might be like all the neurons as a SINGLE entity translating itself. Of course, inanimate objects probably cannot reach this point, because the molecules and atoms within them do not affect and translate each other as intricately and systematically as neurons do.

Can you mention a property of the mentioned probability that would provide a reason for neurons to develop when given sufficient time? If not, is your argument based on the Infinite Monkey Theorem (topic)?

Yes, it is based on the Infinite Monkey Theorem.

What evidence is there that neurons operate out of themselves and that the explicit self-awareness that you are seeking to explain originates from the individuality of individual neurons?

As long as they have enough self-control or individuality to exist as themselves, which they do, that should already be sufficient enough for them to be able to create boundaries between the self and non-self. It is only the object’s existence that allows for acts of translations to be possible, and for the translated information of the world to BELONG to the object, not necessarily its individuality—unless you meant the same. This is because an object can only translate the external world only through its own existence to begin with.

[GrayArea]

No, that is not a sufficient ground to claim that the idea of objective reality as ground for causality is valid because words are mere notions of expressions of experience and what is called experience is at question.

Looking back in the past (history) is no ground for claims about the realness of reality.

What us humans—including you and I—perceive as “reality”, does exist, simply because there is a term for it, which is the word “reality”.

Similarly, what us humans—including you and I—perceive as “reality”, does exist, because we are ABLE to create a term for it. Perhaps I did not fully convey my point last time. I can see why you inferred my opinion the way you did.

How can you be certain that your argument is valid?

My own existence is what leads me to be certain about this argument.

So there is an essential symbiotic relationship involved BEFORE conscious awareness can be produced by the neurons and brain? Do you have an explanation how that symbiotic relationship can have formed by two apparent independent parts that arrose by sheer probability and by given millions of years time?

The only symbiotic relationship that is needed is the symbiotic relationship between an object and its external world, such as between a neuron and other objects outside of our physical self that the neurons “sense”, or even between a neuron and another neuron. This kind of symbiotic relationship is ever-present between all objects, as long as one affects the other. But for this symbiotic relationship to produce self-awareness, it would have to include a specific type of object such as neurons. If you'd like, I can repeat the entirety of my so-called "theory" as to how consciousness and self-awareness is created from neurons. Ever since the first OP, I've added more content and made some fixes.

Does your theory consider humans to have free will or does it consider human consciousness to be bound by mere probabilistic potential within the scope of its outer 'really real' (true causal) environment?

Perhaps experience itself is indeed deterministic. But that does not mean that we cannot navigate our way through experiences freely. The way in which neurons interact are deterministic when seen from a third-person perspective, yes—however, from the “local” perspective of the neurons, they are free. A deterministic object can freely navigate a deterministic reality.

In a deterministic world, for a lifeform to operate deterministically is ironically to navigate the deterministic world freely—at least from the lifeform’s perspective which controls / is aware of this. As long as the neurons have control over their own actions DETERMINED by the external world. We ARE free in a sense that neurons, like any other object, are “free to exist as themselves”. And for them to be affected by the external world is still a part of existing as themselves. They are influenced by the external world because they exist. Furthermore, as much as the external world affects the actions of neurons, the neurons affect the external world too.

[GrayArea]

That is not what I intended to denote. One is to explain the 'why' of conscious experience and when the outer world would be causal as you indicate that it would be and when experience is to follow neurons that have come about by causal probability in millions years of time evolution then what would be there to be experienced?

What is already known on a cosmic scale does not need experience since it would make conscious experience meaningless. Do you disagree?

Sorry, but I do not entirely get what you are trying to convey here. It would be nice to hear you explain a bit more on this. But yes, the outer world / external world is causal. But I do not get the question "What would be there to be experienced?". I simply believe that neurons experience what they "translate", i.e. how the external world affects them, but from the perspective of the neurons themselves.

How can it be said that conscious experience is an 'as' (or 'is'), i.e. that it exists as a 'created thing'? Is it not merely your experience that could potentially provide ground for the idea? It was said earlier that such an idea is not valid. The realness of reality cannot be proven from within experience.

To be fair, even the fact that you currently possess an idea of the “realness of reality” or is able to speak of “realness of reality” suggests that you too have subconsciously proven its nature from within your experience. The trueness of this nature is only as true as we allow it within our experiences.

I am simply trying to say that this is the best anyone can do in order to perceive the realness of reality.

[GrayArea]

So with that said, the ability for an object to “sense” the outer world is essentially the ability to be altered by the outer world, which in this case, comes from both the outer world and the object. The outer world (senses / is altered by) the object as much as the object (senses / is altered by) the outer world.

That would require deterministic causality which has been disproven by many philosophers.

According to many philosophers there is no true 'interaction' between objects. There are forces at play that do not yet have an explanation.

David Hume:

"The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other.

When I see, for instance, a billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from the cause? … All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable."

Immanuel Kant responded to this by arguing:

"The relation between a real ground and its consequent can only be given by experience.

...

It is impossible ever to comprehend through reason how something could be a cause or have a force, rather these relations must be taken solely from experience."

Kant and Hume on Causality
Kant famously attempted to “answer” what he took to be Hume’s skeptical view of causality. ... Because Hume’s discussion of causality and induction is equally central to his philosophy, understanding the relationship between the two philosophers on this issue is crucial for a proper understanding of modern philosophy more generally.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-hume-causality/

In the face of this quote, how would you defend your idea that sensing would causally follow interaction between objects in nature?

Going back to the example of the jelly & the finger, if I poke the jelly, the jelly changes shape. It is true that the act of the jelly changing shape is not equal to the act of me poking the jelly. However, the act of the jelly changing shape can still be caused by me poking the jelly, without the two events being the same event. I believe that idea you have provided could have simply risen from the confusion that these two events would have to be the same event for them to have any causal link.

Ironically, BECAUSE the jelly and the finger that pokes the jelly are separate objects, they are able to affect one another. BECAUSE two events are separate, they gain enough existential force to affect one another.

Whatever allows the existence of the first billiards ball and thus its behavior is connected to whatever allows the existence of the second billiards ball and its behavior. Therefore, the first billiards ball’s physical self (nor the behavior of the first ball) does not necessarily have to be connected to the second billiards ball’s physical self (nor the behavior of the second ball), in order for the former to affect the latter. Thus the causality still stands.

The infinitesimally thin boundary between the self/neurons and the world, connects the two together through existence itself. And because of this, these two are both themselves and individual one another, at the same time. The boundary both exists and does not exist, due to being infinitesimally thin. By being aware of how the world affects ourselves, we are aware of the world.

Let’s take a scenario where a red lightwave crashes into our optical neurons so that we can perceive the “color” red. Here, the red lightwave itself is not inside the neurons when we perceive red. But despite this, whatever MAKES the red lightwave exist the way it does, is still transmitted to the neurons, because whatever MAKES the red lightwave exist, is what makes the red lightwave act a certain way when it crashes into neurons. And that certain way of “act” is really what affects the neurons to react the way they do. So whatever MAKES the red lightwave exist and whatever MAKES the neurons exist are connected and not the red lightwave and the [optical] neurons. This is how the neurons can perceive the red lightwave.

In a similar manner, the ring of neurons takes in the information of what MAKES itself exist as itself. Thus it becomes aware of itself.

What each neuron within the ring delivers to another neuron is not themselves, but the information of what MAKES them exist as themselves.

The external/outer world is not the neurons, the external world is not connected to a neuron as strongly when compared to a neuron that is connected to another neuron. The two do not experience the exact same causal chain, therefore the neurons are still able to be aware of and experience the external world, as much as it experiences itself.


In order for the neurons to “exist as themselves”, they have to be shaped by the external AND the internal world. From the outside and from the inside.


In the end, the question of which comes first between the two—the external and the internal—only depends on which perspectives we answer this question in—either from the external perspective or the internal perspective. Both perspectives are valid, because the internal contributes to the existence of the external as much as the external contributes to the existence of the internal.

Any object is specifically kept existent as that object, from the inside and the outside of the object, because the definition of that object is both defined by the inside and the outside.

And an object is also defined by the very boundaries that separate the object from the external world, which is the boundary that ironically links the internal world of the object and the external world together.

[value]

Can you mention a property of the mentioned probability that would provide a reason for neurons to develop when given sufficient time? If not, is your argument based on the Infinite Monkey Theorem (topic)?

Yes, it is based on the Infinite Monkey Theorem.

What do you think of the fallacy to exclude the observer from the consideration? Mathematical infinity is merely a potential infinity which cannot logically be applicable to reality since it requires a begin that is introduced by an observer.

A topic dedicated to the subject: Endless and infinite https://onlinephilosophyclub.com/forums ... =2&t=16634

What evidence is there that neurons operate out of themselves and that the explicit self-awareness that you are seeking to explain originates from the individuality of individual neurons?

As long as they have enough self-control or individuality to exist as themselves, which they do, that should already be sufficient enough for them to be able to create boundaries between the self and non-self. It is only the object’s existence that allows for acts of translations to be possible, and for the translated information of the world to BELONG to the object, not necessarily its individuality—unless you meant the same. This is because an object can only translate the external world only through its own existence to begin with.

Why would that idea be different for a photon?

Can you please provide argumentation for the idea why 'only existence' (no other factor) would allow for the required translation potential and the logical evolutionary ability to develop into a neuron and brain that is to 'produce' consciousness?

[GrayArea]

What do you think of the fallacy to exclude the observer from the consideration? Mathematical infinity is merely a potential infinity which cannot logically be applicable to reality since it requires a begin that is introduced by an observer.

A topic dedicated to the subject: Endless and infinite https://onlinephilosophyclub.com/forums ... =2&t=16634

I don't really understand that fallacy, because, well, the existence of infinity can only depend on the observer when seen from the observer's first-person perspective. I know that as observers ourselves, we are only aware of the world through this said first-person perspective, but if you think about it, because we are aware of the world to begin with, we can know that the world exists on its own—as evidenced by how we also exist on our own.

Why would that idea be different for a photon?

Can you please provide argumentation for the idea why 'only existence' (no other factor) would allow for the required translation potential and the logical evolutionary ability to develop into a neuron and brain that is to 'produce' consciousness?

As I define it, for an object to inherently "translate" another object, is for that object to react to another object after being in physical contact. And what allows that object to react to its external objects/environment is its own existence, as whatever allows physical contact(and how that affects an object) to be possible is also whatever allows the existence of that object to be possible.

[value]

What do you think of the fallacy to exclude the observer from the consideration? Mathematical infinity is merely a potential infinity which cannot logically be applicable to reality since it requires a begin that is introduced by an observer.

A topic dedicated to the subject: Endless and infinite https://onlinephilosophyclub.com/forums ... =2&t=16634

I don't really understand that fallacy, because, well, the existence of infinity can only depend on the observer when seen from the observer's first-person perspective. I know that as observers ourselves, we are only aware of the world through this said first-person perspective, but if you think about it, because we are aware of the world to begin with, we can know that the world exists on its own—as evidenced by how we also exist on our own.

That's profoundly assumptious thinking in my opinion with as foundation at most a 'feeling' of being alive on the basis of which reality is assumed to be real. (Descartes his argument "I think, therefore I am" but why does Descartes think in the first place and without an answer to that question why would the assertion be evidence for the realness of reality?)

Why would that idea be different for a photon?

Can you please provide argumentation for the idea why 'only existence' (no other factor) would allow for the required translation potential and the logical evolutionary ability to develop into a neuron and brain that is to 'produce' consciousness?

As I define it, for an object to inherently "translate" another object, is for that object to react to another object after being in physical contact. And what allows that object to react to its external objects/environment is its own existence, as whatever allows physical contact(and how that affects an object) to be possible is also whatever allows the existence of that object to be possible.

How can it be said that the factor that allows for apparent causal relations can be considered an 'is' (existent)? Would you be open for the consideration that it might be a fallacy to consider that factor to 'exist'?

[GrayArea]

That's profoundly assumptious thinking in my opinion with as foundation at most a 'feeling' of being alive on the basis of which reality is assumed to be real. (Descartes his argument "I think, therefore I am" but why does Descartes think in the first place and without an answer to that question why would the assertion be evidence for the realness of reality?)

What is the definition of "realness" to you?

How can it be said that the factor that allows for apparent causal relations can be considered an 'is' (existent)? Would you be open for the consideration that it might be a fallacy to consider that factor to 'exist'?

I believe I expand on this in one of my later replies.