PROVE to me that the world is, in fact, real at all.

[d3r31nz1g3]

That it's a real world with real wars and etc and not a hypnotic deception.

Billion Chinese.

[Moreno]

In the case of the sock drawer, we have statistics, tried and tested, that give us a means of guessing what socks could emerge from the drawer in what order. But there are also circumstances — the ones I refer to — where we have no means even to guess (with any hope of accuracy). In such circumstances, we should avoid guesswork, and admit openly that we have no means to proceed with our reasoning and guessing.

Here, we are considering unproven and unprovable things, and we don't have the statistics that would enable us to guess at the odds (probability).

Right, but I am wondering how broad you consider the unprovable. Sock drawers with known numbers of socks of different colors allow for basic statisitics. Fine. Then we have the simulation/no simulation choice which is at a deep ontological level and includes options that will affect our current perception. There's a lot in between those extremes.

Provable is an extremely rigorous criterion. That would eliminate weather prediction, which is, nevertheless informative well above chance, however much we may complain. Then there might be things like trends in society or poker players or detectives reading other players and suspects. Skilled poker players and detectives can be well above chance, but they can't prove their analyses (at least not in advance). And really, proofs are for math and symbolic logic.

So, what kinds of estimates are you ruling out?

[Pattern-chaser]

So, what kinds of estimates are you ruling out?

I know I said that we should avoid guesswork (estimates), but I was wrong in that. Guesswork is not ideal, but difficult for us to avoid. There are loads of situations where we wish to proceed with our thinking and reasoning, but we have insufficient evidence to continue correctly. So, because we wish to proceed, we do, by means of guesswork. We do this because the alternative would be to cease all intellectual efforts to progress in the direction of understanding, and we prefer not to do that. So there is little point in ruling out all estimates.

I am thinking of relatively formal situations, like a philosophy discussion, for example. More specifically, I am saying that we should avoid stating probabilities when we have no means to determine those probabilities. It's more about honesty (with ourselves) than anything else. This kind of sloppy thinking is not good for reasoning.

Whether we might be brains-in-vats is a good example. There are those who, even if they admitted it was possible, would assert that it is 0.000001% likely. The same person might also assert that the world our senses and perception reveals to us is 99.99999% likely to be Objective Reality. Both estimates are misleading and, if they should be correct, this would be by coincidence. In this example, all we can correctly do is to recognise that both of these are possible, but not to attempt precise estimates of likelihood, because those estimates are wholly unfounded guesses or opinions, nothing more.

[Moreno]

I know I said that we should avoid guesswork (estimates), but I was wrong in that. Guesswork is not ideal, but difficult for us to avoid. There are loads of situations where we wish to proceed with our thinking and reasoning, but we have insufficient evidence to continue correctly. So, because we wish to proceed, we do, by means of guesswork. We do this because the alternative would be to cease all intellectual efforts to progress in the direction of understanding, and we prefer not to do that. So there is little point in ruling out all estimates.

Agreed, but I would go further and say that in the zone between situations where the variables are known and we can draw clear statistical estimates and the situation where we don't have that overview at all - like the situation with ontological claims about our reality being some kind of simulation or solipsistic reality - there are many situations were our estimates are effective but fallible. But not random. We are better than chance with them with regularity.

I am thinking of relatively formal situations, like a philosophy discussion, for example. More specifically, I am saying that we should avoid stating probabilities when we have no means to determine those probabilities. It's more about honesty (with ourselves) than anything else. This kind of sloppy thinking is not good for reasoning.

I think your reaction to his estimate was a good reaction. It just seemed very rigid, though I didn't know how inclusive it was, so I asked.

Whether we might be brains-in-vats is a good example. There are those who, even if they admitted it was possible, would assert that it is 0.000001% likely. The same person might also assert that the world our senses and perception reveals to us is 99.99999% likely to be Objective Reality. Both estimates are misleading and, if they should be correct, this would be by coincidence. In this example, all we can correctly do is to recognise that both of these are possible, but not to attempt precise estimates of likelihood, because those estimates are wholly unfounded guesses or opinions, nothing more.

Though isn't this a similar claim. How do you KNOW that there faith in their estimates is off? Aren't you now making a strong ontological claim about what everyone's perception must be like and everyone's intuition?

[Pattern-chaser]

Whether we might be brains-in-vats is a good example. There are those who, even if they admitted it was possible, would assert that it is 0.000001% likely. The same person might also assert that the world our senses and perception reveals to us is 99.99999% likely to be Objective Reality. Both estimates are misleading and, if they should be correct, this would be by coincidence. In this example, all we can correctly do is to recognise that both of these are possible, but not to attempt precise estimates of likelihood, because those estimates are wholly unfounded guesses or opinions, nothing more.

Though isn't this a similar claim. How do you KNOW that there faith in their estimates is off? Aren't you now making a strong ontological claim about what everyone's perception must be like and everyone's intuition?

No! I'm making a claim that is wholly based on the mathematical discipline of statistics. Where there is no statistical foundation, there can be no valid or meaningful estimates of probability, only random guesswork and wishful thinking.

[Moreno]

Whether we might be brains-in-vats is a good example. There are those who, even if they admitted it was possible, would assert that it is 0.000001% likely. The same person might also assert that the world our senses and perception reveals to us is 99.99999% likely to be Objective Reality. Both estimates are misleading and, if they should be correct, this would be by coincidence. In this example, all we can correctly do is to recognise that both of these are possible, but not to attempt precise estimates of likelihood, because those estimates are wholly unfounded guesses or opinions, nothing more.

Though isn't this a similar claim. How do you KNOW that there faith in their estimates is off? Aren't you now making a strong ontological claim about what everyone's perception must be like and everyone's intuition?

No! I'm making a claim that is wholly based on the mathematical discipline of statistics. Where there is no statistical foundation, there can be no valid or meaningful estimates of probability, only random guesswork and wishful thinking.

Right but if you care saying to him that we cannot make any kind of guess as to whether there is an external universe or 'it' is merely solipsism or this is some kind of simulation. IOW if you yourself do not feel like you can make an estimate about that, then you cannot possibly know whether even the sock drawer statistics really work. Perhaps the simulation made it seem that way, perhaps they are tinkering with your brain in the vat, perhaps this is a mere dream and your memories and all the qualia around sock drawer and similar statistics are off. And then there's all this stuff in between the sock drawer and fundamental authority.

You could I suppose have some kind of subjunctive estimate: if the external world is real and I am not in a simulation or vat or some other fundamentally other kind of ontology, then it seems like after three socks I will have a pain since I only have black and white socks.

[Pattern-chaser]

Whether we might be brains-in-vats is a good example. There are those who, even if they admitted it was possible, would assert that it is 0.000001% likely. The same person might also assert that the world our senses and perception reveals to us is 99.99999% likely to be Objective Reality. Both estimates are misleading and, if they should be correct, this would be by coincidence. In this example, all we can correctly do is to recognise that both of these are possible, but not to attempt precise estimates of likelihood, because those estimates are wholly unfounded guesses or opinions, nothing more.

Though isn't this a similar claim. How do you KNOW that there faith in their estimates is off? Aren't you now making a strong ontological claim about what everyone's perception must be like and everyone's intuition?

No! I'm making a claim that is wholly based on the mathematical discipline of statistics. Where there is no statistical foundation, there can be no valid or meaningful estimates of probability, only random guesswork and wishful thinking.

Right but if you care saying to him that we cannot make any kind of guess as to whether there is an external universe or 'it' is merely solipsism or this is some kind of simulation. IOW if you yourself do not feel like you can make an estimate about that, then you cannot possibly know whether even the sock drawer statistics really work. Perhaps the simulation made it seem that way, perhaps they are tinkering with your brain in the vat, perhaps this is a mere dream and your memories and all the qualia around sock drawer and similar statistics are off. And then there's all this stuff in between the sock drawer and fundamental authority.

You could I suppose have some kind of subjunctive estimate: if the external world is real and I am not in a simulation or vat or some other fundamentally other kind of ontology, then it seems like after three socks I will have a pain since I only have black and white socks.

I don't understand your objections. We are considering two speculations, both of which we consider to be possible.

• In one case, we already have statistical techniques, tried and tested, that apply to the speculation, so we can reasonably estimate numerically-qualified probabilities.
• In the other case, we do not have any applicable statistical techniques, and so we cannot reasonably estimate numerically-qualified probabilities.

It's that simple.

[Moreno]

I don't understand your objections. We are considering two speculations, both of which we consider to be possible.

• In one case, we already have statistical techniques, tried and tested, that apply to the speculation, so we can reasonably estimate numerically-qualified probabilities.
• In the other case, we do not have any applicable statistical techniques, and so we cannot reasonably estimate numerically-qualified probabilities.

It's that simple.

Well, I disagree. If you are in a simulation, how can you know 1) that the testing period was not rigged by the programmers or 2) your memory is not accurate since the simulation includes the feature of writing in your memory or 2) some other aspects of what reality actually is that mean that your sense the these statistical techniques work or always work or have worked, etc.

If you cannot even make a decent estimate about whether anything is real or not how can you then make specific estimates?

You could I suppose make some kind of extremely qualitied estimate...

If ontology is more or less like I think it is, and my memories of what I've read and experienced are generally correct, iow my sense of reality is close enough especially when it has to do with statistical situations, then.....
removing three socks from a drawer with only differently colored types of socks guarantees one pair.

But statistics, the whole field, is posited on top of certain ontological assumptions - which seem to be true so far ((but are they???)) - if we say we cannot make a guess about the foundation of statistics, we can't then say we can be sure when using statistics.

[EricPH]

When one casts doubt on the senses, then there is doubt about perception. If there is doubt about perception, then nothing can be absolutely taken at face value and of course it becomes possible for everything to be false.

You can sit in your garden in sunny Australia and crack open a Fosters, but what you think and feel may well be an illusion. The reality is, you are sitting upside down on our Earth which is spinning round like a top at a 1,000mph. We are hurtling round our Sun at 67,000mph, and we are travelling at the breakneck speed of 492,000mph through our galaxy.

And the gentle breeze in our garden tells us otherwise. I blame inhaling psychotropic farts.

[LuckyR]

When one casts doubt on the senses, then there is doubt about perception. If there is doubt about perception, then nothing can be absolutely taken at face value and of course it becomes possible for everything to be false.

You can sit in your garden in sunny Australia and crack open a Fosters, but what you think and feel may well be an illusion. The reality is, you are sitting upside down on our Earth which is spinning round like a top at a 1,000mph. We are hurtling round our Sun at 67,000mph, and we are travelling at the breakneck speed of 492,000mph through our galaxy.

And the gentle breeze in our garden tells us otherwise. I blame inhaling psychotropic farts.

Well you technically don't know what the reality is. Which is a psychological rabbit hole not worth the neural activity to consider it.

[EricPH]

When one casts doubt on the senses, then there is doubt about perception. If there is doubt about perception, then nothing can be absolutely taken at face value and of course it becomes possible for everything to be false.

You can sit in your garden in sunny Australia and crack open a Fosters, but what you think and feel may well be an illusion. The reality is, you are sitting upside down on our Earth which is spinning round like a top at a 1,000mph. We are hurtling round our Sun at 67,000mph, and we are travelling at the breakneck speed of 492,000mph through our galaxy.

And the gentle breeze in our garden tells us otherwise. I blame inhaling psychotropic farts.

Well you technically don't know what the reality is. Which is a psychological rabbit hole not worth the neural activity to consider it.

We orbit the Sun, and scientists have worked out the Earth's speed. Do we ignore the science?

When we walk around, we have little or no concept of the Earth's speed through space.

[LuckyR]

When one casts doubt on the senses, then there is doubt about perception. If there is doubt about perception, then nothing can be absolutely taken at face value and of course it becomes possible for everything to be false.

You can sit in your garden in sunny Australia and crack open a Fosters, but what you think and feel may well be an illusion. The reality is, you are sitting upside down on our Earth which is spinning round like a top at a 1,000mph. We are hurtling round our Sun at 67,000mph, and we are travelling at the breakneck speed of 492,000mph through our galaxy.

And the gentle breeze in our garden tells us otherwise. I blame inhaling psychotropic farts.

Well you technically don't know what the reality is. Which is a psychological rabbit hole not worth the neural activity to consider it.

We orbit the Sun, and scientists have worked out the Earth's speed. Do we ignore the science?

When we walk around, we have little or no concept of the Earth's speed through space.

Ah, but the OP has noted that our Overlords may just be projecting those "observations" to us and thus they aren't real.

[Pattern-chaser]

I don't understand your objections. We are considering two speculations, both of which we consider to be possible.

• In one case, we already have statistical techniques, tried and tested, that apply to the speculation, so we can reasonably estimate numerically-qualified probabilities.
• In the other case, we do not have any applicable statistical techniques, and so we cannot reasonably estimate numerically-qualified probabilities.

It's that simple.

Well, I disagree. If you are in a simulation, how can you know 1) that the testing period was not rigged by the programmers or 2) your memory is not accurate since the simulation includes the feature of writing in your memory or 2) some other aspects of what reality actually is that mean that your sense the these statistical techniques work or always work or have worked, etc.

If you cannot even make a decent estimate about whether anything is real or not how can you then make specific estimates?

OK, it's true that we can't know the nature of Objective Reality, so we have to stick to the only reality to which we have access, and that's the one our senses and perception reveal to us, illusory or not. And, within that reality, statistics exist, and statistical theories have been tried and tested, and their predictive value has been confirmed.

But once we move outside this reality, we sometimes find questions that we wish to consider, but for which there is little or no evidence, pro or con. Such things are similar to (unfounded) opinions, in that there is no evidence. In such cases, statistics cannot help us, because we are outside the area within which statistics is helpful. Once you move away from evidence, the sand on which we build our beliefs gets softer and less supportive. But one thing we can observe, and comment on, is that the probability of such things being correct cannot be quantified. And that's what I'm getting at here.

[Sculptor1]

Easy.
Walk to the top of a tall building an fly like a bird.

If not, why not?

[Dlaw]

That it's a real world with real wars and etc and not a hypnotic deception.

Ok, but the position against the reality of the world is trivial contradiction.

As soon as people discovered astronomy they found that long-dead humans they nevertheless knew to be alive at one time predicted with total certainty and correctness the future position of the celestial bodies. We can out two microscopic corporeal structures in a warm test tube and then talk to the product years later and hear a new and individual perception of the world. Through DNA a biologist can know who your parents are even if you don't.

Again it's a trivial move outside self-obsession and it can be done a hundred ways. I'll bet there were plenty of Japanese people pondering this very question right before their neighbors got fried and they were made catastrophically ill by radiation they couldn't see or perceive in any way.

How about two engineers in Holmdel, New Jersey who went outside, pointed their new antenna at the heavens and heard a noise that shouldn't have been there. Who cared, at that moment, if a Chinese peasant had no perception or this huge change in human knowledge and thought that the world was nothing more than a hypnotic deception? For his great-granddaughter it's an article of faith, as perceptually solid as a rock.