How May the Perspectives and Ambiguities of Idealism, Materialism and Realism be Disentangled and Analysed?

[JackDaydream]

I see this area at the centre of philosophy as a key area but also as a rather confusing puzzle, sometimes giving rise to heated debate, especially between the 'hardcore' materialists, and those who hold onto forms of idealism. It seems that so much is at stake, but, on the other hand, it may be complicated, in the understanding of both 'reality' and the nature of 'mind, as well as the linguistic aspects of thinking. I see it as an ongoing area for reading and thinking about, with no clear answers.

This thread topic comes after reading some debate and dialogue raised by Richard Stokes in, 'Philosophy: 100 Essential Thinkers,' (2003). He looks at it as a recurrent issue in the history of philosophy and he seeks to define the terms idealism, materialism and reason. He sees idealism as the 'view that the empirical world does not exist independently of the human mind and hence can only be known according to conceptions of it'. Materialis 'is the view that only matter or material things exist', and 'the 'there is nothing in existence other than matter, one of the consequences of which is the nullifications of the possible existence of a God or gods.' Stokes defines realism as, 'the theory that universals exist independently of the human mind and that the essences of things are objectively given in nature'.

So, I am asking where do you lie in this spectrum of possibilities of understanding, and its complexities? Also, in the twentieth first century, so much may come down to science, but to what extent does science come up with clear answers to the thinking and ambiguities of this area which arises in the diversity of the varying historical and cultural perspectives? What are the key issues and assumptions involved, and how may they be evaluated or thought through in some critical depth?

[Gertie]

I'm with you - it's a puzzle with no apparent route to finding answers.

My approach to epistemology is that all that's known with certainty is the reality of my own conscious experience. Either that's all which exists, or that experience refers to and represents something real beyond it. But there's no way of knowing which.

If I assume my experiential states refer to and represent a reality 'out there', then the question becomes how accurately does my experience represent that reality to me in the form of my experience.

Well my experience includes other humans like me who I can ask if they experience this world we share in similar ways to me. And from there we can begin to build a third party falsifiable model of our shared world. This eventually becomes the physicalist model of the world we have today of scientific third person falsifiability. Which is an ongoing endeavour, but gives us an amazingly detailed, coherent, predictive and useful model of what the world is made of and how it works. With some gaps and remaining puzzles, but it's hard to believe those qualities of the model don't capture something of the reality.

There's a more fundamental problem tho. At bottom, we're still reliant on our human abilities to observe the world and reason from those observations to theories, which again can only be falsified in as much as our observational and cognitive toolkit allows. And science itself now tells us we humans are flawed and limited observers and thinkers. Even when we first person pov subjects compare notes and find third person confirmation, we can't achieve a perfect god's eye pov. We're all ultimately limited by the nature of being a human subject, with a flawed and limited perspective on reality. We're fantastic model makers, but with no ultimate access to a pov which can distinguish the map from the ontological territory.

Which leaves open the question of how reliably our experience represents the real world to us. Maybe our physicalist model is so useful and coherently detailed in its explanatory power because it's near bang on. Or maybe it's a 'Darwinian fiction' constructed by the evolutionarily useful toolkit we've evolved to navigate the world at a particular level of resolution. Maybe the world is essentially relational, and it's a category error to think in terms of one definitive reality, it's just parts interacting in different ways. Maybe experience is all there is. Maybe the ontological reality is literally inconceivable to us... who knows.

[JackDaydream]

I'm with you - it's a puzzle with no apparent route to finding answers.

My approach to epistemology is that all that's known with certainty is the reality of my own conscious experience. Either that's all which exists, or that experience refers to and represents something real beyond it. But there's no way of knowing which.

If I assume my experiential states refer to and represent a reality 'out there', then the question becomes how accurately does my experience represent that reality to me in the form of my experience.

Well my experience includes other humans like me who I can ask if they experience this world we share in similar ways to me. And from there we can begin to build a third party falsifiable model of our shared world. This eventually becomes the physicalist model of the world we have today of scientific third person falsifiability. Which is an ongoing endeavour, but gives us an amazingly detailed, coherent, predictive and useful model of what the world is made of and how it works. With some gaps and remaining puzzles, but it's hard to believe those qualities of the model don't capture something of the reality.

There's a more fundamental problem tho. At bottom, we're still reliant on our human abilities to observe the world and reason from those observations to theories, which again can only be falsified in as much as our observational and cognitive toolkit allows. And science itself now tells us we humans are flawed and limited observers and thinkers. Even when we first person pov subjects compare notes and find third person confirmation, we can't achieve a perfect god's eye pov. We're all ultimately limited by the nature of being a human subject, with a flawed and limited perspective on reality. We're fantastic model makers, but with no ultimate access to a pov which can distinguish the map from the ontological territory.

Which leaves open the question of how reliably our experience represents the real world to us. Maybe our physicalist model is so useful and coherently detailed in its explanatory power because it's near bang on. Or maybe it's a 'Darwinian fiction' constructed by the evolutionarily useful toolkit we've evolved to navigate the world at a particular level of resolution. Maybe the world is essentially relational, and it's a category error to think in terms of one definitive reality, it's just parts interacting in different ways. Maybe experience is all there is. Maybe the ontological reality is literally inconceivable to us... who knows.

I am glad that you appreciate the tension between uncertainty of the limits of knowledge and some apparent certainties of the shared aspects of the constructed scientific model. It does seem that the scientific understanding, especially in neuroscience has become extremely dominant. That is because there are clear correlations between the brain and the mind, especially the interaction between the two. It is linked with a picture which topples dualism completely, especially in relation to the perspective which emerged from the thinking of Descartes.

The limitations of the 'shadowy' aspect of the dualistic model, or metaphor of 'the ghost in the machine' was critiqued by Gilbert Ryle in his book, 'The Concept of Mind'. Ryle sees both idealism and materialism as both being not adequate fully because both mind and matter are two important aspects of importance and there being a problem of trying to make one or the other the primary.
There can be a reduction to the outer or inner aspects, when they are different perspectives.

It is linked to the question of subjectivity and objectivity. The difficulty of trying to find the objective point beyond human consciousness was looked at by Nagel in his, 'The View From Nowhere'. As all human thinking is done from the standpoint of human consciousness it is not possible to see the objective picture beyond. This may be ignored by those who focus on the known aspects which can be depicted in the theories and empirical aspects of knowledge demonstrated by the physicalist model.

Simply because the brain is the physical basis, in space and time, doesn't mean that it is the complete picture. It may or may not be and, if anything, the problem may be trying to take the physical wiring as the literal, at face value. The physicalist representation as if it is 'reality' itself, rather than recognising it as a model which is useful, but, not necessarily, the ultimate picture of 'reality' beyond the partiality of human knowledge.

[Gertie]

Jack

Simply because the brain is the physical basis, in space and time, doesn't mean that it is the complete picture. It may or may not be and, if anything, the problem may be trying to take the physical wiring as the literal, at face value. The physicalist representation as if it is 'reality' itself, rather than recognising it as a model which is useful, but, not necessarily, the ultimate picture of 'reality' beyond the partiality of human knowledge.

Nicely summed up.

The big thing physicalism has is in its favour is that it's proven itself on its own terms, even resolving previously seemingly intractable puzzles. It's a predictive, reliable and coherent model, while other possibilities seem to necessarily be vague and speculative.

[JackDaydream]

Jack

Simply because the brain is the physical basis, in space and time, doesn't mean that it is the complete picture. It may or may not be and, if anything, the problem may be trying to take the physical wiring as the literal, at face value. The physicalist representation as if it is 'reality' itself, rather than recognising it as a model which is useful, but, not necessarily, the ultimate picture of 'reality' beyond the partiality of human knowledge.

Nicely summed up.

The big thing physicalism has is in its favour is that it's proven itself on its own terms, even resolving previously seemingly intractable puzzles. It's a predictive, reliable and coherent model, while other possibilities seem to necessarily be vague and speculative.

The problem with idealism is that it involves imaginatatory 'realities' and even hidden ones. This can make it extremely difficult to show empirically. Kant's transcendental idealism was in the context of his argument that there are limits to human knowledge. He worked on the basis of the importance of intuition but it may be hard to know what this corresponds with as an actual reflection of the unseen. Similarly, Plato's idea of forms were based on thought alone as a source of thought. So, it may be that idealism can be seen as flights of fantasy.

On the other hand, the physicalist model, if taken as representative of all there is to reality may be rather 'flat' if it seen as definitive. Personally, I try to see both angles, with the materialist perspective as the underlying one for day to day assumptions. However, the whole realm of dreams, fantasy and introspection do show another perspective on reality. In the twentieth century there was such a move away from introspection, which was viewed as of great significance by William James and some of the thinkers in psychology. That may have been a narrow viewpoint in giving too much attention to the inner life, but the opposite extreme may leave gaps. There may be a danger of trying to speculate to the point of fabrication of the gaps, or the other danger in trying to gloss over these aspects entirely.

[Pattern-chaser]

What are the key issues and assumptions involved, and how may they be evaluated or thought through in some critical depth?

I think the issues, and the assumptions too, are many and varied. I think that perhaps we are too eager to place things in pigeon-holes. We want to be able to say that, for example, idealism is wrong and materialism is right. We want to know — to the extent that we are quite happy to pretend that we know! — that X is correct, but Y is wrong. The problem with this approach is that the universe is often awkward enough () that a particular aspect of its nature cannot be adequately described by a single, simple, label.

Our craving for certainty leads us to reject out of hand the obvious solution to the issues you raise here. The obvious solution is actually two solutions, I think. 1. That materialism, idealism, etc., each offer part of the answer we seek. 2. None of our list — idealism, materialism, etc. — are anywhere close to what we are seeking, and we must look elsewhere, or stop looking and consider other issues instead.

The issues raised in this topic are fundamental ones; they aren't trivial at all. They concern the nature of reality itself. That being the case, the first thing we might confront is that, for us humans, there is no certain answer. We have the means to obtain (some) answers, but not the means to confirm their correctness. We cannot, for example, step out of the spacetime universe, and look back in from the outside, to see if theory T is accurate or not. It isn't possible. There are other perspectives that consider the shortcomings of our senses and perceptions, and conclude that they are not adequate to justify firm conclusions.

Our considerations of the nature of reality will always be accompanied by these things, whose collective result is that certainty, for us, on these fundamental issues, is not accessible. Is everything composed of matter? Is there more to life than is immediately obvious? Is the whole 'world' just a figment of my imagination? And so on. These are questions we'd all like answers to, but I don't think we're going to get them.

I'm not exactly sure where we go from here. We want certainty, and we want answers, that we aren't going to get. We focus on this, and refuse to accept it. We demand answers, and certainty too, and we devote our efforts to circumventing problems that we know to be insoluble (to/for us). Perhaps we might spend our time more wisely by accepting the nature of our world and our lives — i.e. that uncertainty lurks everywhere; there are loads of things we can't, and won't ever, know — and working out how best to live (and think) in harmony with what we have, and what is?

[JackDaydream]

What are the key issues and assumptions involved, and how may they be evaluated or thought through in some critical depth?

I think the issues, and the assumptions too, are many and varied. I think that perhaps we are too eager to place things in pigeon-holes. We want to be able to say that, for example, idealism is wrong and materialism is right. We want to know — to the extent that we are quite happy to pretend that we know! — that X is correct, but Y is wrong. The problem with this approach is that the universe is often awkward enough () that a particular aspect of its nature cannot be adequately described by a single, simple, label.

Our craving for certainty leads us to reject out of hand the obvious solution to the issues you raise here. The obvious solution is actually two solutions, I think. 1. That materialism, idealism, etc., each offer part of the answer we seek. 2. None of our list — idealism, materialism, etc. — are anywhere close to what we are seeking, and we must look elsewhere, or stop looking and consider other issues instead.

The issues raised in this topic are fundamental ones; they aren't trivial at all. They concern the nature of reality itself. That being the case, the first thing we might confront is that, for us humans, there is no certain answer. We have the means to obtain (some) answers, but not the means to confirm their correctness. We cannot, for example, step out of the spacetime universe, and look back in from the outside, to see if theory T is accurate or not. It isn't possible. There are other perspectives that consider the shortcomings of our senses and perceptions, and conclude that they are not adequate to justify firm conclusions.

Our considerations of the nature of reality will always be accompanied by these things, whose collective result is that certainty, for us, on these fundamental issues, is not accessible. Is everything composed of matter? Is there more to life than is immediately obvious? Is the whole 'world' just a figment of my imagination? And so on. These are questions we'd all like answers to, but I don't think we're going to get them.

I'm not exactly sure where we go from here. We want certainty, and we want answers, that we aren't going to get. We focus on this, and refuse to accept it. We demand answers, and certainty too, and we devote our efforts to circumventing problems that we know to be insoluble (to/for us). Perhaps we might spend our time more wisely by accepting the nature of our world and our lives — i.e. that uncertainty lurks everywhere; there are loads of things we can't, and won't ever, know — and working out how best to live (and think) in harmony with what we have, and what is?

I guess that I am just so surprised by the way in which people often wish to attach themselves to particular positions and use labels so much. In the first instance, I gravitated to idealism, which was based on spiritual perspective, not just those in Christianity, but also in Eastern traditions. In particular, in Hinduism, there is the whole picture of the everyday aspects of 'reality' as illusory, as captured in the concept, 'maya'. However, a couple of years ago I became aware that there is ongoing debate about whether the physical or immaterial is the essential 'reality'.

Some aspects of whether a person holds certain beliefs may come down to the psychological dimension of what a person wishes to believe, but, also, what appears as the most rational way. It may be a complex mixture of the two. Also, some people prefer a sense of certainty and I am fairly happy to suspend judgement if an issue appears unclear. This is with a tolerance for ambiguity and an underlying approach of scepticism. Many may doubt taking the unusual at face value, such as NDEs being a potential 'reality' after death. I do agree because it may not be a literal 'reality'. Nevertheless, such attempts to say that these are simply brain processes seems equally flawed.

It is hard to know to what extent idealism or materialism can ever be proven to be the ultimate causal explanations, a bit like theism or atheism. The two areas of debate overlap to some extent because theism is more compatible with theism. That is not to say that idealism leads to a belief in theism necessarily. There are many possibilities, including various viewpoints of consciousness in Buddhism and the pantheism of Spinoza. Really, there may be a whole spectrum of possibilities.

My own approach to philosophy is to try to look at the many different angles. As far as conclusions go, even though these have limits, I prefer to see philosophy as a life long quest. I know that I have so much which I wish to read, including the ideas of Berkeley, Hegel and phenomenology. I do see the phenomenological approach as being of particular significance, possibly parallel with the analysis of Ryle, in thinking how mind and body come together in embodiment.

[Pattern-chaser]

The problem with idealism is that it involves imagined 'realities' and even hidden ones. This can make it extremely difficult to show empirically.

"Difficult"? Impossible, surely? Imagined or hidden aspects of reality cannot even be (empirically) examined, as they have no apparent empirical existence.

So, it may be that idealism can be seen as flights of fantasy.

Definitely!

On the other hand, the physicalist model, if taken as representative of all there is to reality may be rather 'flat' if it seen as definitive.

That's just it. Flat, bland, and lacking in vitality. No room for dreams or daydreams. No room for uncertainty. ... But wait! It's the latter that is the issue: our empirically-accessible world is filled with uncertainty. There are so many things that we have wrong, or haven't yet discovered — which is what that uncertainty points to! If we don't imagine, and don't dream, we will never again learn anything new.

Anything that is possible — i.e. not demonstrably impossible — is a suitable candidate for inclusion in imagined daydream-scapes. Every now and again, something valuable will emerge, and we will have learned something we didn't know before. That is (part of) an idealist perspective; there must be room for dreams:

If we will only allow that, as we progress, we remain unsure, we will leave opportunities for alternatives. We will not become enthusiastic for the fact, the knowledge, the absolute truth of the day, but remain always uncertain … In order to make progress, one must leave the door to the unknown ajar.

[JackDaydream]

The problem with idealism is that it involves imagined 'realities' and even hidden ones. This can make it extremely difficult to show empirically.

"Difficult"? Impossible, surely? Imagined or hidden aspects of reality cannot even be (empirically) examined, as they have no apparent empirical existence.

So, it may be that idealism can be seen as flights of fantasy.

Definitely!

On the other hand, the physicalist model, if taken as representative of all there is to reality may be rather 'flat' if it seen as definitive.

That's just it. Flat, bland, and lacking in vitality. No room for dreams or daydreams. No room for uncertainty. ... But wait! It's the latter that is the issue: our empirically-accessible world is filled with uncertainty. There are so many things that we have wrong, or haven't yet discovered — which is what that uncertainty points to! If we don't imagine, and don't dream, we will never again learn anything new.

Anything that is possible — i.e. not demonstrably impossible — is a suitable candidate for inclusion in imagined daydream-scapes. Every now and again, something valuable will emerge, and we will have learned something we didn't know before. That is (part of) an idealist perspective; there must be room for dreams:

If we will only allow that, as we progress, we remain unsure, we will leave opportunities for alternatives. We will not become enthusiastic for the fact, the knowledge, the absolute truth of the day, but remain always uncertain … In order to make progress, one must leave the door to the unknown ajar.

Ideas of 'hidden realities' may be problematic because they are hidden. That may be the essential problem raised by mysticism because it is beyond explanation, although Wittgenstein offers an alternative slant. He stresses the importance of silence about that which one cannot speak about. There may indeed be a tendency to try to explain that which is not clear. Physicalism may have a headstart here, because it is the realm of the empirical, but the question may its absoluteness. Those who seek to go beyond it may be in the quest for understanding beyond the mundane, seen dimensions described by The Waterboys' songtitle of seeking to see, 'The Whole of the Moon'.

As your quote from Richard Feynman suggests, it is likely that many do not 'leave the door to the unknown ajar'. In some eras, the idea of mysteries remained and materialism may be the attempt to vanquish mystery from the nature of philosophy. Personally, I hold onto the importance of the idea of mystery in philosophy. Science may explain so much, but the existence of God, life after death and the nature of existence of life and consciousness may remain as mysteries.

In particular, the idea of life after death is connected to the question of dualism in some ways, because whether consciousness can survive death is bound up with the issue as to whether it is simply a product of brain processes. Of course, mysteries may need to be approached analytically to be solved, but it may not be simple. The underlying question may involve the question, is external 'reality' is the main, objective denominator for understanding the nature of 'reality'?

[Pattern-chaser]

Ideas of 'hidden realities' may be problematic because they are hidden. That may be the essential problem raised by mysticism because it is beyond explanation, although Wittgenstein offers an alternative slant. He stresses the importance of silence about that which one cannot speak about. There may indeed be a tendency to try to explain that which is not clear.

I will happily admit to a tendency to try to understand or investigate that which is not clear, if that counts? Although trying to explain something nearly always lets us know whether we understand the thing we're trying to explain, so maybe it's a good starting point?

[JackDaydream]

Ideas of 'hidden realities' may be problematic because they are hidden. That may be the essential problem raised by mysticism because it is beyond explanation, although Wittgenstein offers an alternative slant. He stresses the importance of silence about that which one cannot speak about. There may indeed be a tendency to try to explain that which is not clear.

I will happily admit to a tendency to try to understand or investigate that which is not clear, if that counts? Although trying to explain something nearly always lets us know whether we understand the thing we're trying to explain, so maybe it's a good starting point?

The issue may be about what an explanation is exactly, how it arises and what it represents? Is it a direct representation of causation or connected to consciousness as a way of seeking answers? That may be where thinking processes, thought and the nature of ideas become complicated. To what extent can they be reduced to or as seen as a by-product of matter? It is interconnected to the way in which 'mind' itself may have developed or come from.

Some may see 'mind' itself as an add on feature to nature, but this is open to questioning because mind or 'consciousness' may such an intrinsic aspect of evolutionary developments, raising the issue whether mind itself is an emergent feature of development or there from the start. That may be the key aspect at the idealist/materialist and realist dichotomy, as the starting point for understanding the basis of 'reality', its development and how nature and human nature works.

[Pattern-chaser]

...because mind or 'consciousness' may such an intrinsic aspect of evolutionary developments, raising the issue whether mind itself is an emergent feature of development or there from the start.

Our predecessors, all the way back to bacteria, and maybe beyond, are living things. But many of them do not have minds, as we understand minds. So I don't think minds were there "from the start"...?

[JackDaydream]

...because mind or 'consciousness' may such an intrinsic aspect of evolutionary developments, raising the issue whether mind itself is an emergent feature of development or there from the start.

Our predecessors, all the way back to bacteria, and maybe beyond, are living things. But many of them do not have minds, as we understand minds. So I don't think minds were there "from the start"...?

It does depend on what one considers to be a 'mind' and whether this is simply the human conscious mind, as mental function. Not that I have a great knowledge of animal minds, and that sort of makes me smile. That is because I don't have much experience with animals, but the funny aspect is that even those who do have so much experience with animals don't know what the actual experience of consciousness of the many different sentient beings are.

Animals have sleep and waking states as a division between consciousness and unconscious. So, what the essential difference between the human; and other sentient beings, may be language as the starting point for reflective awareness, and some even see this as an an illusion.

However, there may be some purpose or potential behind the pathways of brains. It also depends on whether the mind is seen only as the brain or as the whole organism. In particular, DNA is the raw information of potential. It does have a physical, cellular basis, but it may be unfolded as potential, possibly in a similar way to what the physicist spoke of as the implicate order behind the explicate order of manifestation in the outer world..

Bohm's idea of the implicate and explicate order emerges in the new physics, but there are parallels in the new biology of Rupert Sheldrake. In his theory of morphic resonance, he speaks of a memory inherent in nature, under the category of morphic fields, which are not simply about DNA. He is speaking of patterns forming which in nature, which does imply some kind of 'mind' even if it is not like that experienced by a person's subjective individual mind and, it may be more of a group mind, or underlying organising potential.