Here's part of wiki's entry on Kant's transcendental idealism -
Almost everybody today would agree I think, the world isn't exactly as we see it, because we are subjects with a limited and flawed specific point of view. Physicalism offers a good explanation for us being representational model-makers (from the experiential act of observation itself, to theories which arise from observations) rather than perfect and limitless knowers of reality - the nature of being a subject 'designed for' evolutionary utility. Which doesn't necessitate abandoning space and time. But evolutionary theory, and physicalism itself, is undermined by this recognition Kant would surely point to - evolution theory is itself part of the model. Fair enough.The salient element here is that space and time, rather than being real things-in-themselves or empirically mediated appearances (German: Erscheinungen), are the very forms of intuition (German: Anschauung) by which we must perceive objects. They are hence neither to be considered properties that we may attribute to objects in perceiving them, nor substantial entities of themselves. They are in that sense subjective, yet necessary, preconditions of any given object insofar as this object is an appearance and not a thing-in-itself. Humans necessarily perceive objects as located in space and in time. This condition of experience is part of what it means for a human to cognize an object, to perceive and understand it as something both spatial and temporal: "By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition…"[7] Kant argues for these several claims in the section of the Critique of Pure Reason entitled the "Transcendental Aesthetic".
But does Kant's transcendental idealism also undermine itself? I see two probs -
- If I do abandon space and time as real, I don't think the logical next step is to consider it as part of OUR' (human minds in general) intuitive' human way of creating experiential models. Rather the correct inference is surely that I must also abandon the knowable reality of others beings I call humans with minds like mine - which also only exist as part of my experiential model, located in space and time as part of the overall package of my experience. In which case how does Kant avoid reverting to solipsism, without making unjustified assumptions about other minds (only knowable via observing bodies), which Kant isn't prepared to make about space, time and everything physical. Incidentally, I think any idealist who invokes the existence of other minds must surely run into the same issue issue of solipsism.
- As I understand it, instead Kant invokes some sort of mind of god of which we are all expressions/instantiations (as I understand it). Which somehow our human moral intuition and reason can get us to, even though in every other respect we're incapable of intuiting ultimate 'objective' reality.
Regarding my second objection, Kant believes -
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/a ... 2814064088In the theoretical philosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason, the idea of God as Unconditioned, as a being that is absolutely necessary, is seen as a transcendental ideal determined through an idea as a prototype of perfection necessary to everything that is contingent and determined in our sensible world: what we can do to conciliate sensible experience with the Absolute Being is to presuppose an extra-phenomenal reality designated as transcendental object: we presuppose its existence but we cannot get to know it. Later, in Critique of Practical Reason, God is postulated (together with soul's immortality) as a condition of the supreme value of moral life, the Sovereign Good (union of virtue with happiness). Since in the sensible world moral conduct does not warrant proportional happiness, the virtuous ones has strong reasons to believe in the reparatory intervention of a superior power: God, as moral ideal and warranty of moral order. “Morality leads, inevitably, to religion, through which it (morality) extends over a moral Lawgiver” claims Kant.
I'm struggling to parse even the author's interpretation here, but the transcendental argument for god takes the following form (wiki version), which I don't personally find as persuasive as the logical inference of solipsism -
The TAG is a transcendental argument that attempts to prove that God is the precondition for logic, reason, or morality. The argument proceeds as follows:[6]
1. God is a necessary precondition for logic and morality (because these are immaterial, yet real universals).
2. People depend upon logic and morality, showing that they depend upon the universal, immaterial, and abstract realities which could not exist in a materialist universe but presupposes (presumes) the existence of an immaterial and absolute God.
3. Therefore, God exists. If He didn't, we could not rely upon logic, reason, morality, and other absolute universals (which are required and assumed to live in this universe, let alone to debate), and could not exist in a materialist universe where there are no absolute standards or an absolute Lawgiver.
Thoughts?