Can a man-made computer become conscious?

[psyreporter]

What could explain that humans can bond mentally with animals, and as it appears, even with plants? What is it that can be described as mutually meaningful when it concerns a relation between a human and an animal or plant?

Flowers are talking to animals—and humans are just starting to listen
https://qz.com/1522637/humans-are-learn ... d-animals/

Plants can see, hear and smell – and respond

Plants, according to Jack C Schultz, "are just very slow animals".

This is not a misunderstanding of basic biology. Schultz is a professor in the Division of Plant Sciences at the University of Missouri in Columbia, and has spent four decades investigating the interactions between plants and insects. He knows his stuff.

http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20170109 ... nd-respond

Can the meaningfulness be reduced to a mere mechanism that is functional for survival or is that which is also indicated as 'love', more than that, considering that one may be willing to sacrifice him/herself for a loved animal, and visa versa (e.g. a dog that protects his/her boss against an attacking bear)?

[Sy Borg]

What could explain that humans can bond mentally with animals, and as it appears, even with plants? What is it that can be described as mutually meaningful when it concerns a relation between a human and an animal or plant?

Flowers are talking to animals—and humans are just starting to listen
https://qz.com/1522637/humans-are-learn ... d-animals/

Plants can see, hear and smell – and respond

Plants, according to Jack C Schultz, "are just very slow animals".

This is not a misunderstanding of basic biology. Schultz is a professor in the Division of Plant Sciences at the University of Missouri in Columbia, and has spent four decades investigating the interactions between plants and insects. He knows his stuff.

http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20170109 ... nd-respond

Can the meaningfulness be reduced to a mere mechanism that is functional for survival or is that which is also indicated as 'love', more than that, considering that one may be willing to sacrifice him/herself for a loved animal, and visa versa (e.g. a dog that protects his/her boss against an attacking bear)?

There's still not proof that these things are experiencing rather than executing conditioned responses. For instance, perhaps a certain tempo of activity is needed for experience to occur? We don't know. I personally suspect that being alive means experiencing in some way, but it cannot be proved. And we still will not know how to assess possible sentience in complex self-directed machines.

Note that a machine can be programmed to sacrifice itself to protect its owner from an aggressive bear (or twink for that matter hehe).

[psyreporter]

For an interaction to be meaningful, i.e. 'intelligent', pre-conditioning does not seem to be possible. If the interaction would be based on pre-conditioned responses it would imply that reality is to be perceived as deterministic.

Plants are conscious and interact with intelligence

Evolutionary ecologist Monica Gagliano insists that plants are intelligent, and she’s not speaking metaphorically. “My work is not about metaphors at all,” Gagliano tells Forbes. “When I talk about learning, I mean learning. When I talk about memory, I mean memory.”

Gagliano’s behavioral experiments on plants suggest that—while plants don’t have a central nervous system or a brain—they behave like intelligent beings.

Gagliano, who began her career as a marine scientist, says her work with plants triggered a profound epiphany. “The main realization for me wasn’t the fact that plants themselves must be something more than we give them credit for, but what if everything around us is much more than we give it credit for, whether it’s animal, plant, bacteria, whatever.”

https://qz.com/1294941/a-debate-over-pl ... uman-mind/

The seeds and fruits of plants are presumably data-packets for animals. Plants also communicate in real-time through other animals, for example by talking to insects via ultra-sound that in turn forward information to bigger animals.

The question is: does Nature (life) have a purpose? If there were to be a purpose of life, wouldn't that imply that there is a greater purpose for Nature of which the human is a part? In that case, real-time interaction between plants and animals may be vital, not just for a mere survival but to be able to go beyond what exists, i.e. to serve the purpose of Nature ( "good") in the best way.

[Sculptor1]

What about rats?
What about mosquitoes - ever killed one?

Yes, your point?

So you do not value some animals' consciousness.

[Kaz_1983]

Yep I don't treat all consciousness equal.

[UniversalAlien]

HUMANS, ANIMALS, PLANTS, MACHINES - Are they all that different or all just another manifestation of the same consciousness?

“Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature. And that is because, in the last analysis, we ourselves are a part of the mystery that we are trying to solve.”
― Max Planck, Where is Science Going?

And the issue of consciousness:

“I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing, postulates consciousness.”
― Max Planck

So "Can a man-made computer become conscious?" can be answered by the rhetorical
question - 'How can a man-made computer not be conscious?'

If a conscious mind is using a man-made computer than the computer is part of the
conscious mind that is using it and that conscious mind that is using it is part of the computer.

No conscious minds or machines can exist out side of the greater matrix of which they
are part.

The only question remains is does that matrix of which all that exist is part of
have a consciousness of its own?

[ByronKuiter]

Before we can decide who or what we deem to be "Conscious" we must consider how it is that we recognise Consciousness within one another.
How would you teach a child to use the word Consciousness? What would you refer to? Surely nothing "internal". No connection between the word and the meaning could be established. You could point to a rock and say "That rock lacks Consciousness". You could point to yourself and say "I have Consciousness."
Prove it.
You might say "I am aware that I am alive. I react appropriately to intellectual and emotional stimuli in such a way that convinces others that I am conscious. I behave in such a way that allows you to infer that I am conscious."
These are useful, concrete indicators of consciousness and it is not a logical impossibility that a man-made computer could produce these kinds of indicators. If, however, you believe consciousness to be an "internal mental state" gifted by God or possibly just another word for the "immaterial soul" then it is indeed impossibility for a man-made computer to obtain this definition of consciousness, but this explanation of consciousness is wrong. The reason why a computer cannot obtain consciousness in this way is because nothing/no one can.
The word "Consciousness" is public with a shared communal meaning. We use it to discuss the observable characteristics and behaviours of one another that indicate our awareness of the world and of ourselves. These public behaviours, expressions and reactions could be produced by a computer one day.

[Steve3007]

...These public behaviours, expressions and reactions could be produced by a computer one day.

I would confine myself to saying "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" rather than "a computer", because "computer" generally makes people think of a particular kind of device, manufactured some time between the mid 20th Century and now. It's possible that there is something about the workings of brains that is fundamentally unreproducible by the very specific arrangements of matter that we usually refer to by the word "computer". But if we said the same thing about the more general term that I used, then we'd have to conclude that there is something in brains that is fundamentally different from other things - that brains aren't complex arrangements of atoms. So we'd have to believe in some form of Cartesian Dualism.

[Belindi]

...These public behaviours, expressions and reactions could be produced by a computer one day.

I would confine myself to saying "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" rather than "a computer", because "computer" generally makes people think of a particular kind of device, manufactured some time between the mid 20th Century and now. It's possible that there is something about the workings of brains that is fundamentally unreproducible by the very specific arrangements of matter that we usually refer to by the word "computer". But if we said the same thing about the more general term that I used, then we'd have to conclude that there is something in brains that is fundamentally different from other things - that brains aren't complex arrangements of atoms. So we'd have to believe in some form of Cartesian Dualism.

Brains are more properly brain-minds. This is because of all the organs in the body brain-minds are subjects of experience.For something to be a subject of experience it needs first to be a subject of experience among and contrasted with other subjects of experience.

If "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" was to be a subject of experience that experience would need to include awareness of the other that has other experience which would be other. Experience that an other remembers is communicated through language. Here we have a insuperable obstacle to understanding an other. The more the language is explicit the narrower its info, and the more the language is diffuse the less explicit it can be. However language that is diffused among a complexity of metaphors is the language that mediates a wider entree to an other's experience.

[Steve3007]

For something to be a subject of experience it needs first to be a subject of experience among and contrasted with other subjects of experience.

Surely, for something to be X it has to be an X among and contrasted with a whole loads of Y's more than a whole load of other X's?

If "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" was to be a subject of experience that experience would need to include awareness of the other that has other experience which would be other. Experience that an other remembers is communicated through language.

Mmmm. You seem to be suggesting that it's not possible to be a sentient being (a "subject of experience") unless one is in the presence of other sentient beings and one can communicate with them. Is that what you're suggesting? i.e. no Robinson Crusoes?

Here we have a insuperable obstacle to understanding an other. The more the language is explicit the narrower its info, and the more the language is diffuse the less explicit it can be. However language that is diffused among a complexity of metaphors is the language that mediates a wider entree to an other's experience.

Yes, language inevitably has various problems as a tool for understanding the workings of others' minds.

[Belindi]

For something to be a subject of experience it needs first to be a subject of experience among and contrasted with other subjects of experience.

Surely, for something to be X it has to be an X among and contrasted with a whole loads of Y's more than a whole load of other X's?

If "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" was to be a subject of experience that experience would need to include awareness of the other that has other experience which would be other. Experience that an other remembers is communicated through language.

Mmmm. You seem to be suggesting that it's not possible to be a sentient being (a "subject of experience") unless one is in the presence of other sentient beings and one can communicate with them. Is that what you're suggesting? i.e. no Robinson Crusoes?

Here we have a insuperable obstacle to understanding an other. The more the language is explicit the narrower its info, and the more the language is diffuse the less explicit it can be. However language that is diffused among a complexity of metaphors is the language that mediates a wider entree to an other's experience.

Yes, language inevitably has various problems as a tool for understanding the workings of others' minds.

Yes, no Robinson Crusoe is what I mean. You will know the answer to this but I thought regarding the language of "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" the more it is explicit=the less it involves Man Friday.

I suspect "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" when it speaks it always implies it is first person singular, never first person plural.

[Steve3007]

Yes, no Robinson Crusoe is what I mean. You will know the answer to this but I thought regarding the language of "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" the more it is explicit=the less it involves Man Friday.

I'm not sure what you mean by "the more it is explicit=the less it involves Man Friday". The more explicitly we talk, the less we need someone to talk to?

I suspect "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" when it speaks it always implies it is first person singular, never first person plural.

I thought it was only the Queen, Maggie Thatcher and collective consciousnesses like the Borg that used the first person plural! I guess if ants could talk they might use it.

[Belindi]

Yes, no Robinson Crusoe is what I mean. You will know the answer to this but I thought regarding the language of "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" the more it is explicit=the less it involves Man Friday.

I'm not sure what you mean by "the more it is explicit=the less it involves Man Friday". The more explicitly we talk, the less we need someone to talk to?

I suspect "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" when it speaks it always implies it is first person singular, never first person plural.

I thought it was only the Queen, Maggie Thatcher and collective consciousnesses like the Borg that used the first person plural! I guess if ants could talk they might use it.

I mean classic logic and maths are not expressive. expressive language always involves an other to express feelings to. True, a lonely Crusoe can moan and groan but that is not language. The corollary may be what you said "The more explicitly we talk, the less we need someone to talk to?"

Is it possible that two people could get together to talk about logic or maths entirely dispassionately i.e. entirely devoid of self interest or some other passion?

Heuristically, can "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" be self interested or feel some other passion? Can "a device of some kind constructed by humans out of matter" feel it has ancestors or peers?
I guess the language of ants has exactly the same pronoun for we and I. Maybe devices of some kind constructed by humans out of matter have exactly the same pronoun for we and I when they device ' discuss ' propositions. I imagine artificial devices cannot be stroppy and self opinionated.

[UniversalAlien]

Belindi wrote:
"......... I imagine artificial devices cannot be stroppy and self opinionated."

The way "I see it" its the concept "I imagine" that is most important
- Can our hypothetical AI actually imagine ? - Not calculate possibilities, though that may be involved,
but actually show "creative imagination" - This may be a better determination of sentience and a machine
with a living brain. A super calculating machine is just that, but is not conscious.

A machine with a creative imagination shows consciousness.

[Steve3007]

I mean classic logic and maths are not expressive. expressive language always involves an other to express feelings to.

Yes, but if it were possible to construct some kind of sentient device it doesn't follow that it would communicate using classic logic and maths. I guess science fiction has tended, for some reason, to generally portray artificial minds as cold and logical, and to say "does not compute" and have smoke come out of their ears if you try to talk to them about love. That kind of thing.

True, a lonely Crusoe can moan and groan but that is not language. The corollary may be what you said "The more explicitly we talk, the less we need someone to talk to?"[

Mmmm. Expressiveness requires an audience? Wandering lonely as a cloud isn't conducive to it?

Is it possible that two people could get together to talk about logic or maths entirely dispassionately i.e. entirely devoid of self interest or some other passion?

I guess that is the way that we tend to think people generally do talk about those kinds of things. As in this parody of old Open University lectures (from a longer parody of BBC2 history):