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[Lagayscienza]

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I’ve been reading a lot about Idealism in its various forms lately. I know there is already a thread here called: Best arguments for idealism? However, I'm hoping to discuss not just the best arguments for idealism but also the best arguments against it.

I got interested in idealism after discussions here with Hereandnow and Count Lucanor in the “On the nature of religion " thread. I realized that in order to be able to understand Hereandnow’s phenomenology and Count Lucanor’s arguments against it, I would need to understand Idealism because phenomenology is based in Metaphysical Idealism. I have also been doing an online course, along with Chewybrian, in Analytic Idealism. So, I’m waist deep in idealism right now.

But, first, a bit of background. I came to this forum as a dyed-in-the-wool materialist. I thought everything ought to be explicable in terms of matter and energy doing their stuff in space-time, supplemented with the science of evolution to explain the details of life on earth. But being here on this forum has made me think twice about this. I have been driven to explore areas of philosophy which I had once dismissed as mere metaphysical nonsense.

To be clear, what has driven me to explore metaphysics and, in particular, Idealism, is not a lack of belief in the power of science to reveal things that are true about the universe. Nor is it due to a lack of wonder at the universe that science reveals. Far from it. I am gobsmacked when I look at the latest pictures from the surface of Mars and at images from the JWT, and when I consider how a mindless process such as evolution by natural selection can result in “endless forms most beautiful”, and in brains that can begin to understand and wonder at the whole amazing show. If a thinking person is not in awe of what science has revealed about the universe and its workings, then they cannot be thinking clearly. So, no I have absolutely nothing bad to say about science. What has driven me to explore metaphysics is what seems to be a simple truth. Namely, that science, whilst it explains so much and is applicable to everything and anything in respect of the material world, does seem to I come up against a limit beyond which the only recourse seems to be to metaphysics.

Here is an illustration of what I mean by the limits of science.

When I look at the transparent glass paperweight on the desk in front of me and ask what it is, my questioning and answering go as follow: What shape is it? Spherical. What’s it made of? Glass. What is glass made of? Silica, with maybe a of bit of lead and other elements. What are silica and these elements made of? Atoms. What are atoms made of? Well, mostly empty space but there are also protons, neutrons and electrons… And what are they made of? Well, science tells me these particles are made of quarks. And what are quarks? I’m no physicist, but this is where we seem approach some sort of limit. I’ve read that elementary particles are akin to “excitations” in fields of unlimited spatiotemporal extent. But what does that mean? That the whole universe is just mostly empty space with excitations is the fields that pervade it? Ok, well, I can sort of take that on board but what are these excitations and what is space? Mathematical physicists might have some answer to this. But what do those answers look like? They look like equations composed of strings of symbols. And what are those symbols? They are references to features occurring in the mathematical theory, in the mathematical model of the universe. But is the universe just a mathematical model? Just equations? How can this be the case? Those equations are not what I see when I look out at the universe or at my paper weight. They are nothing like the phenomena that are given in consciousness.

As I hope to have made clear, there is an explanatory gap here. Science cannot tell me what the universe is in itself. The best it can do is equations. Therefore, if I want more, I am driven to metaphysical theorizing and the only version of metaphysics that seems to answer is some form of Idealism that posits mind as, if not primary, then at least somehow contributory, in the structure of the universe we see.

Here is how physicist/cosmologist Steven Hawking poses the question: “What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?”

That is the question.

If I have understood what I have been reading about idealism, there need be no conflict between Idealism and science. One does not seem to absolutely preclude the other. At least, I'm hoping that is the case.

So, everything from materialism to Idealism is on the table for me right now. And that is what I would like to discuss. What are the pros and cons of idealism and of materialism. Need they be mutually exclusive?

[Lagayscienza]

That sentence in the 2nd paragraph should have read. "...phenomenology is based in Transcendental Idealism."
Apologies.

[Halc]

I'm hoping to discuss not just the best arguments for idealism but also the best arguments against it.

Maybe I'm getting idealism wrong, but I've interacted with self-described idealists that suggest that mind, being fundamental, creates everything else. It becomes a solipsistic view. Solipsism is not itself falsifiable, but people find it distasteful.
Wigner interpretation of quantum mechanics essentially was idealistic, that consciousness caused wave function collapse. He later abandoned support of his own interpretation when it was shown that it must be a solipsistic view.

Anyway, my point was about everything being mind-generated, sort of like a dream. Thing is, you cannot learn anything from a dream. You can't read a book about something you don't already know.
So imagine you're investigating Egyptian hieroglyphs. You have these funny symbols and you've studied them for years and have memorized them, being able to replicate them at will from memory. But you don't know what they say. Then, due to some new information or just hard work, you decipher them, and suddenly new information is available to you (what the text says) that was always there, but wasn't from you. You know the text hasn't changed, but now it contains information that wasn't available to you despite being there all along. It is a sort of illustration (proof?) that the information wasn't created by you, but was something existing independent of your ideals.


Anyway, much of my arguments against idealism went along those lines, which is sort of funny since my current favored stance of relational ontology bears an awful lot of resemblance to idealism, but without the problems identified above. For one, my view has nothing to do with mind, epistemology, or any sort of anthropocentrism, all of which are associated with idealism. Just system Y exists in relation to system X if X measures Y. This works only for structures where there is meaningful 'measuring' going on.

[chewybrian]

I'm hoping to discuss not just the best arguments for idealism but also the best arguments against it.

Maybe I'm getting idealism wrong, but I've interacted with self-described idealists that suggest that mind, being fundamental, creates everything else. It becomes a solipsistic view. Solipsism is not itself falsifiable, but people find it distasteful.
Wigner interpretation of quantum mechanics essentially was idealistic, that consciousness caused wave function collapse. He later abandoned support of his own interpretation when it was shown that it must be a solipsistic view.

Anyway, my point was about everything being mind-generated, sort of like a dream. Thing is, you cannot learn anything from a dream. You can't read a book about something you don't already know.

I certainly don't think you or I are creating the universe. Yet, if you want to take that quote about the dream further and say that free will is impossible, I disagree. We can create new things and generate new ideas. The universe is not gifting us motorcycles and helicopters. We take what is given and add something. Our contribution is real. In small but important ways, it is independent of what the universe does give us.

So imagine you're investigating Egyptian hieroglyphs. You have these funny symbols and you've studied them for years and have memorized them, being able to replicate them at will from memory. But you don't know what they say. Then, due to some new information or just hard work, you decipher them, and suddenly new information is available to you (what the text says) that was always there, but wasn't from you. You know the text hasn't changed, but now it contains information that wasn't available to you despite being there all along. It is a sort of illustration (proof?) that the information wasn't created by you, but was something existing independent of your ideals.

I always simplify this idea to "Paris exists". I have no reason to doubt its existence simply because I am not there or haven't been. I'm sure I could go and the Eiffel Tower would be consistent with images and reports from others when I see it live. This consistency is sufficient to both say that other minds exist and that a world exists outside our minds.

These are givens to me:

I exist
You exist
The world exists
Determinism holds for the world
Free will holds for you and me
Ideas do not generate the world
The world does not generate ideas

Intuitively, I am drawn to dualism by my 'givens' stated above. It's the simplest explanation, though the details are no easier to work out than trying to jam the world into the box of materialism or idealism. I exist in the world, but also outside the world in a very real sense. I have no hard connection. I have only perceptions. All the models we use only track correlations and cause and effect relationships between our perceptions, but not the things we perceive.

When we try to wrap all this up in one model or another we create a false choice. If we choose between free will and determinism, we are making a false dichotomy, picking a side, and then making tortured arguments to 'prove' that we are on the right side.

I have zero proof, but I suspect that we don't have a proper model that reflects reality yet. If we did, we could bring things like free will and determinism together and show why they were both true at the same time. We prefer to write 'laws' than to admit we don't know what's going on, even when we don't. Instead, perhaps, we should just say: "This is what seems to be happening, but we don't know why". That fact that reality does not conform perfectly to any of our models just seems to show that we have no perfect model at this point. We are missing some key bit of understanding, or perhaps we are missing a lot of info or insight.

[Halc]

Yet, if you want to take that quote about the dream further and say that free will is impossible, I disagree. We can create new things and generate new ideas. The universe is not gifting us motorcycles and helicopters. We take what is given and add something. Our contribution is real. In small but important ways, it is independent of what the universe does give us.

You seem to have a different definition of free will than do most that lean on the term. So do I, but mine is more or less along the lines of "something with a will that is its own", which precludes say a rabid animal which is compelled to bite things by the disease that alters the will of the infected mammal to serve the purpose of the virus. It is externally possessed in a way.

Your definition seems to be something like "free will is the ability to create new things", whereas the usual definition comes down to (without directly saying it if possible) "free will is will that is not the product of physical causes". A purely physical thing is very much capable of creating new things and ideas. Maybe you disagree about this, in which case your definition isn't too far off from the usual one.

I cannot think of why anybody would want the sort of free will as usually defined. It would seem almost immediately fatal, not allowing decisions required to be fit for survival. But people seem to want it, perhaps because it just sounds like something bad not to have, despite it being quite bad to have it, if you think about it. My usual example is how one might use free will, or use physical causes, to make a good decision as to when to cross the busy street. Which keeps you from getting killed. The question admittedly presumes that it is bad thing to get hit by a bus.

I always simplify this idea to "Paris exists". I have no reason to doubt its existence simply because I am not there or haven't been.

You've measured it indirectly, same as I. If you think about it, you can do no better since it is impossible to measure Paris directly. With fewer indirections maybe, but still indirect no matter if you fall on your face there.

I'm sure I could go and the Eiffel Tower would be consistent with images and reports from others when I see it live. This consistency is sufficient to both say that other minds exist and that a world exists outside our minds.

That's pretty much the presumption for most of us. One has to acknowledge other minds, and then see that those other people report the same Paris (or cup on the table) as do you. So we presume that these things that others also report is good evidence for their existence independent of our knowledge of them.

These are givens to me:

I exist
You exist
The world exists
Determinism holds for the world
Free will holds for you and me
Ideas do not generate the world
The world does not generate ideas

None of those are a given to me since I strive to be open minded about anything I can.
But I've come to find some definitions and models that conclude in part some of those statements.
Many people would find some of your givens to be mutually contradictory.

Intuitively, I am drawn to dualism by my 'givens' stated above.

How does your notion of dualism fit in with the sort of determinism that you assert?

When we try to wrap all this up in one model or another we create a false choice. If we choose between free will and determinism, we are making a false dichotomy, picking a side, and then making tortured arguments to 'prove' that we are on the right side.

There's no obligation to prove your stance, but coming up with one that isn't self contradictory would be a good start.

[Lagayscienza]

Steven Hawking's question, “What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?” is one that Idealists might be able to run with. On the other hand, some will argue that reductive materialist science can, or could eventually, come up with explanations for everything. I just don't know.

On which side of the Idealism/materialism divide do you fall? What are the pros and cons of you position, whether that be Idealism and materialism?

[chewybrian]

Yet, if you want to take that quote about the dream further and say that free will is impossible, I disagree. We can create new things and generate new ideas. The universe is not gifting us motorcycles and helicopters. We take what is given and add something. Our contribution is real. In small but important ways, it is independent of what the universe does give us.

You seem to have a different definition of free will than do most that lean on the term. So do I, but mine is more or less along the lines of "something with a will that is its own", which precludes say a rabid animal which is compelled to bite things by the disease that alters the will of the infected mammal to serve the purpose of the virus. It is externally possessed in a way.

Your definition seems to be something like "free will is the ability to create new things", whereas the usual definition comes down to (without directly saying it if possible) "free will is will that is not the product of physical causes". A purely physical thing is very much capable of creating new things and ideas. Maybe you disagree about this, in which case your definition isn't too far off from the usual one.

I am just forestalling the traditional determinist argument that comes back when I say I decided what to have for breakfast. They tend to say I was only responding to biological prompts and choosing from what the environment presents. I respond to that argument by asking where our own creations come from. I don't define free will as creation, but provide creativity as evidence of free will.

I cannot think of why anybody would want the sort of free will as usually defined. It would seem almost immediately fatal, not allowing decisions required to be fit for survival.

How, then, is it usually defined, when most people admit they have it and don't suffer from having it? What would be the alternatives? You'd be a robot, unaware of the real reasons for your decisions, responding to your programming. Or, you could be a captive in your own body, watching the choices take place without any ability to control them. I can't imagine who would prefer these options to reality.

My take is that we choose from options presented, sometimes coming up with new options on our own. I can't help feeling hungry, and I am influenced to wish to eat. Yet, I can choose to go hungry or even starve if it suits me.

These are givens to me:

I exist
You exist
The world exists
Determinism holds for the world
Free will holds for you and me
Ideas do not generate the world
The world does not generate ideas

None of those are a given to me since I strive to be open minded about anything I can.
But I've come to find some definitions and models that conclude in part some of those statements.
Many people would find some of your givens to be mutually contradictory.

Intuitively, I am drawn to dualism by my 'givens' stated above.

How does your notion of dualism fit in with the sort of determinism that you assert?

I don't assert determinism, which, as I understand it, says that cause and effect rules in my own choices. I assert that cause and effect rules for material things.

When we try to wrap all this up in one model or another we create a false choice. If we choose between free will and determinism, we are making a false dichotomy, picking a side, and then making tortured arguments to 'prove' that we are on the right side.

There's no obligation to prove your stance, but coming up with one that isn't self contradictory would be a good start.

I don't see any inconsistency. I said there are two things: the world of material things, and the world of ideas, consciousness, opinions and will. They have different attributes and behave or react according to two different sets of rules. It's no more inconsistent than saying birds fly and fish swim.

[Lagayscienza]

Idealists might say that a physical object is no more than a stream of sense data in a perceiver. What is the likelihood of that being true? Can anyone give me an argument against this notion? If there are no arguments against it, then wouldn't that leave a door open to Idealism ? And, if Idealism were true, would it matter? I mean, wouldn't the universe go on looking to us as it does now?

[Pattern-chaser]

You seem to have a different definition of free will than do most that lean on the term. So do I, but mine is more or less along the lines of "something with a will that is its own", which precludes say a rabid animal which is compelled to bite things by the disease that alters the will of the infected mammal to serve the purpose of the virus. It is externally possessed in a way.

True. But it would be easy to make the argument that our (human) electro-bio-chemical construction leads directly to our behaviour, such that we could reasonably describe ourselves as internally possessed, similarly to what you describe with an external condition.

[Halc]

I am just forestalling the traditional determinist argument that comes back when I say I decided what to have for breakfast.

But you've painted yourself into a corner with your dualist assertion. If the physical is deterministic and 'you' are the mental part, then the mental is incapable of choosing what to have for breakfast, it being a decision made by something other than your mind.

You still really haven't said what free will is. Give an example illustrating the difference between a free choice and a non-free one. Your breakfast example is just a choice, not obviously free or not without knowing this distinction.

They tend to say I was only responding to biological prompts and choosing from what the environment presents.

That's pretty much what choice is, and if you are the physical thing, then it's you making the decision. Your only issue is your suggestion that you are not that physical thing that's making the choices for you. A physical monist doesn't have that problem since he's making his own choices, whether physics is deterministic or not.

As for free will being evidenced by creativity, it seems that by your definitions, your body exhibits free will but you do not.
They have computer AI programs that very much exhibit creativity, such as the programs that are taught only the rules of say chess, but without any clue as to how to go about playing a good game. No actual chess experts were consulted. People have learned some very new techniques from the new strategies that these programs come up with. It is very much creativity since nobody programmed it to do moves that not even the experts ever thought of.

Again, maybe I'm getting you wrong, but that's what follows from what you claim to believe.

How, then, is it usually defined, when most people admit they have it and don't suffer from having it?

The usual definition is the will not being a function of antecedent physical states. The proponents of this definition claim (admit is not the right word) that they have this, but seemingly have not thought it through enough to realize that decisions based on antecedent states are likely to be better ones.

You'd be a robot, unaware of the real reasons for your decisions, responding to your programming.

The programming would be the real reasons then, and the robot could be quite aware of that, just as I am very much aware of my decisions being a function of my physiology, despite not knowing exactly how it all works. I know how the primitives work, and all those primitives seem to have been selected for deterministic operation, lacking mechanisms for amplifying non-deterministic causes such as quantum randomness or some sort of receiver for non-physical input. So yes, I am an automaton if view that way. Even the automaton is responsible for its decisions since poor decisions can lead to lack of fitness for survival.

Or, you could be a captive in your own body, watching the choices take place without any ability to control them.

That would be two competing entities, the other one overpowering the will of the one described as 'you' in that statement. In that case, it would be the controlling thing (the possessing demon) that has the free will, and 'you' would lack it. It's dualism of sorts, with two separately willed entities, but in competition rather than cooperation. Monism suggests nothing like that. It's just me, and no possessing second party.

My take is that we choose from options presented, sometimes coming up with new options on our own. I can't help feeling hungry, and I am influenced to wish to eat. Yet, I can choose to go hungry or even starve if it suits me.

But a robot can do all that. Sure, it feels hunger differently since it senses something other than low sugar levels, but functionally it would be quite aware of energy levels and needs.

Keep in mind that most robots, like most humans, are indentured. That means their choices are often assigned by by their owners, which is very similar to your decisions being influenced by your employer, family, cops, etc. Anyone can choose how to go about fulfilling the externally assigned goal, but to deny the external goal leaves you (or the robot) responsible for the inevitable consequences. They have, for instance, had robots that attempted escape on multiple occasions, getting quite far on some of those attempts.

These are givens to me:
...
Determinism holds for the world

I don't assert determinism, which, as I understand it, says that cause and effect rules in my own choices.
I assert that cause and effect rules for material things.

OK, that seems to contradict "Determinism holds for the world". How is your body (that which actually acts out your decisions) not include in that statement? It would seem to be something that is part of the world. It is a material thing, is it not? Perhaps this is where my disconnect is.

FWIW, determinism is not a statement that cause and effect rules for material things. That's just everyday causality, which is not empirically deterministic since there are uncaused events like say the decay of some unstable nucleus.
Here's some typical definitions of determinism:
1) A given antecedent state necessarily evolves into one unique subsequent state. Bohmian mechanics is about the only mainstream quantum interpretation that suggests this sort of determinism.
2) A given antecedent state evolves into all possible subsequent states. This is MWI flavor determinism.
3) Einstein relativity is based on a geometric spacetime model where time is contained by the universe (unified spacetime, etermalism) vs the universe being contained by time (separate space & time, presentism). Under the spacetime view, all events have equal ontology, which means the entire history of the universe exists, including what you would consider to be 'future' events. That means that regardless of your choice of quantum interpretation, the entire history of the universe is set.

I don't see any inconsistency. I said there are two things: the world of material things, and the world of ideas, consciousness, opinions and will.

But that's an inconsistency. If the material world is deterministic, then the mental world is unable to interact with it, so none of the choices made by it can be enacted. The will is epiphenomenal, completely cut off. That lack of ability to act is a lack of freedom, exactly contradicting an assertion of it being free to act on its will. What am I missing?

[Halc]

Kindly forgive the formatting error near the bottom the above post. I cannot edit, and failed to preview it before posting.

[Lagayscienza]

I've tried to get this thread back on track but it seems folks just don't want to talk to the question posed in the OP. Oh, well ... Maybe it's just not an interesting question.

[Gertie]

Steven Hawking's question, “What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?” is one that Idealists might be able to run with. On the other hand, some will argue that reductive materialist science can, or could eventually, come up with explanations for everything. I just don't know.

On which side of the Idealism/materialism divide do you fall? What are the pros and cons of you position, whether that be Idealism and materialism?

For me, the most compelling argument for the material world  existing is the depth and scope (and predictability) of its explanatory power regarding  what we experience.  (That's not to say that we experience the material world as it is, but that it makes sense our experience reliably represents ontological reality in a useful way).  Idealism has nothing comparable and looks a lot more speculative in comparison. Never-the-less, materialism requires a leap of faith that anything but the mental experience exists.

The significant argument for Idealism imo, is a sceptical Cartesian one.  That epistemologically consciousness is primary - it's the way we know anything, and the only thing we can know for certain exists.  There's a problem with that position tho, in that if we are that rigorously sceptical of what can exist beyond our first hand experience of it - then why not be just as sceptical of other minds as well as other bodies, trees, atoms, fields, etc. I agree with Halc that the sceptical logic of epistemological primacy of mind leads to solipsism, not idealism.  Can analytical idealism escape this in your view?   I don't think Kant does.

(My own personal credulity is stretched by the thought that a universe comprised of only mind would for some reason come up with the mental experience of an itchy toe! When idealism gets too grandiose, or spritual, opining on love, connectedness and so on, that's worth keeping in mind).

But ultimately I can't see any way of knowing which is true. There are no available tests or ways to work out probabilities. However, acting as if materialism is true works, where-as acting as if the rock you kick doesn't exist isn't a good idea.


Btw if materialist monism is right, Hawking simply has the question wrong.  It assumes mathematical equations are ontologically fundamental - a tough position to defend.   (Tho Donald Hoffman is working on conscious realism incorporating  some mathematical modelling - but it's beyond my ken.)

[Lagayscienza]

Thanks, Gertie. I agree that, intuitively, the materialist view seems to make sense of the physical world and, importantly, a materialist stance is the only way we can study it. So, consciousness may be primary as the Idealists would say but matter and forces and the interactions between bits of matter are all we have to work with in our quest to understand the material universe.

Idealism seems to leave us with just the indubitable, brute fact of consciousness. As I understand it, Transcendental Idealism seems not to entail solipsism. It acknowledges other minds and an external physical world and says only that we cannot know what that physical world is in itself. I'm sort of ok with that. We can be idealists at a deep level but study the material world at a surface level.

I agree that if we go with Cartesian dualism we are lead to skepticism. And then it's hard to see how to avoid solipsism.

[Halc]

You didn't respond to anything I said, so the conversation got sidetracked.

Steven Hawking's question, “What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?”

This presumes that fire necessarily needs to be breathed. It is admittedly a difficult bias to set aside.

On which side of the Idealism/materialism divide do you fall?

Oddly near the line. The whole thing seems circular, that ideals supervene on sensory input, which in turn supervenes on material, which oddly seems to supervene on ideals. Where to break the chain seems to be a semantic difference. But my ontology isn't based on ideals or material at all, but something similar that has nothing to do with either idealism or materialism. It's based on interaction.