Objective Moral Conundrum

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GE Morton
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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by GE Morton » August 1st, 2020, 1:44 pm

Wossname wrote:
August 1st, 2020, 7:09 am

Let me start with something I think we agree on. If I am holding a plate then I may move or smash it regardless of how I came by it. You can empirically determine whether or not I am holding the plate. But if no moral consequences flow from this bare fact then what use is this knowledge for any moral theory?
Whether any moral consequences flow from it depends upon the moral theory you adopt. If that theory prohibits breaking plates, then the fact that you broke it would have moral import.

Taking something to which someone has a right --- which means he acquired it without inflicting loss or injury --- has moral import only if the moral theory you adopt prohibits inflicting losses and injuries (which it will, if the axiom of that theory mandates maximizing welfare for all agents).
It seems to me that any legal or moral consequences in the normal way of things (I know) are linked to the matter of who owns, rather than who is holding, the plate. I am not sure if you agree with this or not but I think you do. You say what matters is how the thing was acquired (it should be a righteous acquisition) and clearly stealing or theft involves inflicting a loss on the rightful owner (not righteous). I think you wish to go further and say that if there is a plate that nobody owns (ownership is not therefore an issue), and if it would cause no harm, you are free to smash it if you wish. Do I have that right?
Ownership is an issue --- you become the owner of that (previously) unowned plate by taking possession of it. You may then do as you wish with it, subject to the "do no harm" proviso, i.e., you may not smash the plate if the flying shards will injure someone.
Now we may say that you are alive and have the ability to move or smash your body if you wish.
Yes indeed.
If your body is a vessel that holds your immortal soul, and these things belong to God and by extension His representative, then His representative has claim and demands that though you can factually move or smash he alone has the right to move or smash you and you should, morally, honour that claim. If so what does your right to life amount to?
I think we covered that. This "representative's" claims are not self-evident (which is required of axioms) and there is no evidence supporting them. Hence they are baseless and can be dismissed.
So I still believe that absent an axiom, simple statements about what can be seen are morally vacuous.
I agree --- "absent an axiom" (and a moral theory derived from it).
. . . and the fact that Alfie is alive in itself confers no rights on Alfie whether or not he has harmed anyone.
You're still not getting it. That Alfie gained possession of his life without inflicting harms on anyone is the sufficient condition for his having a right to his life, per the definition of a "right," just as his having a sibling with a son or daughter is the sufficient condition for his being an "uncle," per the definition of that word. His having that right, however, has no moral significance in the absence of a moral theory.

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Angel Trismegistus
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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by Angel Trismegistus » August 1st, 2020, 4:09 pm

BertNewton wrote:
July 20th, 2020, 10:40 pm
I just read The Moral Landscape by Sam Harris and thought it was wonderful however, I wonder how he would answer this conundrum, considering that he argues for objective morality based on wellbeing:

Imagine 100 billion aliens arrive on earth, they go on a constant rampage of rape and murder. The more they rape and murder the more pleasure they get. Their pleasure far outweighs the suffering of the human race and their suffering, if stopped, would far outweigh the pleasure of the human race.

Is it wrong to stop them? Are there any objective arguments one could make to justify stopping them?
I haven't read Harris and cannot comment on how your "conundrum" may be reconciled with his argument. As it stands on its own, I find no conundrum in the alien rampage. The human race is morally justified in defending itself against attacks on its life.

As far as the question of objective morality is concerned, it seems to me that unless morality is objective in origin, it is baseless. A distinction must be drawn between morality and moral judgment. Moral judgment is subjective, but morality is objective. Morality is the principle on which moral judgment is made, the principle from which moral judgments flow.

And it seems to me that that principle is universal and objective, given in our biological drive to preserve life. In other words, the survival instinct underwrites morality, objectively and universally.

Filter that basic biological drive through 200,000 years of evolving rationality and diverse cultural contexts and you come out with a world of diverse moral judgments. But the original principle stands behind them all.

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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by Wossname » August 1st, 2020, 6:16 pm

Pattern-chaser wrote:
August 1st, 2020, 10:41 am
Pattern-chaser » Today, 3:41 pm

What are the "general principles" you refer to? They sound like scientific principles. I don't think science, and its methodology, offer anything useful to this discussion. I think we have something that is not so much a "free for all", but only a vague question whose answer is not clear or obvious. You agree that "moral questions are by their nature often messy and uncertain at times", and yet you still pursue a non-messy and certain approach to them.


I think you may be misreading me Pattern-chaser. Perhaps it is my fault. By axiom I am only suggesting a general, underlying guiding principle or assumption. An example might be “have concern for the wellbeing of conscious creatures”. A different one might be “do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law”, or again we might choose to be guided by certain religious teachings. These principles are a simple expression of subjective preferences, and we can utilise them to judge the rightness or otherwise of some action. They do not allow for any precise mathematical analysis, and I would not wish them to.

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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by Wossname » August 1st, 2020, 6:23 pm

GE Morton wrote:
August 1st, 2020, 1:44 pm
GE Morton » Today, 6:44 pm

I am trying GEM. I appreciate your patience and you are right, I am not getting it. I have no trouble accepting that the fault may be mine. If you will, one last go.

That Alfie is alive and has harmed no-one may be an objective truth.
By definition he acquired his life righteously, but it has no moral consequence in itself.

Taking something to which someone has a right --- which means he acquired it without inflicting loss or injury --- has moral import only if the moral theory you adopt prohibits inflicting losses and injuries (which it will, if the axiom of that theory mandates maximizing welfare for all agents).

But it seems to me that the claim that Alfie has a right to life does imply a moral consequence in and of itself, i.e. Alfie ought not to have his life taken away (for no good reason). Failing that, “Aflie has a right to life” seems to amount to no more than “Alfie is harmlessly alive”. Which is objective but of itself uninstructive regarding moral attitudes towards Alfie.

Again: There is a movement from an is to an ought, from fact to value.

Is = is alive and harmed no one (life righteously acquired)
Ought = ought not to have his life taken away for no good reason (right to life).

The bridge here is the axiom or theorem. But now it seems to me that the right to life does not exist absent the theorem. No theorem, no bridge, no right to life. The right to life cannot be derived logically from the simple fact that Alfie’s life was righteously acquired. Yet you seem to be saying it can (by definition) and that is what has been giving me a headache.

Again you say claims to the effect that:
"P has a right to X" --- do not depend upon any moral principles or judgments.

Are we simply saying, when we say that Alfie has a right to life, that Alfie meets conditions such that we shouldn’t kill him if our moral theorem says we shouldn’t? What if our moral theorem says otherwise?


I am happy to argue that this fact, (e.g. a righteously acquired life), in the context of this theorem, (e.g. we should have concern for the wellbeing of conscious creatures), may be judged as right or wrong in that context. And since the degree to which the axiom is self-evident is the key battleground for a moral system, this is why I like the wellbeing of conscious creatures approach raised by Gertie. It has a universal intuitive appeal, for all the reasons Gertie outlined, though that does not mean all will accept it.

But the notion of a natural right seems that it is in itself a self-evident truth, not something derived by recourse to some other moral theorem. Your argument is in line with that view. But if this means that, in consequence, it provides no moral imperative regarding how we should behave towards those holding the right, it seems to have little utility. Why not just worry about the theorem, since the notion of natural rights seems superfluous?

GE Morton
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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by GE Morton » August 1st, 2020, 9:44 pm

Wossname wrote:
August 1st, 2020, 6:23 pm

But it seems to me that the claim that Alfie has a right to life does imply a moral consequence in and of itself, i.e. Alfie ought not to have his life taken away (for no good reason). Failing that, “Aflie has a right to life” seems to amount to no more than “Alfie is harmlessly alive”. Which is objective but of itself uninstructive regarding moral attitudes towards Alfie.
Quite right; that he has that right, or any right, has no moral content in the absence of some moral theory, or principle, or premise. No "is" implies an "ought." It is true that "Alfie has a right to life" connotes a moral principle, because such propositions are always asserted to make a moral point, but the proposition doesn't logically entail, or presume, any moral principle. "Alfie ought not have his life taken away" is not entailed/implied by the proposition asserting the right; it is entailed by a moral principle you hold, i.e., "one ought not violate others' rights" (which can be derived from the axiom previously discussed).

Words take on connotations, associations, from the contexts in which the terms are commonly used, or from other properties usually possessed by things satisfying the definition of the word. But connotations are not logical entailments. E.g., being a "mother" connotes being nurturing and protective or her young, but those properties are not entailed by the definition of that word.
The bridge here is the axiom or theorem. But now it seems to me that the right to life does not exist absent the theorem. No theorem, no bridge, no right to life. The right to life cannot be derived logically from the simple fact that Alfie’s life was righteously acquired. Yet you seem to be saying it can (by definition) and that is what has been giving me a headache.
The right to life (or any right) is not "derived" from anything. It is defined to denote a certain relationship between a person and something to which has laid a claim. Saying "P has a right to X" just means, "P acquired X righteously" (i.e, without inflicting loss or injury on anyone).
Are we simply saying, when we say that Alfie has a right to life, that Alfie meets conditions such that we shouldn’t kill him if our moral theorem says we shouldn’t?
Yes. If our moral theory prohibits killing someone who meets those conditions.
What if our moral theorem says otherwise?
Then our violating that right of his would not be immoral.
I am happy to argue that this fact, (e.g. a righteously acquired life), in the context of this theorem, (e.g. we should have concern for the wellbeing of conscious creatures), may be judged as right or wrong in that context. And since the degree to which the axiom is self-evident is the key battleground for a moral system, this is why I like the wellbeing of conscious creatures approach raised by Gertie. It has a universal intuitive appeal, for all the reasons Gertie outlined, though that does not mean all will accept it.
As I said, I agree with Gertie's axiom in substance; its on the right track. But I have some quibbles with it. First, "concern" is vague; it is not clear what actions that might demand or forbid. Moreover, "concern" is an affective (emotional) state, and trying to enjoin people to enter a particular emotional state will be an exercise in futility. Moral axioms, principles, rules have to address behaviors, not emotional states. Also, it is unquantified, which makes it logically incomplete. Finally, which creatures qualify as conscious is an unsettled question.
But the notion of a natural right seems that it is in itself a self-evident truth, not something derived by recourse to some other moral theorem.
Natural rights are self-evident in the sense that it can't be plausibly denied that you acquired (say) your life or body without inflicting loss or injury on anyone (unlike the case with most property rights). But that is the same criterion, the same sufficient condition, which defines all rights. It's moral implications, however, derive from one's moral axiom, not from that definition.
But if this means that, in consequence, it provides no moral imperative regarding how we should behave towards those holding the right, it seems to have little utility. Why not just worry about the theorem, since the notion of natural rights seems superfluous?
Of course it has utility. It marks a fact about a person that has moral import, per our theory.

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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by Gertie » August 2nd, 2020, 5:02 am

woss
Sorry to take a while getting back. Conversation is inevitably disjointed on this forum for numerous reasons. There’s the time zones and domestic needs for starters. Also there is apparently, a nasty virus out there, (who knew?) so as a precautionary measure I was with a few friends yesterday assiduously trying to drown any of the little buggers which may have invaded in a liquid called “Old Speckled Hen” which comes in handy portable containers. This can result in conversation of a sublimity so exquisite that the uninitiated observer might confuse it with drunken stupidity. Back to normal now, though since the treatment seems to be working there will be more merciless drowning tonight. Also the awfully wedded wife has no great love for philosophy and will sometimes scream lovingly in my shelll-like that while I am straning my brane trying to fink grate forts I am not offering her the undying devotion that she unquestionably (unquestionably) deserves. I may like the odd argument but I sometimes know when to keep my gob shut. Besides, she is right
Life can be annoying that way :D


To have a go at summarising then. If we accept morality isn't objective, it's basically a concept humans made up, we have big probs with justifying Oughts -

1 - Is there any justifiable basis for Oughts at all, the ''All things are perissible'' problem.

2 - If we decide all things aren't permissible, can we find a justifiable universal grounding for Oughts which isn't simply a free for all based on each person's opinion/feelings.

3 - If we can, is it it possible create what amounts to a workable consensus for that grounding.

I think philosophy can address the first and second. And I've made the case for the wellbeing of conscious creatures as the appropriate and universal grounding for Oughts, in spite of morality not being objective.

The last problem, which you rightly raise because the rest is irrelevant if people aren't persuaded by such a claim, isn't something philosophy can address. It can help make the case, but you can't make people agree. Not even religious claims to morality being objectively true based in the existence of a perfectly good moral law giver can guarantee everyone's agreement and compliance.

And you are highlighting a particular problem with my claim, which is our evolved pre-disposition of ''looking after our own''. A problem which any grounding not rooted in, or congruent with, those predispositions will face.

Yep, it's a tough one. I can't even get peeps on a philosophy board to buy this as an answer to the first two. I think your post sums it up, you put it well.

One thought -

Here's why we should have hope for the world: I'm partial to Baileys myself. I thought Baileys was perfect - cream, sugar and alcohol blended together, stuck in a bottle, and available down the road at a reasonable price. Genius right. But then someone, a visionary whose name we'll never know, said ''No! We can do better! Salt!''. And now we have Salted Caramel Baileys. Worth remembering.

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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by Wossname » August 2nd, 2020, 2:37 pm

Gertie wrote:
August 2nd, 2020, 5:02 am
by Gertie » Today, 10:02 am

I am not long returned after a determined spell seeking to murder viruses. I cannot speak to the success of the enterprise but hope to have at least frightened a few of the evil blighters. Apologies if this is even less coherent than usual.

Is there a justifiable basis for oughts rather than a free for all? Well if people wish to look after their own, and I say that generally they do, then they will recognise that if this is at the expense of the “own” of others, conflict is inevitable. Consequent suffering is inevitable. If they wish to avoid this then we must find ways to treat with each other that are based on egalitarian principles and which reduce prejudicial outlooks, i.e. to properly look after our own there is a need for universally agreed principles that treat people as equals. People may or may not agree with the argument, but I would class this as an objective truth that is reflected in human history. This should help the argument find resonance, and I think it helps if it is explained clearly. Say to people, this seems to be what we are like, and this is why, do you agree that some universal agreement that resolves to treat people as equals and respects differences would be a good way forward? The “might is right” approach only has appeal to the powerful. I think many (not all) would understand the imperative.

If they do, what would these principles look like? The promotion of the welfare of conscious creatures is attractive precisely because of its universal intuitive appeal. I do agree with others that I do not think you can derive ought from is directly. We are, in the end, asking people what they would like, and what they see as the right way to treat with each other. But I do believe the principle you have outlined can be argued for with hopes of a fair degree of success. Almost everyone understands concepts like happiness and suffering and some basic concerns related to these. To improve the chances of influencing peoples’ attitudes we must engage with them on both an intellectual and emotional level. As you point out, our shared humanity can bridge many gaps. It will not be straightforward and it will meet opposition. But that is par for the course with any moral theory. But in the end, we want to look after our own.

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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by Wossname » August 2nd, 2020, 2:42 pm

GE Morton wrote:
August 1st, 2020, 9:44 pm
GE Morton » Today, 2:44 am

Thank you GEM that was very helpful.

That having a right to life does not logically entail that your life ought not to be taken away without good reason clarifies my understanding. This distinction between connotation and logical implication is interesting when applied in this area, and given the emotion the term “natural rights” seems sometimes to invoke in some people, I think many may not understand the importance of this distinction in relation to natural rights (but possibly I am misreading matters here and the confusion is all mine).

Re my use of “concern”, that is just carelessness on my part. The argument is that we should seek to promote welfare, not just be concerned about it. How we do that is clearly a major area for discussion and one Gertie is fully aware of.

I will ask this in relation to my final point:

But if this means that, in consequence, it provides no moral imperative regarding how we should behave towards those holding the right, it seems to have little utility. Why not just worry about the theorem, since the notion of natural rights seems superfluous?
Of course it has utility. It marks a fact about a person that has moral import, per our theory.



Are we, then, flagging an issue of perceived importance? What I am asking here is that, if our axiom is that we should seek to promote the welfare of conscious creatures, what of any great import is added by this notion of natural rights? Does it entail any thinking beyond the thinking we would normally do when seeking to interpret and apply the axiom?

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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by Gertie » August 2nd, 2020, 3:20 pm

I do agree with others that I do not think you can derive ought from is directly.
Not sure what you mean by ''directly'', but if you accept that Oughts matter, that the concept of morality is something worth keeping even if it has no independant, 'objective' existence, then you can ask why it matters, and come to a conclusion. Which you can use as your foundation for morality. This is the thinking afresh I've mentioned.

You can derive Oughts that way, from the Is of the qualiative 'what it's like' nature of consciousness, as I've tried to demonstrate. And I have argued that this is the appropriate way to think about Oughts in the absence of an 'objective' morality independantly existing for us to discover.

How it is sold, normalised, is a complicated practical matter which psychologists, sociologists, social contract theorists and wotnot will have better ideas about than me. The ingrained neurological bias of care towards me and mine isn't easily overcome by abstract coneptualised thinking as you say, but there are arguments and techniques available at an institutional level. In our private/domestic lives, prioritising me and mine seems to work pretty well within family and friend groups.

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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by GE Morton » August 2nd, 2020, 6:41 pm

Wossname wrote:
August 2nd, 2020, 2:42 pm

But if this means that, in consequence, it provides no moral imperative regarding how we should behave towards those holding the right, it seems to have little utility. Why not just worry about the theorem, since the notion of natural rights seems superfluous?

Of course it has utility. It marks a fact about a person that has moral import, per our theory.


Are we, then, flagging an issue of perceived importance? What I am asking here is that, if our axiom is that we should seek to promote the welfare of conscious creatures, what of any great import is added by this notion of natural rights? Does it entail any thinking beyond the thinking we would normally do when seeking to interpret and apply the axiom?
Violation of any right conflicts with the axiom, at least prima facie.* The term "natural rights" only serves to further mark some rights as particularly immune from challenge. Anyone may challenge my claimed right to, say, my car (by claiming I stole it from him), but I could not possibly have stolen my body from anyone.

* Rights violations are sometimes justified. We violate a murderer's natural right to liberty by jailing him. But that violation is justified. A moral theory must spell out under which circumstances violating a right may be justified. I.e., it must include a theory of justification.

GE Morton
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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by GE Morton » August 2nd, 2020, 7:02 pm

Gertie wrote:
August 2nd, 2020, 3:20 pm

Not sure what you mean by ''directly'', but if you accept that Oughts matter, that the concept of morality is something worth keeping even if it has no independant, 'objective' existence, then you can ask why it matters, and come to a conclusion. Which you can use as your foundation for morality. This is the thinking afresh I've mentioned.
You rely pretty heavily on this notion of "mattering." I share the sentiment, but the concept is problematic. It seems to be, essentially, a synonym for "has intrinsic value." If so, it's subject to the same difficulties that beset the latter. "Value" is not a property of things; it is relation between a person and a thing. Propositions asserting values are non-cognitive unless a valuer is specified, or at least presumed. E.g., "X has value V" is non-cognitive (it has no determinable truth value). To be cognitive it must have the form, "X has value V to P," where P is some moral agent. The same holds, I think, for "mattering." "X matters" is non-cognitive; you'd have to spell out TO WHOM X matters for the proposition to be cognitive. And as with values, X will matter more to some than to others, and not at all to still others. I.e., what matters, like what values things have, is subjective and idiosyncratic.

There is a way around this, however --- just be sure the theory takes this fact into account.

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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by Gertie » August 3rd, 2020, 6:27 am

Article on Goldstein's essay on Mattering and Mattering Maps

https://fs.blog/2016/04/rebecca-goldstein-matter/

I don't see it exactly this way, but she's put her finger on something crucial imo. And it acknowledges that while we share similar basic needs and drives, what matters to me won't be identical to what matters to you.

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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by Wossname » August 3rd, 2020, 6:36 am

Gertie wrote:
August 2nd, 2020, 3:20 pm
Gertie » Yesterday, 8:20 pm

I do agree with others that I do not think you can derive ought from is directly.
Not sure what you mean by ''directly'',

Never a good idea to engage in philosophy after a spell of determined virus murdering.

I am not saying anything new but I will reiterate some things for clarity, and explain the “directly” in my statement. A reason I think Oughts are not derived directly from Is is because of people like Ganghis Khan who I referred to earlier as an example.

I agree with you that morality is concerned with the subjective experiences of conscious creatures. No subjective experience no moral issue. What we do to others matters to them and so we can ask in the light of that knowledge whether an action is morally right or wrong. In your words “conscious subjects are the source and need for morality.” I agree.

But if I am Genghis Khan or somesuch. I understand well enough about suffering, pleasure, subjective experience etc. and I believe that what this means is that I should maximise the wellbeing of my own. Life is a vicious struggle and I want my own to suffer least and the suffering of others may matter to them but does not matter to me. I will sweep across the steppe burning and murdering because it is my own tribe that concerns me, others are not seen as worth consideration. I understand their suffering but am content with it. That was a value judgement. Basic racism. How deal with Genghis? Give him an objective argument. Narrow self-promotion of your own inevitably causes conflict. You won’t always win, your own will be harmed, it is sensible to come to an alternative arrangement. This is an argument for enlightened self-interest. If you care for your own you should have some care for me or your own will suffer. A tough sell to the powerful who may feel little threat and happily opt for might is right. Of course, in the age of nuclear weapons, conflict means we may likely all lose.

So here is a value judgement: “All may suffer and in the light of that knowledge I ought to minimise the suffering of and promote the wellbeing of my loved ones/tribe, since these are the people who matter to me, who show concern for me, and who I feel a sense of duty and loyalty to.”

Here is a different value judgement: “All may suffer, suffering is bad, so in the light of that understanding we ought to minimise the suffering and promote the wellbeing of all.”

We have a universal principle or a more parochial one. They are both concepts of morality that recognise the nature of subjective experience. The parochial view is reflected in the history of human conflict. The universal one offers hope for a better future. Still, we can know about the suffering of others with a sense of mild regret but not really care much about it and so in practice do little to prevent it. How to foster caring? It must be addressed on an emotional level (foster empathy, identification with the sufferer) as well as the cognitive level. And we have discussed matters here.

It is a tall task though. And a taller task across species, something I recognise matters to you. We can more readily understand that other people are like us and their needs are fundamentally similar to ours. Their conscious experience is, perhaps, in some sense the equivalent of ours. So interests should be equally weighed a la Singer. Failure to do this reflects a prejudice. People can fairly easily get this. But speciesism is not such an easy prejudice to convince people of, or at any rate, to convince them to care that it is wrong. Like Genghis Khan, they understand about suffering, but not everyone’s suffering is seen as worthy of equal consideration.

So some people may argue that animals eat other animals, it is just nature. I am not sure we would argue that people kill other people and allow this as a justification for murder. And if a lion kills a zebra for food then it has little choice. But humans do have a choice and morality is only relevant to choices. Was this choice morally right? If no choice was involved then there is little point in arguing the morality of the action. If only humans can make such choices maybe only humans can be truly wicked. What other animals do is therefore irrelevant. Still it is hard to refer to ourselves, who are biologically designed to be omnivores, and argue that we are wicked for acting according to our nature. But then we are naturally programmed to look after our own, and have done much wickedness as a consequence of that.

We can’t easily argue enlightened self-interest, since we are top of the food chain. Were we at risk from beings higher up the chain who we could argue with, we would doubtless be pushing for acceptance of some universal principle. I believe the concepts of suffering are intuitively intelligible. There are increasing numbers of vegetarians and vegans and this supports such a view. Just where are the general boundaries of human caring? I do not know but they do not seem fixed. There are arguments to be had. There is another thread just started on our treatment of other living things and it may be instructive. I expect a few Genghis Khans.

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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by Belindi » August 3rd, 2020, 3:35 pm

But we may presume Ghengis Khan knew nothing of how all living beings interact with each other. The fact is the natural environment concerns all peoples everywhere. The fact is poor nations affect the futures of all nations. Another fact is poverty of some is a drain on all within the nation concerned. Ghnengis Khan, and Hitler , were unaware of the practical benefit of universality as opposed to tribalism.

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Re: Objective Moral Conundrum

Post by Sculptor1 » August 3rd, 2020, 4:53 pm

Belindi wrote:
August 3rd, 2020, 3:35 pm
But we may presume Ghengis Khan knew nothing of how all living beings interact with each other. The fact is the natural environment concerns all peoples everywhere. The fact is poor nations affect the futures of all nations. Another fact is poverty of some is a drain on all within the nation concerned. Ghnengis Khan, and Hitler , were unaware of the practical benefit of universality as opposed to tribalism.
There is a big difference between Hitler and Genghis Khan.
The Kahn's legacy had a massively unifying effect on the nations he conquered, and left a lasting superstructure to each of those societies.
As far as I can see Hitler's effect was wholly negative.

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