The Role of Explanation in Morality

[Lagayscienza]

Cheers, Aristocles.

Maybe you're right. Maybe words are inadequate to explain morality. If the problem had a solution you'd think we'd be closer to solving it after more than 2000 years of thinking about it. But even a cursory reading of the literature or a look at the entry under METAETHICS in the Stanford Encyclopedea of Philosophy shows that professional philosophers are still arguing about even the most foundational questions such as whether moral properties such as goodness and evil are in some sense real, whether we can be right or wrong on moral issues, whether moral claims are expressing facts or just expressing how we feel about an issue and in so doing trying to persuade others...

I'm still in two minds on whether cognitivism or non-cognitivism is is better at explaining what we are doing when we make moral judgement and when we make moral assertions. Both cognitivism and non-cognitivism have their merits but there are also problems with both. I'm naturally inclined to a realist view of morality but, apart from the semantic thesis, there does not seem to be a lot of positive evidence to support it.

I wish the subject would leave me alone. It's giving me a headache.

[Aristocles]

Thank you Lagayscienza.

I am actually trying to mitigate the headache, so tell me if I am actually furthering it.

Our conventions appear to have a utility, but also a great hindrance. This begins as we become aware of the conventions and this awareness may be a helpful future thread to clarify how deeply ingrained a sense of numbers, colors, words, etc. eventually prevents clear thought, especially as it relates to our concepts of reality and our relationships with others.

But, more to the last 2000 years and the attempts at intellectual philosophical clarity, I am seeing a great deal of "philosophic" bureaucracy. The system lends itself to perpetuating itself as opposed to accomplishing more important things. To prove this, we can look at any forum thread and see the consequent confusion in the processing. Or, as you mention, we could see the very concept of METAETHICS has much ink wrestling, but leaving us on shaky foundation.

The two seeming worlds of cognitivism/non-cognitivism furthers the pedagogy of bifurcating "things" so as to further understanding. I maintain that this intellectual dissection often leads to the rest of the forest being overlooked. Perhaps our seeming finite capacities just need to find a better balance.

As far as the understanding of goodness you mention, and admittedly my main thesis of understanding, I would think examples are helpful, as it appears we both agree the concept is rather daunting to put into words, so much so, I argue it is overlooked at the expense of lessening human behavior. I do still think our words can further understanding, and lack of understanding is indeed the culprit for bad things. If you would agree to an example, then I only ask that you give that single example the resolve you have shown in this thread. In other words, adding other examples before pushing the agreed example to a better place of understanding would be inconsistent with the clearer understanding we both seek.

In determining an example, I would be in agreement of any. However, I would ask for an attempt to keep it simple at first, knowing it will be parsed ad nauseam. If we (all parties of interest in the forum) come to an agreement regarding the best decision with the given single example scenario, then we would move on to another, perhaps more and more complicated examples would be helpful. I will be hesitant to further examples until all the antagonists state their cases and get an agreed upon appropriate response to one singular example, at least as singular as we can present an example.