Frost wrote: ↑
January 27th, 2018, 12:03 pm
You keep trying to change the statement. The statement was that vanilla tastes better than chocolate. NOT x
states that vanilla tastes better than chocolate,
Then who made the statement?
NOT x prefers vanilla over chocolate, or whatever permutation you want to attempt. You are attempting to alter the logical structure of the statement from an expressive illocutionary act to an assertive illocutionary act and then use that mistake to question the distinction I made for epistemic subjectivity.
It cannot be an expressive illocutionary act, because such acts are a response to a proposition, and we haven't had a proposition. An expressive illocutionary act would be if somebody had already
said 'vanilla tastes better than chocolate' and then a second person responded 'terrific!' or 'yuk' i.e. indicated their emotional state towards the proposition.
But any tenuous connection this exchange might have once had to the OP has long been lost.
Me: No, I have never been 'aware of intentionality'. What does intentionality look like? What does it weigh?
'Intentionality' is not what you think. One can have 'intentionality' towards God and love and pain as well as mountains.
Are you kidding me? Read up on Intentionality before asking such nonsensical questions. You will need to understand Intentionality to understand this distinction.
Anyone who is interested in the term can Google it and make up their own minds.
I think you are going to start using 'intentionality' in the same way as 'epistemically' and 'praxeology' , as though it is an answer rather than the name of a type of problem.
It is as if somebody submitted a question about a work of art and I justified my own opinion by declaring it was 'aesthetic'.
Back to the topic:
Well that was a non sequitur. Consciousness I guess has no biological function because it's not a chemical. Nevermind the fact that it is a biological phenomena that evolved. It evolved but it has no function! Amazing. Sounds like magic to me.
Did I actually say that? Are you quoting me? No! It is not a good sign when you need to start re-writing the other persons posts in order to make your point.
1) You say human consciousness is a biological function. The leaves of plants also have a biological function. Both 'biological functions'. So, if you treat humans differently from plants, it cannot be because consciousness is a biological function. It is saying 'some biological functions are more equal than others
' which is a value judgement.
2) Human consciousness does not have a specific
function. To say 'X is conscious'
does not mean 'X should not be having so much sex'.
because X's consciousness might be telling them the exact opposite.
Me: Praxeology studies purposeful behaviour. It does not tell us what that purpose should be. It does not tell us we should not have too much sex.
Who said that? Praxeology is a logical analysis. The teleology of biological function provides the basis for epistemically valid moral judgments.
That some young women have too much sex is one of the only two examples of moral judgments you have mentioned so far.
What is the 'biological function' of young women? Suppose they decide they would rather have a different function to the one you think they ought to have?
Me: Normal languages do not have a logical structure. Even if they did, why would we be bound to behave in a particular way just because that was the way our language was constructed?
Wow. I don't even know what to say to this. You need to learn some basic philosophy of language. Add that to the list of basic epistemology and Intentionality. I'm not going to hold your hand and try to walk you through all these. I'm starting to see that there is no point in attempting to explain an epistemically objective morality when you don't have the basic philosophical foundation necessary for the discussion.
Ah, the 'argument from authority'!
Except the reason you need to keep throwing in all these words is that you are bluffing, whereas I really have studied the philosophy of language. Through Frege and Russell and Wittgenstein and the rest there have been attempts to reconcile language to logic, or construct a 'logical language'. There are many problems, not least in that words to not refer in a simple way. In logic, we can clearly distinguish terms like 'X' which have a simple T/F value, from the relationships like 'and', 'or' etc. which connect them. We cannot do that even with simple names.
And again, you dodge the point. Let us say that the structure of language was logical in the same way as a piece of formal logic is logical. What on earth would that have to do with ethics? However closely I analyse the syntax of the sentence 'Don't have sex before marriage
' that would not tell me 'logically' it is moral to be celibate.