If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

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Fooloso4
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by Fooloso4 »

GE Morton:
None of that contradicts what I said in the quote above (read the quote again, carefully).
Empathy does not require putting yourself in someone else’s shoes or analytical steps, although those who are not strongly empathetic may become more empathetic in this way. It is biochemical not a rational process. That is why we find it in other mammals who are not capable of putting themselves in someone else’s shoes or taking analytical steps.
Churchland seems not to grasp the difference between morality (as understood by philosophers) and sociology/evolutionary psychology.
Her understanding of morality is much broader than those philosophers (and by no means is the all philosophers) who understand morality as rational rule making.
We all know that not everyone plays by the rules and that my playing by the rules is not going to change that. If I am at a disadvantage by playing by the rules when others don’t then I may decide not play by them either, because if I do that would be bad for me.
I agree.
But you said:
But they will conclude that breaking that rule is bad because they can grasp the consequences if it were disregarded universally. I.e., "I must do unto others as I would have them do unto me. Because if I don't, then neither will they, and that would be bad for me."
What I grasp is that my obeying or breaking the rule not to inflict pain and suffering has no universal consequences. My reasons for not harming others has nothing to do with rules or imagined universal consequences.
GE Morton
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by GE Morton »

Fooloso4 wrote: November 11th, 2018, 5:42 pm
Empathy does not require putting yourself in someone else’s shoes or analytical steps, although those who are not strongly empathetic may become more empathetic in this way. It is biochemical not a rational process.
I agree. I said that the process may occur subconsciously.
Her understanding of morality is much broader than those philosophers (and by no means is the all philosophers) who understand morality as rational rule making.
No, it is not broader. It is mistaken. She ignores the is-ought gap, and confuses biological imperatives and conditioned responses with morality. An act prompted by an instinctive or intuitive response to a situation may or may not be moral, and whether or not it is cannot be answered by analysis of brain biochemistry or neural circuits. Her view of morality is an example of the "naturalistic fallacy."

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog ... must-avoid
What I grasp is that my obeying or breaking the rule not to inflict pain and suffering has no universal consequences. My reasons for not harming others has nothing to do with rules or imagined universal consequences.
It must be based on some reasons if it is to count as a moral decision at all. Reasons are rational grounds for a belief or an act, the results of reflection, of weighing relevant factors. An emotional reaction may explain an act, but it cannot morally justify it.
GE Morton
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by GE Morton »

Fooloso . . .
GE Morton wrote: November 11th, 2018, 8:44 pm An emotional reaction may explain an act, but it cannot morally justify it.
That is why "crimes of passion" are treated differently than premeditated homicides. The former is an unreasoned response to a provocative situation. But though no evil intent preceded the crime, the agent is duty-bound to control his passions by subjecting them to reasoned reflection.
GE Morton
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by GE Morton »

Hereandnow wrote: November 11th, 2018, 3:24 am
But the ought from an is, now this is to the point. I am a moral realist, or an ethical objectivist. There are other names for this, I am sure. I explain above what I mean by this, in a fast and loose sort of way, but pretty accurate I think: Pain is what I will call a quasi fact, or a "queer" fact (a borrowed term from John Mackie). Now, Wittgenstein stated that in a book of all possible facts, some hypothetical all encompassing compendium, the fact of pain would be included, but the badness of pain, the moral dimension of pain, would not, for such a thing cannot be witnessed (this is how I take it). I disagree.
Well, if the "badness" of pain (or of anything else) is a "fact," i.e., expressible by a proposition such as, "Pain is bad," and if that proposition is to be cognitive, then there must be some understood procedure, universally acknowledged, for determining whether it is true or false. I know of no such procedure. There are procedures for determining the truth or falsity of some related propositions. E.g., "Alfie considers pain to himself to be bad," or, "Alfie considers pain to Bruno to be good." We can verify or falsify the latter two by observing Alfie's behavior. How do we verify/falsify the former? What observations or deductions will answer that question? If there are none, then it is a mistake, a misuse of the term, to characterize "Pain is bad" as a "fact." It is a non-cognitive proposition.
To me the matter is simple, if unpopular: pain (value) possesses a non natural quality which is moral "badness". The awkwardness of the term shows how unfamiliar it is, given that such a thing is generally just freighted along with god and religion, and these stigmatize the genuine absoluteness of what is plain and simple. All one need do is observe the pain of the spear in one's kidney and understand that there is something there, something sui generis in the pain. The objection of is vs ought is a red herring that obscures the obvious.
To say that something is "bad" simply means that some agent considers it unpleasant, or undesireable, and would seek to avoid it or to be rid of it. Similarly, to say that something is "good" means that an agent desires it and would seek to obtain or retain it. Goodness and badness are pseudo-properties imputed to things by agents, and are idiosyncratic; they are subjective and relative to agents. That Alfie is in pain is a fact; that the pain is bad is a subjective evaluation of that fact which varies with the agents doing the evaluating.

Moreover, neither the judgment that Alfie's pain is bad, or that it is good, has, in itself, any moral implications. Nor do any other values. What does have a moral implication is the fact that Alfie considers the pain to be bad, and the fact that it reduces his welfare.
Given that the pain hurts and that hurting is grounded absolutely then one is eo ipso bound to not hurting others.
Surely you can see that is a non sequitur:

1. Pain hurts (true by definition).

2. Therefore I must not inflict pain on Bruno.

The conclusion makes undefended assumptions and contains terms not found in the premise.
Fooloso4
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by Fooloso4 »

GE Morton:
Empathy does not require putting yourself in someone else’s shoes or analytical steps, although those who are not strongly empathetic may become more empathetic in this way. It is biochemical not a rational process.
I agree. I said that the process may occur subconsciously.
A deduction, putting yourself in someone else’s shoes, and analytical steps are rational processes. Whether or not they are subconscious they are not a pre-rational biochemical processes.
No, it is not broader. It is mistaken. She ignores the is-ought gap, and confuses biological imperatives and conditioned responses with morality.
If human beings were not social animals who care about others there would be little or no concern about what one ought to do. Our concern for others is not reducible to self-preservation. To think they are is the moral equivalence of being tone deaf.
An act prompted by an instinctive or intuitive response to a situation may or may not be moral, and whether or not it is cannot be answered by analysis of brain biochemistry or neural circuits.
Churchland points to both biology and culture. Our biology does not determine our morality, but is an ineliminable factor, our ability to reason, deliberate, and change is the other ineliminable factor.
It must be based on some reasons if it is to count as a moral decision at all.
You’ve got it half right, but morality is not a logic puzzle. We desire our own well being and the well being of others. Such desire is prior to rather than the result of reason. Reason is put in the service of our desire to live a good life.
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Hereandnow
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by Hereandnow »

GE Morton
Well, if the "badness" of pain (or of anything else) is a "fact," i.e., expressible by a proposition such as, "Pain is bad," and if that proposition is to be cognitive, then there must be some understood procedure, universally acknowledged, for determining whether it is true or false. I know of no such procedure. There are procedures for determining the truth or falsity of some related propositions. E.g., "Alfie considers pain to himself to be bad," or, "Alfie considers pain to Bruno to be good." We can verify or falsify the latter two by observing Alfie's behavior. How do we verify/falsify the former? What observations or deductions will answer that question? If there are none, then it is a mistake, a misuse of the term, to characterize "Pain is bad" as a "fact." It is a non-cognitive proposition.
You look to verification. The assumption that x is an absolute makes x self verifying and therefore coercive to cognition, just as a mathematical idea is. What is the nature of cognition's acknowledgment of the apodicticity in the proposition 'pain is bad'? You seem to want to relativize pain's moral badness to judgment that can go either way, that is, Bruno may just like the pain and this compromises the universality of the badness of the pain. Of course, you are right to say that if the pain were immediately recognized as bad by the agent receiving it there is no problem with verification: it is self verifying, intuited as bad.
First, it is admitted that pain in-the-world is a complicated thing. What does one do with a masochist's pain and the badness ascribed to it? But I don't think this is a refutation of the universality of the moral badness of pain. The judgment and the pain are one and the same, or, if attestation of the pain being bad is genuine then it is an authentic case of true suffering. Pain is not, after all, bad if acknowledged as good, and while I would like to say that such cases are rare, I think lived experience is filled with such ambiguities, and I think many are so ambiguous one can hardly discern good from bad. Ambivalence is the mark of truly being a social creature. But none of this affects, call it, absolute badness, in the world. Apply a lighted match to your finger and there it is. Apply it to Stalin's finger and you could say he deserves it, but this has no bearing of the nature of pain qua pain.
The verification you seek in the pudding. And to verify the suffering in another is to simply infer based what you witness in the other's visible communications. You could be wrong about this, interpret badly, but so what?
To say that something is "bad" simply means that some agent considers it unpleasant, or undesireable, and would seek to avoid it or to be rid of it. Similarly, to say that something is "good" means that an agent desires it and would seek to obtain or retain it. Goodness and badness are pseudo-properties imputed to things by agents, and are idiosyncratic; they are subjective and relative to agents. That Alfie is in pain is a fact; that the pain is bad is a subjective evaluation of that fact which varies with the agents doing the evaluating.

Moreover, neither the judgment that Alfie's pain is bad, or that it is good, has, in itself, any moral implications. Nor do any other values. What does have a moral implication is the fact that Alfie considers the pain to be bad, and the fact that it reduces his welfare.
Te trouble you have with my thoughts on this is that you refuse to allow for an absolute to be an absolute. If you accept this, at least hypothetically, then the logic clears up. All you do above is posit what conditions would be if there were no such thing as absolute badness, and you
are right: pain would be localized, contextualized, placed against a background of circumstances. Such a thing would be contingent, as in the proposition "this knife is good because it is sharp". Well, the goodness of the sharpness depends entirely on what you want the knife for. It is not an absolute indication of a good knife; you could be doing Macbeth and want it dull.

But absolutes are very different things. If it is there, it is bad regardless of the conditions that apply. It is inherently bad. Posit the pain and you posit the badness. Subjective? What does this matter save for verification, which is incidental?
Surely you can see that is a non sequitur:

1. Pain hurts (true by definition).

2. Therefore I must not inflict pain on Bruno.

The conclusion makes undefended assumptions and contains terms not found in the premise.

Not a non sequitur. The defense of the assumption lies with the positing of the the "hurting" itself. It is inherently bad. always, already.
GE Morton
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by GE Morton »

Fooloso4 wrote: November 11th, 2018, 9:53 pm
If human beings were not social animals who care about others there would be little or no concern about what one ought to do.
Of course there would be. And, in fact, in civilized societies most people do not care about most others. Indeed, that is the precise reason moral rules, and laws, are needed.

Humans, like all primates, are social animals. Until about 10,000 years ago all humans, like most other primates, lived in small tribal communities consisting of a few dozen to a few hundred members. Their members had personal relationships with all other members; they were bonded by kinship, shared personal histories, and a common set of beliefs, traditions, and lifestyles --- all of which elicit and foster empathy.

But civilized societies are "societies of strangers." Their members have no natural bonds, no shared personal histories, no common religion, lifestyles, or interests, no overriding concern for one another's welfare, and no a priori obligations to one another. As Jared Diamond noted, "With the rise of chiefdoms 8000 years ago people had to learn, for the first time in history, how to encounter strangers regularly without trying to kill them."

The bonds that unify tribal societies cannot form in civilized societies with many thousands or millions of members; the required personal interactions cannot occur, and the personal regard of tribal members for one another cannot develop. Hence the need for formal mechanisms of behavioral control --- moral rules and laws.

But of course there would be concern about what one ought to do. Though they do not recognize everyone in their societies as "brothers," they do appreciate the advantages of living in a large society, which are primarily economic --- opportunities for cooperation and the division of labor. Empathy and fellow-feeling cannot be relied upon to secure those advantages; some explicit rules of interaction must be developed and reasonably well enforced.
An act prompted by an instinctive or intuitive response to a situation may or may not be moral, and whether or not it is cannot be answered by analysis of brain biochemistry or neural circuits.
Churchland points to both biology and culture. Our biology does not determine our morality, but is an ineliminable factor, our ability to reason, deliberate, and change is the other ineliminable factor.
Our biology has nothing to do with our morality, other than through giving us a brain with which to figure one out.
You’ve got it half right, but morality is not a logic puzzle. We desire our own well being and the well being of others.
We all desire our own well-being, but for most that desire extends only to certain others. For the rest most harbor neither animosity nor affection.
Fooloso4
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by Fooloso4 »

GE Morton:
We all desire our own well-being, but for most that desire extends only to certain others. For the rest most harbor neither animosity nor affection.
There is ample evidence to the contrary. Humanitarian aid in response to natural disaster, charity, doctors without borders, as well as countless cases in which strangers help others. You may disagree but many see social welfare programs and universal health care as moral obligations.

Why should we follow moral rules? The idea that we do so out of self interest or advantage does not hold up under examination. I may have an interest in others following the rules but that does not explain why I would want to follow them, especially if my violating those rules would go undetected. I do not inflict pain and suffering on strangers in secret because there are moral rules that say I shouldn’t.
GE Morton
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by GE Morton »

Fooloso4 wrote: November 12th, 2018, 10:45 am
There is ample evidence to the contrary. Humanitarian aid in response to natural disaster, charity, doctors without borders, as well as countless cases in which strangers help others.
Those are not evidence to the contrary. The question is not whether some people are charitable and feel empathy with strangers, but whether those attitudes and feelings can serve as the basis for a moral code. People donate to charities for many reasons --- because they have a personal interest in the cause (such as a family whose child has died of leukemia donating to a cancer fund), because their religion commands them to do so, because they believe it will enhance their status within their peer group, because it will give them a tax break, or because they feel genuine empathy with the victims. In any case, the number who so donate, for any of those reasons, is but a fraction of the population. The total amount of charitable giving in 2016 amounted to 2.1% of GDP, and about a third of that was donations to one's church.

https://www.charitynavigator.org/index. ... ew&cpid=42

As I've pointed out several times, empathy varies enormously from person to person, in its strength in relation to other personal interests, and in its targets. Alfie may rush to the aid of a mugging victim, while Bruno chooses "not to become involved." Chauncey may donate to a fund battling malaria in Africa, while Dudley donates to an animal welfare organization and Egbert prefers to save up to launch a business. But a moral code must be universal, and be based on facts universally true, at least within a given society. Empathetic feelings do not satisfy those criteria.
Why should we follow moral rules? The idea that we do so out of self interest or advantage does not hold up under examination. I may have an interest in others following the rules but that does not explain why I would want to follow them, especially if my violating those rules would go undetected. I do not inflict pain and suffering on strangers in secret because there are moral rules that say I shouldn’t.
You may not, but many others do. The prisons are full of them.
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by Eduk »

Why should we follow moral rules? The idea that we do so out of self interest or advantage does not hold up under examination. I may have an interest in others following the rules but that does not explain why I would want to follow them, especially if my violating those rules would go undetected. I do not inflict pain and suffering on strangers in secret because there are moral rules that say I shouldn’t.
I don't inflict pain and suffering on strangers in secret because I don't want to. I want everyone to be successful and live happy and rich lives full of contentment. I want my child to grow up happy and safe in a good world full of good people. I have empathy. I have logic. I even have a little altruism. Personally I wouldn't want to be around anyone who was moral due to some rules as that kind of person is terrifying to me, all it takes is someone to change the rules and a previously much loved and trusted friend would do unspeakable things to me in secret. Certainly not a world I would choose to live in.
You have everything back to front. You don't decide to be moral. You don't choose to be moral. Being moral is of great existential benefit but that is not why you are moral.
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by Eduk »

Being moral is of great existential benefit but that is not why you are moral.
Oh sorry this is somewhat confusing. The existential benefit is why you are more likely to be moral than not due to natural selection but it's not a choice.
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GE Morton
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by GE Morton »

Hereandnow wrote: November 11th, 2018, 11:08 pm
You look to verification. The assumption that x is an absolute makes x self verifying and therefore coercive to cognition, just as a mathematical idea is. What is the nature of cognition's acknowledgment of the apodicticity in the proposition 'pain is bad'?
"Pain is bad" is not an apodictic truth; it is not even cognitive. "Alfie considers pain to be bad" and "Most people consider pain to be bad" may be true, and we can confirm (or disconfirm) those by observing the agents' behaviors.
Of course, you are right to say that if the pain were immediately recognized as bad by the agent receiving it there is no problem with verification: it is self verifying, intuited as bad.
There is no "recognizing" it to be bad. There is no "badness" property to recognize. There is only a judgment that it is bad --- a judgment that will differ from agent to agent.
First, it is admitted that pain in-the-world is a complicated thing. What does one do with a masochist's pain and the badness ascribed to it? But I don't think this is a refutation of the universality of the moral badness of pain.
Of course it is.
But none of this affects, call it, absolute badness, in the world. Apply a lighted match to your finger and there it is. Apply it to Stalin's finger and you could say he deserves it, but this has no bearing of the nature of pain qua pain.
There what is? What is there is only the pain; there is no "badness" property in addition to be apprehended. But I may deem it to be bad, and thereafter seek to avoid it.
And to verify the suffering in another is to simply infer based what you witness in the other's visible communications. You could be wrong about this, interpret badly, but so what?
I can infer another's suffering inductively by observing his behavior. If that behavior includes efforts by him to relieve or escape the suffering I can also conclude that he considers the suffering to be bad.
The trouble you have with my thoughts on this is that you refuse to allow for an absolute to be an absolute.
I'm not sure what you're claiming there, what you mean by an "absolute." Are you claiming that "pain is bad" is a necessary truth? That the proposition is a tautology? It obviously is not, as the terms are not interdefined and the example of the masochist makes clear.
If you accept this, at least hypothetically, then the logic clears up.
Perhaps it would. But I cannot accept that, since the proposition "Pain is bad" is cognitively meaningless.
If it is there, it is bad regardless of the conditions that apply. It is inherently bad. Posit the pain and you posit the badness. Subjective? What does this matter save for verification, which is incidental?
Well, if whether something is bad is subjective then it cannot be inherent to the thing. Those two claims (that a property of something is subjective and inherent) are contradictory.

Nothing is inherently bad or good. Those are both pseudo-properties of things attributed to them by agents, valuers. And which property is assigned to which things varies from agent to agent.
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by GE Morton »

Eduk wrote: November 12th, 2018, 12:55 pm You don't decide to be moral. You don't choose to be moral. Being moral is of great existential benefit but that is not why you are moral.
Well, if that is true then it would instantly render all the moral puzzles and dilemmas posed by philosophers, and the moral challenges most people face from time to time, moot.
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by Eduk »

Well, if that is true then it would instantly render all the moral puzzles and dilemmas posed by philosophers, and the moral challenges most people face from time to time, moot.
Yes and no. Firstly logic is still of benefit to someone who desires to be moral. Many real world scenarios are complex and ambiguous. A system is still of great use. For example do unto others as you would wish they do unto you is a great heuristic tool.
Secondly many moral puzzles posed by philosophers are moot and quite often nothing to do with morality. For example some people claim that reading instructions and obeying those instructions is moral but all those people are wrong to do so.
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Fooloso4
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Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?

Post by Fooloso4 »

GE Morton:
Those are not evidence to the contrary. The question is not whether some people are charitable and feel empathy with strangers, but whether those attitudes and feelings can serve as the basis for a moral code.
It is evidence that contrary to what you say people are not indifferent to the plight of others. It is evidence that we do not act exclusively out of self interest or some abstract notion of universal consequences of everyone doing something harmful to others. A moral code in and of itself is useless if people did not have the desire to do what is good. The desire itself is not sufficient but neither is the code. As I have said repeatedly, moral deliberation is necessary. But you ignore this and argue as if the inclusion of empathy, care, and the desire to live well entails the exclusion of reasoned deliberation.
But a moral code must be universal, and be based on facts universally true, at least within a given society. Empathetic feelings do not satisfy those criteria.
What you avoid addressing is why anyone would adhere to a moral code. Your universalizing the consequences of not adhering is not sufficient to convince anyone since we all know that my actions do not have universal consequences that bite me in the ass.
You may not, but many others do. The prisons are full of them.
And the establishment of a universal moral code will be ineffectual in changing their behavior. If I am to follow a moral code it is because I believe it is good to do so, whether that is limited to my own good or extends to the good of others. My desire to do good is a necessary condition for me to follow the code.
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