Re: If there is no God, murder isn't wrong?
Posted: November 16th, 2018, 2:36 pm
Well, they are not "inadequate" merely because they don't supply immediate answers to every moral question, any more than the rules of chess are inadequate because they don't supply the best next move in your current game, or the laws of physics are inadequate because they don't tell you whether the bridge you're designing will withstand the loads it will carry. You still have to analyze the site, test the materials, estimate the loads, and do the math.
I agree. But I suspect you are assuming there is some disagreement there, perhaps turning on divergent understandings of "values." An individual's beliefs and "values," however, never justify a violation of the rules.And that is why the values and beliefs of the individual matter and must be taken into consideration.I agree, provided you apply the affected agents' criteria for what promotes well-being, not your own.
Norms, yes. Moral rules no --- not if they were sound to begin with.Moral rules or norms change over time.
Well, every theory, every proposition, remains forever in the "realm of opinion." But opinions are merely beliefs, and beliefs are either true, false, or neither (they are non-cognitive). That someone may hold a contrary opinion does not render a sound theory unsound, or a true proposition false.Morality remains forever in the realm of opinion.
Oh, no. I agree that we are sometimes forced to act without conclusive knowledge of what is best, but not always. Not even most of the time.This does not mean that all opinions should be regarded as equal, but that we strive to determine what is best without ever having knowledge of what is best.
I also agree with Wittgenstein. Axioms are not grounded. They must be assumed to be true. And arguments with someone who does not grant that assumption cannot be fruitful. I also agree with the thrust of the "rule paradox" --- the meaning of a rule can only be found in its practice. What I'm suggesting is that moral rules play the same role, and have the same functionality, as rules in any other realm of activity, as revealed though their applications and practice. I.e., there is nothing peculiarly problematic or intractable about moral questions.I agree with Wittgenstein:
But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting. (OC 110)
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (OC 204)
If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, not yet false. (OC 205)
"Thus, according to the alternative reading, one can conclude that Anscombe is arguing that the only suitable and really viable alternative is the religiously based moral theory that keeps the legalistic framework and the associated concepts of ‘obligation.’ This interpretation is more in keeping with Anscombe’s religious views and with her other ethical views regarding absolute prohibitions. There were plenty of actions she took to be morally wrong, so it seems clear—as Simon Blackburn noted—that she herself was not out to jettison these terms. But one can defend an even stronger claim. MMP is a carefully crafted argument intended to show the absurdity of rejecting the religious framework—along with it’s metaphysical underpinnings—when it comes to moral authority."What do you see there that leads you to think I have misinterpreted her?See Sec. 5 of: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anscombe/
Not really. The categorical imperative persuades only because the maxims justifying some acts could not be universalized, not because they lead to contradictions, but because the consequences would be disastrous. There is nothing self-contradictory in, "Everyone may murder anyone else at will."Actions have consequences, but that does not mean that Kant is consequentialist. His method is a priori and categorical.
Yes. Kant was a bit of a fanatic on that issue. Most philosophers, even Kantians, think that rule must be relaxed somewhat.If it is wrong to lie then it is wrong no matter the consequences.
That's true, but the fact that always lying is not defensible does not preclude that it sometimes is. Sound rules would not categorically prohibit lying, but they would place stringent restrictions on it.It is a matter of logical consistency. Can there be a universal law requiring us to lie? What would it mean to lie if everyone always lied? The term would lose its meaning because it would not stand as the opposite of truth telling, which would not exist.