Is morality objective or subjective?

[Terrapin Station]

Just in case you're thinking I'm asking this stuff for an ulterior motive, I'm not. I'm literally asking you about a (running) car at the moment, and only a running car. The only ulterior motive would be to settle whether you realize that processes (at least can be) physical or not.

[chewybrian]

Good grief! Yes the fact that the car is running is an observation of the state of affairs, of physical things and processes.

??? Why would you flip to framing it as an observation?

You mean that if we start a car so that it's running, and then every person suddenly disappears so that there is no one extant any longer to make an observation in the sense you're using that term, then the car is no longer running?

I'm hoping to get back to other stuff from previous posts, by the way, but your responses are increasingly bizarre/absurd, so it's hard to get past something that should be simple to settle.

I already said that the "fact" that the car is running is something physical. All the components and their effects are physical. But, my declaring it a "fact" is still a choice. Any understanding of it is subject to my whims.

I keep returning to the discussion I thought we were having, which is whether my thoughts about the car were something physical or not. You seem to be trying to play gotcha or something else, I am not sure. Can we put aside everything about the car itself or what would happen if I was not there to observe it? In fact, that is really my point.

The situation is all physical until I am there to observe it and interact with it. That is when a different category of "thing" shows itself, which is my subjectivity. The "rules" that seemed to apply when only physical things were involved have melted away. Though the results of my actions or attempts may still be bound by the "rules", my understanding is not. I may form any intent, however unreasonable or unrealistic it may be in relation to those "rules". And, any rules I accept are a matter of free choice on my part, which is at odd with the rules regarding physical things. It may be quite practical (it certainly seems to be) to accept those rules in most cases. Yet, I still have the choice, and this puts the real ME into a different category.

[Terrapin Station]

I already said that the "fact" that the car is running is something physical. All the components and their effects are physical. But, my declaring it a "fact" is still a choice. Any understanding of it is subject to my whims.

I keep returning to the discussion I thought we were having, which is whether my thoughts about the car were something physical or not. You seem to be trying to play gotcha or something else, I am not sure.

My approach is to settle one simple thing at a time. I don't like doing discussions over and over. I want to "get somewhere" with them.

Okay, so the next thing I wanted to get back to was this:

When I gave you the sources for imaging, measuring electrochemical properties of, etc. mental content, you responded with "There is a correlation between thoughts and physical activity in the brain," where you suggested that it's only a correlation and not an identity.

So, to settle the next small thing we'd need to settle, the question is this: For any phenomena we could talk about--let's say ice and the "slipperiness" property, for example, what makes the difference in your view between stating a correlation only and stating an identity? In other words, how do we know whether evidence of anything we might give evidence for--so say evidence of contact pressure, melting, etc. with ice, given in context of the "slipperiness" property--is merely a correlation or whether we're talking about an identity?

[Terrapin Station]

The reason I'm asking, by the way, is that if we're going to criticize something like imaging thoughts as being "only a correlation," as if we'd potentially accept some data as being more than a correlation (and that's necessary, because otherwise any evidence we're presented with of anything is "only a correlation" to us, and that's not a criticism), then we'd better have some well-defined/robust criteria for what evidence counts as more than a correlation (namely, an identity) and why.

[chewybrian]

I already said that the "fact" that the car is running is something physical. All the components and their effects are physical. But, my declaring it a "fact" is still a choice. Any understanding of it is subject to my whims.

I keep returning to the discussion I thought we were having, which is whether my thoughts about the car were something physical or not. You seem to be trying to play gotcha or something else, I am not sure.

My approach is to settle one simple thing at a time. I don't like doing discussions over and over. I want to "get somewhere" with them.

Okay, so the next thing I wanted to get back to was this:

When I gave you the sources for imaging, measuring electrochemical properties of, etc. mental content, you responded with "There is a correlation between thoughts and physical activity in the brain," where you suggested that it's only a correlation and not an identity.

So, to settle the next small thing we'd need to settle, the question is this: For any phenomena we could talk about--let's say ice and the "slipperiness" property, for example, what makes the difference in your view between stating a correlation only and stating an identity? In other words, how do we know whether evidence of anything we might give evidence for--so say evidence of contact pressure, melting, etc. with ice, given in context of the "slipperiness" property--is merely a correlation or whether we're talking about an identity?

Well, where there is really causation, there is also correlation. My swinging of the bat is correlated with the hitting of a home run (let's just pretend I can play baseball that well...). But, in that case, the swinging of the bat in fact caused the ball to change direction and fly over the fence. However, while there is evidence that brain activity in certain areas of the brain correlated with certain thoughts, we don't really understand a cause and effect relationship there.

Again, though, if I refuse to deny my freedom, then I quickly see there could not be that same type of direct correlation between physical processes and my subjective thoughts. For, then I would not be free but rather the slave of circumstance. This is what De Beauvoir means by leaving behind a childish outlook. I can't depend on any given set of rules to form ethics or decide what I must do. When I begin to grow up, I see that there is no Santa Claus and maybe no God. I see that all the "rules" laid down by the adults are based on their own subjective understanding, and sometimes on their wishes that defy what clearly presents itself. In the case of physicalism, perhaps they may wish to believe they understand everything, or that they are on the brink of understanding. Or, they may wish to discard the burden of freedom and the anxiety and responsibility that goes with it.

Yes, I tend to rush off to the end of the line and jump three steps ahead, and assume that I can bring you along. So, I have no problem with going back before going forward, despite my protests.

[chewybrian]

Sorry, I meant to say "causation", not "correlation" at the start of the second paragraph.

The point was that we seem to know that a certain action I took on the bat has a direct and unavoidable cause on the ball being sent back in a particular direction. Based on the circumstances, we seem to know that my swinging of the bat at that time, with the force I used, in the trajectory I chose, could only have resulted in the home run.

Can we say that a certain brain activity in my head could only have resulted in the thought that The Empire Strikes Back was the best movie in the series?

[Terrapin Station]

Sorry, I meant to say "causation", not "correlation" at the start of the second paragraph.

The point was that we seem to know that a certain action I took on the bat has a direct and unavoidable cause on the ball being sent back in a particular direction. Based on the circumstances, we seem to know that my swinging of the bat at that time, with the force I used, in the trajectory I chose, could only have resulted in the home run.

Can we say that a certain brain activity in my head could only have resulted in the thought that The Empire Strikes Back was the best movie in the series?

Ah, okay, so it winds up being about (Let's call this account "C") causation for you where you're taking certain phenomena to be basically "infallibly correlated" in a way that suggests causation to you a la (strong) determinism, and then because (a) we don't have "infallible correlation" accounts like that for mind/brain data, and (b) you're thinking that freedom a la free will wouldn't be possible if we did have that, while you think that there's obviously free will, you're seeing the notion of mind/brain identity as untenable.

Among the issues I'd say there are with that reasoning are:

(1) It's not actually the case that there are infallible observable correlations for most phenomena; that's rather a theoretical conclusion, not a practical one, because in practice, we get unexpected results all the time when we do experiments or when we have many iterations of the "same" phenomenon--like hitting a baseball with a baseball bat. Theoretically, we excuse this to not having "perfect information," where we assume that if we did, we would have an infallible correlation (there's very interesting material about this re actual observations and how we account for them a la the Duhem-Quine Thesis (and confirmation holism, underdetermination, etc.) contra the doctrine of falsification, so that falsificationism isn't anywhere near as cut & dried as we typically present it)

(2) (C) completely ignores such as stochastic and quantum phenomena, which are considered inherently probabilistic (where the probabilities are other than binary (0 & 1)), and not ontologically deterministic; those phenomena are physical,

(3) Given (1) and (2), it's both the case that we don't literally have evidence of causation rather than correlation for anything (hence Hume's infamous remarks about this, for example), and there's no reason to conclude that physical systems can't involve freedom (that can be probabilistically weighted other than 1 or 0 or .5 (so other than it being deterministic or "random"--that's a false dichotomy).)

That (C) is behind your comments/objections on this stuff slips my mind when we're talking about it if you don't make it explicit, because while I'm a physicalist, I don't at all buy strong determinism and I find it weird when anyone does. The strong determinist view is not well-supported at all, and it's also at least 150 years past being in vogue (just research anything about the history of criticism against "Laplace's demon"). Why it persists on boards like this I don't know. It's weird that it would remain the conventional wisdom of those with a casual-to-hobbyist's interest in this stuff, because it's so easy to come across the fact that it's long past being the received view in the sciences.

[Peter Holmes]

Definitions. What we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts. What we call a fact is a (publicly confirmable) feature of reality that is or was the case. So moral objectivism is the claim that there are moral facts. And so my OP is really asking: Are there moral facts?

Here's why I think there are no moral facts, so that morality can't be objective.

The choice of a moral goal, and the claim that only one moral goal is rational, are obviously subjective. They are matters of opinion. The only publicly confirmable (objective) thing about them is that people can and may choose the goal, and perhaps make the claim.

If moral objectivity amounts to nothing more than publicly confirmable consistency with a goal, then, in moral assertions, the words should, ought to, right and wrong are instrumental, and have no special moral meaning. So if an action is morally wrong, then it's wrong in the same way that, if we want to drive safely, it's wrong to jump the lights.

But given this, if our goal is patriarchy, then we should subjugate women. And if our goal is white supremacy, then it's right to oppress non-white people. If that's all that moral objectivity means, then these are publicly confirmable moral facts.

Objectivists who reject these grotesque conclusions have to explain with which goal the claim 'we ought/ought not to have this goal' is consistent. And similarly, with which goal is the claim 'our actions should be consistent with our goals' consistent?

My argument is that the very expression moral fact is incoherent; that there are no moral facts, but only facts about which there can be moral opinions, which are by definition subjective, how ever many people may share them.

(Note. I'm also adding this to my other OP: 'What could make morality objective?', for anyone following only one of the discussions.)

[Belindi]

Peter Holmes wrote:

My argument is that the very expression moral fact is incoherent; that there are no moral facts, but only facts about which there can be moral opinions, which are by definition subjective, how ever many people may share them.

No 'moral' facts or any other sort of 'facts' however credible can be known to be absolutely true.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter Holmes wrote:

My argument is that the very expression moral fact is incoherent; that there are no moral facts, but only facts about which there can be moral opinions, which are by definition subjective, how ever many people may share them.

No 'moral' facts or any other sort of 'facts' however credible can be known to be absolutely true.

The only features of reality that have truth-value (true or false) are factual assertions. Outside language, there's no truth-value.

So what could an absolutely true factual assertion be? I think the expression 'absolutely true assertion' is incoherent, so that denying such a thing could exist is vacuous. It's like denying the existence of things-in-themselves. What is it that's being denied?

[Belindi]

Peter Holmes wrote:

My argument is that the very expression moral fact is incoherent; that there are no moral facts, but only facts about which there can be moral opinions, which are by definition subjective, how ever many people may share them.

No 'moral' facts or any other sort of 'facts' however credible can be known to be absolutely true.

The only features of reality that have truth-value (true or false) are factual assertions. Outside language, there's no truth-value.

So what could an absolutely true factual assertion be? I think the expression 'absolutely true assertion' is incoherent, so that denying such a thing could exist is vacuous. It's like denying the existence of things-in-themselves. What is it that's being denied?

Maybe if you think of absolute truth in terms of God you may be able to imagine what absolute truth looks like. You do not have to believe a proposition (such as God) in order to understand it. A supernatural being one of whose attributes is unearthly and absolute truth is coherent, as the many believers and agnostics who have enough imagination can vouch for.

Truth value is a concept that applies to classical logic and mathematics but not to inductive logic.Truth values are computable by means of truth tables which is a tool used in classical logic.' Factual assertions ' is not part of the terminology of classical logic or mathematics.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter Holmes wrote:

My argument is that the very expression moral fact is incoherent; that there are no moral facts, but only facts about which there can be moral opinions, which are by definition subjective, how ever many people may share them.

No 'moral' facts or any other sort of 'facts' however credible can be known to be absolutely true.

The only features of reality that have truth-value (true or false) are factual assertions. Outside language, there's no truth-value.

So what could an absolutely true factual assertion be? I think the expression 'absolutely true assertion' is incoherent, so that denying such a thing could exist is vacuous. It's like denying the existence of things-in-themselves. What is it that's being denied?

Maybe if you think of absolute truth in terms of God you may be able to imagine what absolute truth looks like. You do not have to believe a proposition (such as God) in order to understand it. A supernatural being one of whose attributes is unearthly and absolute truth is coherent, as the many believers and agnostics who have enough imagination can vouch for.

Truth value is a concept that applies to classical logic and mathematics but not to inductive logic.Truth values are computable by means of truth tables which is a tool used in classical logic.' Factual assertions ' is not part of the terminology of classical logic or mathematics.

1 I think the assertion 'absolute truth could be an attribute of a god' is mystical nonsense. The word 'truth' is an abstract noun, and an abstract noun is not the name of a thing of any kind. Truth could be said to be an attribute of a factual assertion, but its ascription to anything else is metaphorical.

2 A proposition can be about a god, but a god is not a proposition. (I don't believe any god-claims, for the lack of evidence.)

3 Factual premises can be true or false, so inductive conclusions can be too. And the so-called truths of mathematics and formal logic are analytic. They are assertions that can't be false, so calling them true is redundant.

4 I use the expression 'factual assertion' because the expression 'proposition' doesn't distinguish between factual assertions that have truth-value, and non-factual assertions, such as moral and aesthetic ones, that don't. Also, a proposition is supposedly an abstract thing manifested by token sentences - and abstract things are misleading metaphysical fictions.

[Belindi]

Peter Holmes wrote:



No 'moral' facts or any other sort of 'facts' however credible can be known to be absolutely true.

The only features of reality that have truth-value (true or false) are factual assertions. Outside language, there's no truth-value.

So what could an absolutely true factual assertion be? I think the expression 'absolutely true assertion' is incoherent, so that denying such a thing could exist is vacuous. It's like denying the existence of things-in-themselves. What is it that's being denied?

Maybe if you think of absolute truth in terms of God you may be able to imagine what absolute truth looks like. You do not have to believe a proposition (such as God) in order to understand it. A supernatural being one of whose attributes is unearthly and absolute truth is coherent, as the many believers and agnostics who have enough imagination can vouch for.

Truth value is a concept that applies to classical logic and mathematics but not to inductive logic.Truth values are computable by means of truth tables which is a tool used in classical logic.' Factual assertions ' is not part of the terminology of classical logic or mathematics.

1 I think the assertion 'absolute truth could be an attribute of a god' is mystical nonsense. The word 'truth' is an abstract noun, and an abstract noun is not the name of a thing of any kind. Truth could be said to be an attribute of a factual assertion, but its ascription to anything else is metaphorical.

2 A proposition can be about a god, but a god is not a proposition. (I don't believe any god-claims, for the lack of evidence.)

3 Factual premises can be true or false, so inductive conclusions can be too. And the so-called truths of mathematics and formal logic are analytic. They are assertions that can't be false, so calling them true is redundant.

4 I use the expression 'factual assertion' because the expression 'proposition' doesn't distinguish between factual assertions that have truth-value, and non-factual assertions, such as moral and aesthetic ones, that don't. Also, a proposition is supposedly an abstract thing manifested by token sentences - and abstract things are misleading metaphysical fictions.

I wonder what happens with you when you read a novel or listen to a poem.

[Peter Holmes]

I can experience emotions. I wonder why you wonder.

[Belindi]

I can experience emotions. I wonder why you wonder.

I had written

I wonder what happens with you when you read a novel or listen to a poem.

But reading a quality novel or poem is not about emotional titillation although emotional titillation may be a side effect. Reading a quality novel or poem is about understanding some theme which as often as not is what it is like to be human, or more, what it ought to be like to be human.