Is morality objective or subjective?

[Peter Holmes]

Consul

Thanks. This seems to be a reasonable description of my position. I'm not sure about the claim that beliefs are cognitive - or even what 'cognitive' and 'non-cognitive' mean here. I suspect a metaphysical hinterland surrounding such ideas. But that's another story.

[Consul]

Thanks. This seems to be a reasonable description of my position. I'm not sure about the claim that beliefs are cognitive - or even what 'cognitive' and 'non-cognitive' mean here.

"cognitive meaning. The cognitive aspect of the meaning of a sentence. This is thought of as its content, or what is strictly said, abstracted away from the tone or emotive meaning, or other implicatures generated, for example, by the choice of words. The cognitive aspect is what has to be understood to know what would make the sentence true or false: it is frequently identified with the truth condition of the sentence."
—Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (3rd ed., 2016)

"cognitive meaning. An element of meaning which accounts for an expression’s not just standing for something but representing it in a particular way. This explains how a speaker can attach different significance to two words for the same thing. Expressions share the same cognitive meaning when and only when a speaker who understands those expressions regards them as synonymous. Whether different speakers can share the same cognitive meaning to an expression depends on whether their judgements concerning the sameness and difference in meaning for this and other related expressions coincide."

"emotive and descriptive meaning. The emotive meaning of words is their power to express a speaker’s emotions, and to evoke the emotions of a hearer. Descriptive meaning is the cognitive role of language, in determining belief and understanding. Expressions in moral discourse have descriptive and emotive meaning in combination—though these components are capable of independent variation. Opponents of the emotive theory of ethics can hardly deny any of this: but they do deny that the emotive component is the more fundamental to moral judgement."
—Oxford Companion to Philosophy (2nd ed., 2005)

[Consul]

"Cognitive" means "relating to cognition", and "cognition" (etymologically) means "knowledge". Metaethical noncognitivists deny that there is moral knowledge; and they do so because they think there are no moral truths and no moral facts (moral states of affairs including moral properties) making them true.

Non-Cognitivism in Ethics: https://www.iep.utm.edu/non-cogn/

[Consul]

Metaethical Questions:

"(a) Meaning: what is the semantic function of moral discourse? Is the function of moral discourse to state facts, or does it have some other non-fact-stating role?

(b) Metaphysics: do moral facts (or properties) exist? If so, what are they like? Are they identical or reducible to some other type of fact (or property) or are they irreducible and sui generis?

(c) Epistemology and justification: is there such a thing as moral knowledge? How can we know whether our moral judgements are true or false? How can we ever justify our claims to moral knowledge?

(d) Phenomenology: how are moral qualities represented in the experience of an agent making a moral judgement? Do they appear to be 'out there' in the world?

(e) Moral psychology: what can we say about the motivational state of someone making a moral judgement? What sort of connection is there between making a moral judgement and being motivated to act as that judgement prescribes?

(f) Objectivity: can moral judgements really be correct or incorrect? Can we work towards finding out the moral truth?"

(Miller, Alexander. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003. p. 2)

[Felix]

Noncognitive<>ethics is an oxymoron. It is based on the naive premise that the correspondence theory of knowledge is the only valid way to define what is or is not true. It has no relevance to moral philosophy, it only applies to descriptive statements, statements that make assertions about what is or is not the case in reality. Bertrand Russell was ridiculing it when he said, "Ethics is the art of recommending to others what they must do to get along with ourselves."

[Consul]

Noncognitive<>ethics is an oxymoron. It is based on the naive premise that the correspondence theory of knowledge is the only valid way to define what is or is not true. It has no relevance to moral philosophy, it only applies to descriptive statements, statements that make assertions about what is or is not the case in reality.

According to realistic or success-theoretic moral cognitivism (= moral realism), moral sentences express propositions and (purport to) represent (describe) states of affairs (involving properties), have truth-conditions, have a truth-value, and some of them are (literally) true, and are made true by actual moral states of affairs/moral facts (involving moral properties).

According to nonrealistic or error-theoretic moral cognitivism, moral sentences express propositions and (purport to) represent (describe) states of affairs (involving properties), have truth-conditions, have a truth-value, but all of them are (literally) false, because there are no actual moral states of affairs/moral facts (involving moral properties) which could make them true.

Moral Realism: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

"Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common and more or less defining ground of moral realism (although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way).

As a result, those who reject moral realism are usefully divided into (i) those who think moral claims do not purport to report facts in light of which they are true or false (noncognitivists) and (ii) those who think that moral claims do carry this purport but deny that any moral claims are actually true (error theorists)."

Moral Anti-Realism: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/

[Kaz_1983]

Can be both subjective and objective at the same time?

I'm basing what is right and wrong on scientific objectivity not opinion. It comes down to context tho which is subjective I suppose.. that said, not all are equal - there are still right and wrong ways of going about maximizing well-being so it's kinda both.

[Sculptor1]

Can be both subjective and objective at the same time?

I'm basing what is right and wrong on scientific objectivity not opinion. It comes down to context tho which is subjective I suppose.. that said, not all are equal - there are still right and wrong ways of going about maximizing well-being so it's kinda both.

This begs the question what is "well being", and further asks "well being" for whom?
No act is without consequences, both negative and positive. It is highly unlikely that any act to enhance the well being of a person or group will not have some negative effects on some other person or group.
The truth of this was so well known to Jeremy Bentham, that he promoted the idea of utilitarianism for moral questions, and asserted that as long as the majority benefited it was moral. But this leaves massive questions.
So, no, there is really no basis for the objective. At some point the whole question of morality relies on judgement.

[Peter Holmes]

Can be both subjective and objective at the same time?

I'm basing what is right and wrong on scientific objectivity not opinion. It comes down to context tho which is subjective I suppose.. that said, not all are equal - there are still right and wrong ways of going about maximizing well-being so it's kinda both.

This begs the question what is "well being", and further asks "well being" for whom?
No act is without consequences, both negative and positive. It is highly unlikely that any act to enhance the well being of a person or group will not have some negative effects on some other person or group.
The truth of this was so well known to Jeremy Bentham, that he promoted the idea of utilitarianism for moral questions, and asserted that as long as the majority benefited it was moral. But this leaves massive questions.
So, no, there is really no basis for the objective. At some point the whole question of morality relies on judgement.

Agreed. What's right and wrong, what counts as well-being, that we should promote well-being, what the right and wrong ways to promote it are - these are all matters of opinion, and therefore can't be objective - independent of opinion. It's judgements all the way down, with no facts at the bottom - pace Sam Harris and other proponents of the 'subjective goal / objective means' approach to morality.

[Consul]

What's right and wrong, what counts as well-being, that we should promote well-being, what the right and wrong ways to promote it are - these are all matters of opinion, and therefore can't be objective - independent of opinion. It's judgements all the way down, with no facts at the bottom - pace Sam Harris and other proponents of the 'subjective goal / objective means' approach to morality.

"Many readers might wonder how can we base our values on something as difficult to define as “well-being”? It seems to me, however, that the concept of well-being is like the concept of physical health: it resists precise definition, and yet it is indispensable. In fact, the meanings of both terms seem likely to remain perpetually open to revision as we make progress in science. Today, a person can consider himself physically healthy if he is free of detectable disease, able to exercise, and destined to live into his eighties without suffering obvious decrepitude. But this standard may change.
...
If we define 'good' as that which supports well-being, as I will argue we must, the regress initiated by Moore’s 'open question argument' really does stop. While I agree with Moore that it is reasonable to wonder whether maximizing pleasure in any given instance is 'good,' it makes no sense at all to ask whether maximizing well-being is 'good.' It seems clear that what we are really asking when we wonder whether a certain state of pleasure is 'good,' is whether it is conducive to, or obstructive of, some deeper form of well-being. This question is perfectly coherent; it surely has an answer (whether or not we are in a position to answer it); and yet, it keeps notions of goodness anchored to the experience of sentient beings.

Defining goodness in this way does not resolve all questions of value; it merely directs our attention to what values actually are—the set of attitudes, choices, and behaviors that potentially affect our well-being, as well as that of other conscious minds. While this leaves the question of what constitutes well-being genuinely open, there is every reason to think that this question has a finite range of answers. Given that change in the well-being of conscious creatures is bound to be a product of natural laws, we must expect that this space of possibilities—the moral landscape—will increasingly be illuminated by science."

(Harris, Sam. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. New York: Free Press, 2010. p. 11-3)

As for the is-ought gap, the crucial question with regard to Harris' definition is whether "well-being" is a purely descriptive word, such that questions of moral goodness (defined in terms of conduciveness to well-being) are objectively answerable factual questions.

Well-Being: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/

Aspects of well-being:

1. the production of pleasure or happiness (or contentment)/the reduction of unpleasure or unhappiness (or suffering)

2. the satisfaction of needs or desires

3. the realization of values or ideals

[Sculptor1]

What's right and wrong, what counts as well-being, that we should promote well-being, what the right and wrong ways to promote it are - these are all matters of opinion, and therefore can't be objective - independent of opinion. It's judgements all the way down, with no facts at the bottom - pace Sam Harris and other proponents of the 'subjective goal / objective means' approach to morality.

"Many readers might wonder how can we base our values on something as difficult to define as “well-being”? It seems to me, however, that the concept of well-being is like the concept of physical health: it resists precise definition, and yet it is indispensable.

Actually moral well being is far more difficult to define than physical health. The medical profession has very little trouble with its choice of objective facts such as temperature, resting heart rate, blood tests, and lung capacity.
On the other hand people can be forced into the most disgraceful sorts of trials and deprivations just because some moralist considers that such things are "for their own good". These might include boarding school, army training, sexual abstinence, being shamed, forced into marriage, denied divorce, having to wear religiously prescribed clothing... Need I go on.
In many cases throughout history moralist have asserted that the freedom to chose your own "well being" is bad for your moral well being.

" Given that change in the well-being of conscious creatures is bound to be a product of natural laws, we must expect that this space of possibilities—the moral landscape—will increasingly be illuminated by science."

(Harris, Sam. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. New York: Free Press, 2010. p. 11-3)

As for Harris - just another bigoted moralist with delusions of grandeur.

[Sculptor1]

What's right and wrong, what counts as well-being, that we should promote well-being, what the right and wrong ways to promote it are - these are all matters of opinion, and therefore can't be objective - independent of opinion. It's judgements all the way down, with no facts at the bottom - pace Sam Harris and other proponents of the 'subjective goal / objective means' approach to morality.

"Many readers might wonder how can we base our values on something as difficult to define as “well-being”? It seems to me, however, that the concept of well-being is like the concept of physical health: it resists precise definition, and yet it is indispensable.

Actually moral well being is far more difficult to define than physical health. The medical profession has very little trouble with its choice of objective facts such as temperature, resting heart rate, blood tests, and lung capacity.
On the other hand people can be forced into the most disgraceful sorts of trials and deprivations just because some moralist considers that such things are "for their own good". These might include boarding school, army training, sexual abstinence, being shamed, forced into marriage, denied divorce, having to wear religiously prescribed clothing... Need I go on.
In many cases throughout history moralist have asserted that the freedom to chose your own "well being" is bad for your moral well being.

"
Given that change in the well-being of conscious creatures is bound to be a product of natural laws, we must expect that this space of possibilities—the moral landscape—will increasingly be illuminated by science."[/i]

(Harris, Sam. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. New York: Free Press, 2010. p. 11-3)

As for Harris - just another arrogant moralist. Not only bigoted, but simply wrong about what science is for.

[Consul]

As for Harris - just another arrogant moralist.

Arrogant?

Not only bigoted, but simply wrong about what science is for.

"[W]hen we make a moral judgement about something, we make it because of the possession by it of certain non-moral properties. Thus…moral judgements about particular things are made for reasons[.]"

(Hare, R. M. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. p. 21)

Scientific facts cannot tell us what we ought (not) to do, but they can be adduced as non-moral reasons for moral judgements, in terms of which these can be justified.

"No account of scientific facts about the world can by themselves determine what we should do. Some philosophers and scientists have tried to deduce ultimate ethical precepts from the conclusions of evolutionary biology. Thus, it may be pointed out that evolution is tending in the direction from A to B, and it is then suggested that this proves that we should act in certain ways, perhaps by the application of eugenics, so as to help the transition from A to B. The conclusion does not follow. If a man dislikes the prospect of B he may decide to act in such a way as to oppose the transition from A to B. What ethical precepts we recommend depends in the last analysis on what we want. Scientific facts alone cannot give us a precept.
This is not to say that scientific facts are not of the greatest importance for ethics. It is simply that scientific facts do not by themselves determine any ethical system. The fact that some event X causes an event Y can be of great importance, but this importance is a secondary one. If we want Y and discover that X causes Y, then we will want X. If, on the other hand, we want not to have Y, then we will want not to have X.
...
I have said that no moral rules can be deduced purely from scientific considerations. Science may be able to tell us what means conduce to what ends, but it cannot tell us what ends to pursue. Nevertheless, the scientific temper can be psychologically conducive to an ethics of generalised benevolence. The scientist tries to find laws of nature which apply anywhere and anywhen, and he will therefore be attracted by a moral outlook which places the interests of all men, whatever their caste or creed, on an equality. He will even be attracted, beyond a merely humanistic ethics, to consider the interests of other species of animal, in so far as
these seem capable of happiness or unhappiness, and, if it ever in the future of space technology came to the point where it was of practical importance, he might consider the interests of intelligent extra-terrestrial beings to be as important as his own. There is
another reason why scientific thought is psychologically conducive to a widening of ethical interest. A scientist has to attend seriously to the arguments of another scientist, no matter what may be that other scientist's nationality, race, or social position. He must therefore at least respect the other as a source of arguments, and this is psychologically conducive to respecting him as a person in the full sense, and hence to considering his interests equally with one's own."

(Smart, J. J. C. Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. pp. 154-5)

[Peter Holmes]

Consul

To repeat my earlier point: Whatever facts we deploy to justify a moral judgement, it remains a judgement. And others can deploy the same facts differently, or different facts, to justify different moral judgements. That is our inescapable moral predicament.

I think Smart's argument begs questions at every turn. And, as some of us have pointed out to you, merely cutting and pasting large chunks of other people's words isn't much use here. Better to present your own opinion and reasons - by all means citing reference if you want to.

[Sculptor1]

As for Harris - just another arrogant moralist.

Arrogant?

Not only bigoted, but simply wrong about what science is for.

"[W]hen we make a moral judgement about something, we make it because of the possession by it of certain non-moral properties. Thus…moral judgements about particular things are made for reasons[.]"

(Hare, R. M. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. p. 21)

Scientific facts cannot tell us what we ought (not) to do, but they can be adduced as non-moral reasons for moral judgements, in terms of which these can be justified.

"No account of scientific facts about the world can by themselves determine what we should do. Some philosophers and scientists have tried to deduce ultimate ethical precepts from the conclusions of evolutionary biology. Thus, it may be pointed out that evolution is tending in the direction from A to B, and it is then suggested that this proves that we should act in certain ways, perhaps by the application of eugenics, so as to help the transition from A to B. The conclusion does not follow. If a man dislikes the prospect of B he may decide to act in such a way as to oppose the transition from A to B. What ethical precepts we recommend depends in the last analysis on what we want. Scientific facts alone cannot give us a precept.
This is not to say that scientific facts are not of the greatest importance for ethics. It is simply that scientific facts do not by themselves determine any ethical system. The fact that some event X causes an event Y can be of great importance, but this importance is a secondary one. If we want Y and discover that X causes Y, then we will want X. If, on the other hand, we want not to have Y, then we will want not to have X.
...
I have said that no moral rules can be deduced purely from scientific considerations. Science may be able to tell us what means conduce to what ends, but it cannot tell us what ends to pursue. Nevertheless, the scientific temper can be psychologically conducive to an ethics of generalised benevolence. The scientist tries to find laws of nature which apply anywhere and anywhen, and he will therefore be attracted by a moral outlook which places the interests of all men, whatever their caste or creed, on an equality. He will even be attracted, beyond a merely humanistic ethics, to consider the interests of other species of animal, in so far as
these seem capable of happiness or unhappiness, and, if it ever in the future of space technology came to the point where it was of practical importance, he might consider the interests of intelligent extra-terrestrial beings to be as important as his own. There is
another reason why scientific thought is psychologically conducive to a widening of ethical interest. A scientist has to attend seriously to the arguments of another scientist, no matter what may be that other scientist's nationality, race, or social position. He must therefore at least respect the other as a source of arguments, and this is psychologically conducive to respecting him as a person in the full sense, and hence to considering his interests equally with one's own."

(Smart, J. J. C. Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. pp. 154-5)

you need to stop quoting and start thinking and saying what you think.