What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

118 pages -- What could make morality objective? How about the people who create morality, who turn ideas into systems, structures, institutions to serve said ideas that constitute morality.

If people say 'this is right and wrong', and turn those claims into systems, structures and institutuions, that doesn't mean what they call right and wrong are facts. Obviously.

[Gertie]

Peter

What we count as good or bad (or evil) is a matter of opinion, which is therefore subjective. So that we ought to do something is also a matter of opinion, which is therefore subjective. And facts about human nature have no bearing on the necessary subjectivity of our opinions.

My view is that the Subjective v Objective debate about morality is anachronistic and a red herring.

We now have a rough evolutionary account of our predispositions about behaviour we naturally find laudable (good), and we despise as 'bad'. Morality can be seen as an abstract framing we created to account for having such feelings, as if it had some objective reality of its own. Which if we agree it doesn't, then we need to think afresh about the appropriate role for morality in light of our current knowledge.

If it is merely a happenstance of our species' evolution which bequeathed us certain attitudes and opinions, should it have any binding role at all?

I don't think it's merely opinion, and I think the notion of right and wrong and oughts still have a valuable role.

Why? Because how we treat each other, and other sentient creatures, matters.

If I cause you to suffer, it is meaningful and matters. Because we are experiencing beings who can flourish or wither, feel joy and despair, and everything in between. It's being experiencing subjects which makes what happens to us matter, as CIN says. Though I think reducing this to 'pleasure' is too simplistic. You might on balance suffer more in your life than experience pleasure, but still value your life. And if I took the ability to experience life from you, it would be taking something of value and meaning from you, it would matter.

That seems to me to be the appropriate basis for judging actions right or wrong, and justifying oughts. Whether it can be characterised as subjective or objective isn't the salient factor, when we think about what morality is for.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter

What we count as good or bad (or evil) is a matter of opinion, which is therefore subjective. So that we ought to do something is also a matter of opinion, which is therefore subjective. And facts about human nature have no bearing on the necessary subjectivity of our opinions.

My view is that the Subjective v Objective debate about morality is anachronistic and a red herring.

We now have a rough evolutionary account of our predispositions about behaviour we naturally find laudable (good), and we despise as 'bad'. Morality can be seen as an abstract framing we created to account for having such feelings, as if it had some objective reality of its own. Which if we agree it doesn't, then we need to think afresh about the appropriate role for morality in light of our current knowledge.

If it is merely a happenstance of our species' evolution which bequeathed us certain attitudes and opinions, should it have any binding role at all?

I don't think it's merely opinion, and I think the notion of right and wrong and oughts still have a valuable role.

Why? Because how we treat each other, and other sentient creatures, matters.

If I cause you to suffer, it is meaningful and matters. Because we are experiencing beings who can flourish or wither, feel joy and despair, and everything in between. It's being experiencing subjects which makes what happens to us matter, as CIN says. Though I think reducing this to 'pleasure' is too simplistic. You might on balance suffer more in your life than experience pleasure, but still value your life. And if I took the ability to experience life from you, it would be taking something of value and meaning from you, it would matter.

That seems to me to be the appropriate basis for judging actions right or wrong, and justifying oughts. Whether it can be characterised as subjective or objective isn't the salient factor, when we think about what morality is for.

Thanks, Gertie. I'm pretty sure we've done this already - but anyway...

I agree with your explanation of why we have moral values and rules, or 'attitudes and opinions' - why things are 'meaningful' and matter to us. What I reject is the idea that moral assertions make falsifiable factual claims - claims which are true or false independently from opinion.

Take any example. Suppose one person believes capital punishment is morally wrong. Nobody would argue that means capital punishment is factually morally wrong. We would accept it as a moral opinion, with which others can (and many do) disagree. (And I'd point out the problem of an appeal to our shared experience as 'experiencing subjects' in deciding the issue.)

Now, add more people, up to everybody: even if everybody thinks capital punishment is morally wrong, that remains an opinion. It can never be a fact. And that's why morality isn't and can't be objective - there are no moral facts.

[Gertie]

Thanks, Gertie. I'm pretty sure we've done this already - but anyway...

oops you're right - sorry!

[Sculptor1]

Peter

What we count as good or bad (or evil) is a matter of opinion, which is therefore subjective. So that we ought to do something is also a matter of opinion, which is therefore subjective. And facts about human nature have no bearing on the necessary subjectivity of our opinions.

My view is that the Subjective v Objective debate about morality is anachronistic and a red herring.

We now have a rough evolutionary account of our predispositions about behaviour we naturally find laudable (good), and we despise as 'bad'. Morality can be seen as an abstract framing we created to account for having such feelings, as if it had some objective reality of its own. Which if we agree it doesn't, then we need to think afresh about the appropriate role for morality in light of our current knowledge.

If it is merely a happenstance of our species' evolution which bequeathed us certain attitudes and opinions, should it have any binding role at all?

I don't think it's merely opinion, and I think the notion of right and wrong and oughts still have a valuable role.

Why? Because how we treat each other, and other sentient creatures, matters.

If I cause you to suffer, it is meaningful and matters. Because we are experiencing beings who can flourish or wither, feel joy and despair, and everything in between. It's being experiencing subjects which makes what happens to us matter, as CIN says. Though I think reducing this to 'pleasure' is too simplistic. You might on balance suffer more in your life than experience pleasure, but still value your life. And if I took the ability to experience life from you, it would be taking something of value and meaning from you, it would matter.

That seems to me to be the appropriate basis for judging actions right or wrong, and justifying oughts. Whether it can be characterised as subjective or objective isn't the salient factor, when we think about what morality is for.

Thanks, Gertie. I'm pretty sure we've done this already - but anyway...

I agree with your explanation of why we have moral values and rules, or 'attitudes and opinions' - why things are 'meaningful' and matter to us. What I reject is the idea that moral assertions make falsifiable factual claims - claims which are true or false independently from opinion.

Take any example. Suppose one person believes capital punishment is morally wrong. Nobody would argue that means capital punishment is factually morally wrong. We would accept it as a moral opinion, with which others can (and many do) disagree. (And I'd point out the problem of an appeal to our shared experience as 'experiencing subjects' in deciding the issue.)

Now, add more people, up to everybody: even if everybody thinks capital punishment is morally wrong, that remains an opinion. It can never be a fact. And that's why morality isn't and can't be objective - there are no moral facts.

The fat lady has soung her song.
Roll Credits.....

[Gertie]

Sculptor -

Encore! Encore!

Oh alright then, just for you Sculptor!

[Gertie]

Peter

Thanks, Gertie. I'm pretty sure we've done this already - but anyway...

I agree with your explanation of why we have moral values and rules, or 'attitudes and opinions' - why things are 'meaningful' and matter to us. What I reject is the idea that moral assertions make falsifiable factual claims - claims which are true or false independently from opinion.

Aside from potential language quibbles yes I agree, sorry if I wasn't clear about that. Informed non-religious people will nearly all agree I expect. The problem then is - so what now.? In other words, that should be the beginning of the moral philosophy discussion, not the end. Because if we can't find an appropriate role for morality aside from ''This is how I personally feel so it is Good'', we can't eg say the inclinations and opinions of a psychopath who feels justified murdering anyone who gets in their way are morally wrong. In other words, once we agree morality isn't objective, we need an appropriate moral foundation which is more than subjective opinion, and philosophy has a role in that.

Take any example. Suppose one person believes capital punishment is morally wrong. Nobody would argue that means capital punishment is factually morally wrong. We would accept it as a moral opinion, with which others can (and many do) disagree. (And I'd point out the problem of an appeal to our shared experience as 'experiencing subjects' in deciding the issue.).

Our shared opinion as experiencing subjects isn't the basis of my argument. My argument is that we deserve moral consideration because we are experiencing subjects, who can experience wellbeing, suffering, etc - we have interests in the state of affairs. That is what makes behaviour matter - outcomes of behaviour matter to us. And this is the appropriate foundation for notions of right and wrong behaviour and oughts.

Now, add more people, up to everybody: even if everybody thinks capital punishment is morally wrong, that remains an opinion. It can never be a fact. And that's why morality isn't and can't be objective - there are no moral facts.

Right. I agree there are no moral facts. I made a different case for an appropriate foundation for morality.

So I'm putting to you - on what basis should we then make moral judgements like this? Or should we simply abandon the notion of morality?

[Leontiskos]

I'm pretty sure we've done this already - but anyway...

Hello Peter,

I wasn't going to post in this long thread until I realized that you are still active. I read pages 1, 2, 3, 118, and 119. Is there a particular post which you believe most strongly and concisely illustrates your position against objective morality? Two candidates that I noticed were #315468 or #315751, but perhaps there is a better option in the 100+ intervening pages? For example, is there a place where you attempted to formalize the argument with special rigor? If so, I would prefer to start there rather than at the beginning. Yesterday marked the 3 year birthday of your thread.

Thanks,
Leontiskos

[Peter Holmes]

Peter

Thanks, Gertie. I'm pretty sure we've done this already - but anyway...

I agree with your explanation of why we have moral values and rules, or 'attitudes and opinions' - why things are 'meaningful' and matter to us. What I reject is the idea that moral assertions make falsifiable factual claims - claims which are true or false independently from opinion.

Aside from potential language quibbles yes I agree, sorry if I wasn't clear about that. Informed non-religious people will nearly all agree I expect. The problem then is - so what now.? In other words, that should be the beginning of the moral philosophy discussion, not the end. Because if we can't find an appropriate role for morality aside from ''This is how I personally feel so it is Good'', we can't eg say the inclinations and opinions of a psychopath who feels justified murdering anyone who gets in their way are morally wrong. In other words, once we agree morality isn't objective, we need an appropriate moral foundation which is more than subjective opinion, and philosophy has a role in that.

Take any example. Suppose one person believes capital punishment is morally wrong. Nobody would argue that means capital punishment is factually morally wrong. We would accept it as a moral opinion, with which others can (and many do) disagree. (And I'd point out the problem of an appeal to our shared experience as 'experiencing subjects' in deciding the issue.).

Our shared opinion as experiencing subjects isn't the basis of my argument. My argument is that we deserve moral consideration because we are experiencing subjects, who can experience wellbeing, suffering, etc - we have interests in the state of affairs. That is what makes behaviour matter - outcomes of behaviour matter to us. And this is the appropriate foundation for notions of right and wrong behaviour and oughts.

Now, add more people, up to everybody: even if everybody thinks capital punishment is morally wrong, that remains an opinion. It can never be a fact. And that's why morality isn't and can't be objective - there are no moral facts.

Right. I agree there are no moral facts. I made a different case for an appropriate foundation for morality.

So I'm putting to you - on what basis should we then make moral judgements like this? Or should we simply abandon the notion of morality?

Going by what you've written, I'd guess we share a lot of basic values. And no - we desperately need a sound, rational morality.

[Leontiskos]

After reading more of this thread, I think @CIN has provided excellent and successful argumentation. I sure hope he doesn't give up philosophy, because he seems like a good philosopher. I certainly don't want to rehash the long argument between @CIN and @Peter Holmes, but it seems that a large part of the debate revolved around this argument from Peter:

1. If it is fallacious to derive an "ought" from an "is", then objective morality fails.
2. It is fallacious to derive an "ought" from an "is".
3. Therefore, objective morality fails.

The problem is that premise (2) was never defended. As often happens, it was asserted as a dogma rather than defended as a premise. For example:

4 The is/ought barrier is insuperable. An argument that pretends it isn't, or that the barrier doesn't exist, begs the question and is therefore fallacious.

I think it is actually you that is begging the question here, by describing any attempt to cross the supposed barrier as a 'pretence'. That is something you can only judge by examining the attempt to see if it succeeds. If you think no such attempt could ever succeed, then the burden of proof that this is so rests on you.

Here's why the barrier is insuperable: a factual (is) premise can never entail a 'judgemental' (ought) conclusion. In other words, what ought to be the case can never follow deductively from what is the case. Any claim that it can must be a 'pretence', in the form of a question-begging fallacy. So this is not a matter of inductive overreach - needing pragmatic, case-by-case analysis.

Again you make a claim without giving reasons why I should accept it. Give me reasons why I should accept that a factual premise can't entail an 'ought' conclusion.

...we are given no reasons in support of premise (2). It is merely re-asserted at each juncture. Contrariwise, CIN gave various arguments and examples which purported to falsify premise (2). They were met with the same assertion that premise (2) must be true. Therefore it seems to me that CIN's arguments were based on more fundamental premises and deeper reasoning.

-------------------------------------

I want to press from a slightly different angle. There are many entry points into Peter's argument, but I want to pursue the idea that it proves too much. Namely, if we follow Peter's reasoning then it is not only objective morality that becomes impossible, but also all objectivity, including objective science.

Let's just take an empirical claim. Suppose there is a fruit sitting in front of Peter. Peter claims, "This is a tangerine." Peter's sister makes the counter-claim, "This is a clementine." Let's apply Peter's criteria:

1 Take any assertion expressing a value judgement - slavery is wrong, this god is good, that painting is beautiful, happiness is better than unhappiness, health is better than sickness, life is preferable to death - and so on.

Rather than a value judgment we are taking a factual judgment, for my claim is that his criteria preclude all objectivity.

2 To be objective - and so true or false - the assertion has to make a falsifiable claim about something - an 'object' of some kind. Ask yourself what that object is.

His claim about the fruit is presumably falsifiable. Check.

3 The object can't be what the judgement is about - slavery, this god, that painting, happiness, health, life - and so on - because that is also the object of the contrary value judgement - slavery is right, this god is bad - and so on. Back to square one.

The judgment is about the object, which is also the object of the counter-claim. "Back to square one." We have already failed. According to Peter's criteria the nature of the piece of fruit is not an objective reality. Nevertheless, let's continue:

4 And the object can't be the judgement itself: what justifies the judgement that this god is good is ... the goodness of this god - and so on. That just begs the question, going around in a circle.

It's hard to know what is meant by (4), but it seems to me that (4) also fails because the fruit itself is the crucial justifying factor. For example, "What justifies the judgment that this fruit is a tangerine is ... the tangerine-ness of the fruit - and so on."

5 Realise this is a wild goose chase, because the fact/value barrier is insuperable, which is why value judgements can't be factual - and why moral values and judgements - and morality itself - can't be objective.

It is interesting to note that Peter has also violated the is-ought "fallacy." This is because he began with an "is": the existence of a piece of fruit. He moved to an "ought": "This is a tangerine". Why is it an "ought"? Because truth claims are teleological in the relevant ought-sense. The propositional truth claim entails the normative claim that objective and rational observers ought to recognize this as a tangerine. To claim that some proposition is true is to claim that one has accurately perceived reality and that other minds ought to come to the same conclusion if they studied the same phenomena. Truth claims are necessarily "ought"-claims on all rational agents. Indeed, his sister will feel this "ought" claim particularly acutely.

Dr Peter suggests this guaranteed cure for any strain of objectivism.

Truly, "any strain."

The argument proves too much. If we follow Peter's reasoning all objectivity is impossible, including empirical and scientific objectivity. I think the reasons why this approach fails are interesting, but it seems prudent to start with a simple reductio in a thread that is already 120 pages long!

-Leontiskos

[Peter Holmes]

After reading more of this thread, I think @CIN has provided excellent and successful argumentation. I sure hope he doesn't give up philosophy, because he seems like a good philosopher. I certainly don't want to rehash the long argument between @CIN and @Peter Holmes, but it seems that a large part of the debate revolved around this argument from Peter:

1. If it is fallacious to derive an "ought" from an "is", then objective morality fails.
2. It is fallacious to derive an "ought" from an "is".
3. Therefore, objective morality fails.

The problem is that premise (2) was never defended. As often happens, it was asserted as a dogma rather than defended as a premise. For example:

I think it is actually you that is begging the question here, by describing any attempt to cross the supposed barrier as a 'pretence'. That is something you can only judge by examining the attempt to see if it succeeds. If you think no such attempt could ever succeed, then the burden of proof that this is so rests on you.

Here's why the barrier is insuperable: a factual (is) premise can never entail a 'judgemental' (ought) conclusion. In other words, what ought to be the case can never follow deductively from what is the case. Any claim that it can must be a 'pretence', in the form of a question-begging fallacy. So this is not a matter of inductive overreach - needing pragmatic, case-by-case analysis.

Again you make a claim without giving reasons why I should accept it. Give me reasons why I should accept that a factual premise can't entail an 'ought' conclusion.

...we are given no reasons in support of premise (2). It is merely re-asserted at each juncture. Contrariwise, CIN gave various arguments and examples which purported to falsify premise (2). They were met with the same assertion that premise (2) must be true. Therefore it seems to me that CIN's arguments were based on more fundamental premises and deeper reasoning.

-------------------------------------

I want to press from a slightly different angle. There are many entry points into Peter's argument, but I want to pursue the idea that it proves too much. Namely, if we follow Peter's reasoning then it is not only objective morality that becomes impossible, but also all objectivity, including objective science.

Let's just take an empirical claim. Suppose there is a fruit sitting in front of Peter. Peter claims, "This is a tangerine." Peter's sister makes the counter-claim, "This is a clementine." Let's apply Peter's criteria:

1 Take any assertion expressing a value judgement - slavery is wrong, this god is good, that painting is beautiful, happiness is better than unhappiness, health is better than sickness, life is preferable to death - and so on.

Rather than a value judgment we are taking a factual judgment, for my claim is that his criteria preclude all objectivity.

2 To be objective - and so true or false - the assertion has to make a falsifiable claim about something - an 'object' of some kind. Ask yourself what that object is.

His claim about the fruit is presumably falsifiable. Check.

3 The object can't be what the judgement is about - slavery, this god, that painting, happiness, health, life - and so on - because that is also the object of the contrary value judgement - slavery is right, this god is bad - and so on. Back to square one.

The judgment is about the object, which is also the object of the counter-claim. "Back to square one." We have already failed. According to Peter's criteria the nature of the piece of fruit is not an objective reality. Nevertheless, let's continue:

4 And the object can't be the judgement itself: what justifies the judgement that this god is good is ... the goodness of this god - and so on. That just begs the question, going around in a circle.

It's hard to know what is meant by (4), but it seems to me that (4) also fails because the fruit itself is the crucial justifying factor. For example, "What justifies the judgment that this fruit is a tangerine is ... the tangerine-ness of the fruit - and so on."

5 Realise this is a wild goose chase, because the fact/value barrier is insuperable, which is why value judgements can't be factual - and why moral values and judgements - and morality itself - can't be objective.

It is interesting to note that Peter has also violated the is-ought "fallacy." This is because he began with an "is": the existence of a piece of fruit. He moved to an "ought": "This is a tangerine". Why is it an "ought"? Because truth claims are teleological in the relevant ought-sense. The propositional truth claim entails the normative claim that objective and rational observers ought to recognize this as a tangerine. To claim that some proposition is true is to claim that one has accurately perceived reality and that other minds ought to come to the same conclusion if they studied the same phenomena. Truth claims are necessarily "ought"-claims on all rational agents. Indeed, his sister will feel this "ought" claim particularly acutely.

Dr Peter suggests this guaranteed cure for any strain of objectivism.

Truly, "any strain."

The argument proves too much. If we follow Peter's reasoning all objectivity is impossible, including empirical and scientific objectivity. I think the reasons why this approach fails are interesting, but it seems prudent to start with a simple reductio in a thread that is already 120 pages long!

-Leontiskos

Thanks. I may not fully understand your argument - but at a first look it seems misguided. Some initial thoughts.

1 The claim 'this is a tangerine' is falsifiable, because the fruit may or may not be the object (the thing) we call a tangerine. But the claim 'this action is good' is unfalsifiable, because there's nothing in reality that, as it were, functions in the way the tangerine does.

2 Your claim that 'truth-claims are teleological in the relevant ought-sense' is patent nonsense.

3 Don't pretend I've written something that I haven't.

[Peter Holmes]

Oh, and by the way, if the premises don't contain any reference to an ought or a should, a conclusion that does contain them doesn't follow. This is basic logic.

[Gertie]

Peter

Thanks, Gertie. I'm pretty sure we've done this already - but anyway...

I agree with your explanation of why we have moral values and rules, or 'attitudes and opinions' - why things are 'meaningful' and matter to us. What I reject is the idea that moral assertions make falsifiable factual claims - claims which are true or false independently from opinion.

Aside from potential language quibbles yes I agree, sorry if I wasn't clear about that. Informed non-religious people will nearly all agree I expect. The problem then is - so what now.? In other words, that should be the beginning of the moral philosophy discussion, not the end. Because if we can't find an appropriate role for morality aside from ''This is how I personally feel so it is Good'', we can't eg say the inclinations and opinions of a psychopath who feels justified murdering anyone who gets in their way are morally wrong. In other words, once we agree morality isn't objective, we need an appropriate moral foundation which is more than subjective opinion, and philosophy has a role in that.

Take any example. Suppose one person believes capital punishment is morally wrong. Nobody would argue that means capital punishment is factually morally wrong. We would accept it as a moral opinion, with which others can (and many do) disagree. (And I'd point out the problem of an appeal to our shared experience as 'experiencing subjects' in deciding the issue.).

Our shared opinion as experiencing subjects isn't the basis of my argument. My argument is that we deserve moral consideration because we are experiencing subjects, who can experience wellbeing, suffering, etc - we have interests in the state of affairs. That is what makes behaviour matter - outcomes of behaviour matter to us. And this is the appropriate foundation for notions of right and wrong behaviour and oughts.

Now, add more people, up to everybody: even if everybody thinks capital punishment is morally wrong, that remains an opinion. It can never be a fact. And that's why morality isn't and can't be objective - there are no moral facts.

Right. I agree there are no moral facts. I made a different case for an appropriate foundation for morality.

So I'm putting to you - on what basis should we then make moral judgements like this? Or should we simply abandon the notion of morality?

Going by what you've written, I'd guess we share a lot of basic values. And no - we desperately need a sound, rational morality.

Yes I think we desperately do too. I think we're in a po-mo limbo now, with the old certainties of religion and modernism crumbling, along with dealing with unprecedented globalisation. There is no global moral consensus, no foundational shared anchor, philosophically or in practice. And if we look to the facts of our evolutionary predispositions, we see they were designed for up close and personal tribal living, where 'the other' is a potential threat or competitor. That's not how we live now, and these anachronistic traits like tribalism are ill-fitting, sometimes catastrophic.

My view is what Harris calls 'the welfare of conscious creatures' is an appropriate moral foundation. I gave my rationale, whether it's a neat fit with 'rationality' might be arguable, because Subjects are a peculiar phenomenon, but if we reframe the issue as ''What is an appropriate morality for?'', I think it works. And this is the approach philosophers should be adopting imo.

Of course even if we establish a moral foundation and touchstone rooted in the nature of what it is to be a Subject, we still have the inevitably complex, messy problem of applying it to particular moral scenarios. Because Subjects aren't homogenous, across species, or individual humans - we are complex and messy individually and en masse. My notion of wellbeing, my fears and desires won't be identical to yours, so in practice we will never have a perfect a one size fits all moral equation we can calculate. But at least it gives us a place to start.

[popeye1945]

118 pages -- What could make morality objective? How about the people who create morality, who turn ideas into systems, structures, institutions to serve said ideas that constitute morality.

If people say 'this is right and wrong', and turn those claims into systems, structures and institutuions, that doesn't mean what they call right and wrong are facts. Obviously.

Peter, Which is percisely why we have what we have, morality needs to be based upon its obvious subject, our common biology.

[Leontiskos]

1 The claim 'this is a tangerine' is falsifiable, because the fruit may or may not be the object (the thing) we call a tangerine. But the claim 'this action is good' is unfalsifiable, because there's nothing in reality that, as it were, functions in the way the tangerine does.

I admitted that the claim about the tangerine is falsifiable. In the method you give here falsifiability is not sufficient to provide objectivity. The claim, "This is a tangerine," fulfills condition 2, but fails conditions 3, 4, and 5.

2 Your claim that 'truth-claims are teleological in the relevant ought-sense' is patent nonsense.

This is just one more dogmatic re-assertion of premise (2). It is not an argument. Again, here is premise (2):

2. It is fallacious to derive an "ought" from an "is".

Oh, and by the way, if the premises don't contain any reference to an ought or a should, a conclusion that does contain them doesn't follow. This is basic logic.

Again, this is merely a dogmatic reassertion of premise (2). You have not argued for premise (2) in this thread, you have merely asserted it.

From what I can see there are at least four false assumptions you are making in this thread, and they ground your argument:

1. It is fallacious to derive an "ought" from an "is". (Cf. #5 here)
2. Objective assertions must be falsifiable. (Cf. #2 here)
3. The judgment and the contrary judgment cannot share the same object. (Cf. #3 here)
4. The object cannot be "the judgment itself." (Cf. #4 here)

Counterexamples and critiques:

1. Truth and desirability are inherently teleological; I gave an unanswered example in the previous post and CIN has provided many throughout the thread.
2. Necessary truths are objective and unfalsifiable (Cf. CIN's post here). A simple example would be the law of non-contradiction, which is necessary, objective, and unfalsifiable.
3. Just because someone makes a counter-claim does not mean that your claim was non-objective. I see no reason to accept this principle. Disagreements about single objects happen all the time. For example, the fact that we disagree about premise (2) surely doesn't mean that claims regarding premise (2) are non-objective!
4. This seems to flow from a misunderstanding of the foundation of argument and reason. We can analyze complex arguments and premises, but at the end of the reasoning chain are direct judgments about basic premises ("first principles"). If some judgments are not immediately derived from the object then there could be no foundation to build upon.

Again, if we accept assumptions like (1-4) we arrive at the absurd conclusion that no objective statements are possible in any discipline. They are false and they lead to absurdities. Therefore they must be left behind.