What could make morality objective?

[Terrapin Station]

Who suggested that theories create themselves?

TP scoffed at me saying that consensus amongst experts was required for a theory to be accepted.

No, I didn't say that at all. Obviously, tautologously, for a theory to be accepted (by the scientific community), we have to have a consensus. But science isn't about the acceptance of theories.

How is a theory created without expert consensus?

Theories can't be created by "expert consensus." They can be accepted by expert consensus, but accepting a theory, especially where we're talking about the scientific community accepting them, is different than creating theories. Theories are created by individuals attempting to piece together an overarching account of how something works, or we could say an overarching explanation of some phenomenon. Multiple individuals can participate, but each contribution to the theory will still be an individual contribution, not a consensus contribution.

[GE Morton]

The possibly publicly-confirmable claim 'X is consistent/inconsistent with goal Y' says nothing about the moral rightness or wrongness of either X or goal Y, so it isn't a moral assertion - and its truth doesn't demonstrate moral objectivity - independence from opinion when considering the facts.

To make that case you need to spell out just what you think the term "morality" denotes and what qualifies as a moral assertion. I've given mine --- a "morality" is a set of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting (I've also given a definition of "moral agent"). You also need to spell out what you assume to be the purpose of those rules, since a set of rules with no aim or purpose would gratuitous, vacuous, superfluous.

If my definition of "morality" is accepted, then any proposition asserting (or denying) such a rule, or asserting a violation of such a rule, qualifies as a "moral assertion," by definition. I.e., a rule is "moral" --- "morally right" --- if it advances the stated purpose of the rules, and an act is "moral" ("morally right") if it conforms with those rules. A rule which thwarts the stated purpose, and an act which violates a valid rule, is "morally wrong," by definition.

You can only claim that "the possibly publicly-confirmable claim 'X is consistent/inconsistent with goal Y' says nothing about the moral rightness or wrongness of either X or goal Y, so it isn't a moral assertion" if you are assuming some definitions of "morality" and "moral rightness/wrongness" different from those I've given. Please set forth those definitions.

The claim that a moral assertion is no different from a factual assertion - that 'ought', 'should', 'right' and 'wrong' have no special moral meaning - because those words merely refer to goal-consistency - is false, in my opinion.

Please set forth the basis of that opinion. Are you simply saying those terms are often used as though they have some "special moral meaning," or are widely assumed to have such a special meaning? If so, then I agree with you. Unfortunately, however, that "special meaning" is hopelessly nebulous, ethereal, and apparently ineffable, yielding endless "moral" propositions that are subjective, idiosyncratic, and non-cognitive --- which are empirically and logically untestable and express nothing but someone's personal feelings. A rational morality yields moral propositions --- "X is right" or "Y is wrong" --- which have determinable truth values.

There are no moral facts, but only facts about which there can be moral opinions, expressed by means of moral assertions.

We've covered this. If "morality" is defined as above, then whether a proffered rule or a given act comports with that definition is a "moral fact," by definition, just as traffic rules and violations are "traffic facts." Both types of facts are empirically determinable.

Again, please spell out just what you think "morality" is, and the criteria per which you decide whether an act is "morally right" or "morally wrong." Hopefully those criteria will yield cognitive propositions.

[Sculptor1]

The possibly publicly-confirmable claim 'X is consistent/inconsistent with goal Y' says nothing about the moral rightness or wrongness of either X or goal Y, so it isn't a moral assertion - and its truth doesn't demonstrate moral objectivity - independence from opinion when considering the facts.

To make that case you need to spell out just what you think the term "morality" denotes and what qualifies as a moral assertion. I've given mine --- a "morality" is a set of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting (I've also given a definition of "moral agent"). You also need to spell out what you assume to be the purpose of those rules, since a set of rules with no aim or purpose would gratuitous, vacuous, superfluous.

If my definition of "morality" is accepted, then any proposition asserting (or denying) such a rule, or asserting a violation of such a rule, qualifies as a "moral assertion," by definition. I.e., a rule is "moral" --- "morally right" --- if it advances the stated purpose of the rules, and an act is "moral" ("morally right") if it conforms with those rules. A rule which thwarts the stated purpose, and an act which violates a valid rule, is "morally wrong," by definition.

You can only claim that "the possibly publicly-confirmable claim 'X is consistent/inconsistent with goal Y' says nothing about the moral rightness or wrongness of either X or goal Y, so it isn't a moral assertion" if you are assuming some definitions of "morality" and "moral rightness/wrongness" different from those I've given. Please set forth those definitions.

The claim that a moral assertion is no different from a factual assertion - that 'ought', 'should', 'right' and 'wrong' have no special moral meaning - because those words merely refer to goal-consistency - is false, in my opinion.

Please set forth the basis of that opinion. Are you simply saying those terms are often used as though they have some "special moral meaning," or are widely assumed to have such a special meaning? If so, then I agree with you. Unfortunately, however, that "special meaning" is hopelessly nebulous, ethereal, and apparently ineffable, yielding endless "moral" propositions that are subjective, idiosyncratic, and non-cognitive --- which are empirically and logically untestable and express nothing but someone's personal feelings. A rational morality yields moral propositions --- "X is right" or "Y is wrong" --- which have determinable truth values.

There are no moral facts, but only facts about which there can be moral opinions, expressed by means of moral assertions.

We've covered this. If "morality" is defined as above, then whether a proffered rule or a given act comports with that definition is a "moral fact," by definition, just as traffic rules and violations are "traffic facts." Both types of facts are empirically determinable.

Again, please spell out just what you think "morality" is, and the criteria per which you decide whether an act is "morally right" or "morally wrong." Hopefully those criteria will yield cognitive propositions.

As the relationship between the signified and the signifier is arbitrary so too is the objectivity of traffic lights.
Your basic problem is that like every thing is your strange world you think "objectivity" is a concrete thing, that stands alone.
It is not. Objectivity and subjectivity are anstract concepts of metaphysical quality that only lie on a specturm of relationship between that whcih is perceived and the comments and reception of those things. Please note the "spectrum" is not real either, it also is a metaphor to help you understand.
Things can be more or less objective and subjective. There is nothing that can be said to be objective or subjective. These words can only be applied as a judgement in a relationship.
Were there no humans then nothing whatever could be said to exist on this spectrum.

You are living in a fantasy world and no one wants to be a part of that.

[GE Morton]

Objectivity and subjectivity are anstract concepts of metaphysical quality that only lie on a specturm of relationship between that whcih is perceived and the comments and reception of those things.

Er, no, they're not. They are not abstract and certainly not "metaphysical." The two terms denote properties of propositions, and are perfectly well defined. A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are publicly confirmable; subjective if its truth conditions are confirmable only by the utterer.

You're free to attach any spurious definitions you like to those terms, of course. But when I say moralities can be objective, it is per the above definition.

There is nothing that can be said to be objective or subjective.

Well, you've just rendered those terms useless. What a silly statement. BTW, the terms don't apply to "things." They apply to propositions.

[Sy Borg]

Who suggested that theories create themselves?

TP scoffed at me saying that consensus amongst experts was required for a theory to be accepted.

No, I didn't say that at all. Obviously, tautologously, for a theory to be accepted (by the scientific community), we have to have a consensus. But science isn't about the acceptance of theories.

Weasel word games - treating the casual language used in a forum as if it's an incorrect formal dissertation. You knew very well what I meant but still misrepresented my position.

The claim that theories require the consensus of experts was, and is, obviously correct. Without that consensus, propositions remain mere hypotheses.

[Peter Holmes]

Objectivity and subjectivity are anstract concepts of metaphysical quality that only lie on a specturm of relationship between that whcih is perceived and the comments and reception of those things.

Er, no, they're not. They are not abstract and certainly not "metaphysical." The two terms denote properties of propositions, and are perfectly well defined. A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are publicly confirmable; subjective if its truth conditions are confirmable only by the utterer.

You're free to attach any spurious definitions you like to those terms, of course. But when I say moralities can be objective, it is per the above definition.

There is nothing that can be said to be objective or subjective.

Well, you've just rendered those terms useless. What a silly statement. BTW, the terms don't apply to "things." They apply to propositions.

No dictionary definition of the word 'objectivity' that I've come across mentions the public confirmability of propositions - or propositions at all. Perhaps you have one that does. But to call other definitions - such as 'unbiased' or 'independent from opinion' or 'relying on facts' - spurious is plainly false. It seems you've invented your own use for the word.

If instead objectivity is to do with facts and reliance on them, and subjectivity with judgements, beliefs and opinions, then moral objectivism is, as I said, the claim that there are moral facts - and not the public confirmability of moral assertions - whatever that means. Facts are at the heart of the debate over moral objectivism. Your argument for moral objectivism is based on a misunderstanding of the terms.

[Sculptor1]

Objectivity and subjectivity are anstract concepts of metaphysical quality that only lie on a specturm of relationship between that whcih is perceived and the comments and reception of those things.

Er, no, they're not. They are not abstract and certainly not "metaphysical."

Er, yes they are.

The two terms denote properties of propositions, and are perfectly well defined.

Yes the exact interests of metaphysics.

A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are publicly confirmable; subjective if its truth conditions are confirmable only by the utterer.

You're free to attach any spurious definitions you like to those terms, of course. But when I say moralities can be objective, it is per the above definition.

For years you have been banging on about this, but have consistently FAILED to over a single example of an objective moral truth.
And by you own definition(is objective if its truth conditions are publicly confirmable) have no morality which is sully agreeable to the public.

There is nothing that can be said to be objective or subjective.

Well, you've just rendered those terms useless. What a silly statement. BTW, the terms don't apply to "things." They apply to propositions.

They need not apply to ANY propositions.
and there is no example of a morally objective propostion. And you have failed to produce one.

There is no thing which is wholly one or the other. They are about a RELATIONSHIP not absolutes. It's more or less. You can attempt objectivity, and there are plenty of judges that claim that as they apply the establishment's historical and draconian prejudices.
On the religious front we have exaclty the same evil. Condemning people based on out of date so-called objective morality which applies out-of-date disgraceful morals.

[Terrapin Station]

The claim that theories require the consensus of experts was, and is, obviously correct.

No. That's not correct. Only the tautologous claim that acceptance of theories by the scientific community requires the consensus of experts would be correct.

[baker]

What could make morality objective?

Force. Fire and swords. The argument from power. It's the strongest argument there is.

[Sy Borg]

The claim that theories require the consensus of experts was, and is, obviously correct.

No. That's not correct. Only the tautologous claim that acceptance of theories by the scientific community requires the consensus of experts would be correct.

Get serious. Stop defending your error.

I said that consensus was necessary for theories to exist.

You then gave the false impression that my claim was that theories are only formed by consensus, without beforehand forming hypotheses, and rigorously testing and reporting on the results. You clearly wanted to make a point that science was not just a matter of opinion, but you chose the wrong person/statement to attack to make that point.

All I did was point out that science does not happen independent of consensus, that expert human beings still need to agree for theories to exist.

[Terrapin Station]

The claim that theories require the consensus of experts was, and is, obviously correct.

No. That's not correct. Only the tautologous claim that acceptance of theories by the scientific community requires the consensus of experts would be correct.

Get serious. Stop defending your error.

I said that consensus was necessary for theories to exist.

You then gave the false impression that my claim was that theories are only formed by consensus, without beforehand forming hypotheses, and rigorously testing and reporting on the results. You clearly wanted to make a point that science was not just a matter of opinion, but you chose the wrong person/statement to attack to make that point.

All I did was point out that science does not happen independent of consensus, that expert human beings still need to agree for theories to exist.

So to cite a pretty well-known example, when Einstein developed the special theory of relativity in his 1905 paper, "Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper" ("On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies"), not only did it not develop out of any sorts of consensus about anything, it was very controversial for many years.

If a consensus were necessary for theories to exist, we'd have trouble explaining how Einstein developed the special theory of relativity circa 1905.

[Sy Borg]

The claim that theories require the consensus of experts was, and is, obviously correct.

No. That's not correct. Only the tautologous claim that acceptance of theories by the scientific community requires the consensus of experts would be correct.

Get serious. Stop defending your error.

I said that consensus was necessary for theories to exist.

You then gave the false impression that my claim was that theories are only formed by consensus, without beforehand forming hypotheses, and rigorously testing and reporting on the results. You clearly wanted to make a point that science was not just a matter of opinion, but you chose the wrong person/statement to attack to make that point.

All I did was point out that science does not happen independent of consensus, that expert human beings still need to agree for theories to exist.

So to cite a pretty well-known example, when Einstein developed the special theory of relativity in his 1905 paper, "Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper" ("On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies"), not only did it not develop out of any sorts of consensus about anything, it was very controversial for many years.

If a consensus were necessary for theories to exist, we'd have trouble explaining how Einstein developed the special theory of relativity circa 1905.

Special relativity would not have been considered to be a theory without consensus between, at least, the most influential of his peers. If Einstein was alone with his ideas, or if those ideas were only accepted by fringe practitioners, then we would have a hypothesis of special relativity rather than a theory. However, the hypothesis passed enough tests for a sufficient consensus to be reached to be accepted as theory:

A theory is a hypothesis that has been tested numerous times and found to explain previous observations and make accurate predictions about future observations. The division between hypothesis and theory is a bit fuzzy, but is broadly when there is no more ‘reasonable doubt’ of the hypothesis’ truth. Broadly speaking ‘enough’ different people have tested the theory experimentally in ‘enough’ different ways that we can be reasonably sure that the theory is correct.

https://www.raggeduniversity.co.uk/2014 ... x-dunedin/

Unanimity is not needed, only sufficient consensus. This has nothing to do with the thread and morality, though.

[GE Morton]

The claim that theories require the consensus of experts was, and is, obviously correct. Without that consensus, propositions remain mere hypotheses.

No, Greta. As I said above, the difference between hypotheses and theories lies in how they are structured and what are their purposes, not in how widely accepted they are. Hypotheses don't "grow up" into theories by attracting a consensus. If an hypothesis is confirmed it becomes a fact; if it is disconfirmed it is abandoned. It never becomes a theory.

[Sy Borg]

The claim that theories require the consensus of experts was, and is, obviously correct. Without that consensus, propositions remain mere hypotheses.

No, Greta. As I said above, the difference between hypotheses and theories lies in how they are structured and what are their purposes, not in how widely accepted they are. Hypotheses don't "grow up" into theories by attracting a consensus. If an hypothesis is confirmed it becomes a fact; if it is disconfirmed it is abandoned. It never becomes a theory.

Confirmed by whom? By people, who form a consensus. Theories do not happen independent of people.

And moralities don't happen independent of subjects, which is why your thread was doomed to fail from the start. 105 pages is not indicative of a thread's success, but its failure based on your refusal to accept the almost unanimous disagreement of other members, nor any of the numerous valid arguments made against your paradoxical notion of "objective morality".

But let's say, for argument's sake, that your notion is right. Do you think that seeing morality as objective has any actual use, or is it just word play? Ideally, you would provide concrete examples of objective realities. If morality is objective, providing numerous specific examples of morals that are objectively correct should be simple for you. Personally, I think you would struggle to name any outside of blatantly entropic actions like killing, torturing, abusing and stealing (from humans).

[GE Morton]

Special relativity would not have been considered to be a theory without consensus between, at least, the most influential of his peers. If Einstein was alone with his ideas, or if those ideas were only accepted by fringe practitioners, then we would have a hypothesis of special relativity rather than a theory. However, the hypothesis passed enough tests for a sufficient consensus to be reached to be accepted as theory:

A theory is a hypothesis that has been tested numerous times and found to explain previous observations and make accurate predictions about future observations. The division between hypothesis and theory is a bit fuzzy, but is broadly when there is no more ‘reasonable doubt’ of the hypothesis’ truth. Broadly speaking ‘enough’ different people have tested the theory experimentally in ‘enough’ different ways that we can be reasonably sure that the theory is correct.

https://www.raggeduniversity.co.uk/2014 ... x-dunedin/

That is an exceeding poor --- indeed, dead wrong --- explanation of the difference between theories and hypotheses. Pity any students who take it to heart.

"Special relativity would not have been considered to be a theory without consensus between, at least, the most influential of his peers."

Also dead wrong. Einstein's theories, as well as Maxwell's, Darwin's, Mendel's, Alfred Wegener's (plate tectonics), the "Big Bang" theory, etc., etc., were all theories and characterized as such from the moment they were published, long before there was a consensus on any of them. There are dozens of theories in the sciences, especially quantum physics, for which there is currently no consensus.

This has nothing to do with the thread and morality, though.

You're right about that!