Philosophy Discussion Forums

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑August 19th, 2018, 6:39 am Karpel Tunnel

I take your point. And I've often argued with fellow subjectivists about the post-objective redeemability of moral language.

I suppose my point is that our words mean what we (largely collectively) use them to mean - so that we use 'good', 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' to express moral values and judgements that (rightly) matter deeply to us - but that recognising their subjectivity allows us to develop and change their meanings.

I think that if we refuse to acknowledge and talk about what we call moral goodness, we may, at least tacitly, concede something to objectivists. But I fully understand your reservations.

Ah, OK, but I think it just delays and confuses. I think one needs to bite the bullet and leave that language. I don't think it makes any sense, as I explained rapidly in my previous post. 'we have decided we don't want...' 'we don't like' IOW one can approach universalist rules and guidelines, perhaps one day and reflect this in the language where it locally applies. The university has decided that we will not tolerate and so on.

To me the word moral carries with it so strongly that idea that it is NOT a preference merely, but something more and applicable everywhere, that it is confusing and i think even confusing to subjectivists who use it.

I we look at the sentence I was reacting to it included social inequality. Reading that list it would seem like social inequality is something caused by religions, given the context, and something, I guess rational people now realize is no longer justified, freed as we are of the religious ideas. But I don't think that holds. IOW I think you likely have vestiges of objective morals in you - and it would be odd if you didn't given the culture - and it's better to leave the language behind and see how it feels, each of us, when describing things.

We want the power in implicit or explicit use of morals, since it implies objective authority.

For anyone following this post -

After much useful and interesting discussion here, I've posted a summary of my argument against moral objectivism at my OP 'Is morality objective or subjective?'

Karpel Tunnel wrote: ↑August 20th, 2018, 4:23 am

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑August 19th, 2018, 6:39 am Karpel Tunnel

I take your point. And I've often argued with fellow subjectivists about the post-objective redeemability of moral language.

I suppose my point is that our words mean what we (largely collectively) use them to mean - so that we use 'good', 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' to express moral values and judgements that (rightly) matter deeply to us - but that recognising their subjectivity allows us to develop and change their meanings.

I think that if we refuse to acknowledge and talk about what we call moral goodness, we may, at least tacitly, concede something to objectivists. But I fully understand your reservations.

Ah, OK, but I think it just delays and confuses. I think one needs to bite the bullet and leave that language. I don't think it makes any sense, as I explained rapidly in my previous post. 'we have decided we don't want...' 'we don't like' IOW one can approach universalist rules and guidelines, perhaps one day and reflect this in the language where it locally applies. The university has decided that we will not tolerate and so on.

To me the word moral carries with it so strongly that idea that it is NOT a preference merely, but something more and applicable everywhere, that it is confusing and i think even confusing to subjectivists who use it.

I we look at the sentence I was reacting to it included social inequality. Reading that list it would seem like social inequality is something caused by religions, given the context, and something, I guess rational people now realize is no longer justified, freed as we are of the religious ideas. But I don't think that holds. IOW I think you likely have vestiges of objective morals in you - and it would be odd if you didn't given the culture - and it's better to leave the language behind and see how it feels, each of us, when describing things.

We want the power in implicit or explicit use of morals, since it implies objective authority.

I'm coming back to what you say here after a long break - so sorry if it's rehashing.

I agree that we want our moral values and judgement to be objective - meaning not a matter of preference or opinion. And you're right that one reason for this is the need to justify imposing moral values on others - so it's about social power.

But I think another - and perhaps more obvious - reason for holding to moral objectivism is the very nature of moral judgements. We (must?) make them universally - not limited to time and place. It would be inconsistent to believe an action is morally good at one place and time, but morally bad at another place and time - though we may want to justify an otherwise immoral action in a situation with mitigating circumstances.

So moral judgements and the values that inform them 'feel' objective or factual, even though they remain values and judgements, and are therefore, by definition, subjective.

What is life? What is the purpose of life? With such major unknowns involved, it may be impossible to establish objective morality. It could also indicate that it may be possible with enhanced knowledge of life.

arjand wrote: ↑December 9th, 2019, 5:27 pm What is life? What is the purpose of life? With such major unknowns involved, it may be impossible to establish objective morality. It could also indicate that it may be possible with enhanced knowledge of life.

Your argument seems to be that morality may be objective after all - but that we don't know enough at the moment to be able to say. The problem then is lack of knowledge of the facts. (Apologies if I've misunderstood what you say.)

But my argument is that morality can't be objective - a matter of facts - so it can't be about knowledge. There are no moral facts at all, but only moral judgements - so morality is and can only be subjective.

It appears that morality is tied to the idea that there is an optimum condition for (human) life which legitimizes the idea that there are universal principles that apply to every person.

To be able to establish an optimum condition for (human) life it would first be required to explain the origin of life.

Based on this it appears logical that when the origin of life is explained that it will result in a fundament for objective morality.

arjand wrote: ↑December 10th, 2019, 2:23 pm It appears that morality is tied to the idea that there is an optimum condition for (human) life which legitimizes the idea that there are universal principles that apply to every person.

To be able to establish an optimum condition for (human) life it would first be required to explain the origin of life.

Based on this it appears logical that when the origin of life is explained that it will result in a fundament for objective morality.

There are two problems with your argument.

1 There is no 'optimum [best] condition for human life'. There is and will always be disagreement about what constitutes that optimum condition - which shows that it's a matter of judgement, and therefore subjective.

2 There's no reason to think that facts about the origin of life could have moral implications.

3 A moral assertion expresses a judgement - an opinion - so it cannot, by definition, be objective, which means 'independent from opinion'.

Three problems. Sorry.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑December 7th, 2019, 6:27 am I'm coming back to what you say here after a long break - so sorry if it's rehashing.

I agree that we want our moral values and judgement to be objective - meaning not a matter of preference or opinion. And you're right that one reason for this is the need to justify imposing moral values on others - so it's about social power.

But I think another - and perhaps more obvious - reason for holding to moral objectivism is the very nature of moral judgements. We (must?) make them universally - not limited to time and place. It would be inconsistent to believe an action is morally good at one place and time, but morally bad at another place and time - though we may want to justify an otherwise immoral action in a situation with mitigating circumstances.

So moral judgements and the values that inform them 'feel' objective or factual, even though they remain values and judgements, and are therefore, by definition, subjective.

I agree, though that wasn't the area of my focus. I was saying we should (ha, ha) leave behind the word morals, I think, if we think our preferences are not objective. I was suggesting that to be consistant, calling them preferences or desires is necessary. Of course we talk about objective morals, so this would make it seem that there could be subjective morals, but I don't think that makes sense when referring to what you yourself have. If you know they are subjective, they are no longer morals. You could call other people's rules for behavior and judgments of morality and immorality subjective. That makes sense. They are calling them morals, and they treat them as morals (which pretty much always means as ideas of objective good and bad).

But if you yourself do not believe morals are objective, then what you want people to do, to get along, to form the guidelines of your society are not morals and you know this. They could be called customs, guidelines or rules based on preferences, organizational strategies, behavioral heuristics, etc. or a number of these kinds of 'things' in different contexts of discussion.

moral
/ˈmɒr(ə)l/

1.
concerned with the principles of right and wrong behaviour.
"the moral dimensions of medical intervention"
2.
concerned with or derived from the code of behaviour that is considered right or acceptable in a particular society.
"they have a moral obligation to pay the money back"
3.
examining the nature of ethics and the foundations of good and bad character and conduct.
"moral philosophers"

Number two above is using the word in relation to others, others who consider their morals objective. Numbers 1 and 3 clearly include the idea of objectivity.

I think anyone who believes that what get called morals are not objective, should drop the use of the word 'moral' except in the sense of describing, as in number two, what others believe to be morals. About their own preferences, they should use other words.

Karpel Tunnel

Thanks. That's an interesting angle, and I need to think it through properly.

First reaction - I'm not sure your proposed strategy over the use of 'objective' and 'subjective' is needed, or that it does the job you suggest it does. But - I'll try to respond fully when I can. Definitely - thanks.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑December 10th, 2019, 3:19 pmThere are two problems with your argument.

1 There is no 'optimum [best] condition for human life'. There is and will always be disagreement about what constitutes that optimum condition - which shows that it's a matter of judgement, and therefore subjective.

That is an assumption. It may be true but even if so, it must be possible to explain why it is so. The question is essentially: "what is the purpose of life?" (or why it cannot be known)

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑December 10th, 2019, 3:19 pm2 There's no reason to think that facts about the origin of life could have moral implications.

When the origin of life can be explained, it is logical that from the resulting knowledge it is possible to extract an optimal condition for human life which would result in a fundament for objective morality.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑December 10th, 2019, 3:19 pm3 A moral assertion expresses a judgement - an opinion - so it cannot, by definition, be objective, which means 'independent from opinion'.

That may be merely so because the purpose of life is a mystery while it is assumed that life has a purpose that requires morality.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑December 7th, 2019, 6:27 amWe (must?) make them universally - not limited to time and place. It would be inconsistent to believe an action is morally good at one place and time, but morally bad at another place and time - though we may want to justify an otherwise immoral action in a situation with mitigating circumstances.

What about the moral principle that one cannot determine the value of another in relation to the purpose of life? When hold universally, the morality of actions can differ by place and time.

In this example the foundation for the moral principle would be that since the purpose of life is unknown, the value of another person in relation to the purpose of life cannot be known beforehand, thereby by definition requiring a basis of respect for others to serve the purpose of life.

An example case: Albert Einstein was kicked out of school and was refused at the University Zurich Polytechnic. He was described by teachers as mentally slow, not social and absent in his own stupid dreams. He did not speak a word until he was 4 years old and could not read until he was 7 years old.

Albert Einstein's behaviour as a child may be perceived as morally reprehensive by many and a reason for measures but in his time he was merely kicked out of school and otherwise accepted as he was, which enabled him to develop into a genius that contributed to human existence like few others may have could.

If it would be established that the origin of life (and thereby the purpose of life) cannot be defined, in that case the above described moral principle may be called objective.

According the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas the idea of infinity is the foundation of morality.

Others and me is me responsible for him. The infinite is another who meets me. In other words, the infinite is the starting point of morality, its foundation.

Levinas makes ethics, respect for others, the first philosophy. It is therefore a reversal of the ontological approach to the subject.

...

The idea of ​​infinity requires the separation of the Same and the Other. This separation is a drop in the same and the other from the whole.

Levinas distinguishes between the idea of ​​totality and the idea of ​​infinity. The idea of ​​trying to integrate all the different and the same in all, while the idea of ​​infinity maintains separation between the other and the same. According to Levinas, the idea is all theoretical, while the idea of ​​infinity is moral.

https://www.the-philosophy.com/levinas- ... ty-summary

The idea of infinity could be considered undefinable in theory. As ground for a foundation of morality, it can be seen as objective.

I've come to like Goldstein's idea of ''mattering'' when it comes to morality.

It matters if I harm a conscious Subject who has a quality of life, or if I help improve their quality of life. Likewise my own matters too.

So morality and Oughts are inextricably bound to conscious Subjects capable of experiencing well-being and harm. That is the relevant category morality applies to.

What constitutes harm and well-being can become incredibly complex, and might be different from Subject to Subject (particularly for different species). Which makes it tricky to formulate hard and fast rules beyond the obvious ones, like murder and theft, and they might not always hold. Goldstein talks about a ''mattering map'', not dissimilar to Harris' ''moral landscape''. I think that's inevitable, considering the nature of conscious Subjects.

Untidy, annoying, philosophically unsatisfactory, but inevitable. And modern societies usually muddle their way through via evolved social pre-dispositions, culture, narratives, education, institutions, laws and democracy, to get to something which works reasonably well as a ''mattering map''.

But in our post-modern, post-religious age, we are at risk of flounderong without the old certainties, and we need a new touchstone to check against while we're muddling through. ''Mattering'', or ''the well-being of conscious creatures'' seems to me to be the best contender for that moral axiomatic foundation.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑July 16th, 2018, 9:20 am It seems to me this question is the crux in the disagreement between objectivists and subjectivists.

An objection to moral subjectivism is that, if moral values and judgements are matters of opinion, we can't know if they're correct. For example, we can't know if slavery is right or wrong, and can't therefore morally condemn those who think slavery is justifiable. That's just their opinion, and we can't say which opinion is correct or true.

But this assumes that there is indeed something to be known: an object of some kind that verifies the assertion slavery is wrong and falsifies the assertion slavery is right - or, perhaps, vice versa. But what is the object that makes moral judgements objective - matters of fact - and therefore true or false?

It can't be slavery itself, because that would also be the object of the assertion slavery is right - so we're back to square one. And it can't be the wrongness of slavery. To say the assertion slavery is wrong is justified (shown to be true) by the objective wrongness of slavery is circular, and so no justification at all.

So what is it that moral objectivists claim about moral judgements that makes them objective - matters of fact, falsifiable and independent of judgement, belief or opinion?

Does any moral objectivist here have an answer that doesn't beg the question?

(The claim that objective moral values and judgements come from a god's commands or a god's nature begs the question: what makes a god's commands or a god's nature objectively morally good?)

This thread is several years old.

Sounds like Peter Holmes is asking an atheist's question about what to him seems like a contradiction in terms.

According to Descartes, "God" is a good thing that exceeds all other good things, which Descartes then proceeds to expound upon in a philosophical proof.

So essentially the question by Holmes is an inquiry into Descartes.

I would suggest starting by examining Descartes in greater detail. Descartes is considered to be the father of Modern Philosophy.