J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Discuss morality and ethics in this message board.
Featured Article: Philosophical Analysis of Abortion, The Right to Life, and Murder
Post Reply
User avatar
Felix
Posts: 3117
Joined: February 9th, 2009, 5:45 am

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by Felix »

It's not magic to pick up on what someone is feeling, although it's not clear exactly how it works, perhaps a combination of conscious and unconscious clues, such as reading body language, or subtle odors (e.g., pheromones). Many people can tell when someone is angry, frightened, or sad, even if that person does not say a word. I know I can.

Women are usually better at it than men, I imagine it's related to the so-called maternal instinct. Before people developed complex languages, being able to read others intentions would have been an important skill. You don't see anything a little bit mysterious about empathy and compassion?
"We do not see things as they are; we see things as we are." - Anaïs Nin
Kaz_1983
Posts: 432
Joined: May 26th, 2019, 6:52 am

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by Kaz_1983 »

Does empathy only exist because morality exists? Can you not have one, without the other?
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6038
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by Consul »

Felix wrote: September 24th, 2019, 3:03 amYou don't see anything a little bit mysterious about empathy and compassion?
It doesn't require any mysterious perceptual abilities.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
User avatar
Bluemist
Posts: 129
Joined: November 15th, 2009, 10:11 pm

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by Bluemist »

Felix wrote: September 24th, 2019, 3:03 am It's not magic to pick up on what someone is feeling, although it's not clear exactly how it works, perhaps a combination of conscious and unconscious clues, such as reading body language, or subtle odors (e.g., pheromones). Many people can tell when someone is angry, frightened, or sad, even if that person does not say a word. I know I can.

Women are usually better at it than men,
and cats are the best .
If you don't believe in telekinesis then raise your right hand :wink:
CIN
Posts: 284
Joined: November 6th, 2016, 10:33 am

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by CIN »

Consul wrote: September 23rd, 2019, 9:29 pm
CIN wrote: September 23rd, 2019, 7:19 pmYou ignore the possibility that there may be things (such as suffering) that are self-condemning. I suggest the following train of thought:
1. 'Bad' means 'merits a negative response'.
2. Suffering, because of what it is like (which equates to 'by its very nature'), merits a negative response.
3. Anything that merits a negative response is self-condemning.
4. We ought not to do what is self-condemning.
Step 2 makes clear that 'meriting a negative response' is a natural property of suffering. Hence, ethical naturalism.
It doesn't of course follow that all moral evaluations are derivable from natural properties, but at least some are. For example, if I beat my dog and cause him pain, the pain is self-condemning (it is absurd to deny that pain is bad, i.e. merits a negative response), and it follows that I ought not to do it.
We (the non-masochists among us at least) always experience pain as something hedonically bad (unpleasant, unenjoyable); but, as I already said, hedonic badness isn't the same as and doesn't entail moral badness.
There are many different kinds of negative response, and many different kinds of thing can merit a negative response of some kind: but that does not mean that there is more than one kind of badness. On my theory, 'bad' has only one meaning, irrespective of the kind of thing it is used to describe: it always means 'merits a negative response,' and therefore this is the only kind of badness there can be, irrespective of what is being described as bad. A pain has bad hedonic properties, and a moral action has bad moral properties, but it is these properties that differ, not the badness of the properties or of the thing of which they are properties.
Your argument is unsound, because there is no logical or semantical connection between suffering or pain and moral badness/wrongness.
Since I claim that there is only one kind of badness, I claim that pain and the action that causes it have the same kind of badness, and therefore there is a logical and semantical connection.
For example, when a dog attacks a child and you beat it in order to prevent it from killing the child, then there is nothing morally bad/wrong or "self-condemning" about causing it to feel pain, is there? On the contrary, if there's no non-violent way of preventing the dog from killing the child, then hurting it is morally good/right and commendable. One can even say that in such a situation one is morally obliged to inflict pain on the dog, because the child's health and life have a higher value than the dog's.
If we had two ways of preventing the dog from killing the child, one of which involves hurting the dog and the other doesn't, then we ought to choose the one that doesn't. Preventing the dog hurting the child without hurting the dog is thus morally better than preventing it while hurting the dog. The moral goodness of preventing the dog killing the child is therefore lessened by causing the dog pain, which shows that the badness of the pain caused to the dog entails that the action of causing the dog pain is morally bad; this moral badness is outweighed by the moral goodness of preventing the dog killing the child, but it is moral badness just the same, and it is entailed by the badness of the pain caused to the dog.
Another example: Prisoners in solitary confinement do suffer, mentally at least. But it doesn't logically or semantically follow from this fact that it's morally bad/wrong to put prisoners in solitary confinement. A defender of retributive justice can argue that criminals deserve to suffer, so that making them suffer in some way or other, and to some degree or other is the morally right thing to do.
Some good end may be served by putting the prisoners in solitary: the point is, as with the dog, that if there are two ways of meeting that end, one of which involves making the prisoner suffer and the other doesn't, we should choose the latter, and this is because the suffering of the prisoners is in itself bad and lessens the overall goodness of meeting the desired end.

Whether suffering is morally bad and condemnable in principle is a substantive ethical question that cannot be answered by means of logic and semantics. Nobody thinks suffering is morally good or commendable in principle, but one can draw a distinction between deserved suffering that is morally okay, and undeserved suffering (the suffering of innocent people) that is not morally okay.
I do not answer it by means of semantics alone, I answer it by a combination of semantics and empirical observation. I observe that pain is such as to merit a negative response, and I infer that the action that causes the pain also, other things being equal, merits a negative response.
Deserved suffering is only morally okay in the sense that the moral badness of causing the suffering is outweighed by the moral goodness of its being deserved.
It's certainly true that what is morally bad or condemnable ought not to be done; but no non-moral, natural state of affairs is "self-condemning", because condemning is what morally thinking people do. So if the moral condemnability or badness of something is a property of it at all, it's always an extrinsic property depending on our moral evaluation of the thing in question.
By 'self-condemning' I mean 'deserving or meriting condemnation'. In my view this is not dependent on our moral evaluation in such cases as causing unnecessary pain to a dog - in such a case the pain merits a negative response by its very nature, and since the action necessarily, according to physical laws, produces the pain, the action also merits a negative response - in this case, condemnation.
Consul wrote: September 23rd, 2019, 10:07 pm
CIN wrote: September 23rd, 2019, 7:19 pmStep 2 makes clear that 'meriting a negative response' is a natural property of suffering. Hence, ethical naturalism. It doesn't of course follow that all moral evaluations are derivable from natural properties, but at least some are.
I think none are. It is not the case that "meriting a negative response is a natural property of suffering", because there may be and arguably are certain cases or circumstances in which suffering (or pain) does not merit a negative response or condemnation.
As will be clear by now, I do not agree. Pain always merits a negative response. It may form part of a complex that overall does not merit a negative response, but the pain component of such a situation always does.
Philosophy is a waste of time. But then, so is most of life.
Belindi
Moderator
Posts: 6105
Joined: September 11th, 2016, 2:11 pm

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by Belindi »

ought (v.)
Old English ahte "owned, possessed," past tense of agan "to own, possess, owe" (see owe). As a past tense of owe, it shared in that word's evolution and meant at times in Middle English "possessed" and "under obligation to pay." It has been detached from owe since 17c., though he aught me ten pounds is recorded as active in East Anglian dialect from c. 1825. As an auxiliary verb expressing duty or obligation (late 12c., the main modern use), it represents the past subjunctive.
Online Etymology Dictionary.
There is nothing mysterious about morality.

Morality is duty or obligation to another or others. Ethics is the study of morality, and also the plural of ethic which is another word for a moral tenet.
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6038
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by Consul »

Belindi wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:50 pmMorality is duty or obligation to another or others. Ethics is the study of morality, and also the plural of ethic which is another word for a moral tenet.
There are three major approaches in normative ethics:

1. Deontological Ethics: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethi ... tological/

2. Consequentialist Ethics: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/

3. Virtue ethics: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Belindi
Moderator
Posts: 6105
Joined: September 11th, 2016, 2:11 pm

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by Belindi »

Thanks Consul. There is an awful lot of reading here!

I claim the moral agent has a duty to himself and others to find out what sort of duty he is expected to have towards the other(s) . For instance if he's a politician his duty to himself and others is Utilitarian except in special circumstances about which the politician should inform himself as much as possible.E.g. if he's the Home Office minister he should consider special circumstances around a case of repatriation.
If the moral agent is a medic in charge of public health and hygiene his duty is more Utilitarian than if the medic is caring for an individual patient in which , latter, case the medic's duty is primarily to the particular patient.

I am neither medic nor politician and my duty is to inform myself about my own motivation besides the effects of my choices on others. Neither am I Jesus Christ and I am not expected to sacrifice my nearest relations for the good of humanity, nor am I expected to be all-knowing.
So I gather my stance is contractual deontological with a bias towards the duty of informing oneself of reliable and available facts.The more the facts of the case impinge on my decision the more my decision is consequentialist. Duty is service to self and others.
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6038
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by Consul »

CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmThere are many different kinds of negative response, and many different kinds of thing can merit a negative response of some kind: but that does not mean that there is more than one kind of badness. On my theory, 'bad' has only one meaning, irrespective of the kind of thing it is used to describe: it always means 'merits a negative response,' and therefore this is the only kind of badness there can be, irrespective of what is being described as bad. A pain has bad hedonic properties, and a moral action has bad moral properties, but it is these properties that differ, not the badness of the properties or of the thing of which they are properties.
Is "merits a negative response" synonymous with "merits a negative moral response"?
Anyway, your theory is inadequate precisely because "good" and "bad" do in fact have more than one meaning; and an adequate ethical theory must take the different meanings into account, and especially the relevant difference between moral and non-moral uses of "good" and "bad".
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmSince I claim that there is only one kind of badness, I claim that pain and the action that causes it have the same kind of badness, and therefore there is a logical and semantical connection.
Is your "one kind of badness" moral or non-moral?
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmIf we had two ways of preventing the dog from killing the child, one of which involves hurting the dog and the other doesn't, then we ought to choose the one that doesn't.
Yes, but if there's no non-violent alternative, the use of violence is morally justified.
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmPreventing the dog hurting the child without hurting the dog is thus morally better than preventing it while hurting the dog. The moral goodness of preventing the dog killing the child is therefore lessened by causing the dog pain, which shows that the badness of the pain caused to the dog entails that the action of causing the dog pain is morally bad; this moral badness is outweighed by the moral goodness of preventing the dog killing the child, but it is moral badness just the same, and it is entailed by the badness of the pain caused to the dog.
I disagree. It is morally bad or wrong to use violence if there is an equally effective non-violent alternative; but it is not if the child cannot be saved without hurting the dog. Of course, the situational moral goodness or rightness of hurting the dog cannot be generalized and formulated as a situation-independent moral principle that it is morally good/right to hurt dogs.
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pm
Consul wrote: September 23rd, 2019, 9:29 pmAnother example: Prisoners in solitary confinement do suffer, mentally at least. But it doesn't logically or semantically follow from this fact that it's morally bad/wrong to put prisoners in solitary confinement. A defender of retributive justice can argue that criminals deserve to suffer, so that making them suffer in some way or other, and to some degree or other is the morally right thing to do.
Some good end may be served by putting the prisoners in solitary: the point is, as with the dog, that if there are two ways of meeting that end, one of which involves making the prisoner suffer and the other doesn't, we should choose the latter, and this is because the suffering of the prisoners is in itself bad and lessens the overall goodness of meeting the desired end.
Of course, if doing x and doing y will have the same intended effects, and doing x is morally better than (preferable to) doing y (for reasons z), then you ought to do x. But, again, moral badness cannot be logically deduced from mental states with a negative valence, i.e. which are unpleasant and unenjoyable. One can argue that something is morally bad because it causes unpleasant and unenjoyable mental states; but it's a logical mistake to conclude therefrom that "is morally bad" is synonymous with (and thus definable in terms of) "is unpleasant", "is unenjoyable", or "is painful".
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmI do not answer it by means of semantics alone, I answer it by a combination of semantics and empirical observation. I observe that pain is such as to merit a negative response, and I infer that the action that causes the pain also, other things being equal, merits a negative response.
What you can observe empirically is that (normally) people respond negatively to pain in the sense of exhibiting pain-escaping or -avoiding behavior; but you cannot validly conclude from this observation that pain is (in itself) morally bad, or that moral badness is an essential part of the definition of "pain". For example, the Oxford Dictionary of Psychology defines it as "an unpleasant sensation usually caused by noxious stimulation of sensory nerve endings". It is neither a logical nor a conceptual truth that unpleasant sensations or causings of ones are in themselves and always morally bad/wrong.
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmDeserved suffering is only morally okay in the sense that the moral badness of causing the suffering is outweighed by the moral goodness of its being deserved.
If suffering is morally deserved, then it cannot be morally bad or wrong to inflict it on somebody.
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmBy 'self-condemning' I mean 'deserving or meriting condemnation'. In my view this is not dependent on our moral evaluation in such cases as causing unnecessary pain to a dog - in such a case the pain merits a negative response by its very nature, and since the action necessarily, according to physical laws, produces the pain, the action also merits a negative response - in this case, condemnation.
The reasons why an action is morally condemnable are always non-moral ones, and you can certainly argue that the action in question is morally bad/wrong because it (unnecessarily) causes pain; but, as I already said, there is still no logico-semantic connection between "is morally bad/wrong" and "causes pain". Someone saying "Doing x causes pain, but it's not morally bad/wrong to do x" isn't contradicting himself (like someone saying "He's a bachelor, but he's married").
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmAs will be clear by now, I do not agree. Pain always merits a negative response. It may form part of a complex that overall does not merit a negative response, but the pain component of such a situation always does.
If by "merits a negative response" you mean "merits a negative moral response", then it's simply not part of the definition of "pain". There might be (I'm not saying there are) situations or circumstances in which torture is morally justifiable and thus not morally bad/wrong, because the extreme hedonic badness (displeasure, discomfort) it causes cannot be conceptually equated with moral badness/wrongness. For moral evaluations in terms of the predicate "morally good/bad" or "morally right/wrong" are semantically irreducible to non-moral descriptions in terms of the predicate "hedonically good/bad".
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
CIN
Posts: 284
Joined: November 6th, 2016, 10:33 am

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by CIN »

Consul wrote: September 28th, 2019, 3:43 pm
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmThere are many different kinds of negative response, and many different kinds of thing can merit a negative response of some kind: but that does not mean that there is more than one kind of badness. On my theory, 'bad' has only one meaning, irrespective of the kind of thing it is used to describe: it always means 'merits a negative response,' and therefore this is the only kind of badness there can be, irrespective of what is being described as bad. A pain has bad hedonic properties, and a moral action has bad moral properties, but it is these properties that differ, not the badness of the properties or of the thing of which they are properties.
Is "merits a negative response" synonymous with "merits a negative moral response"?
Anyway, your theory is inadequate precisely because "good" and "bad" do in fact have more than one meaning; and an adequate ethical theory must take the different meanings into account, and especially the relevant difference between moral and non-moral uses of "good" and "bad".
You are merely restating your opinion here, and adding nothing new.

If 'good' and 'bad' are to have different meanings depending on what they are used to describe, then since millions of things can be described as 'good' or 'bad', then 'good' and 'bad' must have millions of different meanings.This is obviously absurd, so instead of this, you arbitrarily pick out two different types of things, moral and non-moral, and claim that there are just two meanings. The whole idea of different meanings is unsupported by any evidence or argument. The only reason you want to believe in different meanings for moral and non-moral things is because your subjectivist views demand it, which is putting the cart before the horse.
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmSince I claim that there is only one kind of badness, I claim that pain and the action that causes it have the same kind of badness, and therefore there is a logical and semantical connection.
Is your "one kind of badness" moral or non-moral?
Have you stopped beating your wife?
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmIf we had two ways of preventing the dog from killing the child, one of which involves hurting the dog and the other doesn't, then we ought to choose the one that doesn't.
Yes, but if there's no non-violent alternative, the use of violence is morally justified.
I didn't say it wasn't.
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmPreventing the dog hurting the child without hurting the dog is thus morally better than preventing it while hurting the dog. The moral goodness of preventing the dog killing the child is therefore lessened by causing the dog pain, which shows that the badness of the pain caused to the dog entails that the action of causing the dog pain is morally bad; this moral badness is outweighed by the moral goodness of preventing the dog killing the child, but it is moral badness just the same, and it is entailed by the badness of the pain caused to the dog.
I disagree. It is morally bad or wrong to use violence if there is an equally effective non-violent alternative; but it is not if the child cannot be saved without hurting the dog. Of course, the situational moral goodness or rightness of hurting the dog cannot be generalized and formulated as a situation-independent moral principle that it is morally good/right to hurt dogs.
I never said that if the dog had to be hurt to save the child, then it was morally wrong to save the child. I said that the moral rightness of saving the child is lessened if the dog is hurt. If the dog has to be hurt, then the moral rightness of saving the child is lessened, but it does not become wrong to save the child; it's simply less right than it would otherwise be. This is a utilitarian argument, as I'm sure you realise.
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pm Some good end may be served by putting the prisoners in solitary: the point is, as with the dog, that if there are two ways of meeting that end, one of which involves making the prisoner suffer and the other doesn't, we should choose the latter, and this is because the suffering of the prisoners is in itself bad and lessens the overall goodness of meeting the desired end.
Of course, if doing x and doing y will have the same intended effects, and doing x is morally better than (preferable to) doing y (for reasons z), then you ought to do x. But, again, moral badness cannot be logically deduced from mental states with a negative valence, i.e. which are unpleasant and unenjoyable. One can argue that something is morally bad because it causes unpleasant and unenjoyable mental states; but it's a logical mistake to conclude therefrom that "is morally bad" is synonymous with (and thus definable in terms of) "is unpleasant", "is unenjoyable", or "is painful".
Again, you are merely restating your opinion, and adding nothing new.

CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmI do not answer it by means of semantics alone, I answer it by a combination of semantics and empirical observation. I observe that pain is such as to merit a negative response, and I infer that the action that causes the pain also, other things being equal, merits a negative response.
What you can observe empirically is that (normally) people respond negatively to pain in the sense of exhibiting pain-escaping or -avoiding behavior; but you cannot validly conclude from this observation that pain is (in itself) morally bad, or that moral badness is an essential part of the definition of "pain". For example, the Oxford Dictionary of Psychology defines it as "an unpleasant sensation usually caused by noxious stimulation of sensory nerve endings". It is neither a logical nor a conceptual truth that unpleasant sensations or causings of ones are in themselves and always morally bad/wrong.
And again.
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmDeserved suffering is only morally okay in the sense that the moral badness of causing the suffering is outweighed by the moral goodness of its being deserved.
If suffering is morally deserved, then it cannot be morally bad or wrong to inflict it on somebody.
I never said it was.
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmBy 'self-condemning' I mean 'deserving or meriting condemnation'. In my view this is not dependent on our moral evaluation in such cases as causing unnecessary pain to a dog - in such a case the pain merits a negative response by its very nature, and since the action necessarily, according to physical laws, produces the pain, the action also merits a negative response - in this case, condemnation.
The reasons why an action is morally condemnable are always non-moral ones, and you can certainly argue that the action in question is morally bad/wrong because it (unnecessarily) causes pain; but, as I already said, there is still no logico-semantic connection between "is morally bad/wrong" and "causes pain". Someone saying "Doing x causes pain, but it's not morally bad/wrong to do x" isn't contradicting himself (like someone saying "He's a bachelor, but he's married").
It is morally wrong to cause pain if there are no other results of the action which merit a positive or negative response. This follows logically from the facts (a) that pain merits a negative response, (b) the action causing the pain therefore also merits a negative response, and c) we should not act in a way that merits a negative response.
CIN wrote: September 27th, 2019, 7:11 pmAs will be clear by now, I do not agree. Pain always merits a negative response. It may form part of a complex that overall does not merit a negative response, but the pain component of such a situation always does.
If by "merits a negative response" you mean "merits a negative moral response", then it's simply not part of the definition of "pain". There might be (I'm not saying there are) situations or circumstances in which torture is morally justifiable and thus not morally bad/wrong, because the extreme hedonic badness (displeasure, discomfort) it causes cannot be conceptually equated with moral badness/wrongness. For moral evaluations in terms of the predicate "morally good/bad" or "morally right/wrong" are semantically irreducible to non-moral descriptions in terms of the predicate "hedonically good/bad".
I don't mean 'merits a negative moral response'. I admit no distinction between moral and non-moral responses, except in the sense that the responses are to things that may be categorised as moral or non-moral. And I do not accept that the terms 'morally bad' and 'hedonically bad' reflect different kinds of badness, they merely reflect different categories of things that may be good or bad.

You have advanced no arguments against my theory, merely restatements of subjectivist dogma. That this is the only kind of response I have received really casts doubt on the value of these amateur philosophy forums. Honestly, I have better things to do. You all have a nice day.
Philosophy is a waste of time. But then, so is most of life.
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6038
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by Consul »

CIN wrote: September 29th, 2019, 1:13 pmIf 'good' and 'bad' are to have different meanings depending on what they are used to describe, then since millions of things can be described as 'good' or 'bad', then 'good' and 'bad' must have millions of different meanings.This is obviously absurd, so instead of this, you arbitrarily pick out two different types of things, moral and non-moral, and claim that there are just two meanings. The whole idea of different meanings is unsupported by any evidence or argument. The only reason you want to believe in different meanings for moral and non-moral things is because your subjectivist views demand it, which is putting the cart before the horse.
You're very wrong. There's ample neutral linguistic evidence for different meanings of "good"/"bad"; and by saying that there are both moral and non-moral meanings or uses of these words, I'm not claiming that "there are just two meanings"—one moral and one non-moral. However, that "millions of things can be described as 'good' or 'bad'" doesn't mean that there are "millions of different meanings". Judith Thomson lists five meanings—one moral and four non-moral:

"The ways of being good form a large clutter, and there are a variety of ways of dividing them up. One intuitively attractive way is to divide them into sub—classes as follows. (My way of dividing the territory comes, with modifications, from von Wright (1963).)

Some things are good for use in doing a thing. For example, a certain hammer might be good for use in hammering in nails, a certain fountain pen might be good for use in writing, a certain knife might be good for use in carving. Being good for use in hammering in nails, being good for use in writing, being good for use in carving are ways of being good: the sub-class of the ways of being good that they fall into may be called the useful.

Some people are good at doing this or that: thus Alice might be good at hanging wallpaper, Bert might be good at singing. Carol might be good at playing chess. Being good at hanging wallpaper, being good at singing, being good at playing chess are ways of being good; this sub-class may be called the skillful.

Some things are good to look at or listen to and so on. A certain sunset might be good to look at. A certain wine might taste good. A certain novel might be good to read. Being good to look at, being good-tasting, being good to read are ways of being good; this sub-class may be called the enjoyable.

Some things are good for something. Drinking lemonade might be good for Smith, who has a cold. An increase in funding for public education might be good for children and thereby for the country as a whole. Weekly vacuuming might be good for the living-room carpet. Being good for Smith, being good for children, being good for the living-room carpet are ways of being good; this sub-class may be called the beneficial.

Finally, some things are morally good in one or another way. A certain act or kind of act or person might be morally good, or, more particularly, just or generous or brave or tactful or considerate and so on. This sub-class of the ways of being good may be called the morally good.

In sum, here are five subclasses of the class of ways of being good: the useful, skillful, enjoyable, beneficial, and morally good."


(Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "Moral Objectivity." In: Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, 65-154. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. pp. 131-2)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
User avatar
amplified cactus
Posts: 26
Joined: December 29th, 2019, 6:00 pm

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by amplified cactus »

In my view, the error theorist goes wrong in her account of moral semantics. Moral judgements are better interpreted as expressions of attitudes of approval/disapproval, not as attempts to describe states of affairs in the world, in which case they are not false but neither true nor false. In fact, this is suggested by Mackie's own case for the error theory - in particular, his queerness argument. As Mackie states the metaphysical prong of this argument, the problem is that objective moral properties have no place in a naturalistic, physicalist account of the world. But the problem is far more serious than that. Objective, categorical normativity is "queer" no matter what your metaphysical views are. Postulating God, for example, does not get us any closer to comprehending objective normativity (this is the lesson of the Euthyphro dilemma). Nor does postulating spirits, souls, disembodied minds, etc. I think this should make us at least a little suspicious of the error theorist's claim that moral judgements are descriptive statements.

Here's a scenario to consider: Imagine a world where we build a "moral property detector". It's a machine with a dial on it, and when we point it at different actions, the dial moves. We point it at somebody being enslaved and the dial moves far to the right; we point it at somebody giving to charity and the dial moves far to the left; we point it at somebody reading a book and the dial stays right where it is. Now let's grant for the sake of argument that moral realism is correct, and that this machine really is detecting moral properties. For the most part, the machine delivers results in line with our current moral attitudes. But then something surprising happens: whenever we point the detector at homosexuals, the dial moves far to the right (the "morally wrong" part). How would we react to this?

Well, speaking for myself, it would make very little difference. Of course, granting moral realism and granting that the moral property detector is reliable, I would have to say, "oh, it turns out that homosexuality is objectively morally wrong." But this would only be of academic interest. In everyday life, I would continue to promote acceptance of homosexuality, I would continue to condemn homophobia, etc. Why would it matter if homosexuality is objectively wrong, or if there is some categorical prescription that people should not be homosexuals? What this really amounts to is that the external world has a different moral attitude to me. But why should the fact that the external world has a different moral attitude to me have any more force than the fact that other people have different moral attitudes to me?

What I would conclude from this is that the scenario I asked you to imagine isn't really coherent after all. It just doesn't make sense to interpret moral judgements as attempts to describe objective properties. We use moral judgements to coordinate people's behaviour and to express approval and disapproval of different courses of action. The external world can't tell us how to do that, no matter what it's like. So while I agree with the error theorist's ontology, their semantics is wonky.
User avatar
Hereandnow
Posts: 2837
Joined: July 11th, 2012, 9:16 pm
Favorite Philosopher: the moon and the stars

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by Hereandnow »

amplified cactus

In my view, the error theorist goes wrong in her account of moral semantics. Moral judgements are better interpreted as expressions of attitudes of approval/disapproval, not as attempts to describe states of affairs in the world, in which case they are not false but neither true nor false. In fact, this is suggested by Mackie's own case for the error theory - in particular, his queerness argument. As Mackie states the metaphysical prong of this argument, the problem is that objective moral properties have no place in a naturalistic, physicalist account of the world. But the problem is far more serious than that. Objective, categorical normativity is "queer" no matter what your metaphysical views are. Postulating God, for example, does not get us any closer to comprehending objective normativity (this is the lesson of the Euthyphro dilemma). Nor does postulating spirits, souls, disembodied minds, etc. I think this should make us at least a little suspicious of the error theorist's claim that moral judgements are descriptive statements.
Then you are on Wittgenstein's side, if you think states of affairs in the world possess no basis for true and false statements about the "presence" of the ethical and the aesthetic. But why does he say this? He was in fact a very religious person who recommended participating in the rituals, the liturgies in order to give expression to something unspeakable. And you think Mackie should, therefore, refrain from the mere mention. His explicit rejection of moral objectivity is nonsense, just as talk about the objectivity of the color yellow simpliciter is nonsense, for such talk is outside the frameworks of facts (recalling that book of all facts in his Lecture on Ethics).

If I have you right, I argue that this is an arbitrary way to think of facts, to exclude the moral aspect. If W takes ethics so seriously, then the basis for this must cross our path, even though it does not do so empirically. After all, any fact is, upon relentless analysis, reducible to the unspeakable. But once here, one may speak, though it will be a specialized speaking that has a narrow field of thematic possibilities.

Naturalistic, physicalist accounts of the world being absent of moral description is equally arbitrary. It begs the question regarding what physicality IS. Take a lance and spear my kidney: The objective, descriptive aspects are there, on the sleeve for observation, the pain is there, the rise in blood pressure, the chemical changes in the brain, all there to "fit" the event into explanatory ideas. It is the moral "badness" that, W et al say, escapes the paradigms, escaping in this way is utterly unspeakable, of course, and he is right, to be sure: one cannot "say" the world as such; one cannot step beyond the logical grid. The way I see it, the badness of the pain is just as "observable" as the rest; only it is not an empirical observation. Put a flame to your finger and give a full account of what is there and, I posit, the ethical badness of the event is there, even with far greater poignancy than any other. W ws right in that one cannot speak the world as presence (my word, borrowed from Heidegger and others); presence is the transcendental given (though Heidegger argues otherwise with his notion of equiprimordialism). Metaethics is the only exception to this: The good and bad of joy and suffering are noncontingently what they are.
Here's a scenario to consider: Imagine a world where we build a "moral property detector". It's a machine with a dial on it, and when we point it at different actions, the dial moves. We point it at somebody being enslaved and the dial moves far to the right; we point it at somebody giving to charity and the dial moves far to the left; we point it at somebody reading a book and the dial stays right where it is. Now let's grant for the sake of argument that moral realism is correct, and that this machine really is detecting moral properties. For the most part, the machine delivers results in line with our current moral attitudes. But then something surprising happens: whenever we point the detector at homosexuals, the dial moves far to the right (the "morally wrong" part). How would we react to this?
The moral disposition of the machine's judgment would be arbitrary since you made it up, that is, the judgment against homosexuality. Not if it were an actual eternal truth, then, given the premise, homosexuality would be wrong, but that would be a tautology, simply saying it is bad because it is bad. Useless, really. It doesn't disclose anything about the world; it's an arbitrary supposition.
Well, speaking for myself, it would make very little difference. Of course, granting moral realism and granting that the moral property detector is reliable, I would have to say, "oh, it turns out that homosexuality is objectively morally wrong." But this would only be of academic interest. In everyday life, I would continue to promote acceptance of homosexuality, I would continue to condemn homophobia, etc. Why would it matter if homosexuality is objectively wrong, or if there is some categorical prescription that people should not be homosexuals? What this really amounts to is that the external world has a different moral attitude to me. But why should the fact that the external world has a different moral attitude to me have any more force than the fact that other people have different moral attitudes to me?
But you abandon your own premise: The machine, for all intents and purposes, is God, that is, the moral authority issues form Being itself and cannot be undone. Of course, such a thing is impossible to fathom, but clearly the proposition "God (the machine) has declared such and such" rises far above any academic interest IF TRUE in an absolute sense. This is analytically true, true based on the logic of the assumption itself (unless you want to define an ethical absolute as equally nonbinding as any other "truth". But then, what is the point of it being absolute?).
What I would conclude from this is that the scenario I asked you to imagine isn't really coherent after all. It just doesn't make sense to interpret moral judgements as attempts to describe objective properties. We use moral judgements to coordinate people's behaviour and to express approval and disapproval of different courses of action. The external world can't tell us how to do that, no matter what it's like. So while I agree with the error theorist's ontology, their semantics is wonky.
It's coherent if you offer it as an assumption, but I agree that our affairs cannot be reduced metaethics. This latter has nothing to say about our ethical entanglements. That is the way of religion. Metaethics is about presence, basic givens. The badness or goodness of pain and joy, misery and bliss; and so on. These are, in my thinking, absolutes, and the world is, if you will, the machine that turns these judgments out. The world, however, is far too vague to be useful in moral thinking about our complex affairs.

Ethical disapproval is grounded in metaethics.
User avatar
amplified cactus
Posts: 26
Joined: December 29th, 2019, 6:00 pm

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by amplified cactus »

Hereandnow wrote: December 30th, 2019, 11:37 amThen you are on Wittgenstein's side...
Well, I'm a noncognitivist about moral judgements. I'm not familiar with Wittgenstein's views on metaethics specifically, but I don't think he was right about meaning in general, or much else for that matter. I disagree with many of Wittgenstein's conclusions, and I also feel he was a terrible writer, so I'd prefer not to be considered a Wittgensteinian! If you must identify me with some earlier philosopher, let's say Ayer instead.
The way I see it, the badness of the pain is just as "observable" as the rest; only it is not an empirical observation. Put a flame to your finger and give a full account of what is there and, I posit, the ethical badness of the event is there, even with far greater poignancy than any other.
Yes, pain feels bad. To most of us, at least. There are actually some people who enjoy the kind of pain resulting from putting a flame to a finger. I think that's beside the point, though, so I'm happy to grant just for the sake of argument that literally everybody dislikes such pain. What's still missing here, however, is any moral normativity. The most we can say is that if you want to avoid pain, then you should not put a flame to your finger, just because putting a flame to your finger will cause what you want to avoid. Moral normativity doesn't reduce simply to the desires of an agent and the means of bringing about the satisfaction of those desires. After all, while the sadist might want to avoid burning his own hand, he may thoroughly enjoy burning the hands of other people - the fact that those people experience pain when a flame is held to their fingers is, for him, a reason in favour of holding a flame to their fingers.
Well, speaking for myself, it would make very little difference. Of course, granting moral realism and granting that the moral property detector is reliable, I would have to say, "oh, it turns out that homosexuality is objectively morally wrong." But this would only be of academic interest. In everyday life, I would continue to promote acceptance of homosexuality, I would continue to condemn homophobia, etc. Why would it matter if homosexuality is objectively wrong, or if there is some categorical prescription that people should not be homosexuals? What this really amounts to is that the external world has a different moral attitude to me. But why should the fact that the external world has a different moral attitude to me have any more force than the fact that other people have different moral attitudes to me?
But you abandon your own premise: The machine, for all intents and purposes, is God, that is, the moral authority issues form Being itself and cannot be undone. Of course, such a thing is impossible to fathom, but clearly the proposition "God (the machine) has declared such and such" rises far above any academic interest IF TRUE in an absolute sense. This is analytically true, true based on the logic of the assumption itself (unless you want to define an ethical absolute as equally nonbinding as any other "truth". But then, what is the point of it being absolute?).
I'm not sure why you think that the moral property detector would be God. All it does is detect moral properties. Note that from a moral realist point of view, there already are "moral property detectors", though fallible ones - namely, at least some humans. The moral realist says that our moral judgements can, in some circumstances at least, reliably track moral properties.

Anyway, we can run the "moral property detector" scenario with a God-like being instead. So instead of a machine with a dial on it, God comes down from the heavens to tell us what the moral facts are. By and large, his judgements are in line with our own. But then something surprising happens: he tells us that homosexuality is deeply morally wrong and should be prevented. How would we react to this? Well, again, for me, it would make very little difference. In everyday life, I would continue to promote acceptance of homosexuality, I would continue to condemn homophobia, etc. The fact that God judges that homosexuality is wrong does not have any more force for me than the fact that John my next-door neighbour judges that homosexuality is wrong. (This is assuming, of course, that this God-like being is simply telling us what the objective moral facts are. If he is also threatening punishment for those who do not act in accordance with the moral facts, then that would obviously make a big difference to how we organize society, just because people would want to avoid punishment.)
User avatar
Hereandnow
Posts: 2837
Joined: July 11th, 2012, 9:16 pm
Favorite Philosopher: the moon and the stars

Re: J.L .Mackie's Moral Error Theory

Post by Hereandnow »

amplified cactus

Well, I'm a noncognitivist about moral judgements. I'm not familiar with Wittgenstein's views on metaethics specifically, but I don't think he was right about meaning in general, or much else for that matter. I disagree with many of Wittgenstein's conclusions, and I also feel he was a terrible writer, so I'd prefer not to be considered a Wittgensteinian! If you must identify me with some earlier philosopher, let's say Ayer instead.
Well, W was a noncognitivist about ethics, too. You talk a like his, saying "Moral judgements are better interpreted as expressions of attitudes of approval/disapproval, not as attempts to describe states of affairs in the world." That term, "affairs in the world" is his. Perhaps you've read his Lecture on Ethics" which is available online, for free, I think. He will not talk about ethics, metaethics, that is, the "what it is" for us to value something, because valuing, the ooo's and aahhh's of the world are what the world is, the "is" of the world cannot be spoken.

I read Ayer's paper on free will, and remember reading his book on early pragmatists. Don't' remember HIM, but the pragmatists are impressive. They taught me how to think about language. Very strong views here. Rorty is enlightening: truth is made, not discovered! Anyway. you're right about Wittgenstein's writing; but then, most philosophy that is worth reading is hard. You have to step into the world of a radical and eccentric thinker, often a genius. But W is right about many things.
Yes, pain feels bad. To most of us, at least. There are actually some people who enjoy the kind of pain resulting from putting a flame to a finger. I think that's beside the point, though, so I'm happy to grant just for the sake of argument that literally everybody dislikes such pain. What's still missing here, however, is any moral normativity. The most we can say is that if you want to avoid pain, then you should not put a flame to your finger, just because putting a flame to your finger will cause what you want to avoid. Moral normativity doesn't reduce simply to the desires of an agent and the means of bringing about the satisfaction of those desires. After all, while the sadist might want to avoid burning his own hand, he may thoroughly enjoy burning the hands of other people - the fact that those people experience pain when a flame is held to their fingers is, for him, a reason in favour of holding a flame to their fingers.
Disliking something begs the question: what is the nature of the event in which disliking occurs? Normativity? but what is being regulated, embodied in a principle? Liking or otherwise is just a shorthand that indicates an event of a certain nature, as with all things. I can tell you I am in France on the Seine, but standing there in actuality is certainly NOT reducible to the language I use to tell you. Ethics has such a nature, the essence of ethics, that which is what makes ethics meaningful at all, and this is value. And value is very, very weird, hence Mackie's argument from queerness. That burning sensation on my finger (regardless of the act of choosing and why. These are entanglements which are certainly important in a system of intersubjective complexities, but here, these are put aside in the effort to look plainly at the what makes ethics, ethics: metaethics). Nor does talk about the desires of the agent satisfy the inquiry into the nature of ethics, for desires are not simple, they are analyzable: I desire a Mercedes, but why? Asking such a question, will ultimately lead to the material, that is, the experienceable ground: the pleasure, the joy, the feeling. M\

My position is that these are the foundations of ethical meaning: no value, no ethics. Who would care? and ethics is all about caring. Since caring is about value, and value is given in the world, like the color yellow is given; call it qualia, if you like. Call it phenomenological presence, but it is there, before you, beyond convention. And value possesses an inherent good and bad that is ethical. This makes ethics objective at the level of metaethics.
I'm not sure why you think that the moral property detector would be God. All it does is detect moral properties. Note that from a moral realist point of view, there already are "moral property detectors", though fallible ones - namely, at least some humans. The moral realist says that our moral judgements can, in some circumstances at least, reliably track moral properties.
If the "moral property detector" does what you says it does, then I am assuming it cannot be wrong, which is why it is useful to make a point. If it is as arbitrary as a person, then it has no use. If the machine can't be wrong, and it says homosexuality is morally wrong, then homosexuality is wrong. It's simply logical. God is like this: if God is God, then s/he is infallible in judgment. So, obviously, whatever s/he says, goes. But all this has no basis in reality. I could posit anything, and the logic would depend on what I posited. Arbitrary.

The moral realist, like me, says, and this is the rub that drives Mackie to his anti objectivist position, our ethical affairs, the right and wrong of actions, are grounded on something absolute, like God, but without the God part. Written into the fabric of existence, so to speak. I agree, for the value that is inherent in the ethical entanglements is in the "presence" of things.

Anyway, we can run the "moral property detector" scenario with a God-like being instead. So instead of a machine with a dial on it, God comes down from the heavens to tell us what the moral facts are. By and large, his judgements are in line with our own. But then something surprising happens: he tells us that homosexuality is deeply morally wrong and should be prevented. How would we react to this? Well, again, for me, it would make very little difference. In everyday life, I would continue to promote acceptance of homosexuality, I would continue to condemn homophobia, etc. The fact that God judges that homosexuality is wrong does not have any more force for me than the fact that John my next-door neighbour judges that homosexuality is wrong. (This is assuming, of course, that this God-like being is simply telling us what the objective moral facts are. If he is also threatening punishment for those who do not act in accordance with the moral facts, then that would obviously make a big difference to how we organize society, just because people would want to avoid punishment.)
Well, the problem is with your saying the it's God-like. What does this mean, s/he can't be wrong? Otherwise, it's just some big bully who ha no superior moral authority. But if you stipulate God to the source of absolute moral authority, then one can only conclude s/he right on all matters. You would have no recourse to disobey because you already said disobeying is wrong. Punishment is beside the point. Now if you have God declaring this and announcing that, and you fill in whatever, then that commits us to...whatever.
Post Reply

Return to “Ethics and Morality”

2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise
by John K Danenbarger
January 2023

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul
by Mitzi Perdue
February 2023

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023

The Unfakeable Code®

The Unfakeable Code®
by Tony Jeton Selimi
April 2023

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are
by Alan Watts
May 2023

Killing Abel

Killing Abel
by Michael Tieman
June 2023

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead
by E. Alan Fleischauer
July 2023

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough
by Mark Unger
August 2023

Predictably Irrational

Predictably Irrational
by Dan Ariely
September 2023

Artwords

Artwords
by Beatriz M. Robles
November 2023

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope
by Dr. Randy Ross
December 2023

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes
by Ali Master
February 2024

2022 Philosophy Books of the Month

Emotional Intelligence At Work

Emotional Intelligence At Work
by Richard M Contino & Penelope J Holt
January 2022

Free Will, Do You Have It?

Free Will, Do You Have It?
by Albertus Kral
February 2022

My Enemy in Vietnam

My Enemy in Vietnam
by Billy Springer
March 2022

2X2 on the Ark

2X2 on the Ark
by Mary J Giuffra, PhD
April 2022

The Maestro Monologue

The Maestro Monologue
by Rob White
May 2022

What Makes America Great

What Makes America Great
by Bob Dowell
June 2022

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!
by Jerry Durr
July 2022

Living in Color

Living in Color
by Mike Murphy
August 2022 (tentative)

The Not So Great American Novel

The Not So Great American Novel
by James E Doucette
September 2022

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches
by John N. (Jake) Ferris
October 2022

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021