Deontological Ethics Reducing to Consequentialism

[nathanmichel]

I may have a defunct understanding of deontological ethics, but for some reason it seems to me that deontological ethics ultimately reduce to consequentialist theories. Take, for instance, Kant's Categorical Imperative, "act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law."

When it comes to defining the "maxim" that one can imagine as becoming "universal law", would it not be ultimately defined by an awareness of consequences? Murder, for example, is wrong according to Kant precisely because universalized it would create an unliveable society. But to assert this Kant has to assume the liveability of society as an end goal, no? From here, actions that have consequences that do not promote well-being (another way of saying liveability of society) are precisely the actions that would be prohibited by the Categorical Imperative, and so the Categorical Imperative would be based ultimately on a consideration of consequences. Basically, his rule sounds like Rule Utilitarianism.

Another way of formulating deontological ethics that I've heard is in terms of intentions rather than consequences. The moral status of actions, from this viewpoint, is defined by intentions and not consequences. But even here it seems to be that a moral evaluation of intentions still reduces to consequences. For instance, the intent to murder someone is wrong, but in my view really only because that intention should naturally produce negative consequences (I don't see another way of evaluating intentions).

So, what am I misunderstanding? I feel like morality must take consequences of actions into consideration at some point, and likewise anyone who says well-being isn't a determinant of morality is lying to themselves.

[statiktech]

I don't think you're far off, though some useful distinctions can still be made. The two theories are both historically and conceptually linked. Where one wants to focus on actions themselves, the other wants to focus on the consequences of those actions. However, one might argue that to focus on just one or the other is to take an unnecessarily narrow view—why not consider both? On the flip side, it would also appear that consequentialism might adopt deontological components as well by deriving maxims from those actions expected to produce the most favorable consequences in particular situations.

[snt]

I may have a defunct understanding of deontological ethics, but for some reason it seems to me that deontological ethics ultimately reduce to consequentialist theories. Take, for instance, Kant's Categorical Imperative, "act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law."

When it comes to defining the "maxim" that one can imagine as becoming "universal law", would it not be ultimately defined by an awareness of consequences? Murder, for example, is wrong according to Kant precisely because universalized it would create an unliveable society. But to assert this Kant has to assume the liveability of society as an end goal, no? From here, actions that have consequences that do not promote well-being (another way of saying liveability of society) are precisely the actions that would be prohibited by the Categorical Imperative, and so the Categorical Imperative would be based ultimately on a consideration of consequences. Basically, his rule sounds like Rule Utilitarianism.

Another way of formulating deontological ethics that I've heard is in terms of intentions rather than consequences. The moral status of actions, from this viewpoint, is defined by intentions and not consequences. But even here it seems to be that a moral evaluation of intentions still reduces to consequences. For instance, the intent to murder someone is wrong, but in my view really only because that intention should naturally produce negative consequences (I don't see another way of evaluating intentions).

So, what am I misunderstanding? I feel like morality must take consequences of actions into consideration at some point, and likewise anyone who says well-being isn't a determinant of morality is lying to themselves.

I agree that Kant's Categorical Imperative is contradictory and presupposes a whole lot before the imperative can be said to have been applicable to a moral judgement that was already made.

According to Kant, the moral judgement would stem from reason, - a practical faculty that is 'given' by nature - and Kant scholars complain that Kant never went into depth about what that reason actually is.

plato -dot- stanford -dot- edu on Kant's reason mentions the following:

we might note that Kant rarely discusses reason as such. This leaves a difficult interpretative task: just what is Kant’s general and positive account of reason?

The first thing to note is Kant’s bold claim that reason is the arbiter of truth in all judgments—empirical as well as metaphysical. Unfortunately, he barely develops this thought, and the issue has attracted surprisingly little attention in the literature.

In the Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morality, Kant argued the following about what reason is:

"Nevertheless, reason is given to us as a practical faculty, that is, one that is meant to have an influence on the will."

Kant argued that will is practical reason so the nature of reason is important.

Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being has a will - which is the ability to act according to the thought of laws, i.e. to act on principle.

To derive actions from laws you need reason, so that's what will is - practical reason.

To summarize:

1. reason is 'given' by nature as a practical faculty with the purpose to produce a will that is good in itself (absolutely good will).
2. will is practical reason

If the origin of will is the origin of the will's added moral quality 'absolutely good without qualification' (namely law in itself, the thought of which produces a good will) then that would imply that the origin of will must be good in itself ad infinitum and at question would be why it would need reason as a given faculty by nature (something external to the human as it appears, and also something a posteriori of nature itself for it to be possible to be given) to produce an absolutely good will.

Kant also argued that the will to preserve one's self (the will to survive) isn't moral in nature.

It is a duty to preserve one's life, and moreover everyone directly wants to do so. But because of the power of that want, the often anxious care that most men have for their survival has no intrinsic worth, and the maxim Preserve yourself has no moral content.

Men preserve their lives according to duty, but not from duty.

The actual judgement is presupposed in the Categorical Imperative and Kant's theory would only apply after a moral judgement has already taken place.

In the face of an unknown future one is necessarily to consider consequences. Due to the unknown nature of those consequences, the consequences become as primary as the future in any moral consideration.

When it concerns morality as a philosophical concept, consequences are utilitarian (i.e. (to become) empirical) and that which provides the basis for moral consideration would reside in an a priori context, simply because due to the uncertain nature of the future consequences cannot be known or considered a priori.

The moral reasoning that is applicable can only take consequences into account a posteriori (empirically, through the sense experience). Thus when philosophically examining morality, one will likely focus on the aspect that makes morality possible at all, with reason being a part of it in human affairs and that fulfils the basis for Kant's Categorical Imperative, but in my opinion morality (the aspect that provides the ability for moral reasoning) concerns something that precedes human nature.

So it is a choice of perspective: practical (consequential) or fundamental morality?