Do plants deserve a moral status as "animal"?

[Pattern-chaser]

I see it like this:

In everyday terms, describing consciousness is easy. It means something pretty much like 'awake and aware'.

But as soon as we try to make this description more precise, we fall apart. We cannot even define consciousness precisely and clearly.

Therefore, it is difficult to see how anyone could be sure that consciousness requires an animal brain in order to exist. The first criticism of this sentiment is: what is consciousness, that it requires an animal brain as its foundation? Other criticisms follow on, of course, but this seems to be the fundamental one. When discussing something we cannot define, should we not be somewhat more circumspect concerning the criteria necessary for its existence?

We certainly need to disambiguate the concept of consciousness (and related psychological concepts) so as to avoid confusion and misunderstanding. Awareness qua perceptual or cognitional consciousness (perception or cognition) and awakeness qua waking consciousness are both conceptually different from phenomenal consciousness qua inner, subjective experience—particularly with regard to the question as to whether there are (nonbinary) degrees of consciousness. There surely are different (nonbinary) degrees of awareness (of oneself or one's environment) and also different (nonbinary) degrees of wakefulness or alertness, but it doesn't follow that there are more than two degrees of phenomenal consciousness, viz. off and on.

Moreover, other psychological concepts such as "cognition", "intelligence", and (of course) "mind" need to be clarified too.

We need both a sufficiently clear definition of "consciousness" and a philosophico-scientific theory of consciousness (stating necessary and sufficient conditions for it) before we can answer the question of its distribution in nature.

Yes, so surely we are not (yet) at a stage where we are able to assert - with sincerity and honesty - that an animal brain is required to support consciousness?

[Pattern-chaser]

You and orthodoxy say "no". I and the future say "maybe".

Yes, and the delightful irony is that the former is unsubstantiated subjective dogma, while the latter is as objective as one can get in a discussion like this one.

[Belindi]

I think one thing that does define consciousness is that brain-mind has to be living in a temporal and shared habitat of some sort or another , or else brain-mind can't exist or continue to exist.

[Consul]

You and orthodoxy say "no". I and the future say "maybe".

Yes, and the delightful irony is that the former is , while the latter is as objective as one can get in a discussion like this one.

No, the brain hypothesis is not an "unsubstantiated subjective dogma", because the belief that (human and nonhuman) animal consciousness is brain-dependent is empirically well-supported; and there is no empirical evidence for alternative organs or systems in nonanimal organisms which can plausibly be regarded as non-neural correlates of consciousness. So the inductive generalization that not only animal consciousness in particular but natural consciousness in general depends on (central) nervous systems is justifiable.

Anyway, if all mental functions (including consciousness) implemented by neural processes can as well be implemented by (much less complex) non-neural processes, the evolution of (central) nervous systems appears very mysterious. For if comparatively primitive non-neural mechanisms can do the entire job of intricate neural mechanisms, neural evolution was a waste of time and energy.

You might object that not all but only some mental functions implemented by neural processes can as well be implemented by (much less complex) non-neural processes. Okay, but why should organism consciousness be one of those brain- and nerve-independent mental functions—given that animal consciousness is known to depend on a (C)NS?!

[Sy Borg]

Anyway, if all mental functions (including consciousness) implemented by neural processes can as well be implemented by (much less complex) non-neural processes, the evolution of (central) nervous systems appears very mysterious. For if comparatively primitive non-neural mechanisms can do the entire job of intricate neural mechanisms, neural evolution was a waste of time and energy.

It's not mysterious at all.

Consider a previous comment of yours, where you noted that we cannot attribute higher mental functions to plants. But it's not about higher mental functions, which obviously are only present in brained animals. It's about having some kind of sensation of being, a subjective experience different to that of a rock or a piece of plastic.

I note that brains are extremely energy-hungry, so equivalent structures must be needed for a plant's global processing. Does a plant's global processing, which pulls together variant stimuli, involve any sensations? Does it feel like anything at all to be a plant?

That is not known but, as always, it's assumed in the negative unless proved to the positive. Just as it was assumed that only humans experienced their lives not so long ago, today it's still widely assumed that the vast majority of life on Earth is entirely lacking in any sensations or feelings of being alive whatsoever. That is how a predator sees the world - objectified.

Given that subjectivity research is almost entirely conducted by neuroscientists and cognitive scientists, this situation will not change any time soon. By comparison, there's almost no money available for research of experiences of much simpler organisms. Assumptions are seen as sufficient, and safe.

[Pattern-chaser]

You and orthodoxy say "no". I and the future say "maybe".

Yes, and the delightful irony is that the former is unsubstantiated subjective dogma, while the latter is as objective as one can get in a discussion like this one.

No, the brain hypothesis is not an "unsubstantiated subjective dogma", because the belief that (human and nonhuman) animal consciousness is brain-dependent is empirically well-supported; and there is no empirical evidence for alternative organs or systems in nonanimal organisms which can plausibly be regarded as non-neural correlates of consciousness. So the inductive generalization that not only animal consciousness in particular but natural consciousness in general depends on (central) nervous systems is justifiable.

The "brain hypothesis" is just that, a hypothesis. And it could be correct, of course. But we have no reason to assume so. The brain hypothesis accounts for all available evidence, or it would already have been rejected. But there are many hypothetical possibilities, and the brain hypothesis is only one of them.

"Inductive generalisation" is guesswork, but different guesses also exist. When speculating about possibilities, we cannot use induction to get rid of hypotheses, because induction prevents speculation, in this case. Therefore, inductive generalization is not justifiable. Induction - or better, deduction - has to follow later, after our speculative considerations are complete.

[Consul]

No, the brain hypothesis is not an "unsubstantiated subjective dogma", because the belief that (human and nonhuman) animal consciousness is brain-dependent is empirically well-supported; and there is no empirical evidence for alternative organs or systems in nonanimal organisms which can plausibly be regarded as non-neural correlates of consciousness. So the inductive generalization that not only animal consciousness in particular but natural consciousness in general depends on (central) nervous systems is justifiable.

The "brain hypothesis" is just that, a hypothesis. And it could be correct, of course. But we have no reason to assume so. The brain hypothesis accounts for all available evidence, or it would already have been rejected. But there are many hypothetical possibilities, and the brain hypothesis is only one of them.

"Equally possible" isn't synonymous with "equally probable" or "equally plausible"!

Anyway, if having a (C)NS is unnecessary for having subjective experiences, what is physically necessary for it? Being a living organism? But why stop there? Why should life be a necessary condition for consciousness? There is a slippery slope to transbiological panpsychism; and the only line between subjects and nonsubjects of experience that can be drawn nonarbitrarily in the light of our knowledge of nature is the one between brained animals and all other physical things.

[Consul]

Consider a previous comment of yours, where you noted that we cannot attribute higher mental functions to plants. But it's not about higher mental functions, which obviously are only present in brained animals. It's about having some kind of sensation of being, a subjective experience different to that of a rock or a piece of plastic.

I think it's a basic and consequential mistake to dissociate phenomenal consciousnes from cognition or mental functions in general. You need to have a cognitive mind first before you can have a conscious mind, because consciousness is essentially integrated into the cognitive (functional-informational) architecture of a mind. There is no "pure" experience that can occur in an organism no matter whether or not it has a mind (as conceived by cognitive psychology).
So minimal consciousness requires a minimal mind at least. What mental functions constitute a minimal mind? Perceiving, learning, representing, remembering, knowing, decision-making, problem-solving…?

"Conscious experience is not all there is to the mind." – David Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, 1996, p. 11)

[Sy Borg]

Consider a previous comment of yours, where you noted that we cannot attribute higher mental functions to plants. But it's not about higher mental functions, which obviously are only present in brained animals. It's about having some kind of sensation of being, a subjective experience different to that of a rock or a piece of plastic.

I think it's a basic and consequential mistake to dissociate phenomenal consciousnes from cognition or mental functions in general. You need to have a cognitive mind first before you can have a conscious mind, because consciousness is essentially integrated into the cognitive (functional-informational) architecture of a mind. There is no "pure" experience that can occur in an organism no matter whether or not it has a mind (as conceived by cognitive psychology).
So minimal consciousness requires a minimal mind at least. What mental functions constitute a minimal mind? Perceiving, learning, representing, remembering, knowing, decision-making, problem-solving…?

"Conscious experience is not all there is to the mind." – David Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, 1996, p. 11)

Is the mind needed to feel the sensation of being? It seems that way for humans because they are inherently and intensely cerebral. How can we imagine being without this relentless flow of thoughts? Our experience is like a river. The simplest sense of being would be like puddles by comparison - sparse, sporadic and dependent on outside events.

I don't think of "pure" experience, rather basic experience. Ground level. Consider what it feels like when a reflex is activated, say the archetypal hammer on the knee. Imagine that inner sensation without mental content - without all the complexities (skin, tissues, blood) or interpretations.

[Consul]

I think it's a basic and consequential mistake to dissociate phenomenal consciousnes from cognition or mental functions in general. You need to have a cognitive mind first before you can have a conscious mind, because consciousness is essentially integrated into the cognitive (functional-informational) architecture of a mind. There is no "pure" experience that can occur in an organism no matter whether or not it has a mind (as conceived by cognitive psychology).
So minimal consciousness requires a minimal mind at least. What mental functions constitute a minimal mind? Perceiving, learning, representing, remembering, knowing, decision-making, problem-solving…?

"Conscious experience is not all there is to the mind." – David Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, 1996, p. 11)

Is the mind needed to feel the sensation of being?

I'm still unsure what "the sensation of being" refers to.
"I sense, therefore I am." This is trivially true, since nonexistent things sense nothing. But is the following true? "I sense, therefore I am aware of my being."

Anyway, my point is that there can be experienceless minds but no mindless experiences. That is to say, the experiential, phenomenally conscious part of the mind depends on its nonexperiential, phenomenally nonconscious, functional-representational/computational-informational part.

It seems that way for humans because they are inherently and intensely cerebral. How can we imagine being without this relentless flow of thoughts? Our experience is like a river. The simplest sense of being would be like puddles by comparison - sparse, sporadic and dependent on outside events.

Our introspective impression that human consciousness is a continuous stream or field, and that it has a rich (synchronic) experiential content might be an illusion; and there is actually experimental evidence for its being an illusion.

If the global workspace theory of consciousness is true, then the experiential content of phenomenal consciousness is identical to the informational content of working memory; and then the number of items it can contain simultaneously is surprisingly low: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Magic ... _Minus_Two

The psychologist Nick Chater writes:

"The very intuition that we experience a continuously flowing stream of consciousness must, according to the cycle of thought viewpoint, itself be an illusion. Rather, our conscious experience is a sequence of steps, of irregular length, in which the cycle of thought continually attends to, and makes sense of, fresh material." (p. 181)

"We think we see a detailed, multicoloured world, but we don’t. This is a hoax so astonishing and all-encompassing that it is sometimes known in philosophy and psychology as the ‘grand illusion’." (p. 51)

"[O]ur experience of the sensory world is, to an astonishing degree, also full of gaps – the Grand Illusion has us in its thrall." (p. 52)

"([D]espite our intuitions to the contrary), consciousness is astonishingly sparse: we create sensations, beliefs and desires; and make pronouncements, carry out actions and make choices, one by one, as required." (p. 52)

"It is rather astonishing that we are, from the point of view of conscious experience, entirely oblivious to the highly discontinuous process by which our eyes gather information." (p. 181)

"[O]ur sense that seeing and hearing seem continuous arises because the brain is informing us that the visual and auditory world are continuous; and subjective experience reflects the world around us, not the operations of our own minds." (p. 182)

(Chater, Nick. The Mind is Flat: The Illusion of Mental Depth and the Improvised Mind. London: Allen Lane, 2018.)

I don't think of "pure" experience, rather basic experience. Ground level. Consider what it feels like when a reflex is activated, say the archetypal hammer on the knee. Imagine that inner sensation without mental content - without all the complexities (skin, tissues, blood) or interpretations.

Tactile, visual, and auditory experiences are examples of "basic experiences", aren't they?

Patricia Churchland writes (in her book Touching a Nerve) that "[y]our conscious brain needs your unconscious brain." Analogously, your conscious mind needs your unconscious mind, the unconscious mind being the cognitive mind underlying your conscious mind.

[Sy Borg]

I think it's a basic and consequential mistake to dissociate phenomenal consciousnes from cognition or mental functions in general. You need to have a cognitive mind first before you can have a conscious mind, because consciousness is essentially integrated into the cognitive (functional-informational) architecture of a mind. There is no "pure" experience that can occur in an organism no matter whether or not it has a mind (as conceived by cognitive psychology).
So minimal consciousness requires a minimal mind at least. What mental functions constitute a minimal mind? Perceiving, learning, representing, remembering, knowing, decision-making, problem-solving…?

"Conscious experience is not all there is to the mind." – David Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, 1996, p. 11)

Is the mind needed to feel the sensation of being?

I'm still unsure what "the sensation of being" refers to.
"I sense, therefore I am." This is trivially true, since nonexistent things sense nothing. But is the following true? "I sense, therefore I am aware of my being."

Anyway, my point is that there can be experienceless minds but no mindless experiences. That is to say, the experiential, phenomenally conscious part of the mind depends on its nonexperiential, phenomenally nonconscious, functional-representational/computational-informational part.

A mindless experience, of course, would be hardly memorable. I am not convinced that so called "unconscious processes" are entirely unconscious. I think there are sensations being registered, just that they are akin to the sound of a pin dropping amid the "pneumatic drills" that are human minds. So we assume unconsciousness. The situation is akin to not seeing asteroids in other solar systems because the star is so dominant.

It seems that way for humans because they are inherently and intensely cerebral. How can we imagine being without this relentless flow of thoughts? Our experience is like a river. The simplest sense of being would be like puddles by comparison - sparse, sporadic and dependent on outside events.

Our introspective impression that human consciousness is a continuous stream or field, and that it has a rich (synchronic) experiential content might be an illusion; and there is actually experimental evidence for its being an illusion.

If the global workspace theory of consciousness is true, then the experiential content of phenomenal consciousness is identical to the informational content of working memory; and then the number of items it can contain simultaneously is surprisingly low: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Magic ... _Minus_Two

The psychologist Nick Chater writes:

"The very intuition that we experience a continuously flowing stream of consciousness must, according to the cycle of thought viewpoint, itself be an illusion. Rather, our conscious experience is a sequence of steps, of irregular length, in which the cycle of thought continually attends to, and makes sense of, fresh material." (p. 181)

"We think we see a detailed, multicoloured world, but we don’t. This is a hoax so astonishing and all-encompassing that it is sometimes known in philosophy and psychology as the ‘grand illusion’." (p. 51)

"[O]ur experience of the sensory world is, to an astonishing degree, also full of gaps – the Grand Illusion has us in its thrall." (p. 52)

"([D]espite our intuitions to the contrary), consciousness is astonishingly sparse: we create sensations, beliefs and desires; and make pronouncements, carry out actions and make choices, one by one, as required." (p. 52)

"It is rather astonishing that we are, from the point of view of conscious experience, entirely oblivious to the highly discontinuous process by which our eyes gather information." (p. 181)

"[O]ur sense that seeing and hearing seem continuous arises because the brain is informing us that the visual and auditory world are continuous; and subjective experience reflects the world around us, not the operations of our own minds." (p. 182)

(Chater, Nick. The Mind is Flat: The Illusion of Mental Depth and the Improvised Mind. London: Allen Lane, 2018.)

Interesting quote. The brain fills in countless gaps in our sensory perceptions, while ultimately ignoring most inputs. However, I expect that human consciousness is vastly more consistent than that of simpler organisms.

I don't think of "pure" experience, rather basic experience. Ground level. Consider what it feels like when a reflex is activated, say the archetypal hammer on the knee. Imagine that inner sensation without mental content - without all the complexities (skin, tissues, blood) or interpretations.

Tactile, visual, and auditory experiences are examples of "basic experiences", aren't they?

Patricia Churchland writes (in her book Touching a Nerve) that "[y]our conscious brain needs your unconscious brain." Analogously, your conscious mind needs your unconscious mind, the unconscious mind being the cognitive mind underlying your conscious mind.

However, we cannot experience touch, vision or sound without our noisy brain mediating everything. Meditators try to dampen this effect but they are aware that emptying one's mind 100% is impossible. As I say, I think humans interpret minimal consciousness as zero due to the relativities, like trying to see an asteroid orbiting a distant star.

[Belindi]

Sy Borg wrote:

However, we cannot experience touch, vision or sound without our noisy brain mediating everything. Meditators try to dampen this effect but they are aware that emptying one's mind 100% is impossible.

I did at one time believe Maharishi Mahesh Yogi of TM there was pure empty consciousness but now I believe consciousness is not a thing. We do consciousness like we do digestion , or respiration. Doing consciousness is like shining a search light or an intensely focused light on whatever is there in itself.

[Pattern-chaser]

"Equally possible" isn't synonymous with "equally probable" or "equally plausible"!

Agreed. But comparing possibilities or probabilities is quite different from deciding if something is possible/probable. We need to be able to place a numerical value on such probabilities before we can compare them, and I suggest that there is no statistical technique that can do this, given the imprecise nature of the things we are considering. No quantified probabilities means no comparison is, er, possible.

[Consul]

I did at one time believe Maharishi Mahesh Yogi of TM there was pure empty consciousness but now I believe consciousness is not a thing. We do consciousness like we do digestion , or respiration. Doing consciousness is like shining a search light or an intensely focused light on whatever is there in itself.

Phenomenal consciousness is not a mental box with experiences as its content. It cannot exist without any experiential content, because phenomenal consciousness is nothing over and above its experiential content; so experientially empty consciousness is non-consciousness.

[Belindi]

I did at one time believe Maharishi Mahesh Yogi of TM there was pure empty consciousness but now I believe consciousness is not a thing. We do consciousness like we do digestion , or respiration. Doing consciousness is like shining a search light or an intensely focused light on whatever is there in itself.

Phenomenal consciousness is not a mental box with experiences as its content. It cannot exist without any experiential content, because phenomenal consciousness is nothing over and above its experiential content; so experientially empty consciousness is non-consciousness.

I agree.