A Moral Universe

[Terrapin Station]

So you're claiming it as unconscious (or "subconscious") mental content?

No, you're claiming that on my behalf.
The moral reflection and choice are conscious mental activities.
This moral consciousness is itself derivative of the principle of morality
However, this principle of morality is directive of moral consciousness -- a kind of mental template at this stage of human evolution -- neither present to consciousness nor unconscious, but rather the way the human mind works after 200,000 years.

Wait, so what's your alternate category? Not conscious mentality, not unconscious (or "subconsicous") mentality, but _____ mentality? How do you fill in the blank there?

[Angel Trismegistus]

No, you're claiming that on my behalf.
The moral reflection and choice are conscious mental activities.
This moral consciousness is itself derivative of the principle of morality
However, this principle of morality is directive of moral consciousness -- a kind of mental template at this stage of human evolution -- neither present to consciousness nor unconscious, but rather the way the human mind works after 200,000 years.

Wait, so what's your alternate category? Not conscious mentality, not unconscious (or "subconsicous") mentality, but _____ mentality? How do you fill in the blank there?

A form of mentality.

[Belindi]

Right , a form of mentality mentality.

[Terrapin Station]

Wait, so what's your alternate category? Not conscious mentality, not unconscious (or "subconsicous") mentality, but _____ mentality? How do you fill in the blank there?

A form of mentality.

And you're categorizing that form as?

[Angel Trismegistus]

Angel Trismegistus » Yesterday, 4:57 pm

Are you inviting suggestions as to where you can stick it?
I suppose that your recommendation falls into the category of criticism, which was invited after all. But you're being much too philosophical in your criticism, don't you think?

Truly? Well:-

I note that Sculptor seems to have either developed or be developing an intriguing cognitive framework pertinent to the aforementioned sticking up of the poster.

You will not be surprised to learn that frivolous speculation has led me to wonder whether others might gain some amusement from the application of that model to physical circumstance. I wonder if, were that to be the case, any general good feeling engendered might be considered life affirming and in accordance with the moral principle of the universe?

In fact, were the event to be live-streamed to the masses there seems a possibility of a widespread degree of life affirming good cheer. Provided no severe harm was afforded your erstwhile personage it would seem almost a moral duty that you should be happy to undertake. I would further speculate that Sculptor himself might, given the appropriate PPE, volunteer to do the requisite sticking (though this is also speculation given both the travelling distance involved and my suspicion that Sculptor might not share your moral outlook).

I do recognise that, being human, Sculptor might run afoul of some twist of moral logic that might put him at moral hazard. (He might not mind though, for reasons given). But the principle remains. Since you seem very much a man of principle, what if someone were to paint your fundament red, and you were thereafter to present it “face on” as it were to an angry bull and let the bull act in accordance with its moral nature? There remains some regrettable risk of damage to your personage I admit, but perhaps if it was just a little bull, the risk of any damage might be more than compensated for by the life affirming good feeling engendered among the millions who might watch on some social media platform? I think careful camera work may be required. Clearly there is an additional risk that the sight of your brightly coloured backside might be anything but a life-affirming spectacle, but I’d wager the expression on your face at the moment of bull-ass impact might well more than compensate for matters here. I think there is an aesthetic here that could potentially be a matter of debate in its own right.

If it is not overly philosophical I say brace yourself man and do your moral duty!

Filosophy's Fractious Fundamental Farceur. Bravo!

[Angel Trismegistus]

A form of mentality.

And you're categorizing that form as?

The necessary and sufficient condition for moral thought.

[Terrapin Station]

And you're categorizing that form as?

The necessary and sufficient condition for moral thought.

Not what I asked you. I asked you as what category of mentality you're categorizing it as. Conventional divisions include conscious mental phenomena, unconscious or subconscious mental phenomena, and you're saying that this is a different sort of mental phenomena that you would call _______ mental phenomena. What goes in the blank there that's grammatically parallel to but different than terms like "conscious," "unconscious" and "subconscious"?

[Angel Trismegistus]

The necessary and sufficient condition for moral thought.

Not what I asked you. I asked you as what category of mentality you're categorizing it as. Conventional divisions include conscious mental phenomena, unconscious or subconscious mental phenomena, and you're saying that this is a different sort of mental phenomena that you would call _______ mental phenomena. What goes in the blank there that's grammatically parallel to but different than terms like "conscious," "unconscious" and "subconscious"?

And I answered by omission: none of your mental categories. Where does reason fit into your categorizations? Is reason a conscious mental phenomenon or a subconscious mental phenomenon or an unconscious mental phenomenon? Answer: it doesn't. Reason is the principle of all human mental phenomena. The principle of morality is moral reason.

[Belindi]

Not what I asked you. I asked you as what category of mentality you're categorizing it as. Conventional divisions include conscious mental phenomena, unconscious or subconscious mental phenomena, and you're saying that this is a different sort of mental phenomena that you would call _______ mental phenomena. What goes in the blank there that's grammatically parallel to but different than terms like "conscious," "unconscious" and "subconscious"?

And I answered by omission: none of your mental categories. Where does reason fit into your categorizations? Is reason a conscious mental phenomenon or a subconscious mental phenomenon or an unconscious mental phenomenon? Answer: it doesn't. Reason is the principle of all human mental phenomena. The principle of morality is moral reason.

Reason does fit with subconscious, actually . Intuitions are subconscious reasoning processes.

Moral reasoning is mediated by prescriptive or predictive claims, just like efficient reasoning.There is no difference between moral reasoning and reasoning except that bossy people think their own prescriptions and predictions are the best.

[Terrapin Station]

And I answered by omission: none of your mental categories.

Right. None of mine. Hence I want to tell me the additional categorization(s) that you employ.

It shouldn't be like pulling teeth to get you to provide such simple information.

[Angel Trismegistus]

And I answered by omission: none of your mental categories.

Right. None of mine. Hence I want to tell me the additional categorization(s) that you employ.

It shouldn't be like pulling teeth to get you to provide such simple information.

I gave you my answer already. It is not a mental category; it is the necessary and sufficient condition for moral reasoning.

[Terrapin Station]

Right. None of mine. Hence I want to tell me the additional categorization(s) that you employ.

It shouldn't be like pulling teeth to get you to provide such simple information.

I gave you my answer already. It is not a mental category; it is the necessary and sufficient condition for moral reasoning.

You said that there are some things that are mental that are not present to consciousness.

I asked if you were positing unconscious (or "subconscious") mental content. You said you were not.

So, (a) it's mental, but (b) it's neither (i) conscious mental content or phenomena nor (ii) unconscious (or "subsconscious") mental content or phenomena. So it's some other category than either conscious or unconscious mental phenomena. If it's mental, you can't say it's not a mental category! You need to say what third category of mental phenomena it is. Or you need to revise your reply where you said that there are some things that are mental but that are not present to consciousness (and that are also not unconscious or subconscious mental phenomena).

[Angel Trismegistus]

I gave you my answer already. It is not a mental category; it is the necessary and sufficient condition for moral reasoning.

You said that there are some things that are mental that are not present to consciousness.

I asked if you were positing unconscious (or "subconscious") mental content. You said you were not.

So, (a) it's mental, but (b) it's neither (i) conscious mental content or phenomena nor (ii) unconscious (or "subsconscious") mental content or phenomena. So it's some other category than either conscious or unconscious mental phenomena. If it's mental, you can't say it's not a mental category! You need to say what third category of mental phenomena it is. Or you need to revise your reply where you said that there are some things that are mental but that are not present to consciousness (and that are also not unconscious or subconscious mental phenomena).

The "form" of mentality or the "condition" for mentality (I've used both words in replies to you) or the ground of mentality (new word) is no part of the "content" or "phenomena" of mentality (your words quoted) and therefore NOT categorizable as "conscious," "subconscious" or "unconscious" (your categories). Like Reason itself, which names our capacity for reasoning, the principle of morality is a guiding standard of mentality -- it is in fact moral reason, the capacity for moral reasoning, or Reason moralized if you will.

[Terrapin Station]

You said that there are some things that are mental that are not present to consciousness.

I asked if you were positing unconscious (or "subconscious") mental content. You said you were not.

So, (a) it's mental, but (b) it's neither (i) conscious mental content or phenomena nor (ii) unconscious (or "subsconscious") mental content or phenomena. So it's some other category than either conscious or unconscious mental phenomena. If it's mental, you can't say it's not a mental category! You need to say what third category of mental phenomena it is. Or you need to revise your reply where you said that there are some things that are mental but that are not present to consciousness (and that are also not unconscious or subconscious mental phenomena).

The "form" of mentality or the "condition" for mentality (I've used both words in replies to you) or the ground of mentality (new word) is no part of the "content" or "phenomena" of mentality (your words quoted) and therefore NOT categorizable as "conscious," "subconscious" or "unconscious" (your categories). Like Reason itself, which names our capacity for reasoning, the principle of morality is a guiding standard of mentality -- it is in fact moral reason, the capacity for moral reasoning, or Reason moralized if you will.

Just to review, I wrote:

"This answer, especially in light of the bolded/italicized parts, makes no sense to me given that in your view per an earlier post, it's not something an individual would be conscious of, it's not something they think. How do we have actions/interactions, mental and emotional orientations, assessments and principles in mankind where we're not talking about something an individual would be conscious of, something they think? "

You responded with:

"The principle 'bears on the assessment' -- you skipped the verb. And not all that is mental is present to consciousness."

Were you not answering this question: "How do we have actions/interactions, mental and emotional orientations, assessments and principles in mankind where we're not talking about something an individual would be conscious of, something they think"?

If you weren't answering that question, telling me how we can have those things where we're not talking about something an individual would be conscious of, something they think, could you answer it?

[Belindi]

You said that there are some things that are mental that are not present to consciousness.

I asked if you were positing unconscious (or "subconscious") mental content. You said you were not.

So, (a) it's mental, but (b) it's neither (i) conscious mental content or phenomena nor (ii) unconscious (or "subsconscious") mental content or phenomena. So it's some other category than either conscious or unconscious mental phenomena. If it's mental, you can't say it's not a mental category! You need to say what third category of mental phenomena it is. Or you need to revise your reply where you said that there are some things that are mental but that are not present to consciousness (and that are also not unconscious or subconscious mental phenomena).

The "form" of mentality or the "condition" for mentality (I've used both words in replies to you) or the ground of mentality (new word) is no part of the "content" or "phenomena" of mentality (your words quoted) and therefore NOT categorizable as "conscious," "subconscious" or "unconscious" (your categories). Like Reason itself, which names our capacity for reasoning, the principle of morality is a guiding standard of mentality -- it is in fact moral reason, the capacity for moral reasoning, or Reason moralized if you will.

Do you know if the capacity for empathy is situated in any particular part of the brain?