Gertie wrote: ↑November 21st, 2020, 6:23 pm
Marvin wrote:The natural objection to this is that the life of the fleas on our dog are not morally good for us or our dog.
That is not my objection. Rather it's the reason you came up with the notion that Life is not only objectively good, it can simultaneously not be objectively good, depending on the pov of the species - we haven't even got to the problems with that yet).
Uh, just to be clear,
Life is objectively Good from the specific pov of each species. The evidence, for those species that are able to put up a fight or escape by flight, is that those species when threatened with imminent harm will either resist or flee. Try giving a cat a bath.
Each individual of each species demonstrates that its own life is good by a fight or flight response when threatened. The carrot, unfortunately, is stuck in the ground, so it is just as well that it has no conscious experience.
Marvin wrote:I think that everything begins with the axiom that Life is Morally Good. Which implies that surviving, thriving, and reproducing are morally good, because that is how all organic life operates.
Gertie wrote: ↑November 21st, 2020, 6:23 pm
If the Moral Goodness of Life was self-evident, you could show why and only a few people might disagree who were for idiosyncratic reasons unable to grasp this. ...
I just did. Every animal has a "fight or flight" response to an eminent threat. The Moral Goodness of Life is hard-coded into their instincts.
Gertie wrote: ↑November 21st, 2020, 6:23 pm
You presumably think this is what's happening here, you've run into a bunch of people who can't see what's staring them in the face. But most people arguing with you do grasp what you're saying, but believe you are using axiomatic incorrectly. Just because it looks self-evident to you, does not make it self-evident to others, if you are mistaken.
Well, I am working with an unfair advantage.
Gertie wrote: ↑November 21st, 2020, 6:23 pm
I have made the comparison with the chemical processes with crystals to prompt you to explain why biological processes are axiomatically morally good, but chemical processes aren't. You haven't been able to.
But I did. I pointed out to you several times that crystals and toasters and other non-living things have no interest in outcomes. But all living organisms, because they are BUILT to survive, thrive, and reproduce, are affected positively by events that expedite those functions and are affected negatively by events that injure those abilities. They are subject to benefits (good). They are subject to harms (evil). And benefits and harms are moral notions.
Even the carrot, which has no subjective experience of anything at all, experiences benefits and harms. They can be helped. They can be hurt. And we can objectively observe things which benefit them (water and sunshine) and we can objectively observe things which harm them (drought and rabbits).
Gertie wrote: ↑November 21st, 2020, 6:23 pm
I have made the point that Interests are the key element which makes the difference between a morally neutral state of affairs or action, and a morally relevant one. And that interests come into being with the qualiative nature of conscious experience. You have incorrectly dismissed this as an appeal to subjective desires, rather than my actual position - qualiative experience is the very grounding of meaning, value, mattering and therefore morality.
That's your opinion. I disagree.
1. Objective benefits and harms exist independent of conscious experience.
2. If it IS a net good for you to do something that harms no one else then you OUGHT to do it.
3. If it IS bad for you or if it unnecessarily harms someone else then you OUGHT NOT do it.
1 Subjective benefits and harms exist only within someone's conscious experience.
2. If it IS a net good for you to do something that harms no one else then you OUGHT to do it.
3. If it IS bad for you or if it unnecessarily harms someone else then you OUGHT NOT do it.
I don't know what a "qualitative experience" would be. We can experience objective events, like seeing someone stepping on our toes. We can experience subjective events, like the pain of someone stepping on our toes. Using hypnosis, we can suppress the subjective experience of the event, but we cannot suppress the objective occurrence of the event. The event happens whether we experience it or not.
The carrot, as far as we know, has no subjective experience. But we can observe the carrot sitting on the table, absent water, slowly shrivel as it dries up. And we can objectively observe this as an event that is harming the carrot, because the carrot is shriveling rather than thriving.
The event is not good for the carrot. So, what ought we to do? Well, that depends on what we want, not what the carrot wants. Morality, after all, is species specific.
Gertie wrote: ↑November 21st, 2020, 6:23 pm
This is why I can say that you chopping up a carrot has no moral connotations, but you chopping up a cat does. But you have to rely on your own subjective feelings about cats and carrots find moral connotations.
We know what is objectively good for the carrot. Leaving it growing in the garden is good for the carrot. Uprooting it and having it in my salad is good for me but bad for the carrot.
We know what is objectively good for the cat. Feeding it, cleaning its litter box, and giving it affection are all objectively good for the cat. The cat, we presume, also has subjective feelings about the food, the cleanliness of the litter, and the affection.
We love the cat, probably because it seems a lot like us. It is like having the company of a child or a friend. We are unlikely to have such feelings about the carrot (unless we're entering it in a 4H contest).
But, prior to the year 2010, eating cat meat was a staple in some southern China provinces. It is estimated that as many as 10,000 cats were consumed daily. (see Wikipedia article on "Cat meat" at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cat_meat. The moral connotations of cats and carrots were similar at that time and place.