Gertie wrote: ↑November 23rd, 2020, 7:18 pm
Kaz_1983 wrote: ↑November 23rd, 2020, 8:12 am
What do you guys think of the observer theory?
For anybody that doesn't know “the ideal observer theory’ was first espoused by the philosopher Adam Smith and it's been said that people like David Hume have been supporters of this theory. The "Ideal observer theory" puts forth the idea that what is right is determined by the attitudes that a hypothetical ideal observer would have. To break it down, the Ideal observer theory is the meta-ethical view which claims that ethical sentences express truth-apt propositions about the attitudes of a hypothetical ideal observer.
I suppose it comes down to whether you believe that the "Ideal observer" has used reason alone to come to their moral judgement/s or whether moral judgements are based the human sentiments... look at the theory like this;
P1) The ideal observer feels that the idea of murder brings about “moral disgust”
P2) For me, the idea of murder brings about “moral disgust” too
C) I believe that the ideal observer’s feelings about murder are similar to mine.
The ideal observer theory is kind of like your conscience - your conscience or in this case the “Ideal observer”, keeps you in check... there is also a version of that is based on the desires and human sentiments of a hypothetical ideal observer. David Hume apparently espoused a version of the ideal observed theory....
To sum it up, for me it sounds a lot like a "subjective" version of the divine command theory, because in both cases we're talking about an ideal observer - just in one case the ideal observer is God and the other one is subjective and what is right and wrong is determined by the attitudes that's a hypothetical ideal observer would have in his possession - both are kind like that.... see in a lot of ways “The ideal observer theory” is kind of like Virtue Ethics, because in both cases the primary focus is on what type of person we should aspire to be.
All quote from here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mora ... #SubIdeDis
It seems like an attempt to bring a quasi rational/objective structure to moral subjectivism.
That might depend on the version of the "ideal observer theory" under consideration. I think in Hume's case, he was trying to describe what people in fact are doing when they make moral judgements.
Gertie wrote: ↑November 23rd, 2020, 7:18 pm
I think it's right to acknowledge that moral subjectivism has a massive problem - the ''all things are permissible'' problem.
What is this problem that you mention? No matter what the truth is regarding ethics, not everyone is going to abide by whatever rules or principles are put forth. At least some people will violate whatever moral rules there are. That fact is true regardless of whether we are dealing with some form of moral subjectivism or some objective morality. In the world, people murder, rape, torture, etc. None of that is changed by whether some form of moral subjectivism is correct or some form of objective morality is correct.
Gertie wrote: ↑November 23rd, 2020, 7:18 pm
So can introducing the concept of an Ideal Subject escape that problem?
At the level of logical form, ought claims may have a tacit argument place for a standard, just as for contextualists—but the standard is context-invariant. The second is dispositionalization: the reference is not to anyone's actual sentiments, but to sentiments they would have in suitable circumstances. Suggestions of this type of view can be found in Hume and Smith—recall their talk of correcting our sentiments by reference to the common point of view or the impartial spectator's response. Here is a recognizably Smithian formulation of this kind of view:
To judge that X is wrong is to believe that any informed impartial spectator would disapprove of X.
Roderick Firth's (1952) Ideal Observer Theory is a more contemporary variant of this kind of view. He formulates it as an analysis of the meaning of ethical statements, but it can also be taken as an account of the corresponding thoughts. In general form, it is as follows:
To judge that X has a moral property is to believe that any ideal observer would have an ethically significant reaction to X in conditions ideal for doing so.
By an ‘ethically significant reaction’ Firth means
the kind of moral experience which we take to be evidence, under ideal conditions, for the truth of our ethical judgments. (Firth 1952: 326)
He leaves it open whether the reaction is sentimental, so there are possible variants of Ideal Observer Theory that are not sentimentalist. In specifying the characteristics of the ideal observer, Firth uses a ‘pragmatic methodology’ of
examining the procedures which we actually regard, implicitly or explicitly, as the rational ones for deciding ethical questions. (ibid. 332)
This looks like clutching at straws to me. Even as an appeal to the underlying notion that our sentiments are 'supposed to work in particular ways' which have a rationality to them. Because now we know our species' sentiments evolved for utility, both the selfish and social (''benevolent'') ones.
This part of the article spells out that the role of the Ideal Observer is to replace God as the perfect Moral Arbiter, acknowledgiing Dostoevsky's point - '' If god does not exist everything is permitted'' -
Frankly, I think god is irrelevant to ethics, and could not serve as any reasonable foundation of ethics. For either ethics is dependent upon god, as in the divine command theory (which reduces ethics to whims of god,
which may include genocide or anything else, as mentioned in my first post in this thread), or ethics is not dependent upon god, in which case god is irrelevant to what ethics is.
Gertie wrote: ↑November 23rd, 2020, 7:18 pm
If we actually disqualify someone's ethical verdicts because she is ignorant of non-moral facts, failure to vividly imagine what something would actually be like, partiality, non-moral emotions, and inconsistency, this shows that we implicitly regard moral judgements as valid only when made by an omniscient, omnipercipient, impartial, dispassionate, consistent, but otherwise normal judge (ibid. 333–345). These are then the characteristics of the ideal observer.
But the difference is God is not only omniscient, but crucially here
the embodiment of Goodness - that's why God can't get it wrong (Divine Command Theory). But the Ideal Observer has nothing to check with, no foundational touchstone of Goodness to evaluate and reason from.
If god possesses goodness, then goodness must be a quality that has some meaning, which means that we need only look at that for morality and can forget about god.
To put this another way, if you know that god is good, you must already know what it is to be good, and consequently you don't need god to tell you about it. If you don't know what it is to be good, then you cannot know that god is good. Consequently, you have no reason to suppose that what god says is good.
Gertie wrote: ↑November 23rd, 2020, 7:18 pm
So I think it fails.
If moral philosophy wants to address the double body blows of the death of god as our perfect moral arbiter and objective moral source, and our knowledge that evolutionary utility is what shaped our dispositions towards 'moral' approval and disgust, we need to think afresh.
What would an appropriate modern fit-for-purpose morality look like? What is it for? What might justify it?
I think you might want to look at the
Euthyphro by Plato. God does not help with morality at all.
The divine command theory is just that if god commands something, that makes it good. Thus, if god commands murder and rape, then murder and rape are good. Also, if all there is to morality is that it is commanded by god, then there can be no reason to object to god commanding murder and rape, because, according to this theory, all there is to being good is that it is commanded by god. So there is no standard to judge what god commands; anything and everything that is commanded by god is equally a command of god, and consequently equally "good".
"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence." - David Hume