Objective morality and the Necessity of God

[Terrapin Station]

How would you say that we can make a distinction between ourselves and others where we're not placing others in an objective world?

I think that in the framework of Buddhism, this distinction is nowhere nearly as important as in modern Western culture. In the context of early Buddhism, it would not be an exaggeration to say that other people are of little importance. A person who has made it their goal to attain nibbana concerns themselves with a category of problems that only occasionally and remotely has something to do with other people.

For example, a la Buddha saying, "Work out your own salvation. Do not depend on others"?

I'm going to need a reference for this supposed Buddha quote.

(Here, let me help you with this one: https://fakebuddhaquotes.com/work-out-y ... on-others/)


(I'm not a Buddhist, BTW.)

Okay, but as long as you're making a distinction between self and others placed in the world you're making a subjective/objective distinction. Whether one considers it "important" or not.

[baker]

Okay, but as long as you're making a distinction between self and others placed in the world you're making a subjective/objective distinction.

Not at all, as it is possible to conceive of "self" as yet another mental object. This is esp.possible in a reference frame where selfhood is seen as something constructed, and not as a fixed entity.

[Terrapin Station]

Okay, but as long as you're making a distinction between self and others placed in the world you're making a subjective/objective distinction.

Not at all, as it is possible to conceive of "self" as yet another mental object. This is esp.possible in a reference frame where selfhood is seen as something constructed, and not as a fixed entity.

Hence why I said that one is "placing them in the world." If one is proposing an ontology of separate mental whatevers where it's "all just mental" one would need to try to make some sense out of just what that would amount to ontologically, because on the face of it, it's incoherent.

[Marvin_Edwards]

How would you say that we can make a distinction between ourselves and others where we're not placing others in an objective world?

I think that in the framework of Buddhism, this distinction is nowhere nearly as important as in modern Western culture. In the context of early Buddhism, it would not be an exaggeration to say that other people are of little importance. A person who has made it their goal to attain nibbana concerns themselves with a category of problems that only occasionally and remotely has something to do with other people.

For example, a la Buddha saying, "Work out your own salvation. Do not depend on others"?

I'm going to need a reference for this supposed Buddha quote.

(Here, let me help you with this one: https://fakebuddhaquotes.com/work-out-y ... on-others/)


(I'm not a Buddhist, BTW.)

My favorite story is this:

Before I had studied Chan (Zen) for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and rivers as rivers. When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and rivers once again as rivers.[2]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There_Is_a_Mountain

[Marvin_Edwards]

It works like this. The brain organizes sensory input into a model of reality consisting of objects and events. When the model is accurate enough to be useful, as when we navigate our bodies through a doorway, then we call that "objective reality", because the model is our only access to objective reality. But when the model is inaccurate enough to cause a problem, as when we walk into a glass door thinking it was open, then that we call an "illusion".

Of course, if the assumption is that you can't know that you can observe brains in the first place, you can't even create the theory above without it just as well being an arbitrary fantasy. In which case why would we believe this?

Because that's how neuroscientists describe it. For example:

"Second, the brain uses internal data to construct simplified, schematic models of objects and events in the world. Those models can be used to make predictions, try out simulations, and plan actions."

Graziano, Michael S. A. "Consciousness and the Social Brain", page 8. Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

[Terrapin Station]

Of course, if the assumption is that you can't know that you can observe brains in the first place, you can't even create the theory above without it just as well being an arbitrary fantasy. In which case why would we believe this?

Because that's how neuroscientists describe it. For example:

"Second, the brain uses internal data to construct simplified, schematic models of objects and events in the world. Those models can be used to make predictions, try out simulations, and plan actions."

Graziano, Michael S. A. "Consciousness and the Social Brain", page 8. Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

Sure. So now think about these questions:

How would we know, with any accuracy, what brains do if we can't (know that we more or less accurately) observe brains in the external world?

For that matter, how would we know that there is a world with objects and events in it period if we can't observe it?

And how would we know that our brains only create simplified models of objects and events in the world if we can't observe objects and events in the world in comparison?

[Marvin_Edwards]

Because that's how neuroscientists describe it. For example:

Sure. So now think about these questions:

How would we know, with any accuracy, what brains do if we can't (know that we more or less accurately) observe brains in the external world?

For that matter, how would we know that there is a world with objects and events in it period if we can't observe it?

And how would we know that our brains only create simplified models of objects and events in the world if we can't observe objects and events in the world in comparison?

1) Graziano goes over the history of brain theory starting with Hippocrates. He recorded different behavior disturbances that corresponded to skill injuries, and concluded this was the location of thoughts and feelings. So, we've known what brains do for a long time now.

2) We do observe objects and events. People paint them. People juggle them.

3) The observation is the source of the model. You can confirm what you see by touching it, lifting it, carving it. The qualities of the object are stored as a rich set of information.

[Pattern-chaser]

you need to demonstrate that Objective reality and apparent reality are the same thing. This cannot be done. Your arguments keep running into contradictions, it seems.

If it cannot be done, then your requirement is specious.

Specious adjective Seeming to be right or true, but really wrong or false.

The requirement is not mine. It follows from the argument you have posted. Do you really believe that, because your stated aim is impossible to achieve, anyone pointing this out seems to be right, but is actually wrong or false?

Fortunately, objective reality need not match actual reality to be objective or true.

Please look again at my words. I used the word "apparent", and you have casually switched from that to "actual". I think you must agree that these two words mean quite different things, in this context? In this particular case, it's much worse than that, as your choice of word ("actual") means nearly the opposite of the word I chose ("apparent").

Assuming you intended to write "Fortunately, objective reality need not match apparent reality to be objective or true", this is one of those meaningless things that Objectivists say. Objective reality cannot help but be objective (or true), but so what? The issue is that Objective Reality is not accessible to us, so the truth of your assertions concerning it cannot be verified or falsified. Therefore your statement is nothing more than a faith-statement, backed by ... nothing at all except your fondest wishes.

Both notions, "objectivity" and "truth", evolved within the context of observed reality. That is the insight you are missing.

Your insight doesn't seem to offer much in the way of, er, insight. Both notions, "objectivity" and "truth", evolved within the context of our shared ecosystem, but so what? This offers nothing to the discussion we're having.

"Objectivity" refers in some way - maybe mildly, maybe in absolute terms - to that which actually is. Apparent reality may or may not be objective reality, there is no way we can, or will ever, know. So your assertions are nothing but misleading. Why would you continue to assert things that cannot be investigated by logical or scientific means? Why do you assert things that cannot be verified or falsified? I can only think that you do it to fraudulently present your faith position as something with foundation?

[Terrapin Station]

Sure. So now think about these questions:

How would we know, with any accuracy, what brains do if we can't (know that we more or less accurately) observe brains in the external world?

For that matter, how would we know that there is a world with objects and events in it period if we can't observe it?

And how would we know that our brains only create simplified models of objects and events in the world if we can't observe objects and events in the world in comparison?

1) Graziano goes over the history of brain theory starting with Hippocrates. He recorded different behavior disturbances that corresponded to skill injuries, and concluded this was the location of thoughts and feelings. So, we've known what brains do for a long time now.

2) We do observe objects and events. People paint them. People juggle them.

3) The observation is the source of the model. You can confirm what you see by touching it, lifting it, carving it. The qualities of the object are stored as a rich set of information.

So if we're positing that we do observe, and thus can know more or less accurately, how brains are in the external world, then we can't claim that we only know a model that the brain creates. We can't have it both ways.

[Marvin_Edwards]

"Objectivity" refers in some way - maybe mildly, maybe in absolute terms - to that which actually is.

One might think that. However, all we have to work with is what we are capable of observing. So, for all practical purposes, objective reality is equal to observed reality.

[Marvin_Edwards]

1) Graziano goes over the history of brain theory starting with Hippocrates. He recorded different behavior disturbances that corresponded to skill injuries, and concluded this was the location of thoughts and feelings. So, we've known what brains do for a long time now.

2) We do observe objects and events. People paint them. People juggle them.

3) The observation is the source of the model. You can confirm what you see by touching it, lifting it, carving it. The qualities of the object are stored as a rich set of information.

So if we're positing that we do observe, and thus can know more or less accurately, how brains are in the external world, then we can't claim that we only know a model that the brain creates. We can't have it both ways.

Well, since we do, we clearly can. We know about the brain based upon a model we have about the brain, in our brain.

[Papus79]

"Objectivity" refers in some way - maybe mildly, maybe in absolute terms - to that which actually is. Apparent reality may or may not be objective reality, there is no way we can, or will ever, know. So your assertions are nothing but misleading.

(somewhat bridging off of this - not all of the below is direct reply)

This is part of why I've been harping on terminology in this thread. Things can seem objectively true but (object vs. subject) be both objective and subjective observations and in the later case 'experiences', I guess the only place where the terms really coincide properly are subjective vs subject, ie. you can have subjectivity without a subject to experience it other than perhaps external artifacts of subjectivity in the social and artistic world.

This is also where I really think people constantly talking about objective morality as if it's baked into the universe is a bad idea. The self-assembled robot neutron bombing random planets, while it's a silly analogy, gets to the issue that there's nothing immoral happening unless something that has subjectivity is suffering, some extended arguments can be made about either subjective entities either being prevented or, in the case of a planet that happened to be something like a giant geode or a beautiful mathematical structure of opal-like minerals, it could be robbing future entities of seeing that beauty - ie. it always comes back to subjective experiencers either being robbed of an experience, being robbed of existence, or being harmed while they exist.

That's also where to claim 'God did it' or 'God is needed' could go either one of two ways. It's either that it's baked into outside nature, ie. God's demiurgy or ex-nihilo speech, in which case the claim is objective in the 'object' sense of 'out there', or there's something more like the mystical claim that consciousness and interiority is where we tie back to God rather than through nature but then that even further reifies the idea that morality would be purely there within the framework of subjective experiencers and exchange of impact on subjective experience. The only object (outside) think in that case which might make some sort of sense as immoral is if the neutron-bombing self-assembled robot blew something up and God was like 'dammit! I was working on that!' but as any argument with God would go, for said robot to exist at all would mean that it's God's personal hand-puppet and so God's criticizing God for having damaged God's project. I say that last bit of course as someone who doesn't see good arguments against superdeterminism.

[Terrapin Station]

So if we're positing that we do observe, and thus can know more or less accurately, how brains are in the external world, then we can't claim that we only know a model that the brain creates. We can't have it both ways.

Well, since we do, we clearly can. We know about the brain based upon a model we have about the brain, in our brain.

So again, if it's only a model in a persons' brain, then there's no reason to believe that it's not purely a fantasy. (And there's no reason for that person to not be a solipsist, by the way.)

[Marvin_Edwards]

Well, since we do, we clearly can. We know about the brain based upon a model we have about the brain, in our brain.

So again, if it's only a model in a persons' brain, then there's no reason to believe that it's not purely a fantasy. (And there's no reason for that person to not be a solipsist, by the way.)

The reason to presume it is not mere fantasy is all the experimental evidence. Consider the split-brain experiments that Michael Gazzaniga participated in and reported. Certain functions were located primarily in one hemisphere or the other. Inference was primarily in the left hemisphere and facial recognition primarily in the right. The left side could recognize a plastic spoon as well as a metal spoon as a spoon (generalization), but the right side had difficulty with that (discrimination). One of the most interesting things discovered was that the patient whose corpus collosum was cut did not seem to experience any discomfort other than that they would automatically move their head slightly to give both eyes a view of the same object that previously was communicated across the corpus collosum. Gazzaniga has several books on consciousness, split-brain experiments, and the one on free will ("Who's in Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain").

[Marvin_Edwards]

Well, since we do, we clearly can. We know about the brain based upon a model we have about the brain, in our brain.

So again, if it's only a model in a persons' brain, then there's no reason to believe that it's not purely a fantasy. (And there's no reason for that person to not be a solipsist, by the way.)

The reason to presume it is not mere fantasy is all the experimental evidence. Consider the split-brain experiments that Michael Gazzaniga participated in and reported. Certain functions were located primarily in one hemisphere or the other. Inference was primarily in the left hemisphere and facial recognition primarily in the right. The left side could recognize a plastic spoon as well as a metal spoon as a spoon (generalization), but the right side had difficulty with that (discrimination). One of the most interesting things discovered was that the patient whose corpus collosum was cut did not seem to experience any discomfort other than that they would automatically move their head slightly to give both eyes a view of the same object that previously was communicated across the corpus collosum. Gazzaniga has several books on consciousness, split-brain experiments, and the one on free will ("Who's in Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain").