How is it possible to have self-interest and to be able to form moral judgements?

[AmericanKestrel]

I think if you set aside your snark and silliness you will be better able to have a conversation.

We haven't been having a "conversation" in any meaningful sense of the term. You haven't been trying to have one.

I entered this thread merely to point out that you had obviously mischaracterized what Adam Smith had said. That set you off on a boring, unrelated political rant, which you concluded by stating that it was all that needed to be said.

You then had second thoughts. I had had the temerity to point out your ignorance regarding Adam Smith. Well, you now handled that one by dropping the Hitler bomb, of all things.

Snark was an entirely appropriate response to such a childishness maneuver by someone who I assume is an adult.

Bear in mind that I never said anything about what my ethics were, other than that I believed that it was wrong to rob people. For all you knew, my ethics and notions of social behavior were the same as yours. But was that good enough for you? Oh, no way. Because, as an abstract proposition, I look at ethics and self-interest as being "compatible." Oh my! You just hate that! So what's the solution? After I just finished saying that Hitler had no ethical beliefs, so there was nothing for hm to "balance" with self-interest, you lie and say that I had just said that my ethics "explain how Hitler had some ethical sensibility."

That's childish at best. It's actually considerably worse. That's the kind of tactic that's employed by political ideologies that you no doubt would claim to hate, despite your similar methods.

And this is how you react to a mere difference of opinion regarding how the word "incompatible" should be applied.

So here are some differences between your ethics and mine. You think that lying to win a cheap debating point is just the thing; I don't. You think that disagreeing with you over what is ultimately a stupid issue about semantics, not ethics, puts someone who disagrees with you in the camp that sympathizes with Hitler. I disagree with that approach too. Hitler believed in using the Big Lie to accomplish his purposes; you're not averse to lying either. So am I now supposed to accuse you of being a Nazi sympathizer? Is that the way that "conversations" are supposed to go as far as your concerned?

So snark? You don't like it? It's the mildest thing that I could have issued in response to your contemptible approach to what you now glibly call a "conversation."

No amount of reconstructing the posts is going to make your arguments any more logical. It is what it is for anyone to see.

[-0+]

Is it possible to have self-interest while also being able to form our own moral judgements? Don't they cancel each other out?

What are some examples of morality that don't ultimately boil down to self-interest; that can't be shown to provide some (self-believed) benefit to oneself at some level, as an individual ("me", in this life or afterlife, including reputation/legacy after death), or extended self ("us", whatever self identifies with); including feeling good if act in accordance with this morality and not feeling bad if don't act against this morality?

[Pattern-chaser]

I think if you set aside your snark and silliness you will be better able to have a conversation.

We haven't been having a "conversation" in any meaningful sense of the term. You haven't been trying to have one.

Methinks a less confrontational approach might reap dividends. Thanks.

[AmericanKestrel]

Here is another demonstration of self interest in conflict with ethics, since mention of Hitler seems to produce some deep seated trauma. Closer to home:
Bush. Cheney. Rumsfeld. Bloated self interest in oil money and profiteering lead to lies and the unethical invasion of a sovereign country, utter destruction of people, culture and economy that has left Iraq still in shambles. No chemical weapon found yet. It also lead to US reviving shameful and unspeakable torture.

[Leontiskos]

Drawing on from the work of Adam Smith, how do the two co-exist together? Is it possible to have self-interest while also being able to form our own moral judgements? Don't they cancel each other out?

What sort of mechanisms underpin these two combinations?

Please let me know your thoughts!

Presumably you are thinking that morality cannot be based on self-interest, and if that is so, then what is it based on?

I think it is true that morality requires something that trumps self-interest, or at least balances it. I think the riddle was deepened when Christianity came on the scene and self-sacrifice came to be associated with the highest virtue. It is hard to explain why the self-interested man should be virtuous. It is harder to explain why he should act in deeply self-sacrificial ways.

According to Socrates, they are one in the same. It is in our personal self interest to do the right thing at all times. The value of being a good person exceeds any possible gain from taking more than your share or treating others disrespectfully in pursuit of some short term gain. He claimed that we only behave selfishly out of ignorance, because we don't fully understand the consequences of our choices, and don't value things properly. I agree.

It is true that Socrates sees vice as rooted in ignorance, but that doesn't mean he thinks virtue and self-interest are one and the same. I'm pretty sure he doesn't, unless you have a dialogue in mind? Second, in dialogues like the Protagoras Socrates disputes the idea that virtue can be taught, and Protagoras rightly points out that if virtue cannot be taught then it is not knowledge. If virtue was just an extension of self-interest then presumably it could be taught rather easily. Since Socrates thinks it cannot be taught he must not see it as an extension of self-interest.

Certainly Socrates thinks that virtue is good, and therefore ought to be sought. But a virtuous act and a self-interested act are clearly not the same thing. Or, at least they aren't the same thing on a surface level, and if one could show that they are the same thing on a deeper level then that person would be a teacher of virtue.

[chewybrian]

According to Socrates, they are one in the same. It is in our personal self interest to do the right thing at all times. The value of being a good person exceeds any possible gain from taking more than your share or treating others disrespectfully in pursuit of some short term gain. He claimed that we only behave selfishly out of ignorance, because we don't fully understand the consequences of our choices, and don't value things properly. I agree.

It is true that Socrates sees vice as rooted in ignorance, but that doesn't mean he thinks virtue and self-interest are one and the same. I'm pretty sure he doesn't, unless you have a dialogue in mind? Second, in dialogues like the Protagoras Socrates disputes the idea that virtue can be taught, and Protagoras rightly points out that if virtue cannot be taught then it is not knowledge. If virtue was just an extension of self-interest then presumably it could be taught rather easily. Since Socrates thinks it cannot be taught he must not see it as an extension of self-interest.

Certainly Socrates thinks that virtue is good, and therefore ought to be sought. But a virtuous act and a self-interested act are clearly not the same thing. Or, at least they aren't the same thing on a surface level, and if one could show that they are the same thing on a deeper level then that person would be a teacher of virtue.

Well, I don't claim to be a great teacher of virtue. Even Socrates seemed to struggle to define it and to decide whether it could be taught or not. But I do think he said essentially what I said, which is that knowledge and wisdom lead to virtue, for the reason that virtue leads to happiness, and people do not willingly choose to be unhappy. This is from Xenophon:

He (Socrates) said that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. "For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail.... Therefore since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom." (Memorabilia iii, 9, 5)

I think the catch is that we can never have perfect and complete knowledge. It is a bit theoretical, but I believe that if I did have both, then I would only choose virtue precisely because I would know that it was in my best interest as well as that of everyone else. If you were perfectly receptive to understanding and capable of retaining it all, then and only then could I hope to teach virtue. But, we are all finite, flawed and incomplete, so we can only hope to approach virtue and never be certain when we are getting closer. I think it is clear that Socrates sought virtue and did not see the search and the effort to be virtuous as self-sacrifice. I can't claim to make the same full-time effort or to be notably virtuous. But, I feel that when I try, it is not a self-sacrifice at all, and I am better off for making the effort. At the same time, I can't really explain why I don't always make a full-time effort to get a better payoff, other than to say that I am ignorant and imperfect.

[Pattern-chaser]

Presumably you are thinking that morality cannot be based on self-interest, and if that is so, then what is it based on?

Who knows? Morality is a human-created concept, and it's rationale (if there is one) is a seemingly-random mixture of cultural mores. It could be based on ex-President Trump's pronouncements, or on the weather last Tuesday. These human-created things do not necessarily follow rules, and stuff like logic or formal reasoning.

[Leontiskos]

I think the catch is that we can never have perfect and complete knowledge. It is a bit theoretical, but I believe that if I did have both, then I would only choose virtue precisely because I would know that it was in my best interest as well as that of everyone else. If you were perfectly receptive to understanding and capable of retaining it all, then and only then could I hope to teach virtue. But, we are all finite, flawed and incomplete, so we can only hope to approach virtue and never be certain when we are getting closer. I think it is clear that Socrates sought virtue and did not see the search and the effort to be virtuous as self-sacrifice. I can't claim to make the same full-time effort or to be notably virtuous. But, I feel that when I try, it is not a self-sacrifice at all, and I am better off for making the effort. At the same time, I can't really explain why I don't always make a full-time effort to get a better payoff, other than to say that I am ignorant and imperfect.

Sure, but when the OP asks a question he is professing ignorance. It's like he is saying, "Please remedy my ignorance. I don't understand how morality and self-interest are compatible." You could answer, "According to Socrates they are identical. It's only ignorance that prevents us from seeing this."

Well, sure, but the remedy for ignorance is what is needed. How does the OP remedy their ignorance to arrive at the knowledge that morality and self-interest are compatible?

[chewybrian]

I think the catch is that we can never have perfect and complete knowledge. It is a bit theoretical, but I believe that if I did have both, then I would only choose virtue precisely because I would know that it was in my best interest as well as that of everyone else. If you were perfectly receptive to understanding and capable of retaining it all, then and only then could I hope to teach virtue. But, we are all finite, flawed and incomplete, so we can only hope to approach virtue and never be certain when we are getting closer. I think it is clear that Socrates sought virtue and did not see the search and the effort to be virtuous as self-sacrifice. I can't claim to make the same full-time effort or to be notably virtuous. But, I feel that when I try, it is not a self-sacrifice at all, and I am better off for making the effort. At the same time, I can't really explain why I don't always make a full-time effort to get a better payoff, other than to say that I am ignorant and imperfect.

Sure, but when the OP asks a question he is professing ignorance. It's like he is saying, "Please remedy my ignorance. I don't understand how morality and self-interest are compatible." You could answer, "According to Socrates they are identical. It's only ignorance that prevents us from seeing this."

Well, sure, but the remedy for ignorance is what is needed. How does the OP remedy their ignorance to arrive at the knowledge that morality and self-interest are compatible?

I'm not sure what you expect of me. Op asked:

"Is it possible to have self-interest while also being able to form our own moral judgements? Don't they cancel each other out?"

My answer is that we do not need to put aside our self-interest to do the right thing. We have to more carefully examine what is truly in our self-interest, and should expect to find that doing the right thing is in our self-interest. When we see a conflict between self-interest and virtue, we should try to consider the full effects of our actions. We are not perfect predictors, and we don't have all the facts at hand. How do we know when the way we treat someone else will come back years later to benefit or injure us? We don't, but we can understand that treating them well is more likely to benefit us.

It's not the kind of assertion that is proven by math, science or logic. Intuitively, you may see that it makes sense, as I did, attempt to follow through on it, and discover that it pays off, reinforcing your belief and justifying your faith. Or, you may proclaim: "Rubbish!" and tell everyone they have no free will so don't bother. This has to be a subjective experience and a personal journey, I think, and not everyone is ready to take it and some may never be ready. I can tell you where I would start...

...for the present, totally suppress desire: for, if you desire any of the things which are not in your own control, you must necessarily be disappointed; and of those which are, and which it would be laudable to desire, nothing is yet in your possession. Use only the appropriate actions of pursuit and avoidance; and even these lightly, and with gentleness and reservation....

The condition and characteristic of a vulgar person, is, that he never expects either benefit or hurt from himself, but from externals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is, that he expects all hurt and benefit from himself. The marks of a proficient are, that he censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, accuses no one, says nothing concerning himself as being anybody, or knowing anything: when he is, in any instance, hindered or restrained, he accuses himself; and, if he is praised, he secretly laughs at the person who praises him; and, if he is censured, he makes no defense. But he goes about with the caution of sick or injured people, dreading to move anything that is set right, before it is perfectly fixed. He suppresses all desire in himself; he transfers his aversion to those things only which thwart the proper use of our own faculty of choice; the exertion of his active powers towards anything is very gentle; if he appears stupid or ignorant, he does not care, and, in a word, he watches himself as an enemy, and one in ambush.

Epictetus, "The Enchiridion"

Now if those words do not ring true for you, then you will have to find the ones that speak directly to you. But, you begin by believing that virtue IS self-interest and then acting on the implications of that belief. It's certainly not the kind of faith required by religion or some idea of karma. The scales won't be balanced by magic forces on the outside. Rather, you will internally see the benefits of proper choices. You will have self-respect, even if nobody else happens to respect you. You will have inner peace, even if the world around you is on turmoil. If your goal is to choose well and do right, then you can always win. These are the right goals, because this is what is truly in your power.

You may be unconquerable, if you enter into no combat in which it is not in your own control to conquer. Epictetus, "The Enchiridion"

[chewybrian]

Well, sure, but the remedy for ignorance is what is needed. How does the OP remedy their ignorance to arrive at the knowledge that morality and self-interest are compatible?

Maybe I can be more clear by attacking this a different way. The person who thinks their self-interest is at odds with being a good person has made an error. They have a mistaken idea of what their self-interest might be. So, how should we define self-interest? We tend to use a definition from the science of finance here in the west. Maximizing shareholder equity is the goal of finance, and all other considerations are external to the equation and don't factor. When we apply this to our own lives, we decide that maximizing our personal wealth is the only real goal, as if we could buy happiness with the wealth we accrue. But, underlying these assumptions is the actual goal, which is to maximize our happiness. We have simply substituted money for happiness because money is easier to find and count, and then forgotten that we made the substitution. We aren't really that sure what does make us happy, so it's easier to assume that money will do, and spend our time chasing it. But, how many lottery winners crash and burn because the money was not the real answer?

Maslow's dichotomy of cognition is a great vehicle for understanding the problem. Deficiency cognition is the common way of living here in the west. We look at the world in terms of the things we lack but want, and devise methods to get those things. Other people might then be seen as tools or roadblocks to our goals. Being cognition is a way of seeing the world that says that having the best possible experience is the real goal. We want to be as happy as possible. We want to be treated as a subject who matters, so it follows that we owe the same consideration to others if we wish to declare that they owe it to us.

If you accept that being cognition is a proper way to approach life, then the equations of how to have the best life possible become quite different. Rather than making an investment by exploiting others to earn wealth, you make investments of good will by treating others well and helping them to be happy. You hope that they will do the same for you, and that your life will be better as a result. But, just like the financial investments, some pay off handsomely and some don't.

If happiness is subjective, then we must acknowledge that the right equations can't be as objective those we apply to a physics problem. An equation using subjective variables can't be seen to give off objective answers. You can take or leave anything I am saying and I can't say you are wrong, though I do think most of us would agree that being happy or living well might reasonably be seen as the real goal of life.

[Leontiskos]

Maybe I can be more clear by attacking this a different way...

Okay, so it seems like you are making two basic arguments. First is the idea that if we treat others well they will be more likely to treat us well, and so treating others well is a good investment that will pay out in our favor. Second is the idea that we should focus on doing what is right no matter what because this will result in the most valuable things such as self-respect and inner peace, and such things are more desirable because they are fully in our power and not contingent on outside variables.

The second argument strikes me as more of a "moral" argument insofar as it involves categorical imperatives, but presumably the self-interested ignoramus will wonder whether self-respect and inner peace can be acquired without the difficulty of moral action. Why should he believe that he cannot acquire these valuable things in some other, easier way?

[Pattern-chaser]

...but presumably the self-interested ignoramus will wonder whether self-respect and inner peace can be acquired without the difficulty of moral action. Why should he believe that he cannot acquire these valuable things in some other, easier way?

Experience of life? Empirical observation? I'm sure there are other reasons too.

[chewybrian]

Maybe I can be more clear by attacking this a different way...

Okay, so it seems like you are making two basic arguments. First is the idea that if we treat others well they will be more likely to treat us well, and so treating others well is a good investment that will pay out in our favor. Second is the idea that we should focus on doing what is right no matter what because this will result in the most valuable things such as self-respect and inner peace, and such things are more desirable because they are fully in our power and not contingent on outside variables.

First I must say that you did a good job of "listening", demonstrated by the way you restated the points I tried to make. This is a valuable skill for a would-be philosopher, and lots of us, myself included, could benefit from sharpening this skill. It helps us to avoid talking past each other, and to (hopefully) learn instead of just preaching.

The second argument strikes me as more of a "moral" argument insofar as it involves categorical imperatives, but presumably the self-interested ignoramus will wonder whether self-respect and inner peace can be acquired without the difficulty of moral action. Why should he believe that he cannot acquire these valuable things in some other, easier way?

I think most people would believe that, and I know I did at one time. Most of us are focused on our desires and aversions rather than putting our own efforts toward doing those things we think all people should be doing. We tend to judge others objectively while giving ourselves a pass. When they do wrong, we assume they intended to do wrong. When we do wrong, we know that we had excuses and reasons and grant ourselves the privilege of exemption, a hall pass to do what we want instead of what we should. Sartre's play "No Exit" does a great job of laying out this problem: "Hell is other people".

I think your question boils down to asking whether or not we can teach wisdom. I doubt we can. The oracle said Socrates was the wisest man, and he immediately displayed that wisdom by doubting that he could be. He went around polling the people one might expect to be wise and found none of them were wise. When he tried to impart wisdom, did he have much success? So, I don't know that I should expect that I have wisdom in the first place, or that I should be able to impart it to others unless they were very receptive and open-minded. Intuitively, I fell that I have a few nuggets of wisdom, and that I was able to learn them from wise philosophers of the past. But, wisdom is not raw knowledge. I can successfully teach most people how to make dynamite, but I can't teach them the wisdom of using it to tunnel through mountains or demolish old buildings instead of robbing banks. Some will surely see greater advantage to robbing banks, and find a way to justify their actions to themselves.

So, the idea of whether wisdom could be taught might make an interesting new thread. In the meantime, I would say that it is necessarily a long, hard road to move from ignorance to wisdom (or, at least, a few inches closer to wisdom). Nobody can drag you down that road as far as I can see. It begins with humility. If Socrates could doubt his own wisdom, then why shouldn't we? Then we have to try to be objective in spite of all our preconceptions and prejudices and cognitive biases and our ignorance. Here is a my favorite philosopher on the subject:

The beginning of philosophy to him at least who enters on it in the right way and by the door, is a consciousness of his own weakness and inability about necessary things. For we come into the world with no natural notion of a right-angled triangle, or of a diesis, or of a half tone; but we learn each of these things by a certain transmission according to art; and for this reason those who do not know them, do not think that they know them. But as to good and evil, and beautiful and ugly, and becoming and unbecoming, and happiness and misfortune, and proper and improper, and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, whoever came into the world without having an innate idea of them? Wherefore we all use these names, and we endeavor to fit the preconceptions to the several cases thus: "He has done well, he has not done well; he has done as he ought, not as he ought; he has been unfortunate, he has been fortunate; he is unjust, he is just": who does not use these names? who among us defers the use of them till he has learned them, as he defers the use of the words about lines or sounds? And the cause of this is that we come into the world already taught as it were by nature some things on this matter, and proceeding from these we have added to them self-conceit. "For why," a man says, "do I not know the beautiful and the ugly? Have I not the notion of it?" You have. "Do I not adapt it to particulars?" You do. "Do I not then adapt it properly?" In that lies the whole question; and conceit is added here. For, beginning from these things which are admitted, men proceed to that which is matter of dispute by means of unsuitable adaptation; for if they possessed this power of adaptation in addition to those things, what would hinder them from being perfect? But now since you think that you properly adapt the preconceptions to the particulars, tell me whence you derive this. Because I think so. But it does not seem so to another, and he thinks that he also makes a proper adaptation; or does he not think so? He does think so. Is it possible then that both of you can properly apply the preconceptions to things about which you have contrary opinions? It is not possible. Can you then show us anything better toward adapting the preconceptions beyond your thinking that you do? Does the madman do any other things than the things as in which seem to him right? Is then this criterion for him also? It is not sufficient. Come then to something which is superior to seeming. What is this?

Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of the disagreement, and a condemnation and distrust of that which only "seems," and a certain investigation of that which "seems" whether it "seems" rightly, and a discovery of some rule, as we have discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and a carpenter's rule in the case of straight and crooked things. This is the beginning of philosophy. "Must we say that all thins are right which seem so to all?" And how is it possible that contradictions can be right? "Not all then, but all which seem to us to be right." How more to you than those which seem right to the Syrians? why more than what seem right to the Egyptians? why more than what seems right to me or to any other man? "Not at all more." What then "seems" to every man is not sufficient for determining what "is"; for neither in the case of weights or measures are we satisfied with the bare appearance, but in each case we have discovered a certain rule. In this matter then is there no rule certain to what "seems?" And how is it possible that the most necessary things among men should have no sign, and be incapable of being discovered? There is then some rule. And why then do we not seek the rule and discover it, and afterward use it without varying from it, not even stretching out the finger without it? For this, I think, is that which when it is discovered cures of their madness those who use mere "seeming" as a measure, and misuse it; so that for the future proceeding from certain things known and made clear we may use in the case of particular things the preconceptions which are distinctly fixed.

What is the matter presented to us about which we are inquiring? "Pleasure." Subject it to the rule, throw it into the balance. Ought the good to be such a thing that it is fit that we have confidence in it? "Yes." And in which we ought to confide? "It ought to be." Is it fit to trust to anything which is insecure? "No." Is then pleasure anything secure? "No." Take it then and throw it out of the scale, and drive it far away from the place of good things. But if you are not sharp-sighted, and one balance is not enough for you, bring another. Is it fit to be elated over what is good? "Yes." Is it proper then to be elated over present pleasure? See that you do not say that it is proper; but if you do, I shall then not think you are worthy even of the balance. Thus things are tested and weighed when the rules are ready. And to philosophize is this, to examine and confirm the rules; and then to use them when they are known is the act of a wise and good man. Epictetus, 'The Discourses'

[popeye1945]

Drawing on from the work of Adam Smith, how do the two co-exist together? Is it possible to have self-interest while also being able to form our own moral judgements? Don't they cancel each other out?

What sort of mechanisms underpin these two combinations?

Please let me know your thoughts!

Self-interest is the basis of morality, when one can recognize one's self in the self of others compassion arises, and compassion proceeds the formation of morality and the creation of societies. The two do not counter one another, morality based on common biology is seen also in the natural world where varying forms of animal societies can be viewed. A morality based upon our common biology is the only sane foundation on which to build one.