Scott wrote: ↑May 6th, 2021, 12:18 pm
Hi, marigold_23, thank you for your reply!
I am especially interested by your comments where you write that you think you "should" do it, whatever "should" means, but don't think you would. What does it mean for one to say something like, "I have a choice between A and B, and I should be choosing A and can choose A at any point, but I am choosing B"? What does that mean?
Ah yes…"should"..., sorry about that. Maybe this explanation will help.
To the extent that a person selects B knowing A as an alternative, I think they must beleive in that moment, as far as they could comprehend the selection, that it is the right selection... not universally "right" just that it is more desirable relative to their own experience than B...they betray that belief in that moment even if they come to regret it from a future perspective in retrospect.
I dont think it's possible to say and genuinely mean "I should choose A but i choose B." Because that means the same as: I desire choice A over B but I don't desire choice A over B, and that is a contradiction.
In the moment of selection, it is also impossible for the act of doing the thing to express true regret of doing it, only regret of the discomfort or strain, but not the act. However, looking at the choice before you, before making a selection (as we are doing here) you may experience conflict of perspectives if you are imaginative and chaotic enough to be inconsistent, as most people are.
The inconsistency is expressive, in my opinion, of the ability to experience exclusive, different perspectives either simultaneously relative to a reaction of the mind or in such quick succession that any desire / reaction from one perspective may be retracted and even regretted by some other perspective in the same mind...
When I say, "I should do A, but I will do B." I believe I would be expressing a contradiction, but I didn't say that exactly.
I said:, "I should do A, but I would probably do B"... in fact, I should replace that statement with this: "I should do A but I might not do it because I might not be the me that said I should do A (the me that I am now) when the choice actually arises". I don't think it is a contradiction, but more of a confession of inconsistency... it is an observation of two exclusive choices where one methodology which selects one choice has a greater or equal influence over the mind as the other methodology that selects the other choice.
The other methodology (or perspective) which is not capable of logical application but is still empathetic (and would likely take hold during the stress of the event) is that which projects onto the child...such that the conclusion becomes: "my desire is the child's desire". It is not the same as saying, "i love the child" or "the child's survival is desireable"... from these perspectives I could still kill the child logically, because any experiences of the child as something good would extend to everyone who may die from cancer… i could love flowers and cut one plant down if it is diseased to save the others… here however a perspective which is irregardless of the relative characteristics that I admire in the child would take over… i would conclude, the childs desire is literally my desire...which would also require the conclusion, I am the child, which is logically contradictory. I think it's an old instinctual reflex which doesn't rely too much on logical consideration.
I also confess that I am more considerate of logic when I am relaxed, but the stress of killing would likely cause my mind to switch to the methodology (or perspective) that desires not to kill the child. And I also confessed that I don't know for sure. I am not sure that I couldn't do it.
When I say In my opinion, a person who is empathetic and logical and consistent should do it, I mean that the condition of a person being empathatic and logical and consistent (or the condition of being consistently reactive to that methodology) is that they "would" do it. If they are not logical and/or empathetic then perhaps they wouldn't desire that selection. Or if they are only sometimes empathetic and/or sometimes logical (like myself) but not consistent, then that person (me) may also not desire to do it at some times but not others, but it isn't certain. I could have said "would" rather than "should" (old habit).
I do see selections as conceivably binary. You make a selection for which there is a specific outcome (or future)... if you had selected something else, (no matter how many selections are truly available) other than the one you selected, they all have the same thing in common, which is that they are not causitive of the outcome which your selection caused... they would have all been causitive of other outcomes... so there is always the outcome you select (as one distinct selection) and all the outcomes you didnt select as an unbroken fabric of different futures (your distinct rejection). The reality and what the reality is not.
And, in hypotheticals where there are only two options we have to see it as binary... after all we weren't asked, would you kill a kid with a hammer to cure cancer or with your bare hands to cure cancer or would you not kill the kid... we were only given two options, do it or don't. One future(s) or the other(s), but they are necessarily separate.
I don't believe in good or evil… I used the phrase "the lesser of two evils" to refer to any scenario of two choices where one is preferable to the other according to some particular methodology (or from some perspective) of evaluation… I should have been more clear. But, even though I don't believe in evil, I think being inconsistent must result in guilt or shame or regret to whatever extent you associate with your past self as your present self but don't agree with the decisions made by your past self. Also, regret is a deeply embedded instinct which is functional for learning. Shame is similar to regret, but implies a more conflicted, neurotic, less functional reaction.
I expect that shame is different than regret. Where regret implies you have changed from your past self due to the aquisition of data that, had you applied it then using the same methodology (perspective), you would have experienced less discontent, shame implies a great deal of inner conflict, neurosis… I believe it results from inconsistency between perspectives… which of course is illogical but the mind is chaotic. This experince is what could cause the illusion of self loathing and the illogical reaction of self destruction… it is illogical but still generally natural for inconsistent mechanisms (such as the brain) in highly stressful, demanding situations. Assuming unbearable physical pain or mental anguish…. Which killing a kid would probably bring about as it is associated as an ultimately undesirable act according to a perspective of projection but is associated as highly desirable from a perspective of empathetic logic. Since my mind switches often between both it would be difficult to remain sane after such a conflicted decision.
I agree that we can choose to do things which seem contrary to our immediate feelings but I think it's important to conclude there are fears and desires (deeper feelings) responsible even for those choices… we exercise for fear of infirmity, death, social disdain, and for desire of strength, energy, sex… mainly sex. Fear and pain are both a negative stimulation or association, and in this instance your mind endures the experience of pain because the associations of fear and desire outway your instinct to escape the pain.
So really I dont agree with the idea that we can act in a way that isn't traceable to our feelings or to causality… if we have free will i think it must be an unconscious decision to exist or not to exist (or to exist in some reality or another or to move forward an increment in time or back an increment), something totally irrelevant to the inner happenings of some particular existence.
And there's a limit to the extent we can say a person can act contrary to their feelings without redefining the person… if we act unconsciously or randomly, rather than intentionally, it may be un-caused by feelings but it isn't so much a choice and so it is as likely to be the environment about the self which is responsible for the action as it is the self (as far as we can tell).
We can say neither one exists and its all one thing but we can't say that and at the same time refer to feelings or selections/rejections...memories and characteristics…interactions "of" A "in" or "on" B... those kinds of statements seem to require an arbitrary distinction between what it is and what is not it.
And it wouldnt be much fun for me to answer by saying: I'll do whatever I can do and whatever that is it'll be random and spontaneous… in other words, I'll act as soon as causality is done with me, or when my hands have held the neck of the child so long that there is a planck length moment where a quantum movement in my mind would result in releasing the child just in time or holding on a moment longer to kill him… and that tiny miniscule decision, I maintain, must be a random free one which is regardless of causality… free will if you like, but not free intention or consideration… those things are only relevant to constraint and causality.
Accepting that freedom as your true identity can result in a temporary state of inner peace (like draining static from a computer), and I meditate often seeking to escape the constant context of existence…but I return and then I'm in the game completely. I don't pretend not to feel things and conceive of options. I don't try not to try. It would be a lie, unless I were in a state of deep focus.
And as soon as I wake up, there's a good chance that I'm gonna kill that kid...
Sorry this was so long