Thomson's Violinist

[WanderingGaze22]

This thought experiement was written by Judith Thomson in her 1971 essay A Defense of Abortion.

“You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. If he is unplugged from you now, he will die; but in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you”

Question: Are you obligated to keep the musician alive, or do you cut him loose and let him die because you want to?

Thompson says no. Not because the violinist isn’t a person with rights, but rather because he has no right to your body and the life-preserving functions that it provides. That reasoning can be used to argue that a fetus also lacks the rights to another person’s body and can be evicted at any time.

Bottom line, you don't have a right to kill him, only to stop him from using your body to stay alive because this was done without even his knowledge and especially your consent. His resultant death can just as easily be viewed as a separate yet related event that you have no obligation to prevent.

[LuckyR]

This thought experiement was written by Judith Thomson in her 1971 essay A Defense of Abortion.

“You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. If he is unplugged from you now, he will die; but in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you”

Question: Are you obligated to keep the musician alive, or do you cut him loose and let him die because you want to?

Thompson says no. Not because the violinist isn’t a person with rights, but rather because he has no right to your body and the life-preserving functions that it provides. That reasoning can be used to argue that a fetus also lacks the rights to another person’s body and can be evicted at any time.

Bottom line, you don't have a right to kill him, only to stop him from using your body to stay alive because this was done without even his knowledge and especially your consent. His resultant death can just as easily be viewed as a separate yet related event that you have no obligation to prevent.

A somewhat convoluted but not unreasonable analogy to illustrate the issue of competing interests. Survival on one side and autonomy on the other. Only folks trying to bamboozle simpletons portray the abortion issue as one-sided.

[figliar0]

I agree with Thomson in this violinist matter. But this is not comparable to abortion.

To the matter of that fetus lacks the rights to person’s body. Does already-bornes-child lack the right to mother's body too? What about right for mother's care, attention, lifetime, freedom? Maybe mother wants to have time to do with her body what she wants and does not want to care about child - it is OK if mother just stops child from using her body to stay alive - and as a consequence the child will die?

We can notice another difference beetween violinist story and abortion. Violinist fanclub kidnapped some person, it is the act of violence against person's will. Pregnancy is just natural result of having sex. If the sex was voluntary, the pregnancy should be expected and therefore it it is not true that it was without mother's consent.

Personally, I don't like abortion, but I am a male, so it is not up to my decission. So I don't want to prohibit abortion to anybody - it is everybody's choice (and not my duty to judge). What I am considering as interesting is the fact, that whole matter is simplified to the matter of naming the act - is it murder or is it not? Really, I think it is irrelevant how we call it, because it does not change the character af the act at all.

The reason behind this naming issue is simple: if we stop to call it murder, it stop's to be murder - thus we are not responsible for our acts anymore, because someone else decided that it is OK. We let other to decide about our lives, our opinions, our personalities. That is much bigger problem then some abortions...

[GE Morton]

Personally, I don't like abortion, but I am a male, so it is not up to my decission.

Being male doesn't necessarily disqualify you from having a stake in the issue, and therefore a voice in the decision --- e.g., if you are the father.

What I am considering as interesting is the fact, that whole matter is simplified to the matter of naming the act - is it murder or is it not? Really, I think it is irrelevant how we call it, because it does not change the character of the act at all.

Oh, but it changes the moral character substantially. It would not be (properly) called "murder" if the fetus was not a moral agent (a person), though the abortion might still be immoral for other reasons. That fetuses are not moral agents was Maryanne Warren's argument, published about the same time as Thomson's essay.

https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd ... Warren.pdf

The US Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion rested on a legal parallel to Warren's argument --- that fetuses were not "persons" as understood in the US Constitution.

[Ecurb]

Oh, but it changes the moral character substantially. It would not be (properly) called "murder" if the fetus was not a moral agent (a person), though the abortion might still be immoral for other reasons. That fetuses are not moral agents was Maryanne Warren's argument, published about the same time as Thomson's essay.

https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd ... Warren.pdf

The US Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion rested on a legal par allel to Warren's argument --- that fetuses were not "persons" as understood in the US Constitution.

What determines whether something is a "moral agent"? However we define it, I foresee problems. If we decide one needs a certain level of mental competence to qualify, then we would sanction abuse of some mentally handicapped people. If we use a more inclusive definition, then we would prohibit eating animals.

My opinion: we must protect members of society. They have relationships within the socety -- a mentally handicapped person with the intellience of (say) a pig, still has a mother and father and other relations. Not so with a fetus. (I recognize that this is not the reasoning used in U.S. legal decisions, but perhaps it hould have been. Laws are designed to protect members of society.)

[GE Morton]

What determines whether something is a "moral agent"?

Warren outlines her criteria in that essay. My own simpler definition is,

A Moral Agent is a sentient creature who
a) has interests and some capacity for pursuing them, and
b) is capable of recognizing other qualifying creatures as moral agents who likewise have interests, which may differ from his own, and
c) is capable of understanding and formulating moral principles and rules and acknowledges the need for them in a moral field.

If we decide one needs a certain level of mental competence to qualify, then we would sanction abuse of some mentally handicapped people. If we use a more inclusive definition, then we would prohibit eating animals.

Neither of those follows. The handicapped people you mention, and the animals, might be moral subjects (or "moral patients"), in which case moral agents have some moral moral constraints and duties to them, though they have none to us (because they're incapable, by hypothesis, from grasping them).

My opinion: we must protect members of society. They have relationships within the socety -- a mentally handicapped person with the intellience of (say) a pig, still has a mother and father and other relations. Not so with a fetus.

I suspect you meant to say the fetus is not aware of any relations with other persons. Obviously it has relationships with its parents.

[Ecurb]

I suspect you meant to say the fetus is not aware of any relations with other persons. Obviously it has relationships with its parents.

The fetus has a biological connection to its father; SOCIAL relationships (with which SOCIETY and its laws are concerned) differ. I'll grant that it may have a social relaionship with its mother. (It's a gray area -- once the fetus attains mobility, people other than the mother can feel it move and feel a connection to it. Obviously, a newly fertilized egg, which nobody is aware is fertilized) doesn't have a social relationship with anyone).

[Ecurb]

A Moral Agent is a sentient creature who
a) has interests and some capacity for pursuing them, and
b) is capable of recognizing other qualifying creatures as moral agents who likewise have interests, which may differ from his own, and
c) is capable of understanding and formulating moral principles and rules and acknowledges the need for them in a moral field.

Part C of this definition is problematic. I suspect that all of us (not excluding you, Morton) work backwards to establish "moral principles". In other words, we decide what behaviors we admire and think conduive to our (and others') well being, and derive principles from which such behaviors can be justified. If this is the case, why must we "acknowledge the need for (moral principles) in a moral field"?

The principles must derive from something. I suppose religious people can say they derive from God, and we are morally bound to follow them. But that doesn't apply to you or me. For us, such principles are often mere rationalizations or justifications. Therefore, the "need' for them is a contrivance and rationalization. If this is the case, it is irrational to acknowledge the "need" for them.

[GE Morton]

The fetus has a biological connection to its father; SOCIAL relationships (with which SOCIETY and its laws are concerned) differ. I'll grant that it may have a social relaionship with its mother. (It's a gray area -- once the fetus attains mobility, people other than the mother can feel it move and feel a connection to it.

Well, you didn't specify social relationships in your comment.

But the fetus does have social relationships with several other people besides the mother --- with the docs who performed ultrasounds and other diagnostics, the nutritionist who advised the mother on dietary constraints during pregnancy, even Grandma who scolds her daughter, the mother, when she violates that diet or over-exerts herself.

The fetus, of course, is unware of the roles of other people in its life and its dependence upon them.

[GE Morton]

A Moral Agent is a sentient creature who
a) has interests and some capacity for pursuing them, and
b) is capable of recognizing other qualifying creatures as moral agents who likewise have interests, which may differ from his own, and
c) is capable of understanding and formulating moral principles and rules and acknowledges the need for them in a moral field.

Part C of this definition is problematic. I suspect that all of us (not excluding you, Morton) work backwards to establish "moral principles". In other words, we decide what behaviors we admire and think conduive to our (and others') well being, and derive principles from which such behaviors can be justified.

Yes, we "work backwards" from a goal, to formulate principles and rules governing behavior we believe are necessary or conducive to attaining that goal. Moral philosophy is a pragmatic endeavor.

If this is the case, why must we "acknowledge the need for (moral principles) in a moral field"?

Because someone who does not understand or acknowledge that need will have no incentive to adhere to any such rules, and thus be unfit for membership in a (human) social setting.

The principles must derive from something.

Of course. They derive from the goal, and from empirical evidence for what types of behaviors promote it and which impede or frustrate it.

[LuckyR]

As I outlined earlier, it is not required to declare a fetus not a person or not a moral agent (even though I happen to agree they are not) in order to find abortion as one moral option on how to handle an unwanted pregnancy.

[WanderingGaze22]

I agree with Thomson in this violinist matter. But this is not comparable to abortion.

I did say this argument can, not will be used in the topic of abortion. I too believe the argument is not valid there,but there are similarities. The expectant mother is the one who is doing all the work and the fetus is dependant on her. She and she alone has final say although she does not truly represent the fetus in a communicative way.

[Ecurb]

A Moral Agent is a sentient creature who
a) has interests and some capacity for pursuing them, and
b) is capable of recognizing other qualifying creatures as moral agents who likewise have interests, which may differ from his own, and
c) is capable of understanding and formulating moral principles and rules and acknowledges the need for them in a moral field.

Part C of this definition is problematic. I suspect that all of us (not excluding you, Morton) work backwards to establish "moral principles". In other words, we decide what behaviors we admire and think conduive to our (and others') well being, and derive principles from which such behaviors can be justified.

Yes, we "work backwards" from a goal, to formulate principles and rules governing behavior we believe are necessary or conducive to attaining that goal. Moral philosophy is a pragmatic endeavor.

If this is the case, why must we "acknowledge the need for (moral principles) in a moral field"?

Because someone who does not understand or acknowledge that need will have no incentive to adhere to any such rules, and thus be unfit for membership in a (human) social setting.

The principles must derive from something.

Of course. They derive from the goal, and from empirical evidence for what types of behaviors promote it and which impede or frustrate it.

Here's a poem I wrote while helping my son with his 7th grade physics homework:

REFLECTIONS ON MR. SCHWARTZ' SCIENCE CLASS
Apples knew not which way to fall,
Objects in motion were apt to stall,
Reactions were opposite, but not equal,
(If this verse is confusing, read the sequel)

Things accelerated when no force
Acted upon them (out of balance, of course)
In short, nature's laws weren't so high fallutin'
Before being discovered by Sir Isaac Newton

The point: apples fell down long before the Laws of Gravity. Similarly, people can be "moral" (if not "moral agents") without formulating any rules or laws. As I pointed out (and you agreed) the rules and principles of morality are developed AFTER the developer has decided what constitutes moral behavior. Therefore, it seems strange to insist that ONLY those who "acknowledge the need for (moral rules)" qualify as "moral agents". The apples, after all, fall at 32 fet per second per second -- and they know nothing of the law of gravity.

One rhesus monkey was rewarded with a cucumber for performing a task. The trainer then taught the monkey in the next cage to perform the same task, and rewarded him with a grape. When the first monkey saw this, he disdained the cucumber the next time the trainer tried to reward him. "Where's my grape?" he seemed to say. "This is no fair."

Other animals (and young humans) clearly have a capacity fo moral "agency" within the normal meaning of thse two words) -- although they lack the ability to form moral rules or principles.

What's my point? I think you are manipulating language to grant tacit support for your moral position. I've accused you of this before. Let's posit two people: one is an authoritarian rule follower. The other is not -- but he has normal sensbilities about the safety of himself and others. The rule-follower never exceeds the speed limit. The othe man never even looks at the speed limit signs, but he rarely exceeds the speed limit, because he uses good judgement to drive safely. Based on your definition, the first man is a "moral agent" (with regard to the speed of driving), and the other is not. In as much as you grant cerain privileges to "moral agents", this sems an unfair and false distinction.

[GE Morton]

As I outlined earlier, it is not required to declare a fetus not a person or not a moral agent (even though I happen to agree they are not) in order to find abortion as one moral option on how to handle an unwanted pregnancy.

"Outlined earlier" --- where?

The only moral objection to abortion that I know of rests on the belief that abortion is murder, which presumes that the fetus is a person, or moral agent (the term "murder" being applicable only in that case). There are some circumstances in which killing a person is not immoral, e.g., self-defense, but those are not present in most cases of abortion. So please explain how abortion may be morally acceptable if the fetus is a moral agent.

[GE Morton]

The point: apples fell down long before the Laws of Gravity. Similarly, people can be "moral" (if not "moral agents") without formulating any rules or laws.

Being moral (or acting morally) just is conforming to certain rules or principles. Without the latter "moral" would be undefined.

But your claim was that they could be moral without formulating any rules or laws. And I'll agree that is possible. There would be no need to formulate a moral rule if the agent never encountered any situations not covered by existing rules. They would need only to understand those existing rules.

As I pointed out (and you agreed) the rules and principles of morality are developed AFTER the developer has decided what constitutes moral behavior.

Well, no, I didn't agree to that. I said they formulate, and agree to, rules after agreeing on the aim, or goal, of those rules. That is, as with most other problem-solving endeavors, we define the problem, decide what we seek seek to accomplish, and then set about investigating means of achieving it.

Therefore, it seems strange to insist that ONLY those who "acknowledge the need for (moral rules)" qualify as "moral agents". The apples, after all, fall at 32 fet per second per second -- and they know nothing of the law of gravity.

The analogy is inapt. Moral rules are not natural laws, and people are not compelled to obey them. Obeying them requires an act of will. Anyone who follows, defends, or asserts a moral judgment (You cheated!", "Alfie stole my horse," "You lied to me," etc.) invokes and implicitly acknowledges the need for moral rules.

What's my point? I think you are manipulating language to grant tacit support for your moral position.

In what way?

Let's posit two people: one is an authoritarian rule follower. The other is not -- but he has normal sensbilities about the safety of himself and others. The rule-follower never exceeds the speed limit. The othe man never even looks at the speed limit signs, but he rarely exceeds the speed limit, because he uses good judgement to drive safely. Based on your definition, the first man is a "moral agent" (with regard to the speed of driving), and the other is not. In as much as you grant cerain privileges to "moral agents", this sems an unfair and false distinction.

Heh. Does this "good judgment" entail driving in such a way as not to endanger oneself of others? If so, then the driver is following a moral rule. He is also acknowledging the need for such a rule. (Posted legal speed limits are not moral rules).

What are these privileges you claim I grant to moral agents?