Is Ethics a Puzzle of Uncertainties?

[GE Morton]

We don't have the sort of accepted, authoritative, universal moral foundation we need for that in our modern, globalist world. A world where ''God is dead'' and science tells us our moral intuitions are simply a happenstance of evolutionary utility. We're currently in a post-modernist limbo, and there's a job of work to be done by moral philosophy to help us out. But expectations of perfection in practice in an uncertain world is out of our reach.

More social experience than evolutionary utility, but there is some of the latter as well --- people who learn from experience outlast those who don't. Ethics is, at bottom, a pragmatic endeavor. I agree that perfection in practice is unattainable, but an optimum theory is possible, i.e., we can develop a theory which provides more reliable guidance than any other we've considered.

[Gertie]

Gertie wrote: ↑Today, 3:35 pm
We don't have the sort of accepted, authoritative, universal moral foundation we need for that in our modern, globalist world. A world where ''God is dead'' and science tells us our moral intuitions are simply a happenstance of evolutionary utility. We're currently in a post-modernist limbo, and there's a job of work to be done by moral philosophy to help us out. But expectations of perfection in practice in an uncertain world is out of our reach.

More social experience than evolutionary utility, but there is some of the latter as well --- people who learn from experience outlast those who don't.

That's true, but I'm looking at the Big Picture here of where the philosophical state of morality is at - and it's struggling in po-mo limbo imo. It wasn't a prob when we used to live in communities where we all believed in the same god as our authoritative source and arbiter of what's right. That's about as clear and tidy as it gets, barring theological disputes. When that collapsed as a universal standard, we had the enlightenment and modernism which was supposed to sort everything out, and enable progress via reason. But science's answer to morality is essentially that our notion of morality is rooted in evolved social instincts, just like our selfish/anti-social instincts. How to we reason from that as to what morality is founded in?

That's philosophy's big dilemma imo, re-thinking morality on its own terms in order to find an appropriate foundation for judging right and wrong. (You and I have cracked it ). And I think that has to ultimately be consequentialist. Once you're in the territory of predicting consequences we have lots of tools - reason, experience, all the info at our disposal, and you make your best guess. Just like you pick your best route to travel from A to B based on all you know, but you might be involved in an accident none-the-less.

Ethics is, at bottom, a pragmatic endeavor. I agree that perfection in practice is unattainable, but an optimum theory is possible, i.e., we can develop a theory which provides more reliable guidance than any other we've considered.

Yes I agree. But you have to sort out the basics first - what is morality about, what's it for, can we encapsulate that in a foundation to guide our actions in situations, and use as a touchstone to judge the consequences of those actions against.

[Good_Egg]

I don't think deontology or virtue ethics escape the problem of unforseen consequences, they effectively just ignore it on the basis of overall it's for the best.

That is escaping it. Those who believe that the commandment against murder is absolute - something you should not do, regardless of the potential good consequences - are utterly unfazed by the notion that the consequences are uncertain.

Whereas the consequentialist's approach - that murder is justified where the downstream consequences are sufficiently beneficial - is completely undermined.

Suppose that a man who you judge to be completely unfit to be president of your country looks to have a chance of being elected. Should you assassinate him on the basis of the likely future saving in lives from having a competent leader in place ?

If you do, you will never know whether the future that you have prevented would have been bad enough to justify your action.

That's not any sort of sound basis for moral judgment.

I'd rather grapple with consequences in the context of the particular situation.

With respect, that sounds like your underlying belief in consequentialism talking, rather than any logical response to the reality of uncertainty.

An uncertainty which goes beyond the "bell curve" that JackDaydream refers to - where experience gives us knowledge of the distribution of likely outcomes - to include the "unknown unknowns".

We don't have the sort of accepted, authoritative, universal moral foundation we need for that in our modern, globalist world. A world where ''God is dead'' and science tells us our moral intuitions are simply a happenstance of evolutionary utility. We're currently in a post-modernist limbo, and there's a job of work to be done by moral philosophy to help us out.

Agree completely. But ditching consequentialism is the first step...

[Gertie]

Good Egg

Gertie wrote: ↑May 27th, 2022, 3:35 pm I don't think deontology or virtue ethics escape the problem of unforseen consequences, they effectively just ignore it on the basis of overall it's for the best.

That is escaping it. Those who believe that the commandment against murder is absolute - something you should not do, regardless of the potential good consequences - are utterly unfazed by the notion that the consequences are uncertain.

Are they? Then on what basis are they acting morally? What's the moral grounding for their unfazedness?

Whereas the consequentialist's approach - that murder is justified where the downstream consequences are sufficiently beneficial - is completely undermined.

Why? Based on what?

Most actions involve an element of uncertainty, because we're not omniscient and we live in a highly complex world. If uncertain consequences completely undermined our ability to deal with risk then we'd never leave the house. Morality too has to deal with real life.

Suppose that a man who you judge to be completely unfit to be president of your country looks to have a chance of being elected. Should you assassinate him on the basis of the likely future saving in lives from having a competent leader in place ?

I didn't assassinate Boris Johnson.

If you do, you will never know whether the future that you have prevented would have been bad enough to justify your action.

That's not any sort of sound basis for moral judgment.

Just saying consequentialism will sometimes get it wrong doesn't mean there's an alternative ''sound basis for moral judgement'' which will always get it right. This isn't simple or formulaic. How do you determine ''a sound basis for moral judgement'', and how do you guarantee it always meets its goals? How do you justify not considering the consequences of your actions as moral?

My moral foundation (promoting the welfare of conscious creatures) would bar killing in nearly every instance, the circs would have to be compelling, but they could arise. A dying loved one of mine with cancer asked me to 'take care of it' if things got too bad, I don't know if I could have if the time had come, but I said I would and I think I would, I think it would have been the right thing to do.

To consider assassinating a democratically elected leader as morally acceptable would ultimately make society so unstable it would be ungovernable. But there might be occasions when it's right. Hitler is the classic example.

I'd rather grapple with consequences in the context of the particular situation.

With respect, that sounds like your underlying belief in consequentialism talking, rather than any logical response to the reality of uncertainty.

I think moral agents should grapple with their moral responsibilities despite uncertainty, rather than unthinkingly follow prescriptive ideals regardless of the consequences. I've said that we need a moral foundation to guide that process of engaging with all the difficulties living in the real world entails, but ideal perfection isn't realistic. Life can be annoying that way. But discarding thought for the consequences of your actions, following a list of rules no matter what, is what we expect of children.

An uncertainty which goes beyond the "bell curve" that JackDaydream refers to - where experience gives us knowledge of the distribution of likely outcomes - to include the "unknown unknowns".

Yes Jack points to a real problem. But adopting simple rules which take no account of consequences doesn't solve the uncertainty problem, unless you believe consequences are irrelevant to morality. (Some might believe that, some theists for example, but I don't think it's what underlies deontology or virtue ethics). It will mostly work out, but gives you no room to adapt, or progress in the light of experience when you discover black swans actually do exist.

We don't have the sort of accepted, authoritative, universal moral foundation we need for that in our modern, globalist world. A world where ''God is dead'' and science tells us our moral intuitions are simply a happenstance of evolutionary utility. We're currently in a post-modernist limbo, and there's a job of work to be done by moral philosophy to help us out.

Agree completely. But ditching consequentialism is the first step...

For what?

[GE Morton]

Yes I agree. But you have to sort out the basics first - what is morality about, what's it for, can we encapsulate that in a foundation to guide our actions in situations, and use as a touchstone to judge the consequences of those actions against.

Yes indeed. The very first questions must be, What is morality? What is its purpose? What are we trying to accomplish when contemplating or constructing or debating it?

Historically there have been two broad answers to those question: 1) Morality is a set of "rules to live by," rules which guide our actions, with the aim of enabling us to live a more satisfying life. This is the aim of "virtue ethics," and of what I've called "private moralities." Since what counts as a satisfying life is subjective and idiosyncratic, so will be any rules adopted to further it. 2) Morality is a set of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting. This is a "public morality." Their purpose is to enable all agents in that setting to maximize their welfare, by maximizing the advantages of a social setting (e.g., possibilities for cooperation and a division of labor), and by minimizing the disadvantages (e.g., conflicts and vulnerability to predation). Unlike the rules of private moralities, public moralities make no assumptions concerning what counts as a satisfying life --- they take each agent's welfare to consist in satisfying whatever interests and desires he/she may have. Thus those rules are objective: whether they do or do not accomplish that goal, and to what extent, is observable and measurable. While a public morality entails no particular private morality, its rules do demand that any private morality not conflict with the public morality (for agents in a social setting).

[GE Morton]

Agree completely. But ditching consequentialism is the first step...

That is an odd suggestion. If not the consequences of actions, what other criterion for distinguishing between right and wrong actions would you propose? And how would you justify it?

You need to go back to Gertie's question: What is morality, what it its purpose?

[JackDaydream]

We don't have the sort of accepted, authoritative, universal moral foundation we need for that in our modern, globalist world. A world where ''God is dead'' and science tells us our moral intuitions are simply a happenstance of evolutionary utility. We're currently in a post-modernist limbo, and there's a job of work to be done by moral philosophy to help us out. But expectations of perfection in practice in an uncertain world is out of our reach.

More social experience than evolutionary utility, but there is some of the latter as well --- people who learn from experience outlast those who don't. Ethics is, at bottom, a pragmatic endeavor. I agree that perfection in practice is unattainable, but an optimum theory is possible, i.e., we can develop a theory which provides more reliable guidance than any other we've considered.

I was a bit surprised to see this thread pop up recently because I wrote it a while ago. Your point about pragmatism seems important, especially in relation to the idea of perfection. Some moral systems, especially those in conjunction with spiritual philosophies often emphasised morality and intention in relation to the inner life of virtue. As secular philosophies developed, especially humanism an emphasis on consequences became more important. Of course, there are limitations of predictability of actions and events but the emphasis is more on ends, rather than means, as in an intrinsic need to have a good conscience. That doesn't mean that conscience as the emotional aspects that understanding of motivation can be eliminated, but that a key aspect of ethics is about the pragmatic elements. Even the use of the terms morality and ethics, though interchangeable in some ways, may have used slightly differently, with ethics being more about reasoning about outcomes of acts with morality being often associated with conscience and the internal sense of goodness as a spiritual aspect rather than the rational examination of ethics.

[GE Morton]

Even the use of the terms morality and ethics, though interchangeable in some ways, may have used slightly differently, with ethics being more about reasoning about outcomes of acts with morality being often associated with conscience and the internal sense of goodness as a spiritual aspect rather than the rational examination of ethics.

I think that's true for common usage, but among philosophers the terms are synonymous. Some have titled their works "Ethics" (Aristotle, Spinoza, Sidgwick, G.E Moore, et al), others "Morals" (Hume, Kant, Bentham, R.M. Hare, et al).

[Good_Egg]

We don't have the sort of accepted, authoritative, universal moral foundation we need for that in our modern, globalist world. A world where ''God is dead'' and science tells us our moral intuitions are simply a happenstance of evolutionary utility.

Agree completely. But ditching consequentialism is the first step...

For what?

For achieving the Holy Grail of moral philosophy as you've described it. Reasoning our way to an ethic that all reasonable people will agree with, in the absence of a "live" God to lend it His authority.

As long as you feel justified in breaking any moral rule if your valuation of the likely consequences comes up with the result that the world will be a better place thereby, then there can be no such authority-by-reason.

Whether you interpret "better place" in terms of the welfare of conscious creatures, or any other terms.

Because you thereby put yourself above any rule. Your pride insists you'll break any rule in the right circumstances. Moral rules are something you look down on, as being suitable only for children. With that attitude, no rule will satisfy you.

...among philosophers the terms are synonymous. Some have titled their works "Ethics" (Aristotle, Spinoza, Sidgwick, G.E Moore, et al), others "Morals" (Hume, Kant, Bentham, R.M. Hare, et al).

I'd understood an ethic to be a code of morals. So that we have moral intuitions - a sense that some acts are right or wrong - but describe our attempts to satisfactorily codify these into a rule of conduct as "ethical reasoning".

[GE Morton]

As long as you feel justified in breaking any moral rule if your valuation of the likely consequences comes up with the result that the world will be a better place thereby, then there can be no such authority-by-reason.

What do you suppose justifies those rules, if not the consequences of not following them?

I'd understood an ethic to be a code of morals. So that we have moral intuitions - a sense that some acts are right or wrong - but describe our attempts to satisfactorily codify these into a rule of conduct as "ethical reasoning".

Private moralities (see post above) are indeed often rationalizations of moral intuitions, and that's fine. But public moralities must set intuitions aside, and begin from an agreed upon goal and empirical facts, about humans (and other sentient creatures) and the world and the social setting in which they find themselves.

[Good_Egg]

You seem to be talking about a reasoned and evidence-based method of achieving an agreed-upon goal that has no connection with any moral intuition. That is not a morality, it's only a policy.

Humans make laws. Generally those laws are obeyed by the majority most of the time because they share the goal and recognise that obeying the law contributes to that goal. They're also obeyed by many most of the time out of fear of punishment by the coercive power of the state. Mete human laws are not obeyed as an act of moral duty. If you decide that some other consequence is of more importance to you than that goal then you will break the law with a clear conscience.

Unless the law corresponds with some pre-existing moral intuition - something like natural justice.

Those laws that do not so correspond (for example, laws against smuggling) have no moral weight.

Would you break the speed limit to get your wife to hospital if she needed to be there ? Of course you would - speed limits have no moral weight. Would you drive dangerously to achieve the same goal ? You should not - you do wrong to third parties by endangering their lives.

Public moralities are not derived by setting aside moral intuition. They are built on a consensus of widely-shared moral intuitions. Aiming to use reason to help individuals identify where their more idiosyncratic moral intuitions are logically inconsistent with that shared consensus.

If you seek to justify a law which criminalizes breach of copyright, for example, you do so by equating such a breach to theft. Presenting such a law as some sort of logical extension of a widely-shared moral intuition that theft is wrong.

[GE Morton]

You seem to be talking about a reasoned and evidence-based method of achieving an agreed-upon goal that has no connection with any moral intuition. That is not a morality, it's only a policy.

Yes, it is a reasoned and evidence-based morality. It may or may not have any connection with moral intuitions. Moral intuitions, like all other intuitions, are idiosyncratic and subjective. So a rational morality will probably cohere with the intuitions of some, not not others. But to be philosophically respectable it needs to be rational.

Mete human laws are not obeyed as an act of moral duty. If you decide that some other consequence is of more importance to you than that goal then you will break the law with a clear conscience.

There is a moral obligation to obey as law only when the law itself is morally defensible --- i.e., it is consistent with a sound, rational moral theory. But moral rules, like laws, can sometimes be broken, because no rule can anticipate all the consequences of of every act embraced by the rule. So sometimes the rule must be set aside and the decision based directly on the goal those rules aim to further.

Unless the law corresponds with some pre-existing moral intuition - something like natural justice.

Those laws that do not so correspond (for example, laws against smuggling) have no moral weight.

I agree, except the consistency must be, not with any moral intuitions, but with a sound moral theory.

Public moralities are not derived by setting aside moral intuition. They are built on a consensus of widely-shared moral intuitions. Aiming to use reason to help individuals identify where their more idiosyncratic moral intuitions are logically inconsistent with that shared consensus.

No consensus per se carries any moral force. That amounts to an ad populum argument. Many evil practices and institutions have enjoyed a consensus of the community in which they were practiced.

[Good_Egg]

To consider assassinating a democratically elected leader as morally acceptable would ultimately make society so unstable it would be ungovernable. But there might be occasions when it's right. Hitler is the classic example.

Suppose that we agree that the world would be a better place if Hitler had been strangled at birth.

Can we conclude from this that it would have been morally right to do so ? Yes or No ?

You think Yes ? You read in the newspaper of someone who strangled a new-born baby and think that this might be a morally right action ? You write to the editor about the case saying that we shouldn't punish the criminal because he might have saved us from a future dictator ?

You don't see a rather large uncertainty-related problem with this point of view ?

You think No ? That the step from "world a better place" to "morally right action" is a false step ? An error of reasoning ? One does not imply the other ?

[Gertie]

Good Egg

It's frustrating when I take the time to thoughtfully answer your questions, when you just seem to scan my replies to find gotchas, throw in ad homs and don't answer questions put to you. I gave up responding to you on the eternal moral truths thread for the same reason. I don't doubt your sincerity, but if you want a philosophical discussion we need a reset.

If you're game how about tackling this question from GE which seems like a glaring issue for your position -

Good_Egg wrote: ↑Yesterday, 4:12 am

As long as you feel justified in breaking any moral rule if your valuation of the likely consequences comes up with the result that the world will be a better place thereby, then there can be no such authority-by-reason.

What do you suppose justifies those rules, if not the consequences of not following them?

[Good_Egg]

... a rational morality will probably cohere with the intuitions of some, not not others. But to be philosophically respectable it needs to be rational.

You know how in education policy, the emphasis on measurable targets can act to distort the aims of education so that it becomes all about what's easiest to measure?

It just struck me that there's a risk of the same phenomenon here. That a philosopher's notion of morality becomes all about what's easiest to rationalise.

Of course, that cuts both ways. What's easiest to formulate as a Commandment can similarly distort a complex reality.

But I think the point is that it's not enough to put together a nice coherent theory and stick the label "morality" on it. That in order for your rational theory to be an ethic it actually has to deal with the content of moral intuitions.

There is a moral obligation to obey as law only when the law itself is morally defensible --- i.e., it is consistent with a sound, rational moral theory. But moral rules, like laws, can sometimes be broken, because no rule can anticipate all the consequences of of every act embraced by the rule. So sometimes the rule must be set aside and the decision based directly on the goal those rules aim to further.

This is an ends-justifies-the means argument, which depends on conceiving of moral rules as a means to some end, in order to justify breaking them whenever we think we can see a better route to that end.

Whereas acting morally is supposed to be an end in itself; it's not something we do in order to achieve something else.

Unless the law corresponds with some pre-existing moral intuition - something like natural justice.

Those laws that do not so correspond (for example, laws against smuggling) have no moral weight.

I agree, except the consistency must be, not with any moral intuitions, but with a sound moral theory.

It's not one or the other. It's not whatever we idiosyncratically feel to be right in the absence of reason.
Nor is it a nice piece of reasoning divorced from moral sense. It's both together reinforcing each other. Moral intuitions made rationally consistent, with reason sanding off the rough edges where a rogue sense of rightness is unsupported by the rest of the structure, and filling in the gaps where moral feeling is lacking but we reason our way to an unfelt imperative that is necessary for coherence.

Public moralities are not derived by setting aside moral intuition. They are built on a consensus of widely-shared moral intuitions. Aiming to use reason to help individuals identify where their more idiosyncratic moral intuitions are logically inconsistent with that shared consensus.

No consensus per se carries any moral force. That amounts to an ad populum argument. Many evil practices and institutions have enjoyed a consensus of the community in which they were practiced.

A majority can be wrong, certainly. Weight of numbers does not make right. If people get much of their sense of right and wrong from reading the Daily Blah then adding more readers doesn't make the publisher's output any more or less right.

But at the same time, awareness of other independent thinkers does help us to identify which of our thoughts and feelings are idiosyncratic and therefore suspect.