Are there eternal moral truths?

[Good_Egg]

The question asks: how can it be perceived that a living creature can make a subjective moral judgement before it had ever sensed?

Once again you are not making sense.

I think, Sculptor1 , that this can be read as a proposition in Artificial Intelligence. Which says that making a moral judgement is higher up the scale of intelligence - requires a greater level of Mind - than processing sense-data.

And that it's true of living creatures. That an earwig, for example, can process and respond to sense data whilst entirely lacking the capacity to make moral judgments.

But maybe not true of AIs, which are constructed rather than evolved. For example an expert system based around a database of legal cases might conceivably be able to make legal judgments with a very limited level of Mind and no sensory input at all. With moral judgments being maybe not so very different.

But I agree that psyreporter's style tends to obscure meaning.

[Pattern-chaser]

But maybe not true of AIs, which are constructed rather than evolved.

Some AIs are built to learn, and this learning is a sort of evolution, taking place in a very constrained context: one AI. ... Or indeed any thinking being that is learning, not just an AI.

[Good_Egg]

My conception of knowing utility is that some being capable of understanding utility has some direct or indirect way of making some broadly quantitative judgment that bears some non-random resemblance to actual utility.

If you think it's meaningful to talk of "actual utility", then it seems pretty clear that you are indeed a utilitarian.

From what you've said, your system appears different from classical utilitarianism only at the point where you're prepared to set aside your utilitarian ethic for the sake of satisfying your own preference for an equal distribution of unpleasantness.

But I could of course be misreading you...

[Leontiskos]

My conception of knowing utility is that some being capable of understanding utility has some direct or indirect way of making some broadly quantitative judgment that bears some non-random resemblance to actual utility.

If you think it's meaningful to talk of "actual utility", then it seems pretty clear that you are indeed a utilitarian.

From what you've said, your system appears different from classical utilitarianism only at the point where you're prepared to set aside your utilitarian ethic for the sake of satisfying your own preference for an equal distribution of unpleasantness.

But I could of course be misreading you...

I agree with Good_Egg. It seems to me that CIN is a utilitarian.

Note that the reason CIN originally preferred the label "consequentialist" to "utilitarian" was because he believed his equality principle was consequentialist but not utilitarian. Yet in time he rejected this belief:

They are not entitled to ignore this fact, because in so doing, they ignore the morally relevant fact that Fred and Bill count equally as moral ends. My current view is that the fact that there are sentient beings capable of experiencing un/pleasantness gives rise to two consequentialist moral principles not one: the principle that we should aim to maximise pleasantness and minimise unpleasantness where possible, and the principle that we should aim to distribute pleasantness and unpleasantness equally.

Why think that your second principle is any more consequentialist than it is utilitarian? It strikes me as an egalitarian principle that is altogether separate from consequentialism, and it is just the sort of thing that would be required to establish objective fault, which I referred to above.

I agree that it isn't a consequentialist principle. I shouldn't have said that it was.

Many consequentialists and utilitarians do accept the equality principle, so accepting it would not seem to disqualify CIN. Given this and the emphasis on pleasure I think "Utilitarian" is the more accurate label.

[psyreporter]

I think, @Sculptor1 , that this can be read as a proposition in Artificial Intelligence. Which says that making a moral judgement is higher up the scale of intelligence - requires a greater level of Mind - than processing sense-data.

No, it is intended to denote that the aspect 'processing' at all (by a brain or 'Mind') cannot have preceded the senses and that a mechanical sensing facility cannot have preceded the potential for sensing (which is moral valuing because it involves the question 'what is good?').

The 'brain in a vat' idea (causally explainable consciousness) would suppose that an empirical cause of moral judgement can have preceded the sense-data. You would need to envision an empirical cause of consciousness to reside within absolute nothingness to suddenly receive a bit of information to magically judge subjectively. It would be a nonsensical idea.

The question intends to indicate that intelligence and moral valuing is a priori in the face of a mechanical sensing facility and that it cannot be explained with an empirical cause. It implies that morality cannot be subjective.

And that it's true of living creatures. That an earwig, for example, can process and respond to sense data whilst entirely lacking the capacity to make moral judgments.

But maybe not true of AIs, which are constructed rather than evolved. For example an expert system based around a database of legal cases might conceivably be able to make legal judgments with a very limited level of Mind and no sensory input at all. With moral judgments being maybe not so very different.

How would you perceive an AI to learn moral judgement? It would imply that morality is merely subjective and that with sufficient empirical knowledge, morality (empathy, love etc) can be 'learned'.

The question intended to denote that the idea that moral judgement can have an empirical cause is nonsensical and that morality cannot be subjective.

The original question: "What can possibly 'say' (figuratively speaking) that it has sensed when it had never sensed?" (how can it be perceived that a living creature can make a subjective moral judgement before it had ever sensed?)

[CIN]

My conception of knowing utility is that some being capable of understanding utility has some direct or indirect way of making some broadly quantitative judgment that bears some non-random resemblance to actual utility.

If you think it's meaningful to talk of "actual utility", then it seems pretty clear that you are indeed a utilitarian.

From what you've said, your system appears different from classical utilitarianism only at the point where you're prepared to set aside your utilitarian ethic for the sake of satisfying your own preference for an equal distribution of unpleasantness.

I think utilitarians do not generally regard equality as an intrinsic good (cf. https://www.utilitarianism.net/objectio ... m/equality). I do, however. Suppose we have a choice between (1) Fred and Bill each experiencing 50 units of pain, and (2) Fred experiencing 95 units while Bill experiences 0 units. Utilitarianism says that (2) is better than (1). I currently hold that neither is objectively better, but I prefer (1) to (2), on the grounds that since the total amounts of net pleasantness in the two scenarios are not much different, it is more important to distribute the net pleasantness fairly than to minimise the total. If the differences were very great, I would take a different view: if, for example, the choice were between (3) Fred and Bill each experiencing 50 units of pain and (4) Fred experiencing 5 units of pain while Bill experiences 0 units, I would say to hell with equality, we should go for (4) because the total pain is very low.

The equality principle, in my view, derives from the fact that since sentient beings capable of un/pleasant experience are always, by virtue of that capability, to be considered ends in themselves, and since it is not obvious that there is any meaning to the idea that one being could be more an end in itself than another, such beings should always be treated equally as ends in themselves. Historically, most people have thought otherwise: for example, most humans throughout history have thought that non-human animals are less to be considered ends in themselves than humans; and in earlier centuries, white people often considered that black people were less to be considered ends in themselves than white people.

We can therefore say that there are two distinct kinds of value to be considered when morally evaluating an action: a net pleasantness moral value (NPMV), and an 'ends in themselves' moral value (EiTMV). If we hold that two individuals can have different EiTMVs, we may think that this is more important when deciding how to act than maximising NPMV: for example, it may be that if I give my child's dinner to the dog, he may get more net pleasantness from eating it than my child, but if I think that my child is more to be considered a moral end than my dog, then I will nevertheless think that I should give the dinner to my child rather than to the dog.

In cases where there seems no reason to think that one being's EiTMV differs from another, it seems reasonable to think that net pleasantness should be shared equally between them. This is the equality principle. Cutting across this is the utilitarian principle that we should act so as to maximise net pleasantness across all affected individuals. This leads to a moral dilemma: how, when the requirements of NPMV and EiTMV conflict, are we to choose between them? The difference between me and standard utilitarians is that utilitarians adopt strategies which are supposed to subordinate and assimilate EiTMV to NPMV, which they regard as more important. I consider that their relative importance varies from scenario to scenario, and as I have not so far managed to find any objective principle that explains this, I am forced to conclude that the choice between the two principles is necessarily subjective, with the result that while morality is partly objective, it cannot be wholly so.

[Good_Egg]

In cases where there seems no reason to think that one being's EiTMV differs from another, it seems reasonable to think that net pleasantness should be shared equally between them. This is the equality principle.

I don't see your reasoning here. If your utilometer captures all the aspects of pleasure and pain involved, then if Fred and Bill have the same EiTMV then it seems to me that logically implies that we should be indifferent to whether any util of wellbeing occurs to one of them or the other. Because the logic of these assumptions obliges us to treat a util to Fred and a util to Bill as having equal weight.

Your sense of fairness isn't happy with that. You feel moral outrage at the unfairness of Fred getting 95 utils today and Bill getting 0.

But would you feel differently if you learned that Bill got 600 utils yesterday ?

I am forced to conclude that the choice between the two principles is necessarily subjective, with the result that while morality is partly objective, it cannot be wholly so.

I commend to your consideration the possibility that your subjective sense of fairness doesn't correspond with anything objective at all.

In evidence for that, I suggest that by shifting the focus between a narrow concentration on the present transaction and a broad assessment of what has happened to Fred and Bill over their lifetimes, your sense of fairness can be induced to increase or decrease (and maybe even reverse) its objection to any inequality of outcome today.

[CIN]

In cases where there seems no reason to think that one being's EiTMV differs from another, it seems reasonable to think that net pleasantness should be shared equally between them. This is the equality principle.

I don't see your reasoning here. If your utilometer captures all the aspects of pleasure and pain involved,

What do you mean by 'all the aspects'? That is vague.

then if Fred and Bill have the same EiTMV then it seems to me that logically implies that we should be indifferent to whether any util of wellbeing occurs to one of them or the other.

If we treat person A better than person B, then we are behaving as if A had more entitlement to be treated as a moral end than B, and if in fact they have the same entitlement, then we are behaving immorally. I don't think I can put this any more plainly.

Because the logic of these assumptions obliges us to treat a util to Fred and a util to Bill as having equal weight.

Of course. But we are not talking about the weight of each individual util, we are comparing the quantity of utils assigned to each of the two people.

Your sense of fairness isn't happy with that. You feel moral outrage at the unfairness of Fred getting 95 utils today and Bill getting 0.

But would you feel differently if you learned that Bill got 600 utils yesterday ?

Yes, but that's because you're now changing my unstated assumption that the utils I mentioned are all the utils there are. Obviously if we add more utils, whether over time or not, that makes a difference to the moral position.

I am forced to conclude that the choice between the two principles is necessarily subjective, with the result that while morality is partly objective, it cannot be wholly so.

I commend to your consideration the possibility that your subjective sense of fairness doesn't correspond with anything objective at all.

In evidence for that, I suggest that by shifting the focus between a narrow concentration on the present transaction and a broad assessment of what has happened to Fred and Bill over their lifetimes, your sense of fairness can be induced to increase or decrease (and maybe even reverse) its objection to any inequality of outcome today.

As I've implied in my answer to your previous point, we should consider all the utils over time when making a moral decision. This, of course, is impossible, since humans are not omniscient. But that is what would be morally required if we could do it. It is, for example, what is morally required of God.

[Leontiskos]

I think utilitarians do not generally regard equality as an intrinsic good (cf. https://www.utilitarianism.net/objectio ... m/equality). I do, however. Suppose we have a choice between (1) Fred and Bill each experiencing 50 units of pain, and (2) Fred experiencing 95 units while Bill experiences 0 units. Utilitarianism says that (2) is better than (1). I currently hold that neither is objectively better, but I prefer (1) to (2), on the grounds that since the total amounts of net pleasantness in the two scenarios are not much different, it is more important to distribute the net pleasantness fairly than to minimise the total. If the differences were very great, I would take a different view: if, for example, the choice were between (3) Fred and Bill each experiencing 50 units of pain and (4) Fred experiencing 5 units of pain while Bill experiences 0 units, I would say to hell with equality, we should go for (4) because the total pain is very low.

The equality principle, in my view, derives from the fact that since sentient beings capable of un/pleasant experience are always, by virtue of that capability, to be considered ends in themselves, and since it is not obvious that there is any meaning to the idea that one being could be more an end in itself than another, such beings should always be treated equally as ends in themselves. Historically, most people have thought otherwise: for example, most humans throughout history have thought that non-human animals are less to be considered ends in themselves than humans; and in earlier centuries, white people often considered that black people were less to be considered ends in themselves than white people.

We can therefore say that there are two distinct kinds of value to be considered when morally evaluating an action: a net pleasantness moral value (NPMV), and an 'ends in themselves' moral value (EiTMV). If we hold that two individuals can have different EiTMVs, we may think that this is more important when deciding how to act than maximising NPMV: for example, it may be that if I give my child's dinner to the dog, he may get more net pleasantness from eating it than my child, but if I think that my child is more to be considered a moral end than my dog, then I will nevertheless think that I should give the dinner to my child rather than to the dog.

First, I think this revised approach is better distinguished from the "instrumental benefits" view explained in your link, than your previous approach.

Second, and as our conversation bore out, you seem to be confusing yourself with the language, "end in themselves." What you depict could be described as an equal value principle or an equal weighting of moral ends, but not as "ends in themselves." The moral agents in your system are moral ends of equal value, not ends in themselves. If they really were ends in themselves then they could not be sacrificed for the sake of further ends (and treated as means). Since you believe they can be treated as means, they are not "ends in themselves" (as that term has been understood since Kant). It would be a whole lot easier to simply say that they are all equal in value and deserve equal treatment.

In cases where there seems no reason to think that one being's EiTMV differs from another, it seems reasonable to think that net pleasantness should be shared equally between them. This is the equality principle.

I don't see your reasoning here. If your utilometer captures all the aspects of pleasure and pain involved, then if Fred and Bill have the same EiTMV then it seems to me that logically implies that we should be indifferent to whether any util of wellbeing occurs to one of them or the other. Because the logic of these assumptions obliges us to treat a util to Fred and a util to Bill as having equal weight.

In my opinion equality should just be baked into CIN's Utilitarian principle (if it isn't already being done so subconsciously). Apparently CIN sees equal treatment as pleasant and unequal treatment as unpleasant, and he does not see the equality principle as overriding the "pleasantness" principle in all cases. So it's not clear why the pleasantness that equal treatment brings is not precisely what the equality principle is based upon.

[Good_Egg]

If your utilometer captures all the aspects of pleasure and pain involved...

What do you mean by 'all the aspects'? That is vague.

What I'm trying to get at is this.

There is an argument for equality from within the utilitarian paradigm. It says something like:
"It is worse for Fred to suffer a 95 util penalty whilst seeing Bill get off with a 0 util penalty than it is for Fred to suffer the same penalty in isolation. Taking this into account, a second-round estimate of the utilities of unequal punishment might give a value of 105 utils.
Showing that an equal distribution maximizes overall wellbeing and is therefore what every person of goodwill should choose".

You've made it clear that this is not your position. It isn't mine either. And Fred might not be that sort of person...

But I felt (perhaps wrongly) that it was worth clarifying that we're talking about utils as the result of a fully-converged calculus of utility which takes all such "disutilities from perceived inequality" into account.

then if Fred and Bill have the same EiTMV then it seems to me that logically implies that we should be indifferent to whether any util of wellbeing occurs to one of them or the other.

If we treat person A better than person B, then we are behaving as if A had more entitlement to be treated as a moral end than B, and if in fact they have the same entitlement, then we are behaving immorally.

Between us we've come up with three different notions of equality:
A) equality of consideration - a util to Fred and a util to Bill have as a matter of principle equal weight and therefore all distributions are equally good.
B) equality of outcome today - the principle that whatever pleasure or pain arises out of the matter currently being considered should be equally shared
C) equality of outcome over a lifetime - the principle that the distribution of pleasure and pain today should seek to offset any differential in past accumulated experience of pleasure or pain.

The idea that Fred and Bill have the same moral value is an argument for A).

The argument you make seems to be an argument for B)
But it's hard to tell because "treat equally" is ambiguous.

As an argument for B) it is false. And the easiest way to see that is to note that getting Bill and Fred to toss a coin for who gets the 95 utils is ensuring that today's outcome is unequal, but it is not treating either as having greater entitlement to be a moral end than the other.

...we should consider all the utils over time when making a moral decision. This, of course, is impossible, since humans are not omniscient. But that is what would be morally required if we could do it. It is, for example, what is morally required of God.

So you've chosen to argue for type C) equality. Presumably because that's what satisfies your sense of fairness.

Despite the fact that it violates your stated principle.

Once you know that Bill had a really bad day yesterday, your sympathy is with him. Your sense of fairness leads you to feel it moral that today's distribution should favour Bill, because of how much he has already suffered.

In doing that you cease to treat Fred as a moral end. He becomes merely something to be used to gratify your sense of what a right distribution should be.

I admire the clarity of your writing. But cannot agree with your logic or your conclusion.

[adam1701z]

It seems like a difficult question, but honestly what about something like rape. Isint that wrong in any world? or under what circumstances could rape be justified?

[LuckyR]

It seems like a difficult question, but honestly what about something like rape. Isint that wrong in any world? or under what circumstances could rape be justified?

Well every one knows there are individuals (rapists) who include rape in their moral code. What many don't appreciate is that there have been groups/societies in history where rape was part of the ethical standard. Thus rape is and has been both moral and ethical (in limited cases).

Having said that, it doesn't make it "right" or "justified".

[adam1701z]

That's not really the question. Even if Germany would win WWII it still wouldnt justify what the Nazis did. The question is not whether any society felt what is moral or not. It is whether there are eternal truths. Rape or torturing babies surely can come under something as an immoral act? At any given time? No?

[LuckyR]

That's not really the question. Even if Germany would win WWII it still wouldnt justify what the Nazis did. The question is not whether any society felt what is moral or not. It is whether there are eternal truths. Rape or torturing babies surely can come under something as an immoral act? At any given time? No?

Justify to whom? You are brushing aside the opinions of rapists and Nazis in favor of... whom ? An unamed arbiter of right and wrong? You? Me? This thread has focused on the reality that morals (and separately ethics) are subjective, hence the falsehood of the "eternal", in the title.

[Sculptor1]

I would like to believe there are eternal moral truths and a moral order. That are actions in this life matter and that no evil can become of a good man. But sometimes I wonder if moral truths are just made up by man and passed down through tradition. But deep down I do believe that things like "always helping a person in need" is a moral truth or good that all people should ascribe to.

It's amazing how many times this question crops up and in many different forms.
It's not even a meaningful question.
How could this even be a possibility?
We know that the human species has a limited biography, and that the human beast seems to be the only living thing that has the capacity to ask this question.
So if there is an eternal truth, then what sustained that truth before humans ,and what sustains it in the absence of humans?
A "moral truth" is a judgement upon certain actions and interactions of conscious entities or upon how conscious entities could be affected by those actions. Judgements are not true or false but rely on criteria; track back the criteria- what sustains them?
What amazes me more is the obsessive nature of those that want to argue for this, but refuse to see the most basic flaws in their arguments.
Yes, we might want to believe in certain morals, and we can pat ourselves on the back when we find a person that agrees with our moral "truth", but that is as far as it goes.

Let's look at this rather amusing attempt to posit a eternal moral truth...
But deep down I do believe that things like "always helping a person in need" is a moral truth or good that all people should ascribe to.
Now I ask you in all seriousness... How many times have you ignored; walked by; or refused to engage with a beggar on the street?
When given the chance to donate to "Children in Need" on TV have you switched channels, or just switched of your mind?
There is no way any one person can possibly sustain this "moral truth".
And it usually boils down to helping a friend.
Even then there are circumstances in mitigation. They say a friend will helo you move, but on a great friend will hwlp you move a body.
All morality is about mitigation, context, relativism and subjectivity.
There is nothing eternal about morals as there is nothing eternal about human society.